Texas State Board of Social Worker Examiners v. Katherin Youniacutt and Tammy Thompson

ACCEPTED
15-25-00064-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/17/2025 4:19 PM
No. 15-25-00064-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK

In the Court of Appeals 15th COURT FILED IN
OF APPEALS

for the Fifteenth Judicial District9/17/2025 4:19:13 PM
AUSTIN, TEXAS

CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
Texas State Board of Social Worker Examiners, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Katherin Youniacutt and Tammy Thompson,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the
345th Judicial District Court, Travis County

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Ken Paxton William R. Peterson
Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General

Brent Webster Beth Klusmann
First Assistant Attorney General Assistant Solicitor General
State Bar No. 24036918
Office of the Attorney General Beth.Kusmann@oag.texas.gov
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-1700
Fax: (512) 474-2697 Counsel for Appellants
Table of Contents
Page
Index of Authorities .................................................................................................. i
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Argument ................................................................................................................. 2
I. Plaintiffs Misunderstand Their Jurisdictional Burden. ............................... 2
II. Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due-Course Claim Is Facially Invalid. .................... 6
A. Plaintiffs have not established a protected liberty interest in
becoming licensed health care workers. ............................................... 6
B. Section 108.052 satisfies all relevant constitutional tests. .................. 12
III. The Enactment of Section 108.052 Did Not Deprive Plaintiffs of
Procedural Due Course. ............................................................................ 17
IV. Section 108.052 Does Not Violate the Texas Constitution’s
Guarantee of Equal Rights. ....................................................................... 21
Prayer ..................................................................................................................... 25
Certificate of Compliance ...................................................................................... 25

Index of Authorities

Page(s)

Cases:
Abbott v. Mex. Am. Legis. Caucus, Tex. House of Representatives,
647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2022) ........................................................................ 2, 3, 5
Andrade v. NAACP of Austin,
345 S.W.3d (Tex. 2011) ....................................................................................... 4
Barletta v. Rilling,
973 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 2013) ........................................................... 16, 24
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441 (1915) ............................................................................................ 17
Chunn v. State, ex rel. Miss. Dep’t of Ins.,
156 So. 3d 884 (Miss. 2015) ...............................................................................16

i
City of Austin v. Powell,
704 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. 2024) ........................................................................... 2, 3
City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ............................................................................... 5
Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs.,
543 U.S. 157 (2004)............................................................................................. 8
Cronin v. O’Leary,
No. 00-1713-F, 2001 WL 919969,
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001) ........................................................................ 20
Dent v. State of W.Va.,
129 U.S. 114 (1889) ............................................................................................. 9
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
597 U.S. 215 (2022)...................................................................................... 12, 14
Edionwe v. Bailey,
860 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2017) ..............................................................................19
Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning,
434 P.3d 999 (Wash. 2019)................................................................................ 20
Furst v. NYC Transit Auth.,
631 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).....................................................................16
Gregg v. Lawson,
732 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) ........................................................... 20, 24
Haveman v. Bureau of Pro. & Occupational Affs.,
238 A.3d 567 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020) ......................................................... 16, 23
Honors Acad., Inc. v. TEA,
555 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. 2018) .................................................................................. 4
Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.,
458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) ..................................................................... 2, 3, 21, 23
Matzen v. McLane,
659 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. 2021) .............................................................. 17, 18, 19, 20
McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs,
394 U.S. 802 (1969) .......................................................................................... 23
McFadden v. Longham,
58 Tex. 579 (1883)........................................................................................ 20-21

ii
McMurtray v. Holladay,
11 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................19
Miller v. Carter,
547 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977)..............................................................................16
Nixon v. Pennsylvania,
839 A.2d 277 (Penn. 2003) .................................................................................16
Owens Corning v. Carter,
997 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999) .............................................................................. 21
Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul.,
469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015) ................................1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Perrine v. Mun. Ct.,
488 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) ....................................................................................16
Rattray v. City of Brownsville,
662 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2023) ............................................................................... 5
Shimose v. Haw. Health Sys. Corp.,
345 P.3d 145 (Haw. 2015) ...................................................................................16
Smith v. Decker,
312 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1958) ................................................................................ 8
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,
712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................... 13
State v. Loe,
692 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2024) ............................................................................... 8
TABC v. Live Oak Brewing Co.,
537 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) .................................... 13
Tarrant County v. Ashmore,
635 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1982) ...............................................................................19
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ............................................................................ 3, 4
Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC,
647 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2022) ...................................................................... 7, 8, 10
Tex. DFPS v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc.,
717 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. 2025) .............................................................................. 20

iii
Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia,
893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995).............................................................................. 14
Tex. S. Univ. v. Villarreal,
620 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2021) ............................................................................... 4
Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson,
590 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2019) ............................................................................... 2
United States v. LULAC,
793 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1986) ............................................................................... 17
United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680 (2024) .......................................................................................... 11
Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than,
834 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1992) ............................................................................... 4
Wilson v. Andrews,
10 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 1999) ................................................................................. 15
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules:
Penn. Const. art. I, § 1.............................................................................................16
Tex. Const.:
art. I, § 3 ............................................................................................................ 21
art. I, § 19 ............................................................................................................ 6
art. II, § 1 ............................................................................................................. 1
art. VIII, § 2 ........................................................................................................ 9
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006(b)................................................................ 5
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 56A.352(b-1) ............................................................... 23
Tex. Educ. Code § 37.115(d-1) ............................................................................... 22
Tex. Fam. Code § 202.002(a) ................................................................................ 22
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 ...................................................................................... 5
Tex. Occ. Code:
§ 108.052 ...................................... 1, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24
§ 502.002(6) ..................................................................................................... 22
§ 502.252 .......................................................................................................... 22
§ 502.252(4)...................................................................................................... 22
§ 503.003 .......................................................................................................... 22

iv
Tex. Occ. Code:
§ 503.302 .......................................................................................................... 22
§ 503.302(2) ...................................................................................................... 22
§ 505.353 ........................................................................................................... 22
§ 505.353(b) ...................................................................................................... 22
§ 505.0025 ........................................................................................................ 22
22 Tex. Admin. Code § 882.3 ................................................................................ 18
Other Authorities:
A New Political Platform, Galveston Daily News, June 11, 1874................................ 9
Act approved Apr. 3, 1879, 16th Leg., R.S., ch. 66,
1879 Tex. Gen. Laws 71 ...................................................................................... 9
Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 776,
1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2923 ................................................................................. 11
Address to the Freedmen of Texas, Semi-Weekly State Gazette (Austin),
Nov. 21, 1865. ................................................................................................... 10
Civil Liberty, 1 Alexander M. Burrill,
A Law Dictionary and Glossary (2d ed. 1871) ....................................................... 9
Current Comment, Evening Tribune (Galveston), Apr. 29, 1886............................ 10
Denison Daily Herald, Dec. 22, 1878 ..................................................................... 10
Fort Worth Standard, July 8, 1875 ........................................................................... 9
H.B. 4974, 89th Leg., R.S. (2025) .......................................................................... 24
House Comm. on Pub. Health, Bill Analysis,
Tex. H.B. 1899, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019) ........................................................ 13, 14
Injustice of the Occupation Tax, Denison Daily News, May 19, 1876 ......................... 9
Lumber Inspection, Galveston Daily News, Apr. 9, 1875 ......................................... 10
Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Types of Social Work,
available at https://www.socialworkers.org/News/Facts/Types-
of-Social-Work .................................................................................................. 23
The Occupation Tax, Galveston Daily News, May 18, 1876 ...................................... 9
Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu/ ........................................... 9
Railways, Jacksboro Gazette, Jan. 17, 1889 ............................................................. 10
Stephen Simpson, A Look at the Texas Mental Health Workforce
Shortage, Tex. Trib. (July 17, 2024) .................................................................. 24

v
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 3438 (To Seller of Brandy Fruits, Aug. 24,
1875), Tex. State Libr. & Archives Comm’n, Box 2006/216-1
(https://perma.cc/KZ2L-C8Z3) ...................................................................... 10

vi
Introduction
The Legislature decides how to best protect Texans, and disagreements with the

Legislature’s choices do not provide grounds for judicial intervention. Only consti-

tutional violations allow a court to reject the Legislature’s judgment. And here, the

Legislature did not cross any constitutional lines when enacting Texas Occupations
Code section 108.052 to bar potentially violent individuals from holding health care

licenses. The Court should respect the Legislature’s choice. See Tex. Const. art. II,

§ 1.
Plaintiffs liken this case to Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation,

469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015). But threading eyebrows is not providing health care. And

hundreds of irrelevant hours of training is a burden on anyone, while avoiding the
commission of violent felonies is not a burden for most. When Patel is limited to what

it actually held, and not the broad constitutional propositions Plaintiffs wish it in-

cluded, Plaintiffs are left with very little to support their claims—claims that would

constitutionalize all occupational-licensing regimes and allow courts to second-guess

the Legislature’s decisions.

Plaintiffs paint a picture of irrational, oppressive legislation that simply does not
exist. Section 108.052 is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protect-

ing the health and safety of its most vulnerable citizens. It has no illegitimate purpose,

nor is it oppressively burdensome. There may well be room to disagree with the Leg-

islature’s choice, but it was not an unconstitutional one. The Court should reverse

the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’

claims.
Argument

I. Plaintiffs Misunderstand Their Jurisdictional Burden.
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction over their suit. Town of

Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). In the context of the

UDJA, that means pleading a claim that is not “facially invalid.” Abbott v. Mex. Am.

Legis. Caucus, Tex. House of Representatives (MALC), 647 S.W.3d 681, 698 (Tex.
2022). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions (at 14, 16), this requires more

than avoiding “obvious[]” or “glaring” errors. When the jurisdictional question is

intertwined with the merits, the Court considers the merits to the extent necessary
to determine whether a claim is facially invalid. MALC, 647 S.W.3d at 698; Town of

Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 550. And it uses a standard similar to that of summary

judgment. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Tex. 2024). If a claim, as
pleaded, will fail as a matter of law, it must be dismissed as barred by sovereign im-

munity. See, e.g., Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex.

2015) (holding that sovereign immunity barred an equal-protection claim that

“fail[ed] as a matter of law”).

A. The main point of contention between the parties is how closely the Court

should look at Plaintiffs’ claims to determine whether they are facially invalid. Plain-

tiffs quote the Texas Supreme Court’s one-time use of the phrase “basic pleading

defects” in Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 77, and then make the citation-free assertion that

“basic pleading defects” refers only to “claims that are obviously defective on their

face.” Appellees’ Br. 14; see also id. at 16 (referring to “glaring” errors). But pleading

a facially invalid claim is a basic pleading defect.

2
The State is unaware of any legal standard that permits an actually invalid claim

to move forward merely because it is not obviously or glaringly so. Rather, the Su-

preme Court has explained that “the process for resolving a plea to the jurisdiction

asserting immunity from suit [is] one that ‘generally mirrors that of a summary judg-

ment.’” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 446 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,

133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004)). Summary judgment roots out legally invalid

claims, not just those that have some obvious defect.
Plaintiffs’ cherry-picked language (at 14) describes portions of opinions in which

pleas to the jurisdiction have been granted based on facial invalidity. E.g., MALC,

647 S.W.3d at 703; Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 16-17. But precedent is read as a whole,

rather than for isolated phrases. Doing so demonstrates that the facial-invalidity anal-

ysis goes far beyond the limitations Plaintiffs would impose—identifying “absurd”

claims or those “conclusively negated” by existing precedent. Appellees’ Br. 14. In

Klumb, for example, the Supreme Court determined that an equal-protection claim

failed as a matter of law because the classification was rationally related to a legiti-

mate purpose. 458 S.W.3d at 13-14. It then also dismissed a due-course claim after

concluding that prior precedent remained valid despite the plaintiffs’ argument that

a constitutional amendment required a different result. Id. at 14-17. Likewise, in

MALC, the Court’s actual analysis encompassed far more than a simple conclusion

that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of a constitutional provision would lead to an “ab-

surd result.” 647 S.W.3d at 701-03.

Other precedent from the Supreme Court reveals that due-course and equal-

protection claims are routinely considered in-depth at the jurisdictional stage. The

3
Court in Honors Academy, Inc. v. TEA dismissed a due-course claim after concluding,

as a matter of first impression, that charter schools do not have vested property rights

in their charters. 555 S.W.3d 54, 60-68 (Tex. 2018). And in Andrade v. NAACP of

Austin, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim at the jurisdictional

stage because it failed as a matter of law. 345 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2011).

Plaintiffs’ assertion that this case should be allowed to proceed because it is just

like Patel and a number of out-of-state cases does not prevent the Court from deter-
mining, at the pleading stage, whether Plaintiffs are wrong. In Texas Southern Uni-

versity v. Villarreal, the plaintiff brought a due-course claim based on her academic

dismissal from college, citing prior Supreme Court precedent recognizing such a

claim for disciplinary dismissals. 620 S.W.3d 899, 904-05 (Tex. 2021) (citing Univ.

of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tex. 1992)). Rather than allow the

claim to move forward on the strength of Than and out-of-state precedent, the Su-

preme Court considered whether academic dismissals created the same stigma as

disciplinary dismissals. Id. at 905-08. Concluding they did not, the Court found no

protected liberty interest and dismissed the claim on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at

907-08, 910. At no point in any of these cases did the Supreme Court ask whether a

claim was obviously or glaringly flawed.

Sometimes the facial invalidity of a claim is apparent, and other times it requires

a more careful analysis. But a trial court “must determine at its earliest opportunity

whether it has the constitutional or statutory authority to decide the case before al-

lowing the litigation to proceed.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. While Plaintiffs are

not required to prove that they will prevail on the merits, Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 77,

4
they must show that they will not inevitably lose. If Plaintiffs’ claims, as pleaded, will

fail, the Court lacks jurisdiction to move beyond the pleading stage. See Rattray v.

City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023) (“Just one valid jurisdictional

obstacle is enough for the court to halt further proceedings.”).

B. Plaintiffs have also failed to establish jurisdiction over the individual defend-

ants—the individual Board and Council members, as well as the executive director

of the Council. The UDJA’s waiver of sovereign immunity lacks the clarity of other
waivers, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it to waive the immunity of “the

relevant governmental entities.” MALC, 647 S.W.3d at 697 n.7; City of El Paso v.

Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 37.006(b) (requiring “the municipality” to be joined when the validity of an ordi-

nance is challenged). Plaintiffs cite no clear and unambiguous statutory language in

the UDJA waiving the sovereign immunity of government officials acting in their

official capacities. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034. And their citations to Patel and

MALC (at 13) are unhelpful. Patel did not consider whether the officials were proper

parties under the UDJA. 469 S.W.3d at 77. And the discussion Plaintiffs quote in

MALC was focused on standing. 647 S.W.3d at 697.

Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendants are thus doubly barred: They

are facially invalid, and the individual defendants are not within the UDJA’s waiver

of immunity. Because both arguments are jurisdictional, the Court can take them in

any order. Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 868-69. Either one should result in rendition of

judgment for the individual defendants.

5
II. Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due-Course Claim Is Facially Invalid.
Plaintiffs do not deny that social workers are health care professionals that

should be licensed and that those prone to violence should not be licensed. They

simply disagree with the State’s chosen method of deciding who presents an unac-

ceptable risk of violence—those with criminal convictions for violent felonies. But
the due-course clause, Tex. Const. art. I, § 19, does not tie the State’s hands to Plain-

tiffs’ preferred method of determining future dangerousness.

Plaintiffs’ claims fail from the outset because they have not established a pro-
tected liberty interest. Patel did not recognize a right to pursue any and all lawful

occupations, much less a right to a professional health care license. And Plaintiffs’

out-of-context quotations from the late 1800s do not establish that those who
adopted the Texas Constitution in 1876 considered the right to work a protected lib-

erty interest. Section 108.052 also survives any applicable constitutional test, as it is

(1) rational to protect Texas patients from harm by denying health care licenses to

those with a demonstrated history of violence, and (2) not oppressively burdensome

to ask individuals to refrain from committing violent felonies. No further trial-court

proceedings can fix the flaws in Plaintiffs’ legal theory. Their substantive due-course
claim is facially invalid and should be dismissed.

A. Plaintiffs have not established a protected liberty interest in be-
coming licensed health care workers.
In its opening brief, the State argued (at 15-24) that any liberty interest must be

narrowly defined, and that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a liberty interest in obtain-

6
ing a health care license. In response, Plaintiffs continue to assert that there is a gen-

eral liberty interest in the right to pursue lawful occupations. But Patel did not estab-

lish that broad constitutional principle, nor is it shown by Plaintiffs’ historical analy-

sis. Plaintiffs, therefore, fail at step one of the due-course test.

1. Plaintiffs first attempt to evade the liberty-interest analysis entirely by as-

serting that Patel recognized a constitutional right to pursue a lawful occupation. Ap-

pellees’ Br. 18-21. It did not, as the Supreme Court later confirmed. Tex. Dep’t of
State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC, 647 S.W.3d 648, 653 n.16 (Tex. 2022)

(noting that the parties in Patel “never presented to this Court the issue of whether

the eyebrow threaders asserted a protected interest”). Plaintiffs’ response does not

identify any language in Patel holding that eyebrow threaders had a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in their work. Instead, Plaintiffs rely (at 18-19) on the length

of the Patel decision, the number of opinions written, and the number of footnotes in

one of the concurrences. Measures of quantity, however, are not a substitute for sub-

stance.

And it is a revealing gap in their argument. The Supreme Court was undoubtedly

correct in Crown Distributing when it noted that Patel “did not address the first-step

issue”—that is, whether the plaintiffs alleged the deprivation of a right protected by

the due-course clause—“because the defendants in that case did not argue that the

plaintiffs failed to assert a protected interest.” 647 S.W.3d at 653 n.16. Plaintiffs at-

tempt to downplay this observation of fact by calling it “dicta.” It is not. The Crown

Distributing plaintiffs argued that Patel protected their right to manufacture smoka-

ble hemp products. Id. at 653. The Court explained why it did not—namely, because

7
Patel never considered the liberty-interest question. Id. at 653 n.16. 1 The Court went
on to state that it need not “decide how or whether Texas’s due-course clause pro-

tects all such occupations or callings,” implying that it had never decided “whether”

Texas’s due-course clause protects all occupations or callings. Id. at 655. The due-
course clause’s protection of the right to pursue any lawful occupation remains an

open question.

2. With Patel off the table, Plaintiffs’ support for a liberty interest is thin. Plain-
tiffs make no response to the State’s argument (at 15-16) and the Supreme Court’s

command that the asserted liberty interest must be “carefully define[d].” State v.

Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 235 (Tex. 2024). As the State’s opening brief explained (at 16-
18), that carefully defined liberty interest here is the right to become a licensed health

care professional. That right is not a protected liberty interest.

Plaintiffs, however, continue to focus on a broad right to pursue a lawful calling

without unreasonable governmental interference. But they cite no constitutional

provisions (other than the due-course clause) or statutes. And the only Texas Su-

preme Court case they cite (other than Patel) referred to the right to earn a living as
a “property” right. Smith v. Decker, 312 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Tex. 1958). Beyond that,

most of their support relies on context-free quotes from the late 1800s. But, consid-

1
As Plaintiffs argue (at 19), the Court should have considered the question. But it did
not. Plaintiffs have pointed to no such analysis, and constitutional precedent is not
created via silence. See Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004).

8
ered in context, those references do not establish that the framers of the Texas Con-

stitution considered the due-course clause’s protection of “liberty” to include the

right to work, much less the right to obtain a health care license.

Several of Plaintiffs’ references explicitly recognize that liberty interests are per-

missibly limited by the laws of the State. See e.g., Civil Liberty, 1 Alexander M. Burrill,

A Law Dictionary and Glossary (2d ed. 1871) (“so far restrained by human laws”); see

also Dent v. State of W.Va., 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889) (recognizing a right to follow a
lawful calling “subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of

like age, sex, and condition”). And one article called on legislators to require all fer-

mented liquors to be sold under a license—explicitly asking for the occupation to be

governed by the State. A New Political Platform, Galveston Daily News, June 11, 1874,

at 2. 2

Many of the articles cited are arguments opposing occupation taxes. E.g., Injus-
tice of the Occupation Tax, Denison Daily News, May 19, 1876, at 2; Fort Worth

Standard, July 8, 1875, at 1; The Occupation Tax, Galveston Daily News, May 18,

1876, at 4. Yet the people adopted a Constitution that explicitly permitted occupa-

tion taxes, Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 2, and the Legislature imposed such taxes, e.g.,

Act approved Apr. 3, 1879, 16th Leg., R.S., ch. 66, 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws 71 (adopting

occupation tax on the sale of liquors). The Framers and Legislature, accordingly, did

not see the right to work as a barrier to taxation on that work.

2
The newspaper articles cited by Plaintiffs can be found at the Portal to Texas His-
tory, https://texashistory.unt.edu/.

9
Some quotations have no context at all but appear in between advertisements for

tailors and windows or following comments on the President’s wedding. Denison

Daily Herald, Dec. 22, 1878, at 5; Current Comment, Evening Tribune (Galveston),

Apr. 29, 1886, at 1. And Provisional Governor Hamilton’s address to Texas freed-

men, explaining that they now have the right to work for their own living, carries a

different meaning to an audience of former slaves, who were previously forced to

work for someone else’s living. Address to the Freedmen of Texas, Semi-Weekly State
Gazette (Austin), Nov. 21, 1865, at 1.

Other statements of government officials cited by Plaintiffs do not establish that

“liberty” in the Texas Constitution included the right to work. The lone case cited

by Plaintiffs did not reference any constitutional provision at all. Lumber Inspection,

Galveston Daily News, Apr. 9, 1875, at 4 (discussing City of Galveston v. Gonzales).

Likewise, the Attorney General did not cite a constitutional provision when conclud-

ing that “brandy peaches” are not subject to the occupation tax that applied to in-

toxicating liquors. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 3438 (To Seller of Brandy Fruits, Aug.

24, 1875), Tex. State Libr. & Archives Comm’n, Box 2006/216-1

(https://perma.cc/KZ2L-C8Z3). And Governor Ross was arguing about rates

charged by railways. Railways, Jacksboro Gazette, Jan. 17, 1889, at 2.

As Justice Young has explained, determining what the due-course clause means

requires significant research—text, history, cases, treatises, records of the conven-

tion, other States’ constitutions, practices, and prior scholarship. Crown Distrib., 647

S.W.3d at 678-80 (Young, J., concurring). Plaintiffs’ handful of newspaper articles

does not accomplish that task.

10
3. Plaintiffs’ other counterarguments are unavailing.

First, Plaintiffs assert (at 28) that no one can be prohibited from practicing social

work because the Legislature did not regulate social workers until 1981. Act of June

1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 776, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2923. But the choice of previ-

ous Legislatures not to regulate social work does not mean it is now constitutionally

prohibited from doing so. See United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 739-40 (2024)

(Barrett, J., concurring) (finding it problematic to “assume[] that founding-era leg-
islatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a ‘use it or

lose it’ view of legislative authority”). Holding otherwise would constitutionalize all

professions that were not regulated in the late 1800s. And in any event, as the State

has shown (at 19-20), the Legislature has long been invested in the regulation of

health care professions.

Second, Plaintiffs argue (at 28) that the regulation of doctors in the 1800s does

not mean that health care professions are unprotected. The State has never argued

that the early regulation of doctors is dispositive. Rather, it is one of many points of

evidence (constitutional text, statutory history, and precedent) that inform whether

there is a protected liberty interest in becoming a licensed health care worker.

***

Plaintiffs ultimately fail to grapple with the magnitude of what they are asking

the Court to recognize. If there is a generalized right to pursue any lawful occupation,

the entire Occupations Code is now subject to Patel’s benefit-versus-burden analy-

sis. Hiring and firing decisions by a governmental entity that impact a person’s right

to practice their profession would also be subject to constitutional scrutiny under

11
Patel. In the nearly 150 years since the due-course clause was adopted, no court has

given it that wide-ranging effect. Plaintiffs’ claim will fail as a matter of law for lack

of a protected right and is accordingly facially invalid.

B. Section 108.052 satisfies all relevant constitutional tests.
Should the Court determine that Plaintiffs have alleged the deprivation of a pro-

tected liberty interest, Plaintiffs’ claims are still invalid under any applicable consti-

tutional test. Section 108.052 is a rational way to protect Texas patients, and refrain-

ing from committing violent felonies is not an unconstitutional burden.
1. Plaintiffs do not appear to argue that section 108.052 fails the rational-basis

test, resting their argument entirely on Patel’s unique analysis. But as the State ex-

plained (at 25-26), Patel is inapplicable because (1) social work is not a “common
occupation” but one that requires significant training and expertise, and (2) section

108.052 is not “economic legislation” or the “governmental regulation of economic

interests,” 469 S.W.3d at 86-87, but the regulation of health care, an area that has
been traditionally regulated by the Legislature.

Subject only to rational basis, the Legislature’s decision must be upheld because

section 108.052 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Dobbs v. Jackson

Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 301 (2022). Plaintiffs do not dispute that indi-

viduals who are prone to violence should not be licensed as health care workers. The

only question is how to make that determination. The Legislature chose to draw a
hard line—eliminating from consideration those individuals whose convictions for

violent felonies demonstrate a potential for violence. Tex. Occ. Code § 108.052. Alt-

hough Plaintiffs believe section 108.052 excludes too many, the Legislature’s choice

12
need not be perfect—only rational. For the reasons Texas has already explained, sec-

tion 108.052 meets that requirement. Appellants’ Br. 26-30.

2. Assuming Patel applies, Plaintiffs first assert that section 108.052’s “pur-

pose” is not “arguably [] rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”

469 S.W.3d at 87. Courts have recognized naked economic protectionism as one

such improper purpose. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222-23

(5th Cir. 2013); TABC v. Live Oak Brewing Co., 537 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2017, pet. denied). But Plaintiffs do not suggest that is what motivated the

law here. Instead, they redefine the purpose of the section 108.052—safety of pa-

tients—and instead claim it was enacted to “bar[] people who would otherwise pass

discretionary review” from becoming social workers. Appellees’ Br. 30.

For Plaintiffs’ improper-purpose theory to work, the Court would have to as-

sume that the individualized-determination process flawlessly weeded out all poten-

tially violent health care workers and then reason that the only possible purpose for

section 108.052 was to prevent qualified individuals from becoming licensed health

care workers. But the only evidence in the legislative record demonstrates otherwise:

One of the bill analyses of H.B. 1899 (which contained section 108.052) explained

that “[c]oncerns have been raised regarding the prevalence of licensed health care

professionals using their privilege and position of authority to commit crimes against

vulnerable patients.” House Comm. on Pub. Health, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1899,

86th Leg., R.S. (2019). That same analysis noted that “[i]t has been suggested that

one way to prevent these horrific crimes is to make individuals who have committed

13
certain crimes . . . ineligible for health care professional licenses.” Id. Considered as

a whole, H.B. 1899 was aimed at the safety of patients. See Appellants’ Br. 30.

The Legislature believed the individualized-determination process was imper-

fect, resulting in harm to patients from individuals who should never have been li-

censed. So the Legislature drew a harder line. Plaintiffs may find the Legislature’s

choice overbroad or unwise, but the wisdom of a law is not the province of the courts.

Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. 1995). Plaintiffs
cannot show that section 108.052 was motivated by an improper purpose.

3. The second Patel test requires Plaintiffs to show that “when considered as

a whole, [section 108.052]’s actual, real-world effect as applied to [licensed master

social workers] could not arguably be rationally related to, or is so burdensome as to

be oppressive in light of, the governmental interest.” 469 S.W.3d at 87. In short,

Patel asks courts to decide whether the regulation is worth it. See Appellees’ Br. 37

(asking the Court to “look at the evidence and determine whether the governmental

interest behind a law justifies the burden that law places on citizens”). But a benefit-

versus-burden balancing test creates significant concerns, as courts are asked to es-

sentially reweigh the policy arguments already considered by the Legislature. E.g.,

Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 281 (holding that the “undue burden” test is “inherently stand-

ardless”). The Court should be extraordinarily cautious when applying it.

Patel found a burdensome real-world effect because having to complete 750

(largely unnecessary) hours of training merely to thread eyebrows was a burden on

anyone who wanted to thread eyebrows. 469 S.W.3d at 88-90. The alleged burden

14
here—not committing violent felonies—is not the same. Most people do not com-

mit, or have not committed, violent felonies, so for a majority of the population, sec-

tion 108.052 imposes no burden at all.

Plaintiffs’ real-world effects argument (at 32-33), therefore, focuses almost ex-

clusively on Plaintiffs themselves and whether this requirement burdens them. But

Plaintiffs have brought a facial challenge. CR.216. Accordingly, they must demon-

strate that “the statute always operates unconstitutionally.” Wilson v. Andrews, 10
S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. 1999) (emphasis added). Even at the pleading stage, it is ob-

vious that (1) section 108.052 will screen out unquestionably violent individuals, and

(2) it is not burdensome to refrain from committing violent felonies. Thus, Plaintiffs

will never be able to show that section 108.052 is facially unconstitutional.

As for Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, for the reasons explained in the State’s

opening brief (at 34-36), individual as-applied challenges make little sense in this

context. Any line drawn by the State in any of its occupational-licensing schemes—

no matter how rational—could still burden individuals who cannot meet that stand-

ard and result in demands, like here, to except them from the rules that apply to all

others. If an occupational-licensing requirement is not unconstitutionally burden-

some generally, the Court should not create individual exceptions. Doing so would

defeat the point of setting generally applicable standards by statute. Indeed, even in

Patel, the Court considered the burden on eyebrow threaders as a whole, not just the

burden on the individual plaintiffs. 469 S.W.3d at 88-90.

4. Plaintiffs finish their substantive due-course analysis with a bullet-point list

of twenty-four out-of-state cases that arguably support their position. Appellees’ Br.

15
38-40. But the majority of those cases do not discuss substantive due-course or sub-

stantive due-process at all. E.g., Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977) (per

curiam), aff’d, 434 U.S. 356 (1978) (not reaching substantive due-process question);

Furst v. NYC Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (not reaching due-

process question); Perrine v. Mun. Ct., 488 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (considering only a

First Amendment challenge). Of the few that do reach the question, most come from

Pennsylvania, which has a constitutional provision that protects the right of men to
“pursu[e] their own happiness,” Penn. Const. art. I, § 1, and whose laws “must not

be unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case,”

Nixon v. Pennsylvania, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (Penn. 2003). Texas has no such constitu-

tional provision or precedent.

The two cases highlighted by Plaintiffs do not support them, either. Chunn v.

State, ex rel. Mississippi Department of Insurance, concerned only an equal-protection

claim. 156 So. 3d 884, 885 (Miss. 2015). And in Barletta v. Rilling, the court rejected

the due-process claim because of a lack of a protected interest. 973 F. Supp. 2d 132,

140 (D. Conn. 2013). Other cases cited by Plaintiffs also found that the due-process

claims failed. Haveman v. Bureau of Pro. & Occupational Affs., 238 A.3d 567, 577 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2020) (en banc); Shimose v. Haw. Health Sys. Corp., 345 P.3d 145, 154

n.17 (Haw. 2015). Plaintiffs’ attempt to paint a picture of nationwide support for

their substantive due-course claim does not withstand scrutiny.

At the end of the day, even if Plaintiffs have a protected interest in becoming

licensed social workers, section 108.052 is not unconstitutional. It represents a ra-

tional solution to the problem of potentially violent individuals obtaining health care

16
licenses, and it imposes no burden beyond what the law already requires—avoiding

the commission of violent felonies. Plaintiffs’ substantive due-course claim will in-

evitably fail and should be dismissed.

III. The Enactment of Section 108.052 Did Not Deprive Plaintiffs of
Procedural Due Course.
Plaintiffs’ procedural due-course claim fails for one simple reason: The alleged

deprivation of Plaintiffs’ liberty interest was caused by the enactment of H.B. 1899,

not the individual actions of the Council and Board. And as the Texas Supreme

Court has stated, citing the United States Supreme Court, “[w]hen the legislature
enacts a law . . . that affects a general class of persons, all of those persons have re-

ceived procedural due process by the legislative process itself and they have no right

to individual attention.” Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 392 (Tex. 2021) (quot-
ing United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 648 (5th Cir. 1986), and citing Bi-Metallic

Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915)). Because H.B. 1899,

and section 108.052 specifically, are generally applicable laws, Plaintiffs are not en-
titled to an individualized hearing before that law is applied to them.

A. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim, this case is squarely governed by Matzen.

There, the Legislature amended the laws concerning sexually violent predators

(SVPs) to create a tiered system. Id. at 385-86. Matzen received an individualized

hearing to determine where he fell within that new system—that is, to determine

how he matched up to the State’s criteria. Id. at 386. But when the Texas Civil Com-

mitment Office (TCCO) adopted a generally applicable rule regarding the costs

owed by SVPs like Matzen, the Supreme Court held that he was not entitled to an

17
individualized hearing before that rule would be applied to him. Id. at 391-92. Specif-

ically, the TCCO did not need to “provide every SVP with individualized process

every time it alter[ed] generally applicable rules or policies governing committed

SVPs.” Id. at 392. The legislative process itself sufficed.

Plaintiffs point (at 44-45) to Matzen’s initial hearing that determined that he

would be subject to the cost-recovery rules as proof that an individualized hearing is

required in their case. But Matzen’s hearing was for the purpose of determining
whether he was the kind of SVP that would, among other things, owe costs. Matzen,

659 S.W.3d at 386. Thus, when the cost rule was changed, it unquestionably applied

to him. But there is no dispute here that Plaintiffs are the kind of individuals to whom

section 108.052 applies—applicants to become licensed master social workers. No

hearing is required to establish Plaintiffs’ status under the law because there is no

risk of getting it wrong. Thus, when the social-worker requirements changed, those

changes applied to Plaintiffs without the need for a further hearing.

Regardless, Plaintiffs received due course regarding whether they met the re-

quirements to become a licensed master social worker. Each submitted their appli-

cations to the Council, and when the Council denied them, they appealed to the

Board. CR.197-98, 203-04; 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 882.3. After the Board’s ruling,

each had the opportunity to appeal to SOAH: Youniacutt dismissed her appeal to

SOAH, CR.199, and Thompson never filed one, CR.205. Plaintiffs received an indi-

vidualized determination regarding whether they met the law’s standards—they

were not entitled to another determination regarding whether they met a different

standard of their own choosing.

18
B. Matzen falls within the adjudicative/legislative framework laid out in the

State’s opening brief. Appellants’ Br. 35. Deciding whether Plaintiffs met the State’s

qualifications for becoming licensed master social workers or whether Matzen met

various SVP criteria is an adjudicative process, and each received individualized con-

sideration. See Tarrant County v. Ashmore, 635 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Tex. 1982) (describ-

ing adjudicative process). Deciding whether the State should prevent those with con-

victions for violent felonies from becoming licensed health care workers or whether
SVPs should pay certain costs is a legislative process, which does not require indi-

vidualized hearings. See id. (describing legislative fact-finding as “deal[ing] with

matters of policy and administrative discretion, and affect individual parties to a dis-

pute only to the extent that those parties are involved in the overall legislative

scheme”).

To avoid this outcome, Plaintiffs attempt to claim (at 45) that they were individ-

ually denied licenses by the Council and Board. But Plaintiffs’ failure to become li-

censed master social workers was not the result of an individualized determination

by the Council or Board. Rather, it was the result of a legislative judgment by the

Texas Legislature as expressed in section 108.052.

As the Fifth Circuit has held, “[w]hen a legislature extinguishes a property in-

terest via legislation that affects a general class of people, the legislative process pro-

vides all the process that is due.” Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2017)

(quoting McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499, 504 (5th Cir. 1993)). Thus, even if sec-

tion 108.052 impacted a liberty interest, it affects a general class of people (licensed

health care workers and applicants). Therefore, Plaintiffs (and any other health care

19
professional with a qualifying felony) have received due course from the legislative

process itself.

C. Plaintiffs rely (at 46) on cases in other jurisdictions to “show[] how laws like

[section 108.052] violate the procedural rights of people like Plaintiffs.” But the

State already explained why each of those out-of-state cases is distinguishable. See

Appellants’ Br. 40-42. The court in Fields v. Department of Early Learning did not

consider whether the rule-making process provided the constitutionally required
process, and the rule at issue appeared to exceed the bounds of the state agency’s

authority. 434 P.3d 999, 1006 (Wash. 2019). In Gregg v. Lawson, the plaintiff had a

protected property interest, something Plaintiffs have not claimed here. 732 F. Supp.

849, 853-54 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). And the Massachusetts trial court in Cronin v.

O’Leary, reached its conclusion based on the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and

Massachusetts caselaw regarding the procedural rights of those convicted of sex of-

fenses. No. 00-1713-F, 2001 WL 919969, at *5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001).

Plaintiffs do not address these distinctions.

Even if Plaintiffs’ out-of-state cases would result in a different conclusion here,

this case is controlled by Matzen, which interprets the Texas Constitution’s due-

course clause. And interpretations of that clause “lie in the text of the Texas Consti-

tution, not in the traditions, experiences, or choices of other states.” Tex. DFPS v.

Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 886 (Tex. 2025).

***

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ hyperbolic claim, the State is not asserting that laws are

constitutional “merely because they are laws.” Appellees’ Br. 44 (citing McFadden

20
v. Longham, 58 Tex. 579, 585 (1883)). But if the Legislature validly enacts a generally

applicable law, the procedural due-course clause is satisfied, regardless of whether

any other constitutional provision is violated. It is, instead, Plaintiffs’ theory that

does damage to the law. Under Plaintiffs’ broad conception of the right to work,

every time an individual cannot meet an occupational-licensing requirement, he has

a constitutional right to a hearing to ask the agency to license him anyway—regard-

less of what the Legislature has decreed. That has never been the law, nor do Plain-
tiffs point to any Texas case making such a broad pronouncement. Their procedural

due-course claim is facially invalid and should be dismissed.

IV. Section 108.052 Does Not Violate the Texas Constitution’s Guarantee
of Equal Rights.
Plaintiffs’ equal-rights claim is also facially invalid because the Legislature ra-
tionally created different professional licenses with different requirements. Plain-

tiffs’ belief that social workers are similar enough to other professions that are not

subject to section 108.052 raises an issue for the Legislature, not the courts.

A. To state a viable equal-rights claim, Plaintiffs must meet the heavy burden

of demonstrating that the challenged law is not rationally related to a legitimate gov-

ernment interest. Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 13; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. Under this

standard, a court “must uphold the law if [it] can conceive of any rational basis for

the Legislature’s action.” Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 581 (Tex. 1999).

And, indeed, Plaintiffs concede (at 49) that this constitutional test is not “subject to
courtroom factfinding.” Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 13.

21
Plaintiffs compare licensed master social workers to licensed professional coun-

selors and licensed marriage and family therapists. 3 As the State pointed out (at 45-

47), these professions all require different education and training. Tex. Occ. Code

§§ 502.252, 503.302, 505.353. And the required education for social workers is more

strict: Social workers must have a degree in “social work,” id. § 505.353(b), while

professional counselors and marriage and family therapists need a degree only in a

“related” field, id. §§ 502.252(4), 503.302(2). Each license also permits different
types of practice. Id. §§ 502.002(6), 503.003, 505.0025. Plaintiffs do not claim that

any of these distinctions are irrational—only the treatment of violent felonies in the

criminal-history consideration. As Plaintiffs argue (at 49-50), because all of these
professions may involve one-on-one sessions, it is irrational to require only social

workers to remain free from violent felonies.

But, of course, social workers do not engage only in one-on-one sessions, and the
Legislature has enacted multiple statutes that apply to social workers, but not pro-

fessional counselors or marriage and family therapists. For example, licensed clinical

and master social workers may be involved in performing a threat assessment for

students in special-education programs. Tex. Educ. Code § 37.115(d-1). Licensed so-

cial workers may attempt to achieve nonjudicial enforcement of child-support obli-

gations and access to a child. Tex. Fam. Code § 202.002(a). They may also represent

3
Plaintiffs did not brief the assertion in their live petition that it is irrational to treat
individuals with convictions for violent felonies different from those without such
convictions. CR.219 (¶¶ 240, 244). Presumably, they are no longer making that ar-
gument.

22
individuals in penal institutions who have been subjected to sexual assault. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. art. 56A.352(b-1). The National Association of Social Workers,

which Plaintiffs rely on in their brief (at 3), also explains the wide variety of situations

in which social workers are found—far beyond one-on-one counseling. See Nat’l

Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Types of Social Work (noting that “[s]ocial workers are found

in every facet of community life, including schools, hospitals, mental health clinics,

senior centers, elected office, private practices, prisons, military, corporations, and
in numerous public and private agencies”). 4

Perhaps professional counselors and marriage and family therapists should also

have been covered by section 108.052. But section 108.052 is not unconstitutionally

irrational “simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover

every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.” Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 14

(quoting McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808 (1969)). Instead, a
“legislature traditionally has been allowed to take reform ‘one step at a time, ad-

dressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative

mind[.]’” Id. (quoting McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809).

B. As with their other claims, Plaintiffs rely heavily on out-of-state cases to ar-

gue what the Texas Constitution requires. But their cases are distinguishable. In

Haveman, an intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court found that barbers and cos-
metologists would complete similar, if not the same, services on salon patrons. 238

A.3d at 579. But social workers, professional counselors, and marriage and family

4
Available at https://www.socialworkers.org/News/Facts/Types-of-Social-Work.

23
therapists perform different, if overlapping, tasks. As Plaintiffs assert in their live

petition, social workers (not counselors or therapists) are often the first points of

contact for vulnerable people looking for mental health help. See CR.206 (quoting

Stephen Simpson, A Look at the Texas Mental Health Workforce Shortage, Tex. Trib.

(July 17, 2024)). In Barletta, the law applied to all felons, not just a subset of individ-

uals with relevant felony convictions. 973 F. Supp. 2d at 137. Section 108.052, how-

ever, does not prohibit all felons from obtaining health care licenses, but only those
with convictions for violent felonies—convictions Plaintiffs agree are, at a minimum,

relevant to licensure. The rule in Gregg also covered all felony convictions, 732

F. Supp. at 851, and the court did not find an equal-protection violation—it merely

allowed the claim to proceed, id. at 856. These cases do not establish that Plaintiffs

have brought a facially valid claim; they establish only that Plaintiffs have no Texas

precedent on which to rely.

The Legislature may ultimately decide to return to individualized determina-

tions, and, indeed, one such bill was filed in the last legislative session, although it

saw little movement. Tex. H.B. 4974, 89th Leg., R.S. (2025). But what professions

require enhanced safety is a quintessentially legislative choice. The Court should not

short circuit the Legislature’s process by constitutionalizing occupational-licensing

schemes.

24
Prayer
The Court should reverse the reverse the judgment of the trial court and render

judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted.

Ken Paxton William R. Peterson
Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General

Brent Webster /s/ Beth Klusmann
First Assistant Attorney General Beth Klusmann
Assistant Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General State Bar No. 24036918
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Beth.Klusmann@oag.texas.gov
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-1700
Fax: (512) 474-2697 Counsel for Appellants

Certificate of Compliance
Microsoft Word reports that this brief contains 6,555 words, excluding ex-
empted text.

/s/ Beth Klusmann
Beth Klusmann

25
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Maria Mendoza-Williamson on behalf of Beth Klusmann
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Filing Code Description: Other Brief
Filing Description: 20250917_ Youniacutt_ Reply Brief for Appellants
Status as of 9/17/2025 4:43 PM CST

Associated Case Party: Katherin Youniacutt and Tammy Thompson

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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James T. Knight II jknight@ij.org 9/17/2025 4:19:13 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Texas State Board of Social Workers Examiners, et al.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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