Treneice Landry Hills v. Milton Wyatt Martin

Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 19, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00621-CV

TRENEICE LANDRY HILLS, Appellant
V.
MILTON WYATT MARTIN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 295th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-15055

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Treneice Landry Hills filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s May 24, 2023 “Order Granting Milton Wyatt Martin’s Rule 91a Motion to
Dismiss Baseless Cause of Action.” On appeal, she contends the trial court erred
in granting Appellee Milton Wyatt Martin’s motion to dismiss because (1) the
motion was procedurally improper under the Texas Tort Claims Act; (2) Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.106 “does not apply to claims
against individuals who cause accidents while not in the course and scope of
employment for the governmental entity”; and (3) the policy behind the Texas Tort
Claims Act is not furthered by dismissing Martin from the suit. We dismiss the
appeal for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2023, Hills sued Defendants Martin, the City of Houston, State
Farm Automobile Insurance Company, and XCZ Insurance Company. In her
original petition, Hills alleged that Martin, who is a police officer employed by the
City of Houston, “aggressively and forcefully accelerated his vehicle in a forward-
like motion and, while moving at an alarming speed, violently smashed its front-
end into the back-passenger side of” Hills’ vehicle, causing her injuries and
damages to her vehicle. Hills asserted negligence claims.

State Farm filed its original answer, asserting a general denial on March 31,
2023. The City of Houston filed its original answer and special exceptions on
April 10, 2023, asserting, among other things, a general denial and governmental
immunity from suit and liability “to all of Plaintiff’s claims.” On April 20, 2023,
Martin filed his Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss Baseless Cause of Action, and a few
weeks later, Hills filed her Opposition to Milton Wyatt Martin’s Rule 91a Motion
to Dismiss. On May 24, 2023, the trial court signed an order granting Martin’s
motion to dismiss.

On June 22, 2023, Hills filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial, and
two weeks later, Martin filed his response to Hills’ motion. On July 13, 2023, the
trial court denied Hills’ motion. She filed a notice of appeal on August 22, 2023.1

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Hills and Martin are the only parties who filed briefs in this court.

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JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, we consider whether we have jurisdiction to address the
merits of this appeal. Martin argues in his brief that this court lacks jurisdiction
over Hills’ appeal because it is an interlocutory appeal that is not authorized by
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014. Without citing any
authority, Hills responds that “the record clearly demonstrates that the order was
final and appealable, as was stated in the text of the order.”

Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, we generally only have
jurisdiction over final judgments. CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447
(Tex. 2011); see Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see
also Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992). We
strictly apply statutes granting interlocutory appeals because they are narrow
exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately
appealable. Perez, 340 S.W.3d at 447-48; see Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2007).

An order granting a motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
91a has not been specifically designated as an appealable interlocutory order.
Harrell v. Evans, No. 01-21-00666-CV, 2023 WL 3634318, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] May 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gause v. Triumph Hosp. of
N. Houston, L.P., No. 14-18-00723-CV, 2018 WL 6217412, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); see also
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014. Therefore, we may exercise
jurisdiction over this appeal only if the trial court’s order constitutes a final
judgment. Harrell, 2023 WL 3634318, at *3; McClairne v. PrimeWay Fed. Credit
Union, No. 01-22-00812-CV, 2023 WL 307484, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Jan. 19, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); see also Gause, 2018 WL

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6217412, at *1.

In cases in which a judgment has been rendered without a conventional trial
on the merits, the judgment is not final unless it (1) actually disposes of every
pending claim and party or (2) clearly and unequivocally states that it finally
disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so. In re
Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam); Bella
Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801-02 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam); In re
Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at
205. Although “[t]alismanic phrases are not required or dispositive,” “[a]
statement like, ‘This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is
appealable,’ would leave no doubt about the court’s intention.” Jones, 629 S.W.3d
at 924 (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206). If an order contains a “clear and
unequivocal” finality statement disposing of the entire case, the order is final, and
the failure to actually dispose of all claims and parties renders the order erroneous
but not interlocutory. Id.; Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 828.

Here, the trial court’s order does not satisfy either of the requirements set
forth above. The order states: “After considering the motion, the response (if
any), and/or the arguments of counsel (if any) the Court finds the motion is
meritorious and should be GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY
GRANTS the motion and ORDERS that all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Milton Wyatt Martin are DISMISSED. This order is Final and Appealable.”

The order disposes only of Hills’ claims against Martin. It neither mentions
the other defendants Hills sued — the City of Houston, State Farm Automobile
Insurance Company, and XCZ Insurance Company — nor does it dispose of any
claims Hills asserted against the remaining defendants. Additionally, the trial
court’s order does not state “with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as

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to all claims and all parties.” See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192-93; Harrell, 2023
WL 3634318, at *5.

Because Hills appealed an interlocutory order and failed to identify a statute
(and we have found none) that would authorize an interlocutory appeal from the
trial court’s order granting Martin’s motion to dismiss under Rule 91a, we
conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction over Hills’ appeal.

CONCLUSION

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

/s/ Meagan Hassan
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan.

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