Libny Dirk Pineda v. Christina Pineda

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 14, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00683-CV

LIBNY DIRK PINEDA, Appellant

V.
CHRISTINA PINEDA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 245th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2019-53263

MEMORANDUM OPINION
An ex-husband appeals a divorce decree complaining that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering him to make an equalization payment, allegedly
resulting in a division of community property that was punitive and not just and
right. Because no party requested, and the trial court did not make, findings of fact
and conclusions of law, we are unable to determine whether the trial court erred as
appellant claims. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellee/petitioner/counter-respondent Christina Pineda and appellant/
respondent/counter-petitioner Libny Dirk Pineda were married and had three
children. Christina filed a divorce petition and Libny filed a counter-petition. The
case was called to trial, and a jury trial proceeded on one issue regarding
conservatorship. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court conducted a
bench trial on the remaining issues. The trial court did not announce a decree at the
end of the bench trial, but shortly thereafter the trial court put a lengthy “rendition”
on the trial court’s docket sheet that allegedly is the same as a rendition contained
in an email sent by the trial court to counsel for Christina and Libny. Two months
later, the trial court signed a final divorce decree (the “Decree”). In the Decree, the
trial court ordered Libny to pay Christina $50,000 as an “equalization payment”
(the “Money Judgment”). Libny timely perfected this appeal from the Decree.1

II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

Acting pro se on appeal,2 Libny asserts a single issue:

The trial court erred in awarding [the Money Judgment] in favor of
Christina and against Libny, resulting in a property division with a

1
Within thirty days after the trial court signed the Decree, Libny filed three motions, each of
which is entitled, “Motion For Mistrial Due to Errors.” This court gives effect to the substance of
these motions, rather than their form or title. See State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829,
833 (Tex. 1980). The substance of each of these motions is a motion for new trial. These timely
filed motions for new trial extended Libny’s deadline to file his notice of appeal to ninety days
after the date on which the trial court signed the Decree. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a). Libny
complied with this deadline.
2
Though Libny was represented by counsel at trial, after trial in the trial court and in this appeal,
Libny has acted pro se. We liberally construe briefs and other filings submitted by pro se parties,
and we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys, requiring them to
comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573
S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Rogers v. City of Houston, 627 S.W.3d 777, 786 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.).

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significant disparity and that gave Libny a negative award of the
community estate. The [Money Judgment] resulted in a division that
was punitive and therefore not just and right. It should be reversed and
the case remanded for a new division of the estate.
Libny asserts that the trial court reversibly erred in awarding Christina the
Money Judgment because the judgment was not necessary to “equalize” the
division of the community property as the trial court indicated, especially given
that the trial court determined there was insufficient evidence of fraud by Libny.
Libny contends that instead of equalizing the division, the trial court effectively
awarded Libny 0% of the community property. Therefore, Libny argues that the
Money Judgment was not part of a “just and right” division of the community
property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West, Westlaw through 2023 4th
C.S.). Instead, Libny alleges that the Money Judgment was a punitive measure
designed by the trial court to punish Libny for exercising his constitutional right to
a jury trial, based on inadmissible evidence regarding settlement offers at
mediation. Libny claims that the trial court found that the Money Judgment should
be rendered against Libny because of (1) evidence of confidential and inadmissible
settlement offers at mediation, and (2) Libny’s choice to exercise his constitutional
right to try the case to a jury. Libny asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
by not making a just and right division of the community property, as required by
section 7.001 of the Family Code. See id.
The Family Code provides: “In a suit for dissolution of a marriage in which
the court has rendered a judgment dividing the estate of the parties, on request by a
party, the court shall state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
including the characterization and value of all assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets
on which disputed evidence has been presented.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.711(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2023 4th C.S.) (emphasis added). No party requested
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the trial court did not issue any. Libny

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appears to rely on alleged findings of fact contained in the trial court’s rendition
that was made on the court’s docket sheet. In the rendition made on the docket
sheet the trial court states a value for Vepic Energy & Resources, a business run by
Libny that was community property, but the trial court does not state the value of
any other community property.3 In this rendition the trial court refers to the
“Court’s Property Division,” which the trial court says was filed with the trial court
and attached to an email containing the rendition. This “Court’s Property Division”
is not in our appellate record, nor is any email from the trial court containing this
document or the rendition.4 Nonetheless, we presume for the sake of argument that
the trial court emailed a rendition to the parties’ counsel that was the same as the
rendition contained on the court’s docket sheet and that had a document attached to
it stating values for each item of community property.

To determine whether the assets of the community estate were divided in a
“just and right” manner, an appellate court must have the trial court’s findings on
the value of those assets. Vasudevan v. Vasudevan, No. 14-14-00765-CV, 2015
WL 4774569, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Without findings of fact, we do not know the basis for the division, the
values assigned to the community assets, or the percentage of the marital estate
that each party received. Id. In the absence of such findings, we presume the trial
court made all the necessary findings to support its judgment. Id. Statements made
by the trial court in a rendition or at the bench trial are no substitute for findings of

3
In the Decree, the trial court states a value for a couple of items of community property, but the
trial court does not state a value for most items of community property, including Vepic Energy
& Resources.
4
Items 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the appendix attached to Libny’s opening brief are not contained in our
appellate record. With limited exceptions not relevant to these items, an appellate court may not
consider matters outside the appellate record. In re C.C.E., 530 S.W.3d 314, 317, n.1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Therefore, we do not consider these items. See id.

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fact and conclusions of law, and we may not consider such statements to be
findings of fact or conclusions of law. See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716
(Tex. 1984); In re J.C., 346 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2011, no pet.).

The trial court did not file, nor did any party request, findings of fact or
conclusions of law reflecting the value the court assigned to each asset or liability,
the net value of the community property, or the factors considered by the trial court
in dividing the marital community property. See Vasudevan, 2015 WL 4774569, at
*4. Although the trial court made statements in its rendition regarding the division
of the community property and the values the court assigned to certain assets, these
statements are not findings of fact or conclusions of law.5 See In re W.E.R., 669
S.W.2d at 716; Vasudevan, 2015 WL 4774569, at *4; In re J.C., 346 S.W.3d at
193. Any inventory filed by Christina or Libny that assigns values to any items of
community property cannot serve as a substitute for findings of fact by the trial
court. See Hubbert v. Hubbert, No. 01-20-00065-CV, 2021 WL 4780090, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Vasudevan,
2015 WL 4774569, at *4. Consequently, we have no way to determine that the trial
court abused its discretion in dividing the community property. See Hubbert, 2021
WL 4780090, at *3; Vasudevan, 2015 WL 4774569, at *4. The trial court could
have considered any number or combination of factors to arrive at the division it

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In the rendition recited on the docket sheet, the trial court stated that the equalization payment
that Libny had to make to Christina “is necessary to effect a just and right division based on the
grounds pleaded for a disproportionate division by [Christina] and, specifically, that [Libny]
greatly exacerbated the costs of litigation in this matter, including but not limited to declining a
settlement offer more favorable than the foregoing result and instead trying his case to a jury
who returned a verdict against him within approximately 10 minutes of beginning deliberation.”
Though Libny challenges this “finding” on appeal, it is not a finding of fact, and the trial court
did not include any statement in the Decree as to the reasons for its division of the community
property or for ordering Libny to pay the Money Judgment. See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 716;
In re J.C., 346 S.W.3d at 193.

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made of the community property. See id. Because we do not know what values the
trial court assigned to the community property assets or the percentage of the
property awarded to each party, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering Libny to pay the Money Judgment or in dividing the
community property. See Hubbert, 2021 WL 4780090, at *3; Vasudevan, 2015 WL
4774569, at *4. Accordingly, we overrule Libny’s sole issue and affirm the
Decree.

/s/ Randy Wilson
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.

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