In the Interest of E.A.O.E. AKA E.O.E., G.E.O.E. AKA G.O.E., Children v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 20, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-24-00240-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.A.O.E. AKA E.O.E., G.E.O.E. AKA G.O.E.,
CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2022-01137J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant C.O. (Father) appeals the trial court’s final order of termination of
his parental rights appointing the Department of Family and Protective Services
(Department) as sole managing conservator of his children, E.A.O.E. (Edward) and
G.E.O.E. (Gabrielle).1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405(a). The trial court terminated
Father’s parental rights on predicate grounds of endangerment, and failure to comply
with a family service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The

1
Edward and Gabrielle are pseudonyms, which we use to protect the minors in this case.
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
trial court further found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2). On appeal Father
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that termination of his parental rights is in the best interest of the children.
We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The children came to the attention of the Department on March 1, 2022, due
to a report of physical abuse of Gabrielle when Gabrielle was three months old.
Gabrielle arrived at Texas Children’s Hospital unresponsive; initial assessments
revealed head trauma and eight broken and displaced ribs. Mother and Father
reported the injuries were the result of a fall from a baby swing. At the time Gabrielle
came to the hospital Edward was under two years old.

The children were initially removed from the parents because the parents’
explanation of the cause of Gabrielle’s injuries was inconsistent with the severity of
the injuries. In addition to the aforementioned head trauma and broken ribs,
Gabrielle had retinal bleeding in her eyes. Father also admitted shaking Gabrielle.
The Department recommended a safety plan for the parents and requested they
engage in Family Based Safety Services (FBSS). Both parents refused. When
Gabrielle was released from the hospital three weeks later, she was released to
Mother with the condition that Father not be permitted to live in the same house with
the children. On July 1, 2022, the Department filed an original petition seeking
termination of both parents’ rights. The Department removed the children from
Mother’s home because Mother permitted Father to move back into the home and
was not taking Gabrielle to necessary medical appointments to address her injuries.

On June 28, 2023, the trial court found good cause to extend the dismissal
date to December 29, 2023. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401.
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Father was indicted for intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to
Mother on or about January 1, 2023. On June 26, 2023, Father was indicted for injury
to a child.

Trial commenced October 3, 2023. Dr. Sarah Risen, a pediatric neurologist at
Texas Children’s Hospital, testified that when Gabrielle came into the hospital, she
had sustained a severe traumatic brain injury and her “level of consciousness was at
the lowest possible level.” Gabrielle’s brain was swelling, and she had to undergo
life-saving emergency surgery. The brain injury caused Gabrielle to be delayed “in
every single area of her development” including motor skills, language, and eating.
Gabrielle had to be fed through a tube in her nose.

Risen testified that the severity of the injuries Gabrielle experienced was
consistent with a high-speed car accident or shaken baby syndrome, and did not
typically happen in routine childhood activities, such as falling from a baby swing.
The bleeding in the brain, hemorrhages behind the eyes, and broken ribs were
consistent with injuries sustained as a result of shaken baby syndrome. Severe brain
trauma such as that experienced by Gabrielle leads to a lifelong increased risk for
seizures and other neuro-developmental complications. At the time of trial Gabrielle
was still unable to get all her calories by mouth and had to receive some nourishment
through a G-button, which replaced a G-tube she had earlier.2 As she grows
Gabrielle’s needs will be extensive, including speech therapy, occupational therapy,
aid with social communication, twice-yearly visits to a neuropsychologist, and
treatment for vision loss due to the brain injury. Gabrielle is at high risk for learning
problems and cognitive delays. Risen testified there was no other reason for the

2
Gabrielle initially needed a G-tube, which is placed through the nose to feed an individual
who is unable to swallow. The tube was later replaced with a G-button, which goes through the
navel to help feed Gabrielle.

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injuries experienced by Gabrielle other than abuse.

Dr. Marcella Donaruma-Kwoh, a pediatric child abuse expert, was consulted
on the day Gabrielle was admitted to the hospital. While being transported to the
hospital via helicopter Gabrielle experienced seizures and her body temperature
dropped to 87 degrees. Gabrielle experienced injury to both sides of her brain; her
right retina was detached, and the cavity was full of blood. Gabrielle’s injuries were
inconsistent with the parents’ report that she fell roughly two feet from a baby swing.
Gabrielle had an emergency craniotomy to relieve pressure on her brain and drain
blood from her skull. Gabrielle was hospitalized for 23 days. Donaruma-Kwoh
discussed Gabrielle’s condition with the neurosurgeons, and they concluded that her
injuries were caused by abuse. The doctors concluded that Gabrielle’s rib fractures
resulted from Father’s attempts at CPR, but her other injuries were caused by being
shaken violently. Donaruma-Kwoh testified that Father told Mother he had shaken
Gabrielle.

Father was home alone with the children when Gabrielle was injured. At trial,
when Father was asked how Gabrielle sustained her injuries he exercised his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. Father was charged with injury to a child and
released on bail. While on bail for that offense, on January 1, 2023, Father was
arrested for assaulting Mother. Father, testifying from jail, admitted physically
assaulting Mother in January 2023. Before Father was incarcerated, he took clothing
to the children, but has not financially supported them either while out of jail or
before. Father was given a family service plan written in Spanish, but did not finish
reading the plan despite testifying he understood that completing the services on the
plan was necessary for the return of his children.

The foster mother testified that she had Edward beginning July 2, 2022, and
Gabrielle beginning March 21, 2023. Edward bonded with the foster parents

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immediately while Gabrielle was not as social and did not bond right away. By the
time of trial Gabrielle was also bonded with the foster parents. Gabrielle was
improving every day, including taking about 25 percent of her food orally. The foster
parents participated in 30 hours of observation training observing other children who
have similar medical needs. The foster parents also received training at Texas
Children’s Hospital from Gabrielle’s gastroenterologist and nutritionist. Both
children attend a Montessori school near their home. A home health nurse goes to
the school to help with Gabrielle’s feedings. Gabrielle has also bonded with her
brother. Both foster parents want to adopt the children and feel they understand the
complexity of Gabrielle’s medical issues and how to care for them. The foster
parents’ parents and some of their siblings have also undergone training so they can
support the foster parents in Gabrielle’s care. If the foster parents were unable to
adopt they would do what they needed to do to help the children but would seek
legal counsel on the issue.

Sabrina Stranton, the conservatorship caseworker for the Department,
testified that the Department removed the children from the home in July after
Gabrielle’s injuries in March because Mother permitted Father to move back into
the home and was not taking Gabrielle to necessary medical appointments to address
her injuries. During a welfare check a caseworker observed Gabrielle being fed with
a bottle propped up by a blanket, which was inappropriate because Gabrielle could
not swallow and had a feeding tube placed in her nose at the time. A caseworker also
observed Mother feeding Gabrielle table food with a spoon.

Stranton was unable to meet with Mother until June 2023, almost a year after
the children were removed, because Mother gave Stranton an incorrect address. In
June 2023, Stranton confirmed Mother’s address and visited her at home. Mother
regularly provided pay stubs to the Department, completed a psychosocial

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assessment, and completed individual counseling as recommended by the
assessment. Mother completed a domestic violence course and acknowledged that
she needed to provide a safe and stable home for her children and that it was not safe
for Father to be around the children. Stranton testified, however, that the Department
had recorded jail calls between Mother and Father in which Mother expressed a
desire to continue a relationship with Father. Mother told her therapist that she had
filed for divorce from Father, but Mother did not follow through with the divorce
allowing it to be dismissed for want of prosecution. In sum, Mother completed her
family service plan but, according to Stranton, was not honest in her reports to
providers.

Stranton testified that Father completed a psychosocial assessment and a
parenting class. Father did not provide proof of income, or proof of housing. Father
did not refrain from criminal activity, as evidenced by his incarceration for alleged
assault of Mother. Stranton further testified that the Department was concerned if
the children were returned to Father they would be endangered due to Father’s past
violent conduct.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the predicate grounds of
endangerment and failure to comply with a family service plan. The trial court
further found that termination of Father’s rights was in the best interest of the
children. The trial court did not terminate Mother’s parental rights, but designated
the Department as the sole managing conservator of the children and appointed
Mother possessory conservator. Father timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

Father concedes the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
termination on the predicate grounds of endangerment. See Tex. Fam. Code §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
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evidence to support termination on the trial court’s findings that he failed to comply
with the service plan and termination of his rights was in the children’s best interest.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O) & 161.001(b)(2).

I. Standards of Review

In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship under Family Code
section 161.001, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence one
or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of section 161.001(b)
and that termination is in the best interest of the child under subsection (2). See Tex.
Fam. Code § 161.001; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019); In re J.L., 163
S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious
matter implicating fundamental constitutional rights. See In re of J.F.-G., 627
S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2021); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 531 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Although parental rights are of constitutional
magnitude, they are not absolute. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex. 2018);
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).

Due to the severity and permanency of terminating the parent-child
relationship, Texas requires clear and convincing evidence to support such an order.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001; In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 310; In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002). “Clear and convincing evidence” means “the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex.
Fam. Code § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. This heightened burden of
proof results in a “correspondingly searching standard of appellate review.” In re
A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination
case, we must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged
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finding to determine whether a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the finding was true. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex.
2009). We assume that the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding
if a reasonable fact finder could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a
reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved. See id.; In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46,
52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Because of the heightened
standard, we also must be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding
and consider that evidence in our analysis. In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 531.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence under the clear-and-
convincing standard, we consider and weigh disputed evidence contrary to the
finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631;
In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence
that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at
345. We give due deference to the fact finder’s findings, and we cannot substitute
our own judgment for that of the fact finder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108
(Tex. 2006).

To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one
termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best-interest finding—
even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground. In re N.G.,
577 S.W.3d at 232; In re L.M., 572 S.W.3d 823, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

II. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Father endangered the children.
Father’s parental rights were terminated on the predicate grounds of

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endangerment and failure to follow the family service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). Father concedes on appeal that the evidence was legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he endangered the
children.

An unchallenged fact finding is binding on an appellate court “unless the
contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the
finding.” See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (unchallenged findings
of fact supported termination under section 161.001(1)(O) because record supported
those findings).

Our review of the record shows the trial court’s findings on subsections
161.001(1)(D) and (E) are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
Those subsections require clear and convincing evidence that Father:

(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child[ren] to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional
well-being of the child[ren]; [or]
(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child[ren].”
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

Endangerment under subsection D may be established by evidence related to
the children’s environment. In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). “Environment” refers to the acceptability of living
conditions, as well as a parent’s conduct in the home. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351,
360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). A child is endangered
when the environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but
consciously disregards. In re L.E.R., 650 S.W.3d 771, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by a parent

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or other persons who live in the children’s home can create an environment that
endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child as required for
termination under subsection D. Id.

Under subsection E, the evidence must show the endangerment was the result
of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failure to act. In re A.L.H., 515
S.W.3d 60, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Termination
under subsection E must be based on more than a single act or omission; the statute
requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent. Id.

Father concedes the evidence of domestic violence in the home is legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection D. See In re
J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)
(“[d]omestic violence, want of self control, and propensity for violence may be
considered as evidence of endangerment.”). Father further concedes the extensive
medical evidence as to Gabrielle’s injuries is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding under subsection E. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105,
114 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (medical evidence that child’s
physical injuries were intentionally caused and consistent with physical abuse was
sufficient to support finding of endangerment). Father declined to testify about the
charge of injury to a child by asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, permitting the trial court to draw an adverse inference concerning the
charges. See In re J.J., No. 14-19-00622-CV, 2020 WL 428859, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316–19 (1976) (in civil cases, court may draw adverse
inference from assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege)).

Because the trial court’s findings on subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) are
supported by the record, we are bound by them. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249.

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These findings are sufficient to support a decree of termination when there is also a
finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at
362. In light of our conclusion regarding the trial court’s findings on subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we need not review the evidence supporting the finding
under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(O).

We overrule Father’s first two issues.

III. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best
interest.

The trial court found that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2). Father challenges this
finding asserting the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support it.

The best-interest inquiry is child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-
being, safety, and development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. The trier of fact may
consider several factors to determine the child’s best interest, including: (1) the
desires of the child; (2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the
child; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the
parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist
those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of
the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent that may
indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse
for the parents’ acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(b) (listing factors to consider in
evaluating parents’ willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe

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environment).

Courts apply a strong presumption that the best interest of the children is
served by keeping the children with their natural parents, and it is the Department’s
burden to rebut that presumption. In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 531. Prompt and
permanent placement in a safe environment also is presumed to be in the children’s
best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(a). A finding in support of best interest does
not require proof of any unique set of factors, nor does it limit proof to any specific
factors. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Evidence that proves one or more
statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that
termination is in the children’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. And a fact
finder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct in determining
whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. In re L.G.,
No. 14-22-00335-CV, 2022 WL 11572541, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Oct. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Before we review the Holley factors in light of the evidence at trial, we address
Father’s primary argument challenging the trial court’s best-interest finding. Father
asserts that because Mother’s rights have not been terminated, the children cannot
be adopted by the foster parents and their placement is “speculative at best.”
Placement plans and adoption are relevant to the best-interest inquiry, but “the lack
of evidence about definitive plans for permanent placement and adoption cannot be
the dispositive factor.” In re L.D.T.P., No. 14-22-00815-CV, 2023 WL 3115756, at
*9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In
re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28). The issue is whether, on the entire record, a fact finder
could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that termination of the parent’s
rights would be in the children’s best interest even if the agency is unable to identify
with precision the child’s future home environment. In re A.M., No. 14-23-00415-

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CV, 2023 WL 7206735, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 2, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). We therefore turn to an analysis of the Holley factors.

A. The desires of the children.

At the time the final hearing began Edward was almost three years old and
Gabrielle was almost two. Father admits both children were too young to express
their desires. When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder
may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well cared for
by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent. In re A.R.D., — S.W.3d — No.
14-24-00010-CV, 2024 WL 1662392, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr.
18, 2024, pet. denied). Gabrielle was only three months old when she was injured,
and Edward was one year old at the time. After Gabrielle’s hospital stay she was
released to Mother with the condition that Mother not allow Father to live with the
children. When Mother violated that condition Father was arrested and the children
were removed in July 2022. Father was incarcerated on January 1, 2023; therefore,
the children spent minimal time with Father.

In contrast, the foster parents had the children for more than a year before the
final hearing. The foster parents underwent extensive training to care for Gabrielle’s
medical needs. They also had family members who underwent training to provide
support to the foster parents. Edward bonded with the foster father first, then with
the foster mother. While Gabrielle experienced social anxiety she was also bonding
with the foster parents. This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-interest
finding.

B. The present and future physical and emotional needs of the
children.
Father concedes that the evidence establishes the foster parents are meeting
all of the children’s needs, but asserts no evidence was presented to establish that

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either biological parent was unable to meet the emotional and physical needs of their
children. At trial, evidence was admitted that Father was incarcerated since January
2023 and was subject to no bond due to an immigration hold. Moreover, Father
admitted he was incarcerated because he assaulted Mother. A video of the assault
was admitted into evidence at trial.

In addition to violence against Mother, Father was the only adult caregiver
when Gabrielle suffered injuries as a result of shaken baby syndrome. The trial court
reasonably could have concluded that Father caused Gabrielle’s injuries. This
evidence of violence and abuse is evidence reflecting that Father cannot meet the
children’s physical and emotional needs. See In re M.L.G.J., No. 14-14-00800-CV,
2015 WL 1402652, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845 (The fact finder may infer from
past conduct endangering a child’s well-being that similar conduct will recur if the
child is returned to the parent). This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-
interest finding.

C. Emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the
future.

Father acknowledges that evidence of domestic violence and physical abuse
weighs in favor of termination, but asserts that the evidence reflects Edward had no
signs of abuse or neglect and appeared well-cared for at the time he was removed
from his parents. Father asserts “this factor is neutral and therefore does not
overcome the parental presumption.”

To the contrary, “[c]hild abuse necessarily endangers a child’s physical or
emotional well-being.” In re M.F.M., No. 14-23-00974-CV, 2024 WL 3156150, at
*7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2024, pet. filed) (citing In re A.B.M.,
No 14-21-00687-CV, 2022 WL 1311067, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

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May 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Acts of violence or abuse directed toward one
child can endanger other children who are not the direct victims of the conduct and
support termination of parental rights to the other children. See In re A.C., No. 14-
23-00577-CV, 2024 WL 440263, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 6,
2024, pet. filed) (“Evidence of violence in the home supports a finding that the
placement of children with their parent is likely to subject the children to emotional
and physical danger now and in the future.”). This factor weighs in favor of the trial
court’s best-interest finding.

D. Parenting abilities of the individuals seeking custody and stability
of the home or proposed placement.
Father does not challenge the parental abilities of the foster parents or the
stability of their home, but challenges the lack of permanent adoption plans due to
the fact that Mother’s rights have not been terminated. To recap, this court has held
that the lack of evidence about definitive plans for permanent placement and
adoption cannot be the dispositive factor. In re L.D.T.P., No. 14-22-00815-CV, 2023
WL 3115756, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem.
op.). We have further held that abusive conduct is relevant to a parent’s parental
abilities and his abilities to care for his children’s needs. See In re A.C., 2024 WL
440263, at *12.

E. Programs available to assist those seeking custody.

Father asserts there was no evidence of such programs admitted at trial. To
the contrary, Father testified he completed parenting classes before being
incarcerated. The caseworker investigated what services were provided in jail so that
Father could continue working his services while incarcerated. The trial court could
have reasonably concluded that programs were available but Father failed to take
advantage of those programs, particularly before he was incarcerated. “A fact finder

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may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to complete the services
required to regain possession of his child that he does not have the ability to motivate
himself to seek out available resources needed now or in the future.” In re J.M.T.,
519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). These
factors weigh in favor of termination.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment for our legal-
sufficiency analysis and all the evidence equally for our factual-sufficiency analysis,
we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best
interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2). We overrule Father’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Jerry Zimmerer
Jerry Zimmerer
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.

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