In Re Ignacio Lara Jr. v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00250-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE IGNACIO LARA JR.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1

Ignacio Lara Jr. filed a pro se pleading in this Court. Although this pleading is

unclear, Lara contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a competency

exam. In the interest of justice and in our sole discretion, we liberally construe this

pleading as a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2 (governing

the perfection of appeal in criminal cases); id. R. 52 (describing the requirements for filing

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
original proceedings); In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The function of the writ of

mandamus is to compel action by those who by virtue of their official or quasi-official

positions are charged with a positive duty to act.”). In this regard, we note that there is no

right to appeal an order for a competency examination. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

46B.011 (“Neither the state nor the defendant is entitled to make an interlocutory appeal

relating to a determination or ruling under Article 46B.005.”); see also Morris v. State, No.

07-19-00045-CR, 2019 WL 613833, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 13, 2019, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (per curiam).

In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish

both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary

or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged

harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding);

In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam);

In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the

relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be

denied. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d

207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding).

It is the relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus

relief. See id.; In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021,

orig. proceeding). “The petition must contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the appendix or record.”

2
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(i). Relator’s burden includes providing a sufficient record to establish

the right to mandamus relief. In re Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2022, orig. proceeding); In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d at 839; see generally TEX. R. APP. P.

52.3 (delineating the required form and contents for a petition in an original proceeding),

R. 52.7(a) (providing that the relator “must file” a record including specific matters).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the pleading at issue, and having

construed it as a petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that Lara has not met his

burden to obtain relief. Lara’s petition fails to meet the requirements of the Texas Rules

of Appellate Procedure, and without additional authority and supporting documentation,

we cannot ascertain the merits of his requests for relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition

for writ of mandamus.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of April, 2026.

3