In the Interest of A.L., a Child v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 26, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-24-00486-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.L., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 315th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-01394J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

C.G.J. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her parental
rights to her minor daughter, A.L. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
on predicate grounds of endangerment and failure to comply with the court-ordered
service plan for reunification. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The
trial court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In three issues, Mother challenges the
legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of
endangerment, failure to comply with a court order, and its best interest
determination. We affirm.

Background

Mother is the biological mother of A.L., and J. L. (“Father”) is the biological
father. Only Mother has filed an appeal. 1 Trial was held on May 13, 2024, and
Mother was not present. Several exhibits, including the redacted emergency
affidavit, Mother’s court-ordered service plan, the permanency reports, the redacted
child advocate reports, Mother’s drug screening results, and Mother’s criminal
records, were admitted into evidence.

Several of Mother’s drug screening results were admitted into evidence. In
June 2023, Mother submitted to a drug screening, and her urine and hair follicle tests
yielded negative results. In July 2023, Mother submitted to another drug screening.
Her urine test yielded negative results, but her hair follicle test was positive for
methamphetamine at a level of 4,116 pg/mg. Mother completed urine screenings in
August 2023, September 2023, and October 2023, and each of the results yielded
negative results. After not completing the required drug screenings in November
2023 and December 2023, Mother submitted to a drug screening in January 2024,
which yielded a positive result for methamphetamine. Mother was supposed to
submit to a drug screening in March 2024, but she did not appear. Because a sample
was not collected, this test was considered a refusal/positive test.

Mother’s court-ordered service plan was admitted into evidence. According
to Mother’s service plan, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
(the “Department”) was concerned about Mother’s lack of compliance with taking

1
The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights on predicate grounds of
endangerment and failure to comply with the court-ordered service plan for reunification. See Tex.
Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). Father does not challenge the trial court’s final decree
and is not a party to this appeal.

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random drug screenings, lack of engagement/participation in services, and inability
to provide safe and stable housing for the child. The Department was also concerned
about Mother’s protective capacity of the child because of the domestic violence
allegations between Mother and Father. It was reported that Mother had completed
some parenting classes, but her attendance was not consistent. Among other things,
Mother’s service plan required her to maintain a safe and stable home environment
that is drug and alcohol free, provide proof of income, successfully complete
parenting classes, participate in random urine drug screenings and hair follicle
testing, complete a psychological evaluation, attend individual and family
counseling, and complete a BIPP course for victims of domestic violence. Mother
participated in some services but was not consistent.

The most recent permanency report prepared by the Department in May 2024
was admitted into evidence. According to the report, the child was one year old and
meeting all of her developmental milestones. The primary permanency goal was
unrelated adoption, and the concurrent permanency goal was family reunification.
The report stated that Mother had been cooperative with the Department but needed
to reengage in services and remain consistent. Among other requirements, the report
stated that Mother was to participate in a psychological evaluation and adaptive
functioning assessment, attend all court hearings and permanency planning
meetings, make progress on her family services plan, maintain a safe and stable
home environment, and participate in random urine and hair follicle testing.

Only two witnesses testified at trial: Nechole Walker and Missy Pacha.
Walker was the conservatorship caseworker assigned to the case. She testified that
the Department received a referral after Father had taken the child and refused to
give Mother access. The Department was able to make contact with Mother and
Father. After speaking with both parents, there were concerns raised about drug use,

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criminal history, and domestic violence. The Department eventually gained custody
of the child after Father was arrested. The Department determined that it would be
unsafe to return the child to Mother because it was alleged that Mother was not able
to provide stable housing, abused drugs, and had a criminal history. As a result of
these concerns, the Department developed a service plan for Mother. Some of the
requirements under the service plan were for Mother to keep in contact with the
Department, document that she obtained safe and stable housing, document proof of
employment, attend court hearings and permanency planning meetings related to the
case, complete parenting classes, and demonstrate sobriety by submitting to random
urine drug screenings and hair follicle testing.

Walker testified that Mother’s contact with the Department was sporadic.
Sometimes, Mother would keep in constant contact; other times, she would go a
month or two without any contact. Mother did not provide any documentation
regarding housing or employment. According to Walker, Mother stated that she was
residing in a hotel that was being paid for with the help of friends. Additionally,
Walker asserted that Mother did not maintain contact with the child, failed to attend
all court hearings and permanency planning meetings, did not complete all the
parenting classes, and failed to maintain sobriety. Mother did complete a
psychological evaluation and adaptive functioning assessment but failed to follow
any of the recommendations. Also, Mother failed to complete individual and family
counseling or the BIPP course for victims of domestic violence as ordered. Walker
testified that based on her interaction with Mother throughout the pendency of the
case, the concerns that initially brought the child into care had not been alleviated.
She requested that the child remain in her current foster placement where she is
thriving and her needs are being met. Walker stated that the foster parents desired to
adopt the child if parental rights were terminated.

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On cross-examination, Walker acknowledged that Mother took some steps
towards completing her court-ordered service plan. Mother moved away from Harris
County to an area where she had the support of family and friends. Mother was also
employed, albeit temporarily, and had a place of her own at one point. Despite a
significant history of instability, Mother was trying. There were times that the
Department was unable to contact Mother, but Mother did reengage in services.
Mother was only two classes away from completing her parenting classes.

Pacha, the court-appointed child advocate, testified that she was appointed to
the case in August 2023. It was her recommendation that Mother’s rights be
terminated because there was no evidence that Mother was complying with the
service plan. She also asserted that Mother continued to use drugs and failed to
establish stable housing or employment. According to Pacha, Mother expressed that
the Department was expecting too much of her with little help or support. Pacha also
testified that she met with the foster parents monthly and opined that they were a
good fit for the child because they provided everything that parents should provide
for their child.

During closing arguments, the Department requested that Mother’s parental
rights be terminated on predicate grounds (D), (E), (N), (O), and (P). The
Department emphasized that Mother would continue to put the child at risk by
maintaining a relationship with Father, despite a history of domestic violence. The
Department also argued that Mother failed to comply with the service plan, lacked
significant contact with the child, and demonstrated an inability to provide a safe
and stable home environment. The attorney ad litem joined in the Department’s
request. Although the attorney ad litem acknowledged that it was difficult to escape
an abusive relationship, she asserted that Mother failed to demonstrate any kind of
protective factors necessary to protect the child. During closing arguments, Mother’s

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trial counsel argued that Mother’s parental rights should not be terminated on
predicate grounds (D) and (E) because Mother was a victim of domestic violence.
However, Mother’s trial counsel essentially conceded that Mother’s parental rights
should be terminated on predicate grounds (O) and (P).

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that Mother knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endangered her physical or emotional well-being, engaged in conduct or knowingly
placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the child’s
physical or emotional well-being, and failed to comply with the provisions of a court
order establishing the actions necessary to obtain the return of her child. The trial
court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interest and therefore terminated her parental rights. The Department was appointed
as sole managing conservator of the child.

Standards of Review

Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious matter implicating
fundamental constitutional rights. In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 357–58 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Although parental rights are of
constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Id. (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,
26 (Tex. 2002)). The child’s emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed
merely to preserve the parent’s rights. Id. Because of the severity and permanency
of terminating the parental relationship, Texas requires clear and convincing
evidence to support such findings. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001; In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002). “Clear and convincing evidence” means “the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex.
Fam. Code § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. The burden of proof is upon

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the party seeking deprivation of parental rights. In re S.A., 665 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2022, pet. denied).

As discussed, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings and its best interest
determination. In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge under the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard, we examine all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d
336, 344 (Tex. 2009). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of
its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we disregard all contrary
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. In re G.M.G., 444
S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

In reviewing termination findings for factual sufficiency, we consider and
weigh all the evidence, including disputed or conflicting evidence. In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 345. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a
reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant
that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then
the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. We give due deference to the factfinder’s
findings and do not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M.,
209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). As always, the trier of fact is the sole
judge of witness credibility. See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014); In re
T.L.E., 579 S.W.3d 616, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

Endangerment

As her first issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s findings that termination is warranted under
Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Under these provisions, courts
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are authorized to terminate parental rights respectively if the parent has “knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child” or “engaged in conduct
or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Only one predicate finding under section 161.001 is
necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex.
2019) (per curiam).

Predicate findings under subsections D and E, however, pose significant
collateral consequences. See id. at 234–35 (discussing section 161.001(b)(1)(M),
which provides that a court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the parent has had their “parent-child relationship
terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that the parent’s conduct
was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E).”). In light of these consequences, we are
required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to subsections D or E
when raised on appeal. Id. at 235; see also, e.g., In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 721,
728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

Both subsections D and E require proof of endangerment. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). “Endanger” means to expose the child to loss or injury or
to jeopardize the child’s emotional and physical health. In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268,
269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). A child is considered endangered when the
environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but consciously
disregards. J.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 511 S.W.3d 145, 159
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). Endangerment encompasses “more than a threat
of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family

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environment.” In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269. But, it is not necessary that the
endangering conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffered injury.
Id.

While both subsections D and E focus on endangerment, they differ regarding
the source of the physical or emotional endangerment to the child. See In re B.S.T.,
977 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). For instance,
subsection D focuses on the child’s living environment, rather than the conduct of
the parent, though parental conduct is certainly relevant to the child’s environment.
In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
Whereas, subsection E focuses on the parent’s conduct, which must be the result of
a conscious course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. Id.

Endangerment by conduct. We will begin our analysis with the evidence
relevant to the trial court’s endangerment by conduct finding under section
161.001(b)(1)(E). Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to terminate her parental rights under subsection E because the primary
evidence is limited to concerns leading up to the removal. However, we are
cognizant that when determining whether a parent has engaged in an endangering
“course of conduct,” a factfinder may consider the parent’s actions and inactions that
occurred both before and after the child was born, and before and after the child has
been removed by the Department. See In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 331 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).

Much of the evidence concerns Mother’s drug use. Drug use and its effects on
the parent’s life and ability to parent may establish an endangering course of
conduct. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 331 (“A parent’s continuing
substance abuse can qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct endangering the child’s well-being.”); In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426

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(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Illegal drug use creates the
possibility that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of
parenting.”). Continued illegal drug use after a child’s removal is conduct
jeopardizing parental rights and may be considered an endangering course of
conduct. V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 331 (citing Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Family
& Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,
no pet.) (en banc)). The factfinder may give “great weight” to the “significant factor”
of drug-related conduct. In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).

At the onset of the investigation, the Department had concerns about Mother’s
drug use. In the court-ordered service plan, which was admitted into evidence
without objection, Mother shared that she used molly and ecstasy in the past but
denied any drug use while pregnant.2 But, Mother revealed that she had reengaged
in drug use at some point after the child’s birth, which was corroborated by Mother’s
drug screening results. At the time of the first positive result, the child would have
been approximately four months old. Mother tested positive again when the child
would have been approximately ten months old, even though maintaining sobriety
was necessary for the return of the child. Mother also completed a psychological
evaluation in October 2023, which was admitted into evidence without objection.3
At the time of the evaluation, Mother stated that she was not currently taking any
drugs but did admit to taking “Xanax, X, and methamphetamines” two months
before the interview. Two months prior to the evaluation, the child would have been
approximately seven months old. Additionally, Walker testified that Mother failed

2
Mother initially objected to certain language included in the court-ordered service plan
but later withdrew her objection.
3
As with the court-ordered service plan, Mother objected to the admission of the
psychological evaluation but later withdrew her objection.

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to appear at multiple scheduled drug screenings. From this, the trial court could have
inferred that Mother’s test results would have been positive if she had submitted to
testing on the missed occasions. See In re A.O., No. 05-21-00789-CV, 2022 WL
620631, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

As factfinder, the trial court could give “great weight” to the “significant
factor” of Mother’s continued drug use before and after the child was removed and
find it to be an endangering course of conduct. V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 331; L.G.R., 498
S.W.3d at 204. Under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate
finding of endangerment under section 161.001(b)(1)(E). We therefore need not
consider Mother’s challenge to the evidence supporting a finding of endangerment
under subsection D or failure to comply with the provisions of a court order under
subsection O. See, e.g., In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d at 728. 4 We overrule Mother’s first
two issues.

Best Interest

We now turn to Mother’s third issue challenging the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination was
in the child’s best interest. There is a strong presumption that the best interest of a
child is served by keeping the child with a parent. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112,
116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). The party requesting termination bears the heavy
burden of rebutting that presumption. See In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). No specific set of facts is required to
establish that termination is in a child’s best interest, but there are several

4
Though we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that Mother failed to comply with the provisions of the court-ordered service plan, we note
that Mother’s trial counsel conceded that Mother did not complete her service plan.

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nonexclusive factors that may guide the factfinder’s best-interest determination. See
In re L.M., 572 S.W.3d 823, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

These factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the child’s emotional
and physical needs now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to
the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in
promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals
or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8)
any acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.
See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); In re E.R.W., 528
S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Tex.
Fam. Code § 263.307(b) (listing factors to consider in evaluating a parent’s
willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment). The same
evidence used to establish grounds for termination under section 161.001(b)(1) may
be probative in determining the best interest of the child. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105,
118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

The child’s desires. A.L. came into the Department’s care when she was
approximately three months old. At trial, Walker testified that Mother has not had
any contact with her daughter since November 2023 because there was a no
visitation order in place. Walker asserted that there were certain steps that Mother
needed to complete to re-establish visitation, but Mother failed to complete the
necessary steps. Due to the child’s age, neither party has identified any evidence
establishing that the child has expressed a specific desire to either to return to
Mother’s care or remain with her foster parents. However, there was evidence that
the child was bonded with her foster parents. Even though the child was just

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beginning to talk, she referred to her foster parents as “mama and dada.”

Emotional and physical needs. There was evidence that Mother loved her
child and could benefit from parenting classes. While Mother was not consistent
with her court-ordered service plan, she was only two classes away from completing
her parenting classes. But, there was also evidence that the foster parents had been
taking care of the child’s emotional, physical, and developmental needs for the entire
time that the child was in the Department’s care. The child was very bonded with
her foster parents and considered them to be her mother and father. Additionally, the
foster parents expressed a desire to adopt the child should parental rights be
terminated.

Emotional and physical danger. A child’s need for a safe and stable home
is the paramount consideration in assessing the best interest of the child. See Tex.
Fam. Code § 263.307(a) (providing that prompt and permanent placement of child
in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest); In re G.M.G.,
444 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (providing that
parent who lacks ability to provide the child with safe and stable home is unable to
provide for the child’s emotional and physical needs). Evidence of illegal drug use
supports a finding that placement of the child with her parent poses a potential
danger to the child. See, e.g., E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d at 266 (“Mother’s history of drug
abuse bespeaks a course of conduct that the fact finder reasonably could conclude
endangers [child]’s well-being.”). Additionally, evidence of violence in the home
supports a finding that the placement of child with her parent is likely to subject the
child to emotional and physical danger now and in the future. In re J.S.-A., No. 01-
17-00491-CV, 2018 WL 891236, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 15,
2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2013, no pet.) (“[I]t was a form of abuse for the children to be exposed to

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an environment where physical abuse occurred even if it was not directed toward
them.”).

There was significant evidence that Mother had been using illegal drugs both
before and after the child was born and before and after the child had been removed
by the Department. See V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 331. There was also evidence of violence
in the home. Six months before the child was born, Father was charged with
assaulting Mother and was later found guilty. Mother remained with Father, and nine
months later, the child came into the Department’s care after Father physically
assaulted Mother again and absconded with the child to another state. See In re J.T.,
No. 01-19-00908-CV, 2020 WL 1942463, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Apr. 23, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The evidence of the mother’s . . . continued
association with a violent boyfriend . . . bears on the emotional and physical danger
to [the child] now and in the future.”). There was not much evidence presented
regarding Mother’s continued relationship with Father after the child was removed,
presumably because Father was in jail for a period of time.

Parenting abilities. A parent’s inability to provide adequate care for her
child, unstable lifestyle, lack of a home and income, lack of parenting skills, and
poor judgment may be considered when looking at the children’s best interest. In re
J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119. There was not much evidence admitted concerning
Mother’s parenting abilities, although there was evidence that Mother acknowledged
that she could benefit from parenting classes even though she did not consistently
participate in services. The court-ordered service plan also required Mother to
maintain a safe and stable home environment and provide proof of income. The
conservatorship caseworker testified that Mother was unable to provide
documentation establishing either requirement. The redacted child advocate reports
stated that Mother had not demonstrated an understanding of the child’s needs or

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shown an ability to meet the child’s needs because she resided in unstable hotel
housing, lacked reliable transportation, and had an unstable lifetime work history.
Notably, Mother did not appear at trial, which was a requirement to obtain return of
the child.

Programs available to assist. There was little evidence in the record
regarding programs available to those seeking custody. It is clear that Mother
attempted to participate in services, but she was not consistent. Mother demonstrated
a willingness to participate in parenting classes and was only two classes short of
completion. She participated in a psychological evaluation but failed to follow any
of the recommendations. Although Mother was required to participate in a drug and
alcohol assessment, she failed to do so. Mother also did not maintain her sobriety.

Plans for the child. The factfinder may compare the contrasting plans for a
child by the parent and the Department and consider whether the plans and
expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined. Id. at 119–20 (citing
D.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993,
no writ)). There was little evidence in the record concerning Mother’s plans for the
child, though she presumably wanted the child to be returned to her care. Mother did
ask to set up visitation with the child, even though there was a no visitation order in
place, and she sometimes requested updated pictures of the child. However, the child
advocate testified that Mother never once asked about the child or showed concern
for the child’s well-being with her actions. There was evidence admitted at trial that
the foster parents desired to adopt the child should parental rights be terminated. The
child was very bonded with the foster parents’ other children.

Stability. The stability of the proposed home environment is an important
consideration in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the
children’s best interest. In re A.G., No. 14-18-01089-CV, 2019 WL 2385723, at *5

15
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 6, 2019, pet. denied). Texas courts recognize
that a child’s need for permanence through the establishment of a “stable, permanent
home” is a paramount consideration. See In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Therefore, evidence about the present and future
placement informs the best-interest determination. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.

As part of her service plan, Mother was required to provide documentation
regarding housing and employment, but she failed to do so. Mother did not testify at
trial but had previously reported that she did not have reliable transportation. She
also resided in a hotel and relied on friends for lodging expenses. Overall, Mother
did not have much of a work history. On the other hand, there was evidence admitted
at trial indicating that the foster parents were both consistently employed and parents
to two other children. The foster parents also owned their own home and lived within
walking distance of family support.

Acts and omissions of the parent and any excuses. Mother’s relevant acts
and omissions have largely already been discussed in detail above: the illegal drug
use before and after the child was born, before the child had been removed by the
Department, and afterwards when return of the child depended on her not using
drugs; the failure to engage in services; and violence in the home with Father. Mother
did not testify at trial or otherwise offer any excuses, but Mother did express to the
court-appointed child advocate that the Department was expecting too much of her.

Conclusion. Reviewing the record, a reasonable factfinder could have formed
a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest. See
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344. It would have been reasonable for the trial court to
conclude that Mother lacked the ability to provide a safe and stable environment and
successfully parent the child. This is supported by evidence of Mother’s persistent
drug use, continued association with Father after he physically assaulted her, and

16
failure to engage in services necessary for the return of the child. Additionally, the
evidence strongly suggests that the child is thriving in her current placement, and
adoption appears to be the next logical step for the child. We overrule Mother’s third
issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best
interest finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(2).

We affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights
and appointing the Department as sole managing conservator of the child.

/s/ Frances Bourliot
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bourliot and Wilson.

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