Jesus Yanez v. Oilpatch NDT, LLC

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 27, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00417-CV

JESUS YANEZ, Appellant

V.
OILPATCH NDT, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 11th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2020-06236A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

At 2:20 a.m. on Christmas Eve in 2018, Jose Magana Garcia was drunk and
under the influence of cocaine and barbiturates when he blacked out while driving
his employer’s vehicle, ran a red light, and crashed into a vehicle driven by Jesus
Yanez. Yanez was injured, and he sued Yanez’s employer, OilPatch NDT, LLC, for
negligent supervision and negligent training. The trial court granted summary-
judgment in OilPatch’s favor. Because there is no evidence that the accident was
proximately caused by OilPatch’s negligence in supervising or training Garcia, we
affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Sunday, December 23, 2018, was not a workday for Garcia. That afternoon,
he went to his coworker Rafael’s apartment to watch a couple of soccer games on
television. Garcia’s vehicle had broken down, so he drove his employer’s Chevrolet
Equinox.

Garcia spent several hours drinking while watching the games. By the time he
decided to go home, Garcia knew that his drinking had made it unsafe for him to
drive and that he was endangering anyone else on the road on his way home. Garcia
remembers leaving his friend’s house but then he blacked out.

The next thing Garcia recalls is the side of Yanez’s pickup truck so close in
front of him it was too late for him to brake. Garcia, traveling south, “T-boned” the
passenger side of Yanez’s truck, which was traveling west. Although both vehicles
sustained major damage, Garcia’s vehicle kept going, now traveling west in the
eastbound lane of traffic, until it struck yet another vehicle.

Both Garcia and Yanez were taken by ambulance to a hospital. There,
Garcia’s blood tested positive for barbituates, cocaine, and alcohol. His blood-
alcohol level was .261—more than three times the legal limit1—and he was cited for
driving while intoxicated.

Yanez sued Garcia and Garcia’s employer OilPatch. The trial court granted
summary judgment on all of the claims against OilPatch, but on appeal, Yanez

“Intoxicated” is defined as having 0.08 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. TEX.
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PENAL CODE § 49.01.

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challenges the rulings only of his negligent-supervision and negligent-training
claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In separate issues, Yanez challenges the summary judgment on his negligent
supervision and negligent training claims. OilPatch’s summary-judgment motion
was a hybrid, combining a no-evidence motion with a traditional motion for
summary judgment. We review both traditional and no-evidence summary
judgments de novo. See Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. 2014)
(per curiam). Where, as here, a successful movant sought both no-evidence and
traditional summary judgment, and the record does not reveal the grounds on which
the trial court may have granted judgment, we review the no-evidence grounds first.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant asserts that there
is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the claim or defense for which
the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see Timpte
Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the
elements specified in the motion. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572,
582 (Tex. 2006). We will affirm a no-evidence summary judgment when (a) there is
a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law
or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact,
(c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or
(d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. See City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).

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III. ANALYSIS

To prevail on claims of negligent supervision or training, a plaintiff must
prove that the employer owed the plaintiff a legal duty to supervise or train its
employees; that the employer breached that duty; and that the breach proximately
caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Rayner v. Claxton, 659 S.W.3d 223, 248 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2022, no pet.); Najera v. Recana Sols., LLC, No. 14-14-00332-CV, 2015
WL 4985085, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op.). OilPatch sought no-evidence summary judgment on the ground, among others,
that there is no evidence that a breach of the duty to supervise or train Garcia
proximately caused Yanez’s injuries.

Proximate cause consists of cause-in-fact and foreseeability. Rattray v. City
of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 874 (Tex. 2023). Cause-in-fact is established when
“‘the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury’ and,
without it, the harm would not have occurred.” Id. (quoting Nixon v. Mr. Prop.
Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985)). Foreseeability requires the defendant
to have reasonably anticipated the dangers that his negligent conduct created for
others. Id.

As to both his negligent-supervision and his negligent-training claim, Yanez
argues that the accident was proximately caused by Garcia’s (a) personal use of the
company vehicle, and (b) driving while intoxicated.

A. Personal Use of the Company Vehicle

Yanez maintains that the accident and his resulting injuries would have been
avoided but for OilPatch’s (1) negligent supervision in failing to put a tracking
device on the vehicle, or (2) OilPatch’s negligent training in failing to inform Garcia
that company policy forbade personal use of the vehicle.

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There is no evidence that OilPatch’s failure to put a tracking device on the
vehicle or to tell Garcia not to use the vehicle for personal trips was a cause-in-fact
of the accident. A tracking device might reveal that Garcia had used the vehicle for
personal trips, but there is no evidence it would have prevented him from doing so.
Additionally, it was already Garcia’s personal policy to use the vehicle only for
work-related purposes. Inasmuch as he was already violating his personal policy by
driving OilPatch’s vehicle on this occasion, there is no reason to suppose that he
would not have violated his employer’s policy as well, had he known of it. Because
there is no evidence that Garcia had ever used the company vehicle for personal
reasons before, there is no support for Yanez’s assertion that Garcia would not have
had the use of the company vehicle that night if the vehicle was equipped with a
tracking device or if OilPatch had informed Garcia of its no-personal-use policy.

These arguments suffer from the same flaw: there is no evidence that the
accident and Yanez’s resulting injuries occurred because of what Garcia was driving,
that is, a Chevrolet Equinox owned by his employer. Rather, the accident occurred
because of how Garcia was driving: he struck Yanez’s pickup truck because he was
intoxicated and ran a red light. Yanez produced no evidence that the accident would
not have occurred if Garcia had been driving a vehicle that Garcia personally owned,
borrowed, or rented. There also is no support for Yanez’s assumption that, but for
his access to the company vehicle, Garcia would not have been driving at all that
night.

As for foreseeability, Yanez asserts that it is foreseeable that an employee
might put a company vehicle to personal use. But, there is no evidence that it was
foreseeable that Garcia would drive while intoxicated.

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B. OilPatch’s Anti-Drug, Anti-Weapons and Alcohol Program

OilPatch has an “Anti-Drug, Anti-Weapons and Alcohol Program” intended
“to reduce accidents that result from the illegal use of controlled substance[s],” but
Garcia testified in his deposition that he was not informed of the policy. Yanez
argues that OilPatch negligently supervised Garcia by failing to conduct pre-
employment and annual tests for prohibited drugs and alcohol as specified in the
company policy and negligently trained Garcia by failing to tell Garcia about the
policy.

There is no evidence that the accident would not have happened but for
OilPatch’s failure to test Garcia for illegal drugs or alcohol or to inform Garcia that
the illegal use of controlled substances is against company policy. Garcia already
knew that driving while intoxicated is against the law, and that the use of illegal
drugs is, by definition, illegal. See Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801
S.W.2d 523, 525 n.3 (Tex. 1990) (“[A]ll persons are presumed to know the law.”).
There is no evidence that Garcia, though willing to commit illegal acts on this
particular occasion, would have abstained from those same acts had he but known
that they were against company policy. Moreover, there is no evidence that Garcia
would have tested positive for drugs and alcohol at a pre-employment or annual
screening.

Finally, Yanez failed in his summary-judgment response to address
foreseeability in connection with OilPatch’s failure to inform Garcia of its anti-drug
policy or to perform pre-hiring and annual testing.

There being no evidence that the accident was proximately caused by
OilPatch’s negligent supervision or training, we overrule both issues.

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IV. CONCLUSION

To prove negligent supervision or training, the plaintiff’s harm must be the
result of the employee’s employment. See Rayner, 659 S.W.3d at 248–49; Wheeler
v. Free, 638 S.W.3d 731, 738–39 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. denied). In this
case, there is no evidence of proximate cause connecting Yanez’s injuries to
OilPatch’s conduct. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Tracy Christopher
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.

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