Robert Edward Battaile v. Texas Elections Division, Hon. Jane Nelson; Texas Secretary of State; Jeffrey Travillion, Travis County Commissioner

ACCEPTED
15-25-00142-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/31/2025 9:57 AM
No. 15-25-00142-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK

In the Court of Appeals FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifteenth Judicial District AUSTIN, TEXAS
______________________________ 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
R OBERT E DWARD B ATTAILE ,
Appellant,
v.

T EXAS E LECTIONS D IVISION ; H ON . J ANE N ELSON ; T EXAS S ECRETARY
OF S TATE , ET AL .,
Appellee.
______________________________

On Appeal from the 459th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas
Honorable Jan Soifer Presiding
______________________________

JOINT APPELLEES’ BRIEF FOR TEXAS SECRETARY OF
STATE JANE NELSON AND TRAVIS COUNTY
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY TRAVILLION
______________________________

1
KEN PAXTON Roy Adams
Attorney General of Texas Texas Bar No. 24133175
BRENT WEBSTER Assistant Attorney General
First Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA General Litigation Division
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
AUSTIN KINGHORN Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Deputy Attorney General for Litigation (512) 475-4104 | Fax: (512) 320-
KIMBERLY GDULA 0667
Chief, General Litigation Division roy.adams@oag.texas.gov
COUNSEL FOR SEC. OF STATE
DELIA GARZA
County Attorney, Travis County Cynthia W. Veidt
P. O. Box 1748 State Bar No. 24028092
Austin, Texas 78767 cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov
Telephone: (512) 854-9513 Patrick M. Kelly
Facsimile: (512) 854-4808 State Bar No. 11228000
pat.kelly@traviscountytx.gov
COUNSEL FOR TRAVIS CNTY.
COMM’R JEFFREY TRAVILLION

ORAL ARGUMENT IS CONDITIONALLY REQUESTED

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Pursuant to Rule 38.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Appellees herein provide this Court with the following list of parties and the

names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel:

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Edward Battaile
Pro se
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant (trial and
appeal)

2
Defendant-Appellee Texas Elections Division; Hon. Jane
Nelson; Texas Secretary of State, et al.
Attorney for Defendant -
Roy Adams
Appellee (trial and appeal)
Office of the Attorney General
General Litigation Division
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Phone (512) 475-4104
Fax (512) 320-0667
roy.adams@oag.texas.gov

Defendant-Appellee Travis County Commissioner Jeffrey
Travillion
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellee (trial and appeal) Cynthia W. Veidt
cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov
Patrick M. Kelly
pat.kelly@traviscountytx.gov
Assistant Travis County Attorneys
Travis County Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 1748
Austin, Texas 78767
Phone: (512) 854-9513
Fax (512) 854-4808

3
TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................... 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................ 4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................. 13

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENTS................................. 13

ISSUES PRESENTED (RESTATED) ....................................................... 14

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................... 14

STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................... 16

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS........................................................ 18

ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... 19

I. The Trial Court’s Judgment Regarding Appellees Should Be

Affirmed Because Battaile Waived Review of The Reasons for Dismissal.

19

II. Battaile Lacked Standing to Bring Claims Against Appellees. ........... 23

A. There is No Judiciable Controversy Between Battaile and Either

Appellee................................................................................................. 23

B. Battaile Fails to Establish Traceability. ........................................... 25

4
C. Battaile Fails to Establish Redressability. ........................................ 26

D. Battaile Cannot Assert Third Party Rights. ..................................... 28

III. Appellees Have Sovereign Immunity From Battaile’s Claims. ....... 30

1. Secretary Nelson is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity. ................. 30

2. Commissioner Travillion is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity

and/or Legislative Immunity. ............................................................ 31

3. Battaile Fails to Identify Any Waiver of Sovereign and/or

Legislative Immunity. ........................................................................ 32

D. Battaile’s Failure to Comply with Section 233.006(b)’s Thirty-Day

Deadline is a Fatal Jurisdictional Defect.................................................. 34

PRAYER .................................................................................................. 37

Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................... 39

5
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Barham v. Turner Constr. Co. of Tex.,

803 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) ....................... 13

Britton v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice,

95 S.W.3d 676 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) .............. 17

Brooks v. Mass Mktg., Ltd.,

No. 03-07-00658-CV, 2010 WL 1404739 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 6,

2010, pet. denied) ................................................................................ 15

Bullock v. Calvert,

480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1972) ................................................................. 21

City of El Paso v. Heinrich,

284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ............................................................... 28

City of Houston v. Bryant,

516 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) ...... 31

Concerned Cnty. Involved Dev., Inc. v City of Houston,

209 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)26

Dallas Cnty. Mental Health v. Bossley,

968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998).................................................................27

Equistar Chems., LP v. ClydeUnion DB, Ltd.,

579 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). 17

6
Eriksen v. Nelson

No. 15-24-00059-CV, 2025 WL 351632 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Jan. 30,

2025) .................................................................................................... 31

Escondido Res. II, LLC v. Las Tinajas Minerals, Ltd.,

No. 04-20-00132-CV, 2020 WL 7753986 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec.

30, 2020, no pet.) ................................................................................. 15

Grant v. Espiritu,

470 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) ............................ 25

Hampton v. Equity Tr. Co.,

607 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied) ...................... 15, 17

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,

369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex.2012) ................................................................. 26

Herring v. Houston Nat’l Exch. Bank,

253 S.W.3d 813 (Tex.1923) ................................................................. 28

Huey v. Huey,

200 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).............................. 14

In re A.B.,

267 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)............................. 24

In re C.D.E.,

533 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)....... 24

7
In re C.J.M.S.,

269 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) ......................................... 24

In re Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice,

710 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) .............................................. 26

Irisson v. Lone Star Nat’l Bank,

No. 13-19-00239-CV, 2020 WL 6343336 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi—

Edinburg Oct. 29, 2020, no pet.) ......................................................... 14

Kowalski v. Tesmer,

543 U.S. 125 (2004) ............................................................................ 26

Lane v. Ross,

151 Tex. 268 (1952) .............................................................................. 21

Loya Ins. Co. v. Avalos,

610 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2020) ............................................................... 20

Maldonado v. Johnson,

No. 04-18-00599-CV, 2018 WL 4517551 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept.

21, 2018, no pet.) ................................................................................. 33

Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt,

373 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) ....................... 14

Marshall v. Maropco, Inc.,

714 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, pet. filed) ....... 13

8
Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd.,

548 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2018) ..................................................... 13, 20, 23

Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,

372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) .................................................................27

Neeley v. West Orange–Cove CISD,

176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005) ................................................................ 26

Nichols v. Seei,

97 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) .............................. 32

Nueces Cnty. v. Ferguson,

97 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ................. 28

Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist.,

441 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) .............. 32

Oliphant Fin. LLC v. Angiano,

295 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).............................. 17

Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas,

197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................ 28

Rivas v. Pitts,

684 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. granted) ..................... 17

S.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist.,

435 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.).................. 15, 17

9
Salazar v. Gonzales,

931 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ)............. 33, 34

Sepulveda v. Medrano,

323 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) ............................. 34

Skelton v. Yates,

119 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1938) ................................................................... 33

Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc.,

106 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) ... 13

Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,

233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................27

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,

852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993)................................................................ 25

Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Miller,

51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001) .................................................................. 29

Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust,

354 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011) ................................................................ 26

Velzer v. ZB, Nat’l Ass’n,

No. 01-19-00161-CV, 2019 WL 6204909 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Nov. 21, 2019, pet. denied) ................................................................... 14

Ward v. Ward,

10
No. 12-11-00368-CV, 2012 WL 2513668 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 29, 2012,

no pet.) ................................................................................................. 15

Weatherly v. Fulgham,

153 Tex. 481 (1954)............................................................................... 21

Weiderman v. City of Arlington,

480 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied) ................ 23

Zamarron v. Shinko Wire Co., Ltd.,

125 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003 pet. denied) ... 19

Zurita v. Lombana,

322 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010 pet. denied) ... 19

Statutes

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(2) .............................................. 29

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3)(B) & (D) ............................... 29

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021 ................................................... 29

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.052 ................................................... 29

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.055 ................................................... 29

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.056 ................................................... 29

Tex. Elec. Code § 232.007 ...................................................................... 33

Tex. Elec. Code § 232.008(c)(2) ........................................................32, 33

Tex. Elec. Code § 233.006(b) ............................................................ 31, 32

11
Tex. Elec. Code § 67.003(c) .................................................................... 32

Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c) ................................................................... 24

Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 31.045, 31.166 ........................................................... 21

Tex. Gov't Code § 22.220(d) ................................................................... 25

Tex. Gov't Code § 22.221(c-1) ................................................................. 25

Tex. Gov't Code § 311.034........................................................................27

Tex. Gov't Code §§ 22.220, 22.221 ....................................................24, 25

Tex. Transp. Code § 451.052(c) .............................................................. 28

Rules

TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ........................................................................... 24

TEX. CONST. ART. IV, § 21 ......................................................................... 21

TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 and 21 ...............................................................27

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) .............................................................................. 19

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) .............................................................................. 13

12
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Although Battaile loosely identifies numerous
causes of action, the substance of his appeal
challenges the outcome of a mayoral election
that he lost. He alleges that the election was
affected by fraud and contends that the Texas
Secretary of State, as the chief elections officer,
has a duty to overturn the results of that
election. Battaile further complains about
discretionary decisions made by various
government officials, including but not limited
to Travis County Commissioner Jeffrey
Travillion, but lacks standing to challenge such
decisions and has failed to articulate any viable
waiver of immunity by which the trial court and
this Court may exercise jurisdiction over such
claims.

Trial Court: Cause No. D-1-GN-25-00719
Honorable Jan Soifer
459th District Court
Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court granted the Texas Secretary of
State’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissed
the case with prejudice. CR 550. The trial court
also granted Travis County Commissioner
Jeffrey Travillion’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and
Chapter 13 Motion to Dismiss and dismissed
the case with prejudice. CR 552.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENTS

In his Brief, Battaile requests oral arguments. Appellees do not believe

that oral arguments will assist the Court. The jurisdictional issues involve

black-letter principles that will not benefit from argument. Appellees

13
therefore respectfully ask that this Court deny oral argument and set the case

for submission on the briefs as quickly as the Court’s docket will allow. But if

the Court grants oral arguments, Appellees ask to participate.

ISSUES PRESENTED (RESTATED)

I. The trial court’s judgment regarding the Texas Secretary of State

(“Secretary Nelson”) and Travis County Commissioner Jeffrey

Travillion (“Commissioner Travillion”) should be affirmed because

Battaile waived review of the reasons for dismissal.

II. Battaile lacked standing to bring claims against Secretary Nelson and

Commissioner Travillion.

III. Secretary Nelson and Commissioner Travillion have sovereign

immunity from Battaile’s claims. Commissioner Travillion is also

entitled to legislative and/or official immunity from Battaile’s claims.

IV. Battaile failed to comply with the statutory 30-day deadline required

to contest the City of Manor mayoral election results.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal arises from the trial court’s dismissal of Battaile’s election

contest challenging the results of the November 5, 2024 City of Manor

mayoral and city council elections. App. Brief at 6; CR. 26, 34.1 Battaile was

1 References to the Clerk’s Record filed on August 19, 2025, in the Third District Court of Appeals are

14
a candidate for mayor. CR. 49, 53. After losing the election, he sought to void

and set aside the election results for Mayor and City Council Places 1, 3, and

5. CR. 164-67. Battaile further contended that Texas Secretary of State Jane

Nelson possessed authority to overturn the election results. Id. at 36, 39, 42,

476, 573. After a hearing on the Secretary’s Plea to the Jurisdiction [CR 210-

222]], the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case with prejudice

for lack of jurisdiction. RR.2 at 23: 9-25; 24: 1-2. CR. 550.

In the trial court, Battaile filed suit pursuant to a Statement of Inability

to Afford Payment of Court Costs. CR. 8-20. Battaile’s claims concerning

Commissioner Travillion involved his disagreement with the

Commissioner’s legislative decisions as a single member of the Travis County

Commissioners Court and the Capital Metro Board of Directors. See CR. 451-

475 at 451-454 (citing portions of CR. 33-172). The trial court dismissed

Battaile’s claims with prejudice both for lack of jurisdiction and because the

claims were groundless and without merit under Chapter 13 of the Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code. CR. 552. On appeal, Battaile complains

about the actions of numerous government officials that he deems “Real

Parties in Interest”, including Commissioner Travillion. App. Brief at 4.

However, the only substantive reference to Commissioner Travillion, Travis

included as “CR.” References to the Supplemental Clerk’s Record filed on October 3, 2025, in the Fifteenth
District Court of Appeals are included as “SCR.”

15
County, or Capital Metro is Battaile’s requested “Transit/Cap Metro/Travis

County Relief”. Id. at 13. Therefore, Battaile has not addressed any of the

grounds for dismissal asserted in Commissioner Travillion’s Plea to the

Jurisdiction and Chapter 13 Motion to Dismiss. CR. 451-475.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Appellate courts reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction review the trial court’s ruling de novo.” Meyers v.

JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Tex. 2018).

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that an appellant’s

brief “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Marshall v. Maropco,

Inc., 714 S.W.3d 724, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, pet. filed);

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). “This is not done by merely uttering brief conclusory

statements, unsupported by legal citations.” Id. (citing Tesoro Petroleum

Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); see also Barham v. Turner Constr.

Co. of Tex., 803 S.W.2d 731, 740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied)

(appellant bears burden of discussing his assertions of error).

“The failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite

appropriate authority or the record waives a complaint on appeal.” Id. (citing

16
Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2011, no pet.); Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2006, no pet.); see also Irisson v. Lone Star Nat’l Bank, No. 13-19-

00239-CV, 2020 WL 6343336, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi—

Edinburg Oct. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When an appellant’s brief fails

to contain clear and concise argument for the contentions made with

appropriate citations to authorities, the appellate court is not responsible for

doing the legal research that might support a party’s contentions.”).

Additionally, it is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a

party waives error on appeal by failing to adequately brief all of the potential

grounds for a trial court’s orders. If an appellant’s opening brief fails to

address a ground for dismissal that was actually raised in a motion, and thus

could potentially be the basis for the trial court’s order, the party waives any

error with respect to dismissal on that basis. Texas appellate courts

uniformly apply this fundamental rule of appellate review. See, e.g., Velzer

v. ZB, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 01-19-00161-CV, 2019 WL 6204909, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Escondido Res.

II, LLC v. Las Tinajas Minerals, Ltd., No. 04-20-00132-CV, 2020 WL

7753986, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 30, 2020, no pet.); Ward v.

Ward, No. 12-11-00368-CV, 2012 WL 2513668, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler June

17
29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); S.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Arlington Indep. Sch.

Dist., 435 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.); Hampton

v. Equity Tr. Co., 607 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied).

Brooks v. Mass Mktg., Ltd., No. 03-07-00658-CV, 2010 WL 1404739, at *2

& n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 6, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Both of these waiver principles apply to Battaile’s brief and mandate

that the Court affirm the dismissal orders irrespective of the merits.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

This appeal should be dismissed because Battaile fails on jurisdictional

and substantive grounds.

First, Battaile lacks standing. His pleadings and Brief identify no

specific act or omission by Secretary Nelson or Commissioner Travillion that

creates a justiciable controversy.

Second, as an officer of the Executive Department, the Secretary is

protected by sovereign immunity, and jurisdiction over such claims lies

exclusively with the Supreme Court of Texas. Similarly, Commissioner

Travillion, an elected official who performs legislative duties as a member of

two governmental entities–specifically, the Travis County Commissioners

Court and the Board of Directors for Capital Metro–is protected by both

sovereign and legislative immunity for actions that relate to his discretionary

18
decisions.

Finally, the Election Code bars this suit because a petition contesting

an election must be filed within thirty days of the election.2 Because the

election contest was untimely and jurisdictionally barred, it must be

dismissed and the trial court’s judgment affirmed.

ARGUMENTS

This Court should dismiss Battaile’s appeal or, alternatively, affirm the trial

court’s judgment in full.

I. The Trial Court’s Judgment Regarding Appellees Should Be
Affirmed Because Battaile Waived Review of The Reasons for
Dismissal.

Battaile’s claims against the Texas Secretary of State and

Commissioner Travillion were dismissed because Battaile lacked standing to

bring those claims and sovereign immunity barred such claims.3 In his Brief,

Battaile waived appellate review of these issues, and the Court should affirm

dismissal of claims against the Texas Secretary of State and Commissioner

Travillion on that basis alone.

The district court signed an order granting each Appellees’ Plea to the

Jurisdiction without specifying any particular portion of the plea. CR 550,

2 Additionally, neither Appellee is a proper defendant for Battaile’s election contest because they were not

candidates in, or otherwise involved with, the conduct of the City of Manor’s challenged election.
3 For Commissioner Travillion, Battaile’s claims were also barred by legislative immunity.

19
552. When that happens, an appellant must attack all of the reasons

presented in the plea, and if he fails to do so, the decision of the trial court

will be affirmed. “Generally, if an appellant fails to challenge all possible

grounds for a trial court’s ruling, we must accept the validity of the

unchallenged ground and affirm the adverse ruling.” Equistar Chems., LP v.

ClydeUnion DB, Ltd., 579 S.W.3d 505, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2019, pet. denied); see also Rivas v. Pitts, 684 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2023, pet. granted); Hampton, 607 S.W.3d at 6. “If an independent

ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or judgment, but the

appellant assigns no error to that independent ground, we must accept the

validity of that unchallenged independent ground, and thus any error in the

grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged

independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or judgment.”

Oliphant Fin. LLC v. Angiano, 295 S.W.3d 422, 423–24 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2009, no pet.), citing Britton v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d

676, 681 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also S.W. ex rel.

A.W., 435 S.W.3d at 419.

In her Plea to the Jurisdiction, Secretary Nelson demonstrated that

Battaile lacked standing to bring claims against her because he did not

present a justiciable controversy, because he did not have interests adverse

20
to her, and because he did not present an injury that was fairly traceable to

the conduct of the Secretary or seek redress that the Secretary could provide.

CR. 511-14. Additionally, sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject

matter jurisdiction regarding claims against Secretary Nelson. CR. 514-16.

Commissioner Travillion similarly argued in his dispositive pleadings

that: (1) he was not a proper defendant for Battaile’s challenges to the City of

Manor’s election; (2) Battaile’s allegations concerning Commissioner

Travillion did not constitute conduct for which sovereign immunity is

waived; (3) Commissioner Travillion, as a single member of two different

legislative bodies, is not vicariously liable for any actions taken by either of

them; and (4) Battaile’s claims–which contain nothing more than mere

disagreement with several discretionary decisions made by various elected

officials4–were barred by sovereign immunity, legislative immunity and/or

official immunity. CR 451-473.

In his Brief, Battaile has not demonstrated standing or identified any

waiver of sovereign immunity for any of his claims, and cannot do so now,

because review of an appellate issue is waived by failing to raise it in the

original appellate brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f); see also Zurita v.

4
As to Commissioner Travillion, Battaile primarily complains that Capital Metro does not provide sufficient
bus service to the City of Manor’s general population. E.g., CR 453 (citing CR 33-172 at 81, 105, 116, 140-
142).

21
Lombana, 322 S.W.3d 463, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010 pet.

denied) (citing Zamarron v. Shinko Wire Co., Ltd., 125 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex.

App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003 pet. denied)) (stating that issues not raised

until a reply brief are waived). Indeed, Battaile’s brief does not contain the

words “standing,” “traceability,” “redress” (or any variation of the word), or

“sovereign.” See generally App. Brief. Battaile also does not present any

argument that the trial court was incorrect in dismissing the claims against

the Texas Secretary of State or Commissioner Travillion because of standing

or sovereign immunity. Id. Similarly, as to Commissioner Travillion, Battaile

fails to even mention him in his brief other than as one of the “Real Parties

in Interest” (Brief at p. 4) and does not present any argument that the trial

court was incorrect in dismissing his claims against the Commissioner on the

basis of legislative and/or official immunity. Instead, Battaile’s Brief simply

makes the conclusory claim that this Court should “Order disclosure of

CapMetro/Travis County agreements[;] Require refund or accounting for

transit services not delivered (weekend service withheld)[; and] Mandate

free transit or special service to polling sites”. See Brief at p. 13. All of these

requests seek to compel governmental actions that are the subject of

discretionary policy decisions which Battaile lacks standing to assert. See CR

456-458, 459-463.

22
Accordingly, Battaile has waived any appellate review of the dismissal

of claims against the Texas Secretary of State and Commissioner Travillion,

and the dismissal of those claims should be affirmed.

Even if he had not waived appellate review, the dismissal should be

affirmed for the reasons that follow.

II. Battaile Lacked Standing to Bring Claims Against Appellees.

Standing is a fundamental requirement for subject matter jurisdiction.

Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018). Standing

cannot be waived, and without it, the Court has no authority to hear Battaile’s

claim. Id. To establish standing, Battaile must, but did not, allege a concrete,

personal injury that is “fairly traceable” to Secretary Nelson’s and/or

Commissioner Travillion’s conduct and “likely to be redressed by the

requested relief.” Id. at 485.

A. There is No Judiciable Controversy Between
Battaile and Either Appellee.

As an initial matter, there must be a real and substantial controversy

between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings. “To constitute a

justiciable controversy, there must exist a real and substantial controversy

involving genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical

dispute.” Loya Ins. Co. v. Avalos, 610 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2020).

There is no justiciable controversy between Battaile and Secretary

23
Nelson and/or Commissioner Travillion because the Secretary and the

Commissioner lack the authority to resolve election disputes. The Secretary’s

duties are “strictly defined” in the Texas Constitution and the Texas Election

Code. See TEX. CONST. ART. IV, § 21; TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 31.045, 31.166.

Secretary Nelson is not empowered to make factual determinations in such

matters. Weatherly v. Fulgham, 153 Tex. 481, 483 (1954); Lane v. Ross, 151

Tex. 268, 271, (1952) (The Secretary does not have the authority to resolve

election contests or disputes). Commissioner Travillion has no alleged duties

under the Texas Election Code regarding any elections conducted by the City

of Manor. CR 463-464.

The Texas Supreme Court explained that the Secretary of State, while

designated as the “chief election officer,” holds a role that is advisory and

administrative in nature, limited to promoting uniformity in the application

and interpretation of election laws. Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367, 371

(Tex. 1972) (“The Secretary of State shall be the chief election officer of this

state, and it shall be his responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in

the application, operation and interpretation of the election laws.”).

Battaile’s attempt to expand the Secretary’s authority by requesting this

Court to void the mayoral election results ignores the limits on Secretary

Nelson’s authority. Importantly, Battaile acknowledges that Manor city

24
officials were in charge of administering the November 2024 mayoral

election, not Secretary Nelson or Commissioner Travillion. CR. 34, 36, 45,

47, 49.

Thus, there is no judiciable controversy between Battaile and the

Secretary or Commissioner Travillion concerning his election claims.

Similarly, there is no justiciable controversy between Battaile and

Commissioner Travillion concerning any other claims. See CR 453-454, 460-

464.

B. Battaile Fails to Establish Traceability.

Battaile’s Appeal Brief and his pleadings lack any specific allegations

that Secretary Nelson and/or Commissioner Travillion engaged in any

conduct – let alone an unlawful act – that caused him harm.

Battaile broadly challenges the election process but does not assert how

Secretary Nelson or Commissioner Travillion played any role in his alleged

injury. See generally App. Brief. Despite the length of Battaile’s Brief,

Secretary Nelson is mentioned by name only four times—once in the case

caption, once in the preamble, once in the identification of parties, and once

in the issues presented. Commissioner Travillion is named only once, as one

of the “Real Parties in Interest”. Brief at 4. Beyond these cursory references,

Battaile offers no factual allegations or legal arguments demonstrating that

25
his loss in the election is, in any way, traceable to the conduct of the Secretary

and/or Commissioner Travillion.

It appears that Battaile is dissatisfied with the election results, as well

as multiple other decisions made by various governmental bodies, but

dissatisfaction alone does not confer standing. Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 484;

Weiderman v. City of Arlington, 480 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2015, pet. denied). Courts do not adjudicate generalized grievances

unconnected to a defendant’s specific actions. Id. Because Battaile has not

alleged a direct causal link between his claimed injury and any action by

Secretary Nelson and/or Commissioner Travillion, he lacks standing.

C. Battaile Fails to Establish Redressability.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Battaile has alleged an injury traceable

to Secretary Nelson and/or Commissioner Travillion—which he has not—he

nevertheless fails to demonstrate that the relief he seeks would redress that

injury.

Battaile asks the Court to void the results of the mayoral election, yet

his Brief does not articulate how such relief against Secretary Nelson and

Commissioner Travillion would remedy his claimed harm. See generally

App. Brief. Secretary Nelson and Commissioner Travillion did not

administer the election at issue or have any role in the canvass of that

26
election, and Battaile provides no explanation as to how a court order would

redress his alleged grievance. Id.

To the extent Battaile seeks an order compelling Secretary Nelson to

perform any specific act with respect to the mayoral election, this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to grant that relief. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §

22.002(c). Secretary Nelson is a member of the Executive Department of the

State of Texas. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Under Texas law, only the

Supreme Court of Texas possesses jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,

injunctions, or other forms of mandatory relief compelling an officer of the

Executive Branch to perform a “judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act or

duty.” In re C.D.E., 533 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,

no pet.); In re C.J.M.S., 269 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008); In

re A.B., 267 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Because

Battaile has failed to satisfy the requirements of standing, and because this

Court lacks the jurisdictional authority to redress the alleged injury even if

standing were established, Battaile claim against Secretary Nelson must be

dismissed as a matter of law.

Similarly, in his Brief, Battaile cites to Texas Government Code §§

22.220 and 22.221 as the basis for this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to

compel Commissioner Travillion to perform certain actions related to Travis

27
County and/or Capital Metro governance. But these statutes specifically state

that this Court does not have jurisdiction over claims arising out of Chapter

101 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (i.e., the Texas Tort Claims

Act), which are the only claims asserted against Commissioner Travillion in

the court below. Id., § 22.221(c-1) (referencing § 22.220(d)).

D. Battaile Cannot Assert Third Party Rights.

To the extent that Battaile seeks to assert claims on behalf of the

citizens of Manor, his claims fail because he lacks standing to assert third-

party rights. “[O]ur Constitution opens the courthouse doors only to those

who have or are suffering an injury.” Grant v. Espiritu, 470 S.W.3d 198, 202

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air

Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)). Here, Battaile complains

about the decisions, actions and/or inactions by various governmental

entities in a wide-ranging litany about what he believes those governmental

entities should have done differently. Nowhere does Battaile identify any

particular injury to himself or his specific property, merely allegations of

generalized “public harm”. In other words, because Battaile has not shown

that he personally suffered an injury traceable to any conduct by Secretary

Nelson or Commissioner Travillion; he attempts to raise generalized

grievances on behalf of the public. As a result, Plaintiff has no standing to

28
bring this suit and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such

claims. See, e.g., Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154-55

(Tex.2012); Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384,

388-89 (Tex. 2011); Neeley v. West Orange–Cove CISD, 176 S.W.3d 746, 774

(Tex. 2005) (standing limits jurisdiction to cases involving a distinct injury

to the plaintiff); Concerned Cnty. Involved Dev., Inc. v City of Houston, 209

S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (group of

property owners not entitled to injunctive relief to prevent City from

permitting construction on neighbor’s property that caused no compensable

harm to their own property rights because they lacked standing).

Even if third-party standing were theoretically available, Battaile has

not satisfied its requirements. “Third-party standing requires at least two

additional showings: (1) that the party asserting the right has a ‘close’

relationship with the one who possesses the right, and (2) that there is a

‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect its own interests.” In re Tex.

Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 710 S.W.3d 731, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (citing

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004)).

Battaile has not demonstrated either requirement. He has no “close

relationship” with the citizens of Manor sufficient to assert their rights, nor

has he shown any “hindrance” preventing those citizens from pursuing their

29
own remedies, should they believe their rights were violated. Accordingly,

Battaile lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of third parties, and his

attempt to do so must be rejected.

III. Appellees Have Sovereign Immunity From Battaile’s Claims.

Sovereign immunity is properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction

because it “deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over lawsuits in which the

state or . . . governmental units have been sued, unless the state consents to

suit.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635–36

(Tex. 2012); Dallas Cnty. Mental Health v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341

(Tex. 1998). Texas Government Code § 311.034 further affirms that no

statute should be construed as waiving sovereign immunity unless the waiver

is explicit and unambiguous.

1. Secretary Nelson is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity.

“When a state official files a plea to the jurisdiction, the official is

invoking the sovereign immunity from suit held by the government itself.”

Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex. 2007). The

Secretary of State is a position created within the Executive Department of

the State of Texas. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 and 21. As such the Secretary

of State’s Office and the Secretary herself are protected by sovereign

immunity. Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.

30
2006). Therefore, Secretary Nelson is entitled to sovereign immunity.

2. Commissioner Travillion is Entitled to Sovereign

Immunity and/or Legislative Immunity.

A suit against a public official in his official capacity is a suit against the

governmental entity itself. E.g., Herring v. Houston Nat’l Exch. Bank, 253

S.W.3d 813, 814-15 (Tex.1923); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366,

373 (Tex. 2009); Nueces Cnty. v. Ferguson, 97 S.W.3d 205, 215 n. 11 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Commissioner Travillion was sued by

Battaile based upon actions taken as a member of the Travis County

Commissioners Court and the Board of Directors for Capital Metro. Travis

County is a political subdivision of the State of Texas and enjoys sovereign

immunity, both from suit and from liability, except insofar as the Texas

Legislature has provided a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity by way

of the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) or specific statutes. Similarly,

CapMetro is a metropolitan rapid transit authority created under Chapter

451 of the Texas Transportation Code and is entitled to sovereign immunity

under the TTCA. See Tex. Transp. Code § 451.052(c).

Commissioner Travillion’s role as a member of these two legislative

bodies also entitles him to legislative immunity because Battaile’s claims

concern discretionary decisions made by those governing bodies regarding

31
how and where to allocate public resources. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

¶¶ 101.001(2) (defining “employee” to include an officer or agent of a

governmental unit), 101.001(3)(B) & (D), 101.021 (defining limited scope of

exceptions to governmental immunity), 101.052 (legislative immunity),

101.055 (immunity for certain governmental functions), 101.056 (immunity

for discretionary decisions).

The trial court correctly determined that Commissioner Travillion is

entitled to sovereign immunity and/or legislative immunity, and Battaile has

not asserted otherwise in his Brief.

3. Battaile Fails to Identify Any Waiver of Sovereign

and/or Legislative Immunity.

Battaile has not identified any valid waiver of sovereign and/or

legislative immunity. The burden rests on Battaile to affirmatively establish

jurisdiction, yet he has not met this requirement. See Tex. Dep’t of Crim.

Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001). Battaile has identified no

authority waiving sovereign and/or legislative immunity for the claims

asserted. RR Vol. 2 at 24:10-31:6 (as to Secretary Nelson), 35:9-37:17 and

65:23-66:4 (as to Commissioner Travillion).

Battaile’s filings—both in the trial court and on appeal—make clear that

he has wholly failed to confront, much less overcome, the Secretary’s or

32
Commissioner Travillion’s immunity defenses. Both Appellees’ Plea to the

Jurisdiction raised sovereign immunity as a bar to suit, and Commissioner

Travillion additionally raised legislative immunity. At the Plea hearing,

counsel for each Appellee reiterated that sovereign and/or legislative

immunity deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction because

Battaile’s claims did not identify any waiver applicable to the Secretary or

Commissioner Travillion. Id.; RR Vol. 2 at 23:9-24:8 and 31:8-34:22.

Despite multiple opportunities—through his pleadings, arguments at the

Plea hearing, and now his Brief— Battaile has not engaged with this

threshold jurisdictional issue. See generally App. Brief.

Rather than offering any authority to rebut the application of sovereign

and/or legislative immunity, Battaile diverts the Court’s attention by

advancing broad and irrelevant grievances about alleged political influence

in the City of Manor. App. Brief at 2, 25-26. His Brief focuses almost entirely

on perceived wrongs suffered by the “citizens of Manor,” yet those arguments

are legally immaterial to the jurisdictional question before the Court. See

generally App. Brief.

In Eriksen v. Nelson, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for

failing to present a viable constitutional challenge to an election law and

because sovereign immunity barred his claims. No. 15-24-00059-CV, 2025

33
WL 351632, at *7 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Jan. 30, 2025). Similarly, Battaile

seeks to invalidate an election based on allegations of election coercion under

the Texas Election Code but fails to assert a legally cognizable claim to

overcome sovereign immunity. See generally App. Brief. As in Eriksen,

where similar claims against the Secretary of State were dismissed, the same

reasoning applies here, warranting dismissal of Battaile’s claim.

D. Battaile’s Failure to Comply with Section 233.006(b)’s
Thirty-Day Deadline is a Fatal Jurisdictional Defect.

Even if Secretary Nelson or Commisioner Travillion was a proper party to an

election contest (and they are NOT), Battaile’s appeal would still need to be

dismissed because the claim is barred by the jurisdictional deadline imposed

under the Texas Election Code. Section 233.006(b) titled “Filing Period for

Petition,” mandates that “[] the contestant must file the petition not later

than the later of the 30th day after the date the election records are publicly

available . . . or the official result of the contested election is determined.”

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 233.006(b).

This statutory deadline is not a mere procedural formality—it is a strict

jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. “[T]he thirty-day deadline

by which the petition must be filed under section 233.006(b) is jurisdictional

and non-waiveable.” City of Houston v. Bryant, 516 S.W.3d 47, 51–52 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing Nichols v. Seei, 97

34
S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). Courts have enforced

this deadline, finding that failure to comply constitutes a “fatal impediment.”

Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441 S.W.3d 684, 691 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied).

Under Texas Election Code § 67.003(c), titled “Time for Local

Canvass,” the City of Manor was required to conduct its canvass no later than

the 14th day after election day. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 67.003(c). Given that

election day occurred on November 5, 2024 (App. Brief at 6; CR. 26, 34),

thus the latest permissible date for the canvass was November 19, 2024. CR.

516-17. Since the canvass occurred on or about November 19, 2024 (see CR.

477 with hyperlink to City of Manor’s official records), the deadline to file an

election contest under Texas Election Code § 233.006(b) was no later than

30 days thereafter. Battaile did not file his lawsuit until January 29, 2025 (71

days after the election). CR.516-17; see also CR.210, 452, 465, 618. This delay

exceeds the statutory filing window and, accordingly, deprives this Court of

subject matter jurisdiction.

Additionally, Battaile’s election claims were moot because he failed to

comply with Section 232.008(c)(2). None of the mayoral candidates in the

challenged November 2025 election received more than 50% of the vote so a

runoff election was required between the two candidates that received the

35
highest number of votes – Battaile was not one of those candidates. CR. 36-

37. The mayoral runoff election occurred on Saturday, December 14, 2024, a

date set by the Texas Secretary of State pursuant to Texas Election Code §

2.025. Battaile’s deadline to file a contest for this runoff election was

Wednesday, December 4, 2024 – 15 days after November 19, 2024, the date

on which the Manor City Council canvassed election results. See TEX. ELEC.

CODE § 232.008(c)(2). But Battaile did not file his petition within the

statutory timeframe to prevent the mayoral runoff election from occurring.

See id., § 232.007. “An election contest [also] becomes moot, and the issues

no longer justiciable, when a final judgment adjudging the validity or

invalidity of a candidate’s certificate of nomination is not entered in time for

election officials to comply with the statutory deadlines for preparing and

conducting the general election, or when absentee balloting has begun

during the pendency of the appeal.” Maldonado v. Johnson, No. 04-18-

00599-CV, 2018 WL 4517551 at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 21, 2018,

no pet.) (quoting Salazar, 931 S.W.2d 59, 60 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi 1996, no writ) (citing authorities omitted). As a result, the trial court

properly found that his election contest claims were moot. See Skelton v.

Yates, 119 S.W.2d 91, 91–92 (Tex. 1938) (explaining that an election

commences once absentee balloting has begun, and dismissing relator’s

36
petition for writ of mandamus as moot because absentee balloting had

already begun); Salazar v. Gonzales, 931 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. App.--Corpus

Christi 1996, no writ); Sepulveda v. Medrano, 323 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Alternatively, the trial court properly found that

Battaile’s claims concerning his eligibility to participate in the December

2025 mayoral runoff election were untimely and that the court therefore

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over them.

PRAYER

This Court should dismiss Battaile’s Appeal because he lacks standing.

Even if he has standing, this Court should dismiss his Appeal or alternatively

reaffirm the trial court’s ruling because Battaile faces multiple jurisdictional

barriers, none of which have been adequately addressed in his Brief. The

Court should affirm the trial court’s orders dismissing Battaile’s claims

against Secretary Nelson and Commissioner Travillion because Battaile has

not identified any cognizable waiver of the Appellees’ respective immunity

defenses and has failed to assert any timely claims for relief within this

Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

37
First Assistant Attorney General

RALPH MOLINA
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

AUSTIN KINGHORN
Deputy Attorney General for Civil
Litigation

KIMBERLY GDULA
Chief, General Litigation Division

/s/ Roy Adams
ROY ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General
Texas Bar No. 24133175

Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-25848
(512) 475-4104 Fax: (512) 320-0667
roy.adams@oag.texas.gov
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE TEXAS
SECRETARY OF STATE JANE NELSON

DELIA GARZA
County Attorney, Travis County
P. O. Box 1748
Austin, Texas 78767
Telephone: (512) 854-9513
Facsimile: (512) 854-4808

By: /s/ Cynthia W. Veidt
CYNTHIA W. VEIDT
State Bar No. 24028092
cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov
PATRICK M. KELLY
State Bar No. 11228000
pat.kelly@traviscountytx.gov

38
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE TRAVIS
COUNTY COMMISSIONER JEFFREY
TRAVILLION

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading
has been served on the Parties of record in accordance with TEX. R. APP. P.
9.5(b)(1), electronically through the court’s e service system:

/s/ Roy Adams
ROY ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General

Certificate of Compliance

This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP.
P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller
than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also
complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i), if
applicable.

/s/ Roy Adams
ROY ADAMS
Assistant Attorney General

39
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Victoria Gomez on behalf of Roy Adams
Bar No. 24133175
victoria.gomez@oag.texas.gov
Envelope ID: 107519832
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: 20251031_Battaile Joint Appellees Brief Final
Status as of 10/31/2025 10:06 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Jeffrey Hobbs 24012837 jhobbs@abaustin.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Michael Kabat 24050847 mkabat@mcginnislaw.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

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Michael Roberts 24082153 mroberts@jw.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Cynthia Veidt 24028092 cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Stephanie Serrano 24092655 sserrano@rothberg.law 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Kevin O'Hanlon 15235500 kohanlon@808west.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Patrick Kelly 11228000 pat.kelly@traviscountytx.gov 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Tyler Ryska 24096597 tryska@rigbyslack.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

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Raylynn Howell raylynn.howell@bakerbotts.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Kim McBride kmcbride@mcginnislaw.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Lea Ohrstrom lohrstrom@808west.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Victoria Gomez on behalf of Roy Adams
Bar No. 24133175
victoria.gomez@oag.texas.gov
Envelope ID: 107519832
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: 20251031_Battaile Joint Appellees Brief Final
Status as of 10/31/2025 10:06 AM CST

Case Contacts

Sneed Vine &Perry gtwnfilings@sneedvine.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Stormy Downing sdowning@rrspllc.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Andy Soule asoule@rrspllc.com 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

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Associated Case Party: Jane Nelson

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Roy Adams roy.adams@oag.texas.gov 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Victoria Gomez victoria.gomez@oag.texas.gov 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Associated Case Party: RobertEdwardBattaile

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Robert EdwardBattaile robert@manortx.us 10/31/2025 9:57:26 AM SENT

Associated Case Party: DG MANOR DOWNS PROPERTY OWNER LP
Automated Certificate of eService
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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
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Victoria Gomez on behalf of Roy Adams
Bar No. 24133175
victoria.gomez@oag.texas.gov
Envelope ID: 107519832
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: 20251031_Battaile Joint Appellees Brief Final
Status as of 10/31/2025 10:06 AM CST

Associated Case Party: DG MANOR DOWNS PROPERTY OWNER LP

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