In Re Frances Spanos Shelton v. the State of Texas

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed as Moot and Memorandum and
Concurring Opinions filed April 3, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00152-CV

IN RE FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
414th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-3035-5

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur in the dismissal of Relator Fran Spanos Shelton’s mandamus petition,
but there is a more pressing reason requiring this Court to dismiss. Shelton filed her
mandamus petition in this Court after her interlocutory appeal was transferred from
the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket
equalization powers. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 73.001(a). But the Texas Government
Code extends our writ power only to matters falling within our “exclusive
intermediate appellate jurisdiction,” Id. § 22.221(c-1), and neither her appeal nor her
mandamus does so. Further, an examination of the relevant statutes and the appellate
rules would show that our writ jurisdiction is not the same as the jurisdiction granted
by a docket equalization transfer. Consequently, although I agree that our denial of
relief for the appeal would in theory moot the mandamus petition, I would instead
dismiss because we lack writ power over the petition.

Like the other intermediate appellate courts in Texas, this Court finds its grant
of writ power in section 22.221 of the Government Code. Id. § 22.221(a). Normally,
writ power is limited to the particular district over which a court of appeals presides.
Id. § 22.221(b). But because this Court’s “district is statewide,” In re Dallas Cnty.,
697 S.W.3d 142, 159 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding), our writ power is instead
limited to “matters over which the court has exclusive intermediate appellate
jurisdiction under subsection 22.220(d).” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(c-1).
Subsection 22.220(d) lists certain civil matters that lie within our “exclusive
intermediate appellate jurisdiction,” along with a catch-all provision in (d)(3) for
“any other matter as provided by law.” Id. § 22.220(d). Absent from this list is any
mention of a matter transferred under Chapter 73.

Chapter 73 grants the Texas Supreme Court the discretionary power of docket
equalization, in which it “may order cases transferred from one court of appeals to
another at any time that, in the opinion of the supreme court, there is good cause for
the transfer.” Id. § 73.001. While the Texas Supreme Court may transfer a case from
one court of appeals to the Fifteenth, this does not apply vice versa, meaning that a
case properly filed in this Court cannot be transferred to another court of appeals
“for the purpose of equalizing the dockets.” Id. § 73.001(b). Further, section 73.002
expressly conveys the Legislature’s grant of jurisdiction for docket equalization
transfers, stating that “[t]he court of appeals to which a case is transferred has
jurisdiction of the case without regard to the district in which the case originally was

2
tried and to which it is returnable on appeal.” Id. § 73.002(a).

But section 73.002’s grant of “jurisdiction” for purposes of docket
equalization should not be read as a grant of “exclusive intermediate appellate
jurisdiction” when cases are transferred to the Fifteenth Court. Id. § 22.221(c-1).
Texas courts are bound by the text of the statute itself, and our interpretive power
does not allow us to add words that the Legislature did not include. See In re D.S.,
602 S.W.3d 504, 514 (Tex. 2020) (“In construing a statute, we assume the
Legislature chose statutory language with care, included each chosen word for a
purpose, and purposefully omitted all other words.”); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger,
381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012) (“[T]his Court presumes the Legislature
deliberately and purposefully selects words and phrases it enacts, as well as
deliberately and purposefully omits words and phrases it does not enact.”).

The text of the Government Code is clear: our writ power is limited to cases
within our “exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction.” Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 22.221(c-1). On the other hand, a court of appeals that receives a case by a
discretionary equalization transfer merely “has jurisdiction of the case.” Id.
§ 73.002(a). The words “exclusive,” “intermediate,” and “appellate” in subsection
22.221(c-1) are not to be glossed over, and we must consider the significance of
these words’ absence. See Centerpoint Builders, GP, LLC v. Trussway Ltd., 496
S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tex. 2016) (“‘[W]e must attempt to give effect to every word and
phrase,’ and we may not omit or gloss over verbiage in an attempt to reclaim clarity.”
(quoting Abrams v. Jones, 35 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Tex. 2000))). It follows that the
“jurisdiction” granted by the Legislature for docket equalization (our “equalization
jurisdiction”) must be read as separate and distinct from the “exclusive intermediate
appellate jurisdiction” (our “exclusive jurisdiction”) necessary for our writ power.

Relator Shelton made this point in her appeal by citing Kelley v. Homminga,

3
which stated that “the relevant statutes authorize the Fifteenth Court to hear
(1) appeals and writs within the court’s exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction,
and (2) appeals we transfer into the court to equalize the courts of appeals’ dockets.”
706 S.W.3d 829, 830 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court also stated
that the appeals before the Court did not fall into “either category” in reference to
these two prongs, id., implying that jurisdiction may be granted for docket
equalization apart from this court’s “exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction.”
Thus, Homminga appears to clearly distinguish our exclusive jurisdiction from our
equalization jurisdiction.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27a likewise recognizes that our two
buckets of properly exercised appellate jurisdiction—exclusive jurisdiction cases
and docket-equalization cases—are distinct. 1 Chapter 73 of the Government Code
authorizes the Texas Supreme Court to adopt rules for transfers either to or from this
Court based on whether the case falls within our exclusive jurisdiction.2 Tex. Gov’t
Code § 73.001(c). The Texas Supreme Court did so by adopting Rule 27a,
Homminga, 706 S.W.3d at 832, which applies to appeals “(A) taken to the Fifteenth
Court of Appeals that are not within the Fifteenth Court of Appeals’ exclusive

1
In addition, this Court itself has distinguished its exclusive jurisdiction from its equalization
jurisdiction. See Williams v. MMP Properties, LLC, No. 15-24-00105-CV, 2025 WL 1909795, at
*2 n.2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist., no pet) (mem. op.) (“Because this case was transferred as being
within the exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction of the Fifteenth Court of Appeals, and not
for docket equalization, we are not bound by Rule 41.3 in deciding today's case.”).
2
Specifically, subsection 73.001(c) states: “The supreme court shall adopt rules for:
(1) transferring an appeal inappropriately filed in the Fifteenth Court of Appeals to a court of
appeals with jurisdiction over the appeal; and (2) transferring to the Fifteenth Court of Appeals
from another court of appeals the appeals over which the Fifteenth Court of Appeals has exclusive
intermediate appellate jurisdiction under subsection 22.220(d).” Tex. Gov. Code § 73.001(c). And
as the Texas Supreme Court stated in Homminga, “[w]hen appeals regarding matters falling
outside this jurisdiction are noticed to the Fifteenth Court, they are ‘inappropriately filed’ and must
be transferred.” Homminga, 706 S.W.3d at 833.

4
intermediate appellate jurisdiction; or (B) taken to a regional court of appeals
and over which the Fifteenth Court of Appeals has exclusive intermediate appellate
jurisdiction.” Tex. R. App. P. 27a(b)(1). Notably, Rule 27a “does not apply to
appeals transferred by the Supreme Court for good cause, including for docket
equalization purposes.” Id. R. 27a(b)(2). By adopting rules that apply to our
exclusive jurisdiction, but not our equalization jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme
Court clearly recognizes the two as separate and distinct jurisdictions.

In addition, though subsection 73.001(a) of the Government Code allows for
equalization transfers, it prohibits transfers of cases “properly filed” in the Fifteenth
Court (i.e., within our exclusive jurisdiction) “for the purpose of equalizing the
dockets of the court of appeals.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 73.001(a)–(b); Homminga, 706
S.W.3d at 833 (“Considering the legislation as a whole, we conclude that the most
natural meaning of ‘properly filed’ cases that may not be transferred is supplied
by subsection 22.220(d), which defines the matters over which the Fifteenth Court
has ‘exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction.’”). If the jurisdiction granted
through equalization transfer was included in our exclusive jurisdiction, the
Government Code and appellate rules would be difficult to reconcile. Rather, our
aim should be to interpret the statutory scheme in a way that “harmonizes all its
provisions into a cohesive whole.” Homminga, 706 S.W.3d at 834.

Simply put, we may not conflate these two types of jurisdiction when the
Government Code and the appellate rules do not. Consequently, our writ power
cannot extend to both unless the Legislature clearly intended it to do so. See Combs
v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., 422 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2013) (“When
construing a statute, our chief objective is effectuating the Legislature’s intent, and
ordinarily, the truest manifestation of what lawmakers intended is what they
enacted.”).

5
Though our “district is statewide,” In re Dallas Cnty., 697 S.W.3d at 159, and
we are authorized to hear certain transfer cases, the Fifteenth Court of Appeals is
ultimately a court of limited jurisdiction. The Legislature spoke clearly in limiting
our writ power to cases falling within our “exclusive intermediate appellate
jurisdiction.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(c-1); see Homminga, 706 S.W.3d at 831
(noting that this Court’s writ jurisdiction is “much more limited” than the other
courts of appeals). Consequently, I would caution against entertaining any attempt
to expand this Court’s writ jurisdiction without a clear and exact legislative grant.
This caution is all the more necessary given Texas courts’ strict view on mandamus
remedies. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
(“Mandamus is intended to be an extraordinary remedy, available only in limited
circumstances.”). As such, I would dismiss for lack of writ jurisdiction over the
mandamus petition.

/s/ April Farris
April Farris
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

6

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed as Moot and Memorandum and
Concurring Opinions filed April 3, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00152-CV

IN RE FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
414th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-3035-5

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Frances “Fran” Spanos Shelton filed a petition for writ of mandamus that
raises the same issues as those in her interlocutory appeal from an order appointing
a receiver, which we have rejected today in a memorandum opinion.1 Fran says she
filed the petition because of “counsel’s fear that [this] Court could resolve the
interlocutory appeal without granting mandamus relief to remedy the void nature

1
See Shelton v. Leuschner, No. 15-25-00072-CV (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Apr. 3, 2026).
of the county court at law’s orders.” In the interlocutory appeal, we have rejected
that argument because “the district court’s order appointing a receiver is not
predicated on any part of a prior county court at law order.”
When a party files both an interlocutory appeal and a petition for mandamus
seeking the same relief on the same grounds, if an appellate grants or denies one it
should dismiss the other as moot. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Yarbrough,
405 S.W.3d 70, 82 (Tex. 2013) (dismissing petition for mandamus as moot after
granting relief in related interlocutory appeal); In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196
S.W.3d 774, 784 (Tex. 2006) (dismissing interlocutory appeal as moot after
granting relief in related mandamus proceeding). Having denied relief on the issues
Fran presented in the interlocutory appeal, we dismiss her duplicative mandamus
petition as moot.2

/s/ Scott A. Brister
Scott A. Brister
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. (Farris, J.,
concurring).

2
Soon after Fran filed her mandamus petition, Real Parties filed a motion to stay it. We
dismiss the motion as moot.

2