In the Matter of S.L.S., a Juvenile v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed May 16, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00944-CV

IN THE MATTER OF S.L.S., A JUVENILE

On Appeal from the 13th District Court
Navarro County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D2356-JV

MAJORITY OPINION
Appellant was adjudicated as a juvenile for engaging in delinquent conduct
by committing the offense of murder. Under a single issue she presents three
arguments challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence.
Concluding that appellant failed to preserve error in the trial court as to each of
these arguments, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of December 21, 2021, officers of the Navarro
County Sheriff’s Department were called to a rural residential area in western
Navarro County. The officers arrived and were notified of a deceased man in his
trailer. The officers investigated and developed a suspect, a 14-year-old female
named Jane.1 Realizing Jane was a juvenile, they called for a magistrate to come
and give her certain statutory warnings as prescribed by the Family Code.

Judge Jackie Freeland, a justice of the peace who was already in the area to
perform the inquest, was asked to perform those duties. Judge Freeland arrived and
talked to Jane in a bedroom in her house with her mother and stepfather present,
but without any police officers present. Judge Freeland recited various rights that
Jane had. Jane indicated that she understood these rights. Jane signed an
acknowledgment, and Judge Freeland signed a certificate. Jane made and signed a
handwritten statement that Judge Freeland also signed (the “Written Statement”)
stating that she did not regret killing the complainant.

After Jane made the Written Statement, Officer Jeff Harbuck took Jane on a
walk around the outside of the house, looking for knives that Jane had thrown
down as she returned to her house from the complainant’s trailer. During this walk
Jane answered questions from Officer Harbuck (the “Walkabout Statements”). A
bodycam video recorded the Walkabout Statements, but the statements were not
reduced to writing. Some of the Walkabout Statements were incriminating.

Later that day Jane was taken to the offices of the Navarro County Sheriff’s
Department in Corsicana, where Judge Freeland spoke with Jane again and then
Officers Jeff Harbuck and Caleb Loftis interviewed her; Jane answered the
officers’ questions (the “Sheriff’s Office Statements”). The Sheriff’s Office
Statements were video recorded, but these statements were not reduced to writing.
In the Sheriff’s Office Statements Jane confessed that she had killed the

1
Jane is a pseudonym. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.8, we use this fictitious name
to identify appellant, a minor involved in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.

2
complainant by stabbing him in the chest with a knife.

On the next day an Assistant Criminal District Attorney for Navarro County
filed a “State’s Original Determinate Sentence Adjudication Petition and Notice of
Intention to Seek Approval of Grand Jury” (“Petition”). The Petition alleged that
Jane engaged in delinquent conduct by committing murder in violation of section
19.02(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code and that she used a deadly weapon during the
commission of the offense. A Navarro County Grand Jury later certified and
approved the Petition.

Jane filed an Amended Motion to Suppress Statements (“Motion to
Suppress”) in which she asked the trial court to suppress any and all confessions or
statements taken from Jane for various reasons. The trial court held a hearing on
the Motion to Suppress, at which Judge Freeland, Officer Harbuck, and Officer
Palos testified. The trial court signed an order denying the Motion to Suppress and
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.

After this ruling Jane signed a stipulation of evidence, in which she agreed
and stipulated that on or about December 21, 2021, she intentionally and
knowingly caused the death of the complainant by stabbing him with a knife,
which Jane agreed was a deadly weapon. Jane signed a document waiving her right
to a jury trial, her right to a contested adjudication hearing, and her right to a
contested hearing before the judge for disposition. The trial court conducted an
adjudication hearing and based on the stipulation of evidence found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jane engaged in delinquent conduct by committing murder in
violation of Penal Code section 19.02(b)(1), as alleged in the Petition. The trial
court also found that Jane used a deadly weapon, a knife, during the commission of
the charged offense. The trial court conducted an adjudication hearing and ordered
that Jane be committed to the care, custody, and control of the Texas Juvenile

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Justice Department for a period not to exceed 20 years. The trial court signed a
final Order of Adjudication and Disposition, and Jane timely perfected this appeal
from the order to the Tenth Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Texas ordered
the appeal transferred to this court.2

II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

In her sole appellate issue Jane asserts that because the State failed to strictly
comply with the mandates of Family Code section 51.095, the trial court erred in
denying the Motion to Suppress. Under this issue, Jane asserts three arguments as
to why the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress:

(1) The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress as to the
Written Statement because (a) Judge Freeland did not comply with
Family Code section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) because he did not sign a
written statement verifying that Judge Freeland is fully convinced that
Jane understands the nature and contents of the Written Statement and
that she is signing the Written Statement voluntarily; and (b) Judge
Freeland did not comply with Family Code section 51.095(a)(1)(D)
because he did not certify that Judge Freeland has examined Jane
independent of any law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney,
except as required to ensure the personal safety of Judge Freeland or
other court personnel, and has determined that Jane understands the
nature and contents of the statement and has knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived the rights listed in Family Code section
51.095(a)(1)(A) (the “First Argument”).
(2) The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress as to the
Walkabout Statements because the recording of these statements does
not contain the magistrate warnings described by section
51.095(a)(1)(A) as a part of the recording, thus violating Family Code
section 51.095(a)(5)(A) (the “Second Argument”).

2
In transfer cases, the transferee court must decide the appeal in accordance with the precedent
of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee court’s decision otherwise
would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court. See Tex. R. App. P.
41.3.

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(3) The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress as to the
Sheriff’s Office Statements because the recording of these statements
does not contain the magistrate warnings described by section
51.095(a)(1)(A) as a part of the recording, thus violating Family Code
section 51.095(a)(5)(A) (the “Third Argument”).
Family Code section 51.095 provides in its entirety as follows:

(a) Notwithstanding Section 51.09, the statement of a child is
admissible in evidence in any future proceeding concerning the matter
about which the statement was given if:

(1) the statement is made in writing under a circumstance described
by Subsection (d) and:
(A) the statement shows that the child has at some time before the
making of the statement received from a magistrate a warning that:
(i) the child may remain silent and not make any statement at all
and that any statement that the child makes may be used in evidence
against the child;
(ii) the child has the right to have an attorney present to advise
the child either prior to any questioning or during the questioning;
(iii) if the child is unable to employ an attorney, the child has the
right to have an attorney appointed to counsel with the child before or
during any interviews with peace officers or attorneys representing the
state; and
(iv) the child has the right to terminate the interview at any time;
(B) and:
(i) the statement must be signed in the presence of a magistrate
by the child with no law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney
present, except that a magistrate may require a bailiff or a law
enforcement officer if a bailiff is not available to be present if the
magistrate determines that the presence of the bailiff or law
enforcement officer is necessary for the personal safety of the
magistrate or other court personnel, provided that the bailiff or law
enforcement officer may not carry a weapon in the presence of the
child; and
(ii) the magistrate must be fully convinced that the child
understands the nature and contents of the statement and that the
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child is signing the same voluntarily, and if a statement is taken,
the magistrate must sign a written statement verifying the
foregoing requisites have been met;
(C) the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives
these rights before and during the making of the statement and signs
the statement in the presence of a magistrate; and
(D) the magistrate certifies that the magistrate has examined
the child independent of any law enforcement officer or
prosecuting attorney, except as required to ensure the personal
safety of the magistrate or other court personnel, and has
determined that the child understands the nature and contents of
the statement and has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived these rights;
(2) the statement is made orally and the child makes a statement of
facts or circumstances that are found to be true and tend to establish
the child’s guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or
the instrument with which the child states the offense was committed;
(3) the statement was res gestae of the delinquent conduct or the
conduct indicating a need for supervision or of the arrest;
(4) the statement is made:
(A) in open court at the child’s adjudication hearing;
(B) before a grand jury considering a petition, under Section
53.045, that the child engaged in delinquent conduct; or
(C) at a preliminary hearing concerning the child held in
compliance with this code, other than at a detention hearing
under Section 54.01; or
(5) subject to Subsection (f), the statement is made orally under a
circumstance described by Subsection (d) and the statement is
recorded by an electronic recording device, including a device that
records images, and:
(A) before making the statement, the child is given the
warning described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the
warning is a part of the recording, and the child knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives each right stated in the warning;
(B) the recording device is capable of making an accurate
recording, the operator of the device is competent to use the device,
6
the recording is accurate, and the recording has not been altered;
(C) each voice on the recording is identified; and
(D) not later than the 20th day before the date of the proceeding,
the attorney representing the child is given a complete and accurate
copy of each recording of the child made under this subdivision.
(b) This section and Section 51.09 do not preclude the admission of a
statement made by the child if:
(1) the statement does not stem from interrogation of the child under
a circumstance described by Subsection (d); or
(2) without regard to whether the statement stems from interrogation
of the child under a circumstance described by Subsection (d), the
statement is:
(A) voluntary and has a bearing on the credibility of the child as a
witness; or
(B) recorded by an electronic recording device, including a device
that records images, and is obtained:
(i) in another state in compliance with the laws of that state or
this state; or
(ii) by a federal law enforcement officer in this state or another
state in compliance with the laws of the United States.
(c) An electronic recording of a child’s statement made under
Subsection (a)(5) or (b)(2)(B) shall be preserved until all juvenile or
criminal matters relating to any conduct referred to in the statement
are final, including the exhaustion of all appeals, or barred from
prosecution.
(d) Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5) apply to the statement of a child
made:
(1) while the child is in a detention facility or other place of
confinement;
(2) while the child is in the custody of an officer; or
(3) during or after the interrogation of the child by an officer if the
child is in the possession of the Department of Family and Protective
Services and is suspected to have engaged in conduct that violates a
penal law of this state.

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(e) A juvenile law referee or master may perform the duties imposed
on a magistrate under this section without the approval of the juvenile
court if the juvenile board of the county in which the statement of the
child is made has authorized a referee or master to perform the duties
of a magistrate under this section.
(f) A magistrate who provides the warnings required by Subsection
(a)(5) for a recorded statement may at the time the warnings are
provided request by speaking on the recording that the officer return
the child and the recording to the magistrate at the conclusion of the
process of questioning. The magistrate may then view the recording
with the child or have the child view the recording to enable the
magistrate to determine whether the child’s statements were given
voluntarily. The magistrate’s determination of voluntariness shall be
reduced to writing and signed and dated by the magistrate. If a
magistrate uses the procedure described by this subsection, a child’s
statement is not admissible unless the magistrate determines that the
statement was given voluntarily.
Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.095 (West, Westlaw through 2023 4th C.S.)
(emphasis added).

A. Do the legal standards from criminal cases govern the analysis of
preservation of error in today’s case?

Although juvenile cases are civil proceedings for which the Supreme Court
of Texas is the court of last resort, juvenile cases are also quasi-criminal and thus
bear different consideration with regard to issue preservation. See In re C.O.S., 988
S.W.2d 760, 765–66 (Tex. 1999); In re A.I., 82 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2002, pet. denied). The Supreme Court of Texas has concluded that
appellate courts in juvenile cases should apply the legal standards that apply to
preservation of error in adult criminal proceedings. See In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d at
765–66. Thus, the Supreme Court of Texas adopted the three categories from the
Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion in Marin v. State. See In re C.O.S., 988
S.W.2d at 765; Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
The three categories are: (1) rights considered “so fundamental to the proper

8
functioning of our adjudicatory process that they cannot be forfeited” by a
defendant’s inaction—called “absolute rights or prohibitions and systemic
requirements”; (2) rights that are “‘not forfeitable,’ meaning that they cannot be
lost by inaction but that they are ‘waivable’ if the waiver is affirmatively, plainly,
freely, and intelligently made”; and (3) “forfeitable” rights, which are rights the
trial court has a duty to enforce when requested but that can be waived by a failure
to call the trial court’s attention to the error. In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d at 765–66.
Whether evidence of statements by Jane should be suppressed for failure to comply
with various parts of Family Code 51.095 falls into the third category of rights that
can be waived by a failure to call the trial court’s attention to the error. See
Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); In re A.A.M.,
414 S.W.3d 387, 389–90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).

B. Did Jane preserve error in the trial court on her three arguments?

Before addressing the merits of Jane’s three arguments, we first decide
whether Jane preserved error on these arguments in the trial court. Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) provides that a complaint is not preserved for appeal
unless it was made to the trial court “by a timely request, objection or motion” that
“stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial
court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint,
unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a). Likewise, under Rule 103 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, error may not
be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless “a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.” Tex. R. Evid.
103.

The purpose of requiring a specific objection in the trial court is twofold: (1)
9
to inform the trial court of the basis of the objection and give the trial court an
opportunity to rule on it; (2) to give opposing counsel the opportunity to respond to
the complaint. See Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 312. Although there are no technical
considerations or forms of words required to preserve an error for appeal, a party
must be specific enough so as to “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he
thinks himself entitled to it, and do so clearly enough for the judge to understand
him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.”
Id. at 312–13 (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992)). The parties, not the judge, are responsible for the correct application of
evidentiary rules; in order to preserve a complaint for appeal, the complaining
party must have done everything necessary to bring the relevant evidentiary rule
and its precise and proper application to the trial court’s attention. See Resendez,
306 S.W.3d at 313.
But we cannot consider just the specific complaint in question; we must also
look at the context. See id. When the correct ground for exclusion was obvious to
the judge and opposing counsel, no forfeiture results from a general or imprecise
objection. See id. But when the context shows that a party failed to effectively
communicate his argument, then the error will be deemed forfeited on appeal. See
id.
1. Jane’s Written Motion to Suppress
Jane’s written Motion to Suppress was two-pages long. Jane’s argument
with respect to section 51.095 consisted of two sentences: (1) “[s]tatements made
by [Jane] were taken without the safeguards required by and in violation of . . . the
requirements of . . . [s]ection 51.095 of the Texas Family Code”; and (2) “[t]he
admission of statements by [Jane] is a violation of [Jane’s] rights pursuant to
section 51.095 of the Texas Family Code.” In the motion, Jane does not specify
which of section 51.095’s many requirements she alleges were violated. The
10
statements in the motion are general, and no statement brings any specific violation
of section 51.095 to the trial court’s attention. See id. No statement in the written
Motion to Suppress apprises the trial court of any of Jane’s three arguments on
appeal or makes any of these arguments apparent from the context. See id. at 313.
2. The Statements of Jane’s Trial Counsel at the Hearing
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Jane’s counsel:
(1) asserted “that certain procedural and requirements [sic] under . . .
[s]ection 51.095 of the Family Code were missed . . . in the rendition
of [Jane’s] rights and the taking of her statement.”
(2) asserted that the Walkabout Statements and the Sheriff’s Office
Statements were not voluntary, “that the statute, the Miranda statute
was not fully complied with, that there wasn’t a finding of
voluntariness, that the statute was not, that 38.22 was not followed,
and that not all voices were identified, and that the officers wore their
weapons during . . . both interviews”;
(3) quoted section 51.095(a)(2), which provides that a child’s
statement is admissible in evidence if “the statement is made orally
and the child makes a statement of facts or circumstances that are
found to be true and tend to establish the child’s guilt, such as the
finding of secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with which
the child states the offense was committed” Tex. Family Code Ann. §
51.095(a)(2);
(4) quoted section 51.095(f) and stated that this section has “a
requirement of a finding of voluntariness of the statement that was
made”;
(5) referred to the part of section 51.095(d) that says “[s]ubsections
(a)(1) and (a)(5) apply to the statement of a child made . . .while the
child is in a detention facility”;
(6) observed that that the warnings that Judge Freeland gave may
apply to the Written Statement and appear to contain “all of the
subject warnings for Miranda”;
(7) stated, “I would concede probably that the [Written Statement] is
probably admissible”;
(8) argued that the warnings given before the Sheriff’s Office

11
Statements were incomplete because the warnings did not “go into the
details of the full requirements under 38.22”;
(9) cited a case in which the court concluded that section 51.095 had
been violated because the child was not warned that any statement by
the child could be used as evidence against the child;
(10) asserted that today’s case involves a similar situation because not
all of the Miranda warnings required by article 38.22 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure were given;
(11) asserted that there is no voluntariness finding by Judge Freeland
under section 51.095(f);
(12) described the Fourth Court of Appeals’s opinion in Reta v. State,
as well as this court’s opinion in Carter v. State, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals’s opinion in Carter v. State;
(13) noted that Judge Freeland signed a certification in the Written
Statement in which he certified that “the statutory rights and warnings
listed on page one of this Magistrate’s Juvenile Warning were read
and explained to the juvenile. I have determined the juvenile
understands the nature and contents of the warning and voluntarily
signed the above Acknowledgment.”
(14) stated that this certification was “the only thing that Judge
Freeland testified to, or the only thing he touched on as to the issue of
making a voluntariness assignment as to anything”; and
(15) stated that Judge Freeland’s certification “is not after [Jane]
signed the [Written Statement], it’s not after the [Walkabout
Statements], and it’s certainly not six hours later after she makes the
full-blown confession to Officer Harbuck [in the Sheriff’s Office
Statements]. There is no finding of voluntariness.”
The assertion by Jane’s counsel “that certain procedural and requirements
[sic] under . . . [s]ection 51.095 of the Family Code were missed” is general and
did not bring any specific violation of section 51.095 to the trial court’s attention.
See Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313. At no point in the written Motion to Suppress or
at the hearing on the motion, does Jane’s counsel state any of the following:
(1) Judge Freeland failed to comply with Family Code section
51.095(a)(1);

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(2) the Written Statement does not comply with Family Code section
51.095(a)(1);
(3) Judge Freeland failed to sign a written statement verifying that he
is fully convinced that (a) Jane understands the nature and contents of
the Written Statement; and (b) Jane is signing the Written Statement
voluntarily;
(4) Judge Freeland failed to certify something;
(5) Judge Freeland failed to certify that (a) he has examined Jane
independent of any law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney,
except as required to ensure the personal safety of Judge Freeland or
other court personnel; and (b) Judge Freeland has determined that
Jane understands the nature and contents of the Written Statement and
has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights listed
in Family Code section 51.095(a)(1)(A);
(6) a recording of any statement by Jane does not comply with any
part of Family Code section 51.095(a)(5);3
(7) the recording of the Walkabout Statements does not contain the
magistrate warnings described by section 51.095(a)(1)(A) as a part of
the recording; or
(8) the recording of the Sheriff’s Office Statements does not contain
the magistrate warnings described by section 51.095(a)(1)(A) as a part
of the recording.
During his closing argument at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress,
Jane’s counsel stated that “Subsection (f) of 51.095, at the end of that statute, talks
about a magistrate making a finding of voluntariness of the statement.” Counsel
then quoted subsection (f) in its entirety. Counsel stated that under section
51.095(f) there is “a requirement of a finding of voluntariness of the statement that
was made,” thus indicating that Judge Freeland was required to make a finding of
voluntariness under Family Code section 51.095(f). Under section 51.095(f), a
magistrate who provides the warnings required by section 51.095(a)(5) for a

3
Though he did not assert any such failure to comply with Family Code section 51.095(a)(5),
Jane’s counsel did quote the following part of section 51.095(a)(5): “[s]ubject to Subsection (f),
the statement is made orally under [a] circumstance[] described in Subsection (d).”

13
recorded statement may at the time the warnings are provided request by speaking
on the recording that the officer return the child and the recording to the magistrate
at the conclusion of the process of questioning. See Tex. Family Code Ann. §
51.095(f); State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 735, 741–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). If the
magistrate elects to use this procedure, the magistrate may then view the recording
with the child or have the child view the recording to enable the magistrate to
determine whether the child’s statements were given voluntarily, and the
magistrate will make a written, signed, and dated determination as to whether the
child made the statement voluntarily. See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.095(f);
Torres, 666 S.W.3d at 741–42. If the magistrate uses the subsection(f) procedure,
the child’s statement is not admissible unless the magistrate determines that the
child made the statement voluntarily. See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.095(f);
Torres, 666 S.W.3d at 741–42.

After quoting section 51.095(f) and incorrectly indicating that section
51.095(f) required Judge Freeland to make a finding of voluntariness even if he did
not choose to use the subsection (f) procedure, Jane’s counsel stated once that
Judge Freeland did not make the finding of voluntariness required by section
51.095(f), and counsel stated four other times that Judge Freeland did not make a
finding of voluntariness, without referring to any statute. In this context, the four
general statements that Judge Freeland failed to make a finding of voluntariness
refer to section 51.095(f) rather than to the requirement of a written statement
under section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) or the requirement of a certification under section
51.095(a)(1)(D). See Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 315. For a child’s written statement
section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) requires the magistrate to sign a written statement
verifying that the magistrate is fully convinced that the child understands the
nature and contents of the written statement and that the child is signing the written

14
statement voluntarily. For a child’s written statement section 51.095(a)(1)(D)
requires the magistrate to certify that (1) the magistrate has examined the child
independent of any law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney, except as
required to ensure the personal safety of the magistrate or other court personnel,
and (2) the magistrate has determined that the child understands the nature and
contents of the written statement and has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived the rights listed in Family Code section 51.095(a)(1)(A). See Tex. Family
Code Ann. §51.095(a)(1). Though voluntariness is one of the items included in the
magistrate’s written statement under section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) and the
magistrate’s certification under section 51.095(a)(1)(D), other elements are
required in the written statement and the certification. The only element at issue
under section 51.095(f) is the voluntariness of the statement. Jane’s counsel’s
emphasis on section 51.095(f) and his mention only of a failure to make a finding
of voluntariness show that his four general statements that there was no
voluntariness finding refer to an alleged violation of section 51.095(f), rather than
an alleged violation of section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) or section 51.095(a)(1)(D). The
trial court’s findings of fact show that the trial court understood Jane to be
complaining of an alleged failure to comply with section 51.095(f) but not an
alleged failure to comply with section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) or section
51.095(a)(1)(D). The trial court found that Judge Freeland did not request under
section 51.095(f) that the officers return Jane and the recording to Judge Freeland
at the conclusion of questioning. Judge Freeland’s failure to make this request
meant that he was not using the section 51.095(f) procedure and that he did not
need to make any finding of voluntariness under section 51.095(f). See Tex.
Family Code Ann. § 51.095(f); Torres, 666 S.W.3d at 741–42. The trial court did
not make any finding of fact addressing either section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) or
section 51.095(a)(1)(D).
15
The statements in the Motion to Suppress and the statements of Jane’s
counsel at the hearing were not specific enough to let the trial court know that Jane
wanted the trial court to suppress the Written Statement because Judge Freeland
allegedly failed to comply with Family Code section 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) or section
51.095(a)(1)(D). See Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313–16. Jane did not state the First
Argument with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of this argument,
and the First Argument was not apparent from the context. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a); Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313–16. We conclude that Jane did not preserve
error in the trial court as to the First Argument. See Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313–
16; Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275, 282–83 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012),
aff’d, 395 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Pham v. State, 125 S.W.3d 622,
629–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff’d, 175 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005).

The statements in the Motion to Suppress and the statements of Jane’s
counsel at the hearing were not specific enough to let the trial court know that Jane
wanted the trial court to suppress evidence of the Walkabout Statements or of the
Sheriff’s Office Statements because the recording of these statements does not
contain the magistrate warnings described by section 51.095(a)(1)(A) as a part of
the recording, as required by Family Code section 51.095(a)(5)(A). See Resendez,
306 S.W.3d at 313–16. Jane did not state the Second Argument or the Third
Argument with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of either
argument, and neither argument was apparent from the context. See Tex. R. App.
P. 33.1(a); Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313–16. We conclude that Jane did not
preserve error in the trial court as to either the Second Argument or the Third
Argument. See Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313–16; Herring, 359 S.W.3d at 282–83;
Pham, 125 S.W.3d at 629–30.

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III. CONCLUSION

Under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that Jane did not
assert any of her three appellate arguments in the trial court with sufficient
specificity to make the trial court aware of any of these arguments, and none of
these arguments was apparent from the context. Because Jane did not preserve
error in the trial court as to any of these arguments, we overrule her sole issue and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Randy Wilson
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson (Spain, J., dissenting).

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