Ceiba Land Company, LLC v. Bay Runner Pipeline, LLC

NUMBER 13-26-00004-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CEIBA LAND COMPANY, LLC, Appellant,

v.

BAY RUNNER PIPELINE, LLC, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 445TH DISTRICT COURT
OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

Appellant Ceiba Land Company, LLC (Ceiba) filed suit in district court against

appellee Bay Runner Pipeline, LLC (Bay Runner), arguing that property condemnation

proceedings which Bay Runner brought against it in county court were void. By three

issues in this appeal, Ceiba argues the district court erred by denying its request for a

temporary injunction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

Ceiba owns real property at the Padre Isabel Estates Subdivision in Cameron

County. On June 6, 2025, Bay Runner filed an “Original Petition for Condemnation” in the

Cameron County Court at Law No. 1, seeking to acquire temporary and permanent

easements on Ceiba’s property for the construction and operation of a natural gas

pipeline. Bay Runner alleged in its condemnation petition that it is a “gas utility” as defined

in the Texas Utilities Code and therefore “has the right and power to enter on, condemn,

and appropriate the land, right-of-way, easement, or other property of any person or

corporation.” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 181.004; see id. §§ 121.001(a), 181.021(2) (defining “gas

utility”). In accordance with the Texas Property Code, the county court appointed special

commissioners who, after a hearing, awarded Ceiba $62,078.59 in damages for the

condemned property. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 21.014, .015. Bay Runner deposited that

amount in the registry of the court and filed bonds as required by statute, thereby entitling

it to “possession of the condemned property pending the results of further litigation.” Id.

§ 21.021(a).

Ceiba timely filed an objection to the special commissioners’ award, thus triggering

the county court’s statutory obligation to “try the case in the same manner as other civil

causes.” Id. § 21.018(b). The record does not reflect that a trial was ever held in the

county court or that a final judgment was ever issued in that case.

On November 19, 2025, Ceiba filed the instant suit in the 445th District Court

arguing that “Bay Runner’s condemnation proceeding is both statutorily deficient and

constitutionally flawed” for a variety of reasons, including: (1) Bay Runner is not a “gas

utility,” (2) Bay Runner failed to prove a public use of the property, (3) the property

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description in Bay Runner’s condemnation petition was “fatally defective,” and (4) the

petition “seeks an unreasonably excessive taking not supported by the pipeline’s actual

route.”1 Ceiba asked the district court for a temporary restraining order (TRO) as well as

temporary and permanent injunctions preventing Bay Runner from entering upon its land,

and a declaration that the “prior condemnation proceedings are void ab initio for lack of

jurisdiction.” The district court granted an ex parte TRO the following day.

On December 9, 2026, Bay Runner filed a motion to dissolve the TRO and for

sanctions, arguing that

[i]n a clear attempt to circumvent the pending condemnation action, [Ceiba]
filed this action which was improper, failed to notify condemnation counsel
for Bay Runner, failed to serve Bay Runner and misle[]d th[e district c]ourt
by failing to notify the [district c]ourt of a competing, previously filed lawsuit
with the same parties and issues, refusing to abide by Local Rule 1.3 and
improperly obtaining an ex parte [TRO].

That same day, Bay Runner also filed an “Opposition to Application for [TRO], Temporary

Injunction, and Permanent Injunction,” contesting the merits of the arguments made in

Ceiba’s petition and additionally arguing that, because there are “statutory remedies to

address the harm Ceiba claims it will suffer,” Ceiba cannot show immediate or irreparable

harm should an injunction not be issued.

At a hearing on December 10, 2025, the district court granted Bay Runner’s motion

to dissolve the TRO, opining that “all this needs to be heard in [the county] court where it

originated.” The district court later signed an order denying Ceiba’s request for temporary

injunction. This accelerated interlocutory appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 51.014(a)(4).

1 Ceiba’s petition also named Table Rock Surveying, LLC, as a defendant, but it did not include

any factual allegations or legal claims against that entity, which is not a party to this appeal.

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II. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,” intended to preserve the

status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits, and “does not

issue as a matter of right.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002);

Sargeant v. Al Saleh, 512 S.W.3d 399, 408 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016,

combined appeal & orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). “To obtain a temporary injunction,

the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against

the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and

irreparable injury in the interim.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

“Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s sound

discretion.” Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and

unreasonable it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to

correctly analyze or apply the law.” Sargeant, 512 S.W.3d at 409 (first citing In re Olshan

Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); and then citing

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). In evaluating whether the trial court

abused its discretion, we review evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling, drawing

all legitimate inferences and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence.

See id. at 409–10.

B. Analysis

In its issues on appeal, Ceiba argues: (1) the district court abused its discretion by

yielding to the dominant jurisdiction of the county court at law because the county court

proceedings were void, (2) the county court proceedings were void because Bay Runner

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is not a “gas utility” authorized to condemn private property, and (3) the county court

proceedings were void because the property description in Bay Runner’s condemnation

petition was fatally defective.

“The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed

acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” In re J.B. Hunt

Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016); see Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc.,

159 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. 2005) (“The court in which suit is first filed generally acquires

dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts if venue is proper in the county in

which suit was first filed.”); Joe Williamson Constr. Co. v. Raymondville Indep. Sch. Dist.,

251 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (“Dominant

jurisdiction excludes other courts from exercising jurisdiction over the same case.”).2 The

doctrine applies in condemnation proceedings. See State ex rel. Tex. Transp. Comm’n v.

Suleiman, 651 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (noting

that “once a county court at law’s jurisdiction is invoked in an eminent domain proceeding,

that court has jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts of the subject matter of the

litigation” (citation modified)).

Ceiba argues the district court erred in determining that the county court had

dominant jurisdiction because the doctrine “is not an absolute rule” and does not apply

2 We note that “despite its name, dominant jurisdiction is a creature of venue, not subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Shaw v. Simpson, No. 13-23-00549-CV, 2025 WL 3101346, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Nov. 6, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the doctrine “applies when venue is proper in two or
more Texas counties or courts”). And “the proper method to draw a court’s attention to another court’s
possible dominant jurisdiction is to file a plea in abatement.” Id. (concluding the issue of dominant
jurisdiction was not properly before the appeals court because appellees did not “file a plea in abatement
or any other kind of motion to challenge venue”). Here, Bay Runner did not file a plea in abatement, but it
made clear in its motion to dissolve the TRO that it was asserting the county court had dominant jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Ceiba’s suit. In any event, Ceiba does not argue the district court erred in denying
the temporary injunction for this reason. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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“where the first-filed proceeding is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” In support

of this argument, it cites Schumann v. City of Schertz, 100 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2002, no pet.). In that case, as here, the appellants filed suit in district court

to prevent the appellee from taking action on their condemnation suit which was filed in

county court. Id. at 362–63. The district court denied appellants’ request for a temporary

injunction, and the appellants argued this was error in part because the county court

proceedings were void. Id. at 362. The San Antonio Court of Appeals remarked that “an

attempt to take private property for public use by virtue of eminent domain may be

restrained by injunction when the proceedings are, for any reason, void.” Id. at 364

(quoting Seiler v. Intrastate Gathering Corp., 730 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1987, no writ)). The appeals court then concluded that the district court did not

err because the county court proceedings were not void. Id. at 367.

Schumann is distinguishable because it did not involve dominant jurisdiction. The

appellee there did not argue, as Bay Runner does here, that a temporary injunction would

be improper because the same subject matter was at issue in a separate lawsuit which

was still pending in another court, and the San Antonio court did not discuss that issue.

Accordingly, we disagree with Ceiba that Schumann demonstrates an exception to the

doctrine of dominant jurisdiction.3

3 The Texas Supreme Court has described the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction as a “rule.” Perry

v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001). The Court explained that the rule
has several justifications. The jurisprudential reason for the rule is that once a matter is
before a court of competent jurisdiction, its action must necessarily be exclusive because
it is impossible that two courts can, at the same time, possess the power to make a final
determination of the same controversy between the same parties. A pragmatic justification
for the first-filed rule is efficiency: proceedings earlier begun may be expected to be earlier
concluded. A further justification is simple fairness: in a race to the courthouse, the winner's
suit should have dominant jurisdiction.

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We find that the doctrine was appropriately applied in this case. Bay Runner filed

its condemnation petition on June 6, 2025, in a court of proper venue. See TEX. PROP.

CODE § 21.013(a). Ceiba timely objected to the special commissioners’ award, so it is

entitled to a trial in the county court on the propriety of the award. See id. § 21.018(b).

Ceiba then filed the instant suit in district court on November 19, 2025. Crucially, the

claims raised in the instant suit exclusively concern the validity and merits of Bay Runner’s

condemnation petition and the ensuing award. There is no reason Ceiba cannot bring

those substantive complaints—i.e., that Bay Runner was not a “gas utility” and that the

property description in Bay Runner’s petition was defective—in the pending county court

proceedings and litigate them through final judgment there. See In re Breviloba, LLC, 650

S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (noting “[c]ourts of this State

have long held that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases includes jurisdiction to

adjudicate the condemnor’s eminent domain authority” and collecting cases); Suleiman,

651 S.W.3d at 628 (“A county court at law’s jurisdiction includes the right to try and decide

all questions which may fairly arise out of, or in connection with, a condemnation suit,

other than questions of title.”); see also Tonahill v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 446 S.W.2d 301,

302 (Tex. 1969) (per curiam) (“Petitioner contends that the petition in condemnation does

not contain a legally sufficient description of the property. . . . This and other questions

raised by petitioner may and should be considered and decided by the county court in an

Id. (quotations and footnotes omitted). The Court noted that
[t]he first-filed rule admits of exceptions when its justifications fail, as when the first court
does not have the full matter before it, or when conferring dominant jurisdiction on the first
court will delay or even prevent a prompt and full adjudication, or when the race to the
courthouse was unfairly run.
Id. Ceiba has never alleged that any of these specific exceptions apply in this case.

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appeal from the award of the commissioners.”).

Ceiba has never disputed that its claims could have been brought in the county

court at law proceedings.4 Instead, it brought an independent collateral attack on those

proceedings—before they even advanced to trial—and obtained an ex parte TRO

nullifying Bay Runner’s statutory right to occupy the subject property during the interim.

See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.021. Based on the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, such an

attack is premature and improper in this matter.5

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Ceiba did not establish a probable right to

relief on its claims in the district court, and the district court thus did not abuse its

discretion in denying its request for temporary injunction. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

We overrule Ceiba’s issues on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of April, 2026.

4 Citing section 21.064 of the Texas Property Code, Ceiba argues that district courts enjoy “the

exclusive authority to enjoin a condemnation where the underlying proceeding is unauthorized or fails to
strictly comply with the law.” In fact, “[d]istrict courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction
in eminent domain cases,” TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.001, and the district court’s power to grant injunctive relief
under section 21.064 is not exclusive. See id. § 21.064.
5 We note that the record does not contain a ruling on Bay Runner’s motion for sanctions.

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