Marquieus T. Gradney v. Karla R. Contreras C/O the Contreras Group

Motions Dismissed; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed June
18, 2024

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00658-CV

MARQUIEUS T. GRADNEY, Appellant
V.
KARLA R. CONTRERAS C/O THE CONTRERAS GROUP, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1184811

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this appeal from a forcible detainer action, appellant appeals the trial
court’s judgment awarding possession. Since the time that appellant filed his notice
of appeal, the writ of possession has been executed and appellant is no longer in
possession of the property in dispute. Appellant, proceeding pro se, requests that
we dismiss this appeal because he has vacated the premises. Appellant has filed
numerous motions with this court. It appears appellant further requests that the
underlying judgment be vacated. We agree the appeal is moot and order the
judgment of the trial court vacated. See Marshall v. Housing Auth. of the City of
San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) (concluding that forcible detainer
appeal was moot and that the court of appeals erred in dismissing on the appeal and
leaving the trial court’s judgment in place).

An action for forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property. Id. Judgment in a
forcible detainer case is not intended to be a final determination of whether the
eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate
possession. Id. (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.008)). The only issue in a
forcible detainer action is the right to possession of the property. Olley v. HVM,
LLC, 449 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

The question in the mootness analysis in a forcible detainer action is not
whether the appellant has moved off the premises, but whether she asserted a
potentially meritorious claim for current possession. Compare Kennedy v. Andover
Place Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006,
no pet.) (potentially meritorious claim for current possession asserted, so appeal
was not moot), and Geters v. Baytown Housing Authority, 430 S.W.3d 578, 582–
83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (same) with Briones v. Brazos
Bend Villa Apartments, 438 S.W.3d 808, 812–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (no potentially meritorious claim for current possession
asserted, so appeal was moot). In his motion to dismiss, appellant does not assert a
right to possession, instead argues for the appeal to be dismissed because the home
in which appellant resided on the premises has been torn down. On August 28,
2023, we informed appellant that the appeal was subject to dismissal for want of
jurisdiction unless a response was filed. Appellant responded that he has “no issue

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dismissing the case; as long as you all dismiss this case in its entirety.” Under
Marshall, we hold the appeal is moot and the trial court’s judgment must be
vacated. The appeal is dismissed, and all pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Wise, Bourliot, and Wilson.

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