City of Pharr v. Lt. Krystle Guerra

NUMBER 13-24-00112-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CITY OF PHARR, Appellant,
v.

LT. KRYSTLE GUERRA, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 430TH DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Cron, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Appellee Krystle Guerra is a lieutenant in the City of Pharr Fire Department (the

Department). In the underlying proceeding, Guerra sought district court review of two

decisions by the City of Pharr Fire & Police Civil Service Commission (the Commission)

upholding her separate five- and ten-day suspensions by the Department. See TEX. LOC.

GOV’T CODE § 143.015(a). She also alleged gender discrimination and retaliation against
appellant the City of Pharr (the City) under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. See

TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.051, 21.055.

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction on grounds that Guerra’s Chapter 21 claims

were not viable and that certain relief she requested under her administrative appeals

exceeded the district court’s statutory authority. The City also filed a motion for summary

judgment on the merits of Guerra’s administrative appeals, contending that the

Commission’s decisions should be affirmed because they are supported by substantial

evidence. By separate orders, the district court denied both the jurisdictional plea and the

motion for summary judgment.

In what we construe as three separate issues, the City challenges the propriety of

both interlocutory orders based on the above grounds. Because we agree that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Guerra’s Chapter 21 claims, we reverse and

render a judgment of dismissal on those claims. We disagree, however, with the City’s

characterization of Guerra’s pleadings with respect to the City’s second issue. As Guerra

correctly points out, the complained-of relief was requested in conjunction with her

Chapter 21 claims, not her administrative appeals. Therefore, the dismissal of Guerra’s

Chapter 21 claims renders the City’s second issue moot. Finally, because we do not have

interlocutory jurisdiction over the denial of the City’s motion for summary judgment, we

dismiss that portion of the City’s appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2021, Guerra received written notice that then-Fire Chief Leonardo

Perez was investigating allegations that she violated Department policies on multiple

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occasions. The allegations largely centered on several reports that, without prior

authorization, Guerra repeatedly left her assigned fire station and district to conduct

personal business or socialize at other stations while on duty. During a disciplinary

hearing before Chief Perez, Guerra did not dispute those allegations; instead, she

generally claimed that it was common for other Department personnel to run personal

errands during work hours. Chief Perez invited Guerra to provide examples to support

her contention. In a follow-up email to Chief Perez, she accused him of running personal

errands while on duty and cited specific instances of him allegedly doing so. After

considering Guerra’s response, Chief Perez found the allegations against her to be true

and suspended Guerra for five days without pay.

Guerra appealed the decision to the Commission, which held a contested

evidentiary hearing. Both parties were represented by counsel, and the Department

presented two witnesses and seven exhibits to support the suspension. Guerra’s

presentation consisted primarily of raising legal arguments and cross-examining the

Department’s witnesses. Guerra offered two exhibits, but she did not testify or call other

witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission members voted unanimously

to uphold the suspension.

In January 2022, Chief Perez’s successor, Pilar Rodriguez, sent Guerra written

notice of contemplated discipline concerning two incidents. Guerra was accused of

“exchanging time” with another lieutenant in violation of a supervisor’s prior directive not

to do so. She was also accused of leaving her post for two hours without obtaining prior

authorization from her immediate supervisor or notifying others above her in the chain of

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command. Chief Rodriguez interviewed Guerra prior to sending her the notice, and

Guerra allegedly admitted to violating her supervisor’s directive but claimed that it was

unintentional because she “forgot” about the directive. According to Chief Rodriguez,

Guerra also admitted during the interview that her unapproved absence was a violation

of Department policy. After conducting a disciplinary hearing and considering Guerra’s

response to the allegations, Chief Rodriguez suspended Guerra for ten days without pay.

Guerra also appealed this suspension to the Commission. The contested hearing

played out in a similar fashion to the first hearing. The Department presented two

witnesses and ten exhibits to support the suspension. Guerra did not present any

evidence. Instead, her counsel cross-examined the Department’s witnesses and raised

legal arguments for why the suspension should be set aside. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the Commission members voted unanimously to uphold the suspension.

Guerra appealed both Commission decisions to district court, asking the court to

set aside the orders of suspension on substantive and procedural grounds and award her

back pay. She also brought claims against the City for gender discrimination based on

disparate treatment and “retaliation for reporting misbehavior by a male firefighter and

[Chief Perez].” As to the first report, Guerra alleged that she “reported a subordinate male

employee for insubordination and work performance issues” in January 2021. Guerra

further alleged that she “was unexpectedly transferred from her assigned station, in

retaliation for making a complaint against the subordinate male employee, while the male

employee was allowed to stay at [her] former station.” According to Guerra, while the

subordinate made a complaint against her that was fully investigated, there was no

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meaningful investigation of her complaint. In a section of her petition titled “Damages

Under [Chapter 21],” Guerra requested, among other relief, “reinstatement to her prior

station location” and “removal of the letter of reprimand from her personnel file.”

On October 20, 2023, the City filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion

for summary judgment that would become the subject of this appeal. 1 The plea argued,

among other things, that Guerra could not establish a prima facie case for either Chapter

21 claim because there was “no evidence” of certain elements. The City also claimed that

the district court lacked authority under Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code to

transfer Guerra back to her former station or remove the letter of reprimand from her

personnel file. The City insisted that if Guerra prevailed on her administrative appeals,

the district court could only set aside the suspension orders and award Guerra back pay.

The motion for summary judgment did not concern Guerra’s Chapter 21 claims; rather,

the City asked the court to review the attached administrative records and find that both

decisions were supported by substantial evidence.

In her response, Guerra failed to address the plea to the jurisdiction and focused

solely on the City’s motion for summary judgment. Although she had previously attached

the administrative record from her first hearing before the Commission as support for her

own motion for partial summary judgment (which was also denied), she objected to the

City relying on the administrative records in support of its motion. 2 She also incorporated

1 This was the third iteration of this filing; as Guerra amended her petition several times with
additional claims, the City would respond in kind with an amended plea and motion.

2 Guerra claims that the district court “obviously sustained [her] objections” to the City’s evidence.

It is unclear from the record whether the district court actually did so. In any event, we do not reach the
merits of the City’s motion for summary judgment and have only considered evidence previously submitted
by Guerra in resolving the City’s jurisdictional challenge to her Chapter 21 claims.
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by reference her prior responses to the City’s earlier motions for summary judgment. One

of those responses had several exhibits attached, including an affidavit by Guerra, her

January 2021 report concerning the subordinate employee, and her email to Chief Perez.

The district court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment

motion in separate orders. The City appealed the former order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (permitting immediate appeal of an interlocutory order denying

a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction).

II. CHAPTER 21 CLAIMS

In its first jurisdictional issue, the City maintains that Guerra failed to establish a

prima facie case for either of her Chapter 21 claims and that Guerra was suspended both

times for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons.

A. Standard of Review

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to decide a case. In re

Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Tex.

Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Whether a trial

court has subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim is generally a question of law

we review de novo. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus., 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016).

Governmental entities are generally immune from suits for money damages unless

the Legislature has expressly waived immunity for the type of claim asserted. Mission

Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008) (Garcia I).

This immunity from suit deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s claims and may be properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction or a motion for

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summary judgment. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. 2011). “A

plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Town of

Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). Thus, when a plaintiff sues

a governmental entity, they must allege facts that fall within a legislative waiver of

immunity. Id. A governmental defendant may challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction by

attacking the plaintiff’s pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo

Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018).

When a governmental defendant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts

and supports its argument with evidence, “the standard of review mirrors that of a

traditional summary judgment.” Town of Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 550. If the

governmental entity’s evidence establishes the absence of a jurisdictional fact, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to resolve, and if

the plaintiff fails to do so, the trial court should rule on the jurisdictional question as a

matter of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).

“[I]n evaluating the parties’ evidence, we take as true all evidence favorable to the

nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the

nonmovant’s favor.” City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528–29 (Tex.

2022).

After adequate time for discovery, a governmental entity may also challenge the

existence of jurisdictional facts through a no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

Town of Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 551. The governmental entity must first identify an

element of a claim for which there is no evidence. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)). It is

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then incumbent upon the plaintiff to create a genuine issue of material fact by producing

“more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element.”

Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004)). Less than a

scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is “so weak as to do no more than create

a mere surmise or suspicion” of a fact. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 601. As with a

jurisdictional challenge on traditional summary judgment grounds, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

B. Applicable Law

Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code prohibits employers from discriminating

against employees “because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or

age.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051. Chapter 21 also prohibits employers from retaliating

against employees for engaging in certain protected activities, such as making an internal

report of discrimination. Id. § 21.055.

Chapter 21 “waives immunity, but only when the plaintiff states a claim for conduct

that actually violates the statute.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770; see TEX. LAB. CODE

§ 21.254 (permitting an employee to “bring a civil action against” their employer). A

plaintiff who fails to allege a viable claim under Chapter 21 is subject to dismissal for want

of jurisdiction. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex.

2012) (Garcia II). Likewise, once a claim under Chapter 21 fails on evidentiary grounds,

the alleged waiver evaporates, and the trial court should dismiss the claim for want of

jurisdiction. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 763 (“By intertwining [Chapter 21’s] immunity

waiver with the merits of a statutory claim, the Legislature ensures public funds are not

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expended defending claims lacking sufficient evidence to allow reasonable jurors to find

the governmental entity liable.”). Because Chapter 21 was modeled after Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, see TEX.

LAB. CODE § 21.001(1), (3), Texas courts are guided by federal precedent to the extent

Chapter 21 and those federal statutes are analogous. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Lara, 625

S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (citing Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 634).

Violations of Chapter 21 can be established with either direct or circumstantial

evidence, and for cases based on circumstantial evidence, like this one, Texas courts

employ the three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Alamo Heights, 544

S.W.3d at 781–82 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05

(1973)). First, the employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination or

retaliation, which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that a statutory violation occurred.

Id. at 782 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–54 (1981)).

“Although the precise elements of this showing will vary depending on the

allegations, . . . the plaintiff’s burden at this stage of the case ‘is not onerous.’” Quantum

Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at

253). Even so, the plaintiff must present some evidence establishing each element of her

claim to clear the prima facie hurdle. Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303,

308 (2025) (describing the plaintiff’s initial burden as “producing enough evidence to

support an inference of discriminatory [or retaliatory] motive”); Tex. Tech Univ. Health

Scis. Ctr.-El Paso v. Flores, 612 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2020) (requiring the plaintiff to

present “evidence” on each element of her discrimination claim in response to a plea

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challenging the existence of jurisdictional facts); S. Tex. Coll. v. Villagran, No. 13-24-

00224-CV, 2026 WL 62579, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 8, 2026, no

pet. h.) (mem. op.) (same).

The employer may then rebut this presumption by offering a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for the disputed employment action. Alamo

Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 781–82 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55). This is a burden of

production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment. Reeves v. Anderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). “Once rebutted, the presumption disappears, and an

employee lacking direct evidence cannot prove a statutory violation without evidence that

the employer’s stated reason is false and a pretext for discrimination.” Alamo Heights,

544 S.W.3d at 782 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56). Whether summary judgment is

appropriate at this stage will depend on a “number of factors,” including “the strength of

the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s

explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that

properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Reeves, 530

U.S. at 148–49.

For claims against government employers, each step of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis is jurisdictional in nature. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 783. Thus, “[f]or a

plaintiff who proceeds along the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the prima

facie case is the necessary first step to bringing a discrimination claim under [Chapter

21].” Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 637. A plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case

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“means the plaintiff never gets the presumption of discrimination,” and the claim should

be dismissed because the trial court lacks jurisdiction. Id.

To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination based on disparate

discipline, as Guerra alleges here, the plaintiff must present evidence establishing that

she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated male employee. City of

Brownsville v. Garcia, No. 13-24-00159-CV, 2025 WL 3676269, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Dec. 18, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). “Employees are similarly situated

if their circumstances are comparable in all material respects, including similar standards,

supervisors, and conduct.” Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 312 (quoting Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005)). Their circumstances must be “nearly

identical.” Autozone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).

“Employees with different responsibilities, supervisors, capabilities, work rule violations,

or disciplinary records are not considered to be ‘nearly identical.’” Id.

“A retaliation claim is related to, but distinct from, a discrimination claim, and one

may be viable even when the other is not. Unlike a discrimination claim, a retaliation claim

focuses on the employer’s response to an employee’s protected activity, such as making

a discrimination complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 763–64. To establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in a protected activity;

(2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link

between the two. Id. at 782. A person engages in a protected activity if he or she, “under

[Chapter 21], (1) opposes a discriminatory practice; (2) makes or files a charge; (3) files

a complaint; or (4) testifies, assists, or participates in any manner in an investigation,

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proceeding, or hearing.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.055. To engage in a protected activity by

making an internal complaint, the employee is not required to use “magic words,” but the

complaint “must at least alert an employer to the employee’s reasonable belief that

unlawful discrimination is at issue.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 586

(Tex. 2017) (quoting Brown v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir.

2010) (per curiam)).

C. Discussion

Guerra responds that she satisfied her prima facie burden by merely pleading a

prima facie case for each of her claims. She contends that she “had no obligation to

present [evidence of] a prima facie case at this stage of proceedings” and that the

burden-shifting requirements of McDonnell Douglas “are for the trial on the case, not for

a plea to the jurisdiction contesting whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction.”

Consequently, she points to no evidence in the record that would establish a prima facie

case for her retaliation or discrimination claims, and we have found none.

We agree with the City that Guerra fundamentally misunderstands the parties’

respective burdens when, as here, the governmental employer challenges the existence

of jurisdictional facts. In such cases, “we must move beyond the pleadings and consider

evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if the evidence

implicates both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim.” Alamo Heights, 544

S.W.3d at 770–71. Here, the City claimed in its plea that Guerra could not establish a

prima facie case of gender discrimination because she had “no evidence” that any

similarly situated male employee “was treated more favorably” than her. See Flores, 612

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S.W.3d at 312 (“Because no evidence supports Flores’s argument that she and Solis

were similarly situated, she cannot establish the fourth element of a prima facie case

under the disparate-treatment approach.”). The City also argued that Guerra could not

establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she had “no evidence” establishing a

“causal link” between her allegedly protected activities and her suspensions. See Alamo

Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. Therefore, to avoid dismissal under McDonnell Douglas,

Guerra was required to present some evidence establishing these challenged elements

of her claims. See Ames, 605 U.S. at 308; Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 305; Garcia II, 372

S.W.3d at 637; Villagran, 2026 WL 62579, at *5.

Although Guerra points to no evidence in the record to support her claims, in our

sole discretion, we have nonetheless reviewed evidence she previously submitted to the

trial court, including the transcript of the first Commission hearing, Guerra’s affidavit, her

written January 2021 report concerning the subordinate employee, and her email to Chief

Perez. Rather than establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination and retaliation,

this evidence affirmatively demonstrates that Guerra’s claims are not viable.

Guerra alleged in her petition that her protected activities consisted of “reporting

misbehavior by a male firefighter and [Chief Perez]” and that her transfer to another

station and suspensions constituted “retaliation” for making these reports. However, as

she described in her own petition, the January 2021 report concerned a subordinate’s

“work performance issues.” For example, Guerra reported that this employee’s job

performance was “unsatisfactory” because of his poor interpersonal skills. Nowhere in the

report did Guerra state that the employee had engaged in any kind of discriminatory

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behavior. Likewise, Guerra’s email to Chief Perez merely accused him of conducting

personal business during work hours. Neither of these internal reports constitute

protected activity under Chapter 21. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.055; Alamo Heights, 544

S.W.3d at 786 (“The employee’s complaint must, at a minimum, alert the employer to the

employee’s reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.”). In short, Guerra’s

pleadings and evidence conclusively establish that her retaliation claims are based on

activities that are not protected by Chapter 21. 3 Consequently, these claims must be

dismissed. See Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 637.

Guerra’s discrimination claim fares no better. She alleges in her petition that she

was subjected to disparate discipline because of her gender, but she has not affirmatively

identified a similarly situated male employee for comparison even though the City

challenged her to establish this element of her claim. See City of Brownsville, 2025 WL

3676269, at *2. To the extent that she relies on her subordinate, he is not a suitable

comparator because his alleged misconduct materially differed from hers and their

different positions and ranks in the chain of command, a lieutenant and an engineer,

suggest different responsibilities. See Autozone, 272 S.W.3d at 594. Indeed, Guerra was

his immediate supervisor. See Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 312.

Similarly, even though Guerra accused Chief Perez in an email of conducting

personal business during work hours, the record indicates that their positions at the

Department were not comparable. See Autozone, 272 S.W.3d at 594. For example, as

3 Although the City challenged a different prima facie element of Guerra’s retaliation claims in its

plea to the jurisdiction, we “may raise jurisdictional issues for the first time on appeal” sua sponte. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Murphy, 458 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. 2015).

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an officer assigned to a specific station and district, Guerra was responsible for leading

her crew as they responded to emergency calls. The serious implications of Guerra’s

alleged misconduct are clear: when a supervising officer leaves their district during work

hours without prior authorization, the Department’s ability to promptly and effectively

respond to an emergency is compromised. On the other hand, the record demonstrates

that, as the highest-ranking member of the Department, Chief Perez largely served in an

administrative capacity. In other words, unlike Guerra, Chief Perez was not responsible

for providing frontline emergency services to the public. See id. In sum, because Guerra’s

circumstances were not “nearly identical” to either of these possible comparators, see id.,

Guerra failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination based on disparate

discipline, see City of Brownsville, 2025 WL 3676269, at *2, and the district court erred

by failing to dismiss this claim. See Garcia II, 372 S.W.3d at 637.

We sustain the City’s first issue challenging the district court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction over Guerra’s Chapter 21 claims.

III. RELIEF AVAILABLE ON CIVIL SERVICE APPEALS

In its second jurisdictional issue, the City claims that Chapter 143 of the Texas

Local Government Code operates as a limited waiver of governmental immunity, Guerra

requested certain relief under Chapter 143 that exceeds that waiver, and consequently

those claims for relief should be dismissed. Specifically, the City claims that, even if

Guerra succeeds on her administrative appeals, the district court cannot order the

Department to (1) transfer Guerra back to her former station, or (2) remove the letter of

reprimand from her personnel file.

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Chapter 143 provides that a “district court may grant the appropriate legal or

equitable relief necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter. The relief may include

reinstatement or promotion with back pay if an order of suspension, dismissal, or

demotion is set aside.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.015(b). According to the City, the last

sentence in subsection (b) restricts the scope of the district court’s authority to “grant the

appropriate legal or equitable relief necessary to carry out the purposes of [Chapter 143].”

See id.

Guerra responds that the City’s argument is misplaced because she requested the

complained-of relief pursuant to her Chapter 21 claims. Having reviewed Guerra’s live

pleading, we agree with her characterization of the record. Of course, the corollary to that

finding is that these requests for relief only survive if the district court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over Guerra’s Chapter 21 claims. Having already answered that question in

the negative, we overrule the City’s second issue as moot. 4

IV. OUR LIMITED INTERLOCUTORY JURISDICTION

By its final issue, the City claims the district court erred by denying its motion for

summary judgment because the Commission’s decisions are supported by substantial

evidence. Guerra responds that we do not have interlocutory jurisdiction to consider this

issue. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a). Although the City filed a reply brief,

it failed—perhaps tellingly—to address this threshold matter. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.3

(“The appellant may file a reply brief addressing any matter in the appellee’s brief.”).

Indeed, we are prohibited from addressing the merits of an issue without first resolving a

4 We express no opinion on the City’s construction of § 143.015(b). See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE

§ 143.015(b).
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challenge to our jurisdiction. See Tex. Right to Life v. Van Stean, 702 S.W.3d 348, 353

(Tex. 2024).

We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over the district court’s interlocutory

summary judgment order. Generally, only final judgments are appealable. In re

Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam). Our limited

interlocutory jurisdiction is conferred by statute, and although the list of appealable

interlocutory orders continues to grow, there is nothing in § 51.014 (the most common

source of our interlocutory jurisdiction) that entitles the City to immediate review of an

order denying summary judgment on an appeal from a civil service commission decision.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(1)–(15); Harley Channelview Props., LLC

v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024) (“An appellate court has no

jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless review is conferred by statute.”); N.Y.

Underwriters Ins. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678–79 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (holding

that court of appeals’ assertion of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order “when

not expressly authorized to do so by statute is jurisdictional fundamental error”). We are

aware of no other statute that grants us jurisdiction over the challenged interlocutory

order. See City of Edinburg v. Campos, No. 13-24-00313-CV, 2025 WL 3171064, at *2

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering the

merits of an interlocutory order denying a plea to the jurisdiction but dismissing the portion

of the appeal that challenged the district court’s separate interlocutory order granting

partial summary judgment on an appeal from a civil service commission decision).

Consequently, we dismiss this part of the City’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

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V. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and

render a judgment of dismissal on Guerra’s Chapter 21 claims, including all relief she

requested pursuant to those claims. We dismiss the remainder of the appeal. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 43.2(c), (f).

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
12th day of February, 2026.

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