Hofer Builders, Inc. v. Links Construction, LLC and the Guarantee Company of North America USA

NUMBER 13-24-00614-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

HOFER BUILDERS, INC., Appellant,

v.

LINKS CONSTRUCTION, LLC,
AND THE GUARANTEE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA USA, Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT
OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

Appellant Hofer Builders, Inc. (Hofer) appeals a judgment confirming an arbitration

award via four points of error, two of which seek to overturn the award and two of which

seek to modify the award. We reverse and remand in part to resolve mislabeling of the

projects, to correct some interest, and because the award is ambiguous regarding the
arbitrator’s intentions on Hofer’s lien relief. We otherwise affirm the judgment.1

I. BACKGROUND

Hofer appeals from a final judgment confirming an arbitration award awarding

damages to appellees2 arising out of disagreements on two construction projects.

Appellee Links Construction, LLC (Links) is a general contractor that was hired to

complete two construction projects: Burnett Lofts in Fort Worth and Brazos Promenade

in Waco. In 2020, Links hired Hofer to serve as a framing subcontractor on these projects.

Disputes arose during construction regarding certain change orders. These

change orders resulted in a different order of construction for buildings at Brazos

Promenade. This resulted in Links requesting changes to Hofer’s building schedule. Hofer

claimed the schedule changes were unreasonable and eventually refused to commence

work on “Building 1” at the Brazos Promenade project. Links issued several notices before

eventually terminating Hofer from the project (and consequently from Burnett Lofts) and

hiring another framer to finish Hofer’s scope of work. Hofer sought damages in the form

of unpaid invoices while Links sought damages for the cost of the unfinished work. As a

result of the disputes, Hofer filed liens against the Burnett Lofts and Brazos Promenade

properties for the alleged unpaid amounts in the respective counties’ real property

records.

The parties’ subcontracts contained an arbitration agreement encompassing “all

claims, disputes, and other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Agreement

1 This appeal was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to an order

issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are required to follow the
precedent of the transferor court to the extent it differs from our own. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 Appellee The Guarantee Company of North America USA was the surety for the payment bonds

on the projects but will be otherwise unmentioned throughout this memorandum opinion.

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or the breach thereof.” The arbitration agreement also specified that judgment would be

entered pursuant to the Texas Arbitration Act. The parties hired a private arbitrator on

February 9, 2023, to resolve their disagreements and signed a separate arbitration

agreement. This agreement stated “[p]ursuant to the terms of each written Construction

Contract, Links and Hofer agree to submit any and all claims arising out of said projects

to binding Arbitration.”

The arbitrator issued an award on January 11, 2024. The award identified the

primary dispute as centering on “a commercial project in Waco, Texas” located on the

banks of the Brazos River that it called “the Project.” It also identified “several residual

issues” stemming from a project located in Fort Worth that it titled “the Brazos Lofts.” The

arbitrator found that Links made several unreasonable demands to Hofer regarding the

scheduling of framing at “the Project,” including demanding Hofer start framing “when

underslab rough plumbing, slabs and foundations were not completed” in violation of

Paragraph 4.2 of the subcontract, and that Links “failed to provide adequate material

staging areas” or “reasonable access to the jobsites.” The arbitrator noted that Hofer’s

work was “excellent.” However, the arbitrator found that none of the delays were a

material breach of the subcontract and that Links and Hofer had each caused construction

delays.

Ultimately, the arbitrator found that Hofer breached the subcontract by refusing to

start “Building 1” and “pulled off” the job after two notices of default and a few hours before

receiving Links’s termination notice. The arbitrator further found that Links was current on

its payments to Hofer at the time of termination but that the last work completed by Hofer

“reflected in Pay Applications 17 and 18” were due to Hofer, “as [was] the Project’s

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retainage for [Hofer]’s completed work.”

On January 11, 2024, the arbitrator awarded damages to Links in the amount of

$1,263,745.61 to “repair, replace and complete” Hofer’s work and noted that this sum

included a credit for Hofer totaling $251,261.60 “for Retainage and Pay Application 20 for

Brazos Lofts.” The arbitrator also awarded attorney’s fees and costs of $116,147.05, pre-

judgment interest of $254,130, and 8.5% annual post-judgment interest commencing from

the thirty-first day of the award until paid in full. The arbitrator noted a separate credit to

Hofer of $308,049.64 “representing payment of Applications 17 and 18 and the Retainage

from the Project.” On February 23, 2024, the arbitrator modified the award to note that

Hofer completed work “on Buildings 2 through 5” and excluded reference to Hofer

completing work on Building 1.

Appellees subsequently filed for confirmation of the award in the trial court on

February 27, 2024. On April 9, 2024, Hofer filed its motion for modification or correction

of the arbitration award on several grounds. First, Hofer argued that it was improper for

the arbitrator to enter “cost-of-completion” damages against it after not finding

abandonment on Hofer’s part. Second, it argued the award contained mistakes because

it misstated the date Hofer “abandoned” the jobsite and incorrectly stated that it received

two notices of default when it in fact received three. Third, Hofer attacked the award as

contradictory for finding that Hofer breached the subcontract yet also finding that Hofer

was not obligated to start framing Building 1. Fourth, it contended the award incorrectly

stated that Hofer started work on Building 1 when it did not. Both parties filed

supplemental briefing regarding all of these issues.

On June 21, 2024, the trial court held a hearing regarding confirmation of the

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arbitration award. At the hearing, Hofer presented evidence regarding the alleged

mistakes in the award, namely, several change orders and communications regarding

Hofer being terminated from the project if they did not begin work. Hofer argued this

evidence demonstrated that these items were related to the Brazos Promenade, not the

Burnett Lofts project in Fort Worth. Tom Hofer, the owner of Hofer, testified that his

company did not abandon Brazos Promenade but, rather, that they were terminated and

that they did not start Building 1. There was further testimony regarding the application

numbers as awarded in the arbitration award not existing on the Brazos Promenade

project. Hofer argued that “Pay Application 18” only existed as to the Burnett Project, not

the Brazos Promenade as the award stated. Hofer further argued that the arbitrator

exceeded his authority by awarding a remedy not in accordance with the factual findings.

Finally, it also argued that awarding prejudgment interest from the date of the arbitration

award to the date of the final judgment was improper, as well as awarding prejudgment

interest from November 11, 2021.

On July 8, 2024, the trial court signed a final judgment confirming the arbitration

award as entered “with the exception of revising the pre-judgment interest amount

through June 28, 2024,” for a total damages award of $1,192,692.85. The judgment also

awarded pre-judgment interest of “$222.56 a day until a final judgment is signed” and

post-judgment interest from the date of the final judgment at a rate of 8.5%. The final

judgment also ordered that Hofer’s lien affidavits “are removed and are in invalid as a

matter of law and shall be removed by [Hofer] from the Tarrant and McLennan County

official public records no later than ten days after the date of [the] Final Judgment.”

On August 7, 2024, Hofer filed a motion to modify the judgment or for new trial,

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arguing that the arbitrator awarded improper damages and that the final judgment

improperly awarded removal of the liens that did not comport with the relief in the

arbitration award. It also argued for the removal of “post-arbitration, prejudgment interest.”

This appeal followed after the motion was overruled by operation of law.

II. ANALYSIS

Hofer raises four issues on appeal. In its first two issues, Hofer argues this Court

should either remand the arbitration award for clarification or vacate the award entirely.

In the second pair of alternate issues, Hofer argues the award should be modified to

change the interest calculation and to remove the lien relief.

A. Standard of Review

“Texas law favors arbitration, [therefore] judicial review of an arbitration award is

extraordinarily narrow.” E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 271

(Tex. 2010). We review a trial court’s decision to confirm an arbitration award de novo

and will review the entire record in doing so. O’Grady v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitt.,

P.A., 506 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. denied)

(quoting In re Guardianship of Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.)). “All reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of

the award, and none against it.” In re Chestnut Energy Partners, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 386,

397 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). If the trial court resolved factual issues in

confirming the award, “the review is for legal or factual sufficiency.” DeAnder & Felhaber,

LP v. Montgomery, 615 S.W.3d 352, 356 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. denied).

“Subjecting arbitration awards to judicial review adds expense and delay, thereby

diminishing the benefits of arbitration as an efficient, economical system for resolving

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disputes.” O’Grady, 506 S.W.3d at 125 (quoting In re Cantu, 330 S.W.3d at 17 (internal

citations omitted)). Accordingly, the trial court cannot substitute its judgment for the

arbitrator’s or speculate about the arbitrator’s intent. Garza v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp.,

262 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.); Baker Hughes Oilfield

Operations, Inc. v. Henning Prod. Co., 164 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Rouse v. Campbell, No. 09-21-00023-CV, 2022 WL 17840426, at *9

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Even if there is a mistake of

fact or law by the arbitrator, this is not proper grounds for vacating an award. Crossmark,

Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Tex. App—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). “[A]n arbitration

award is given the same effect as a judgment of a court of last resort.” MCR Oil Tools,

LLC v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 692 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2024, pet. denied). “When there is no transcript of the arbitration hearing, as here, [we]

will presume the evidence was adequate to support the award.” In re Chestnut, 300

S.W.3d at 401.

B. Remand of Arbitration Award

Hofer first contends that the trial court should have remanded the arbitration award

for correction due to alleged mistakes in the award. Namely, Hofer argues the award: (1)

misidentifies the construction projects at issue; (2) accordingly awards damages for a

non-existent pay application; and (3) accordingly failed to properly apply credits against

Links’s recovery. Due to these alleged errors, Hofer argues the award is ambiguous and

should have been remanded to the arbitrator for clarification. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 171.054(a)(2), (b)(2). Conversely, appellees argue the sought modifications

are not proper and the award should be undisturbed.

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1. Applicable Law

Texas courts are required to confirm arbitration awards absent specific statutory

grounds for modifying or correcting the award. Id. § 171.087; Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497

S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. 2016). However, courts are required to “modify or correct” awards

that contain “(A) an evident miscalculation of numbers; or (B) an evident mistake in the

description of a person, thing, or property referred to in the award.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 171.091(a)(1).

For modification to be required, a mistake in miscalculation of numbers must be

clear, concise, and conclusive from the record. Roehrs v. FSI Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d

796, 813 (Tex. App—Dallas 2008, pet. denied); see also DHM Hosp., LLC v. Shah, No.

13-17-00078-CV, 2018 WL 6218071, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 29,

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). This implies that the error occurred due to inadvertence

or oversight. Roehrs, 246 S.W.3d at 813; see also Shah, 2018 WL 6218071, at *3. There

is no evident miscalculation if the amount of the award is rationally inferable from the facts

before the arbitrator. Vernon E. Faulconer, Inc. v. HFI, LP, 970 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 1998, no pet.); see also Shah, 2018 WL 6218071, at *3. In other words,

unless error appears on the face of the award, we must presume there was no

miscalculation. City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Some of our sister appellate courts have held that

correction by the trial court of clerical or typographical errors in an arbitration award is a

permissible mandatory correction. Brad Herriage v. BNSF Logistics, LLC, No. 05-16-

01232-CV, 2017 WL 5559570, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 17, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op.). This has included modifying a mislabeled company name. See Rouse, 2022 WL

8
17840426, at *10, n.10.

On the other hand, we cannot enforce ambiguous awards and “must remand to

the arbitrator with instructions to clarify the award’s particular ambiguities” in such

circumstances. Stage Stores, Inc. v. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 216 (5th

Cir. 2003)); see also Eaton Com., L.P. v. Paradigm Hotel SA Riverwalk, LP, 2016 WL

5795195, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 5, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). Remand is

appropriate where there is an apparent mistake on the face of the award, or the award is

ambiguous in scope or implementation. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d at 856. However, in such

circumstances, remand to the arbitrator “is but a preface to determining confirmation.”

Werline, 307 S.W.3d at 270–71. Absent an allegation that an award is ambiguous or

incomplete, remand to the arbitrator after the trial court confirms the appraisal award, as

is the case here, is inappropriate. See In re Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 252

S.W.3d 480, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). However, this

Court has previously remanded an award to an arbitrator post-confirmation after

determining there was an ambiguity in the award regarding the scope of the dispute and

whether arbitration had resolved all issues between the parties. See In re Nestle USA-

Beverage Div., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, orig.

proceeding).

2. Discussion

The three alleged mistakes that Hofer raises are all related to the fact that the

arbitration award mistakenly labeled the two construction projects in a parlance otherwise

unused throughout the case. Though the project located in Waco was called Brazos

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Promenade, the award instead refers to this as “the Project” and it calls the project located

in Fort Worth “the Brazos Lofts”, despite all evidence in the record indicating this

development was called the Burnett Lofts. Hofer contends that it is impossible to

determine whether the arbitrator incorrectly labeled the Burnett Lofts, incorrectly identified

a pay application number or made some other combination of mistakes. Accordingly,

Hofer urges these mistakes render the award ambiguous and require remand. See

Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d at 855; see also Eaton Com., L.P., 2016 WL 5795195, at *2.

We disagree. The complained-of mistakes are evident from the record and may be

reconciled by correcting the award’s improper labeling. As the award on its face refers to

the Waco project as “the Project”, we will take all references to “the Project” to mean the

Brazos Promenade. Likewise, as the award explicitly refers to the Fort Worth project as

“the Brazos Lofts”, we determine that any reference to “the Brazos Lofts” is meant to

reference the Burnett Lofts. While we cannot speculate as to the arbitrator’s intent, this is

not speculation but rather a typographical error that courts can correct without remanding

to the arbitrator. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091(a)(1)(B); see also

Rouse, 2022 WL 17840426, at *10, n.10; Brad Herriage, 2017 WL 5559570, at *6.

Once the award is reviewed considering this correction, Hofer’s complaints are

resolved. Hofer complains that the award referenced a credit “for Retainage and Pay

Application 20 for Brazos Lofts” that does not exist. But if the award is corrected, and the

credit is instead “for Retainage and Pay Application 20” for the Burnett Lofts, then as

Hofer itself states, the credit amount in the award matches the amounts for the retainage

and pay application that does exist for the Burnett Lofts. Likewise, the award also gave a

credit to Hofer representing “payment of Applications 17 and 18 and the Retainage from

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the Project.” If “the Project” is corrected to mean Brazos Promenade, then this mistake is

reconciled as the record contains Applications 17 and 18 for the Brazos Promenade and

related retainage, which, when summed, match the amount of the credit in the award.

Hofer also argues that it is unclear whether both credits were applied, but as we can glean

from the record, both credits were applied, if at different steps of the award calculation.

But the arbitrator’s application of both credits is plain on the award’s face.

Because this simple correction resolves any apparent mistakes, we shall indulge

this as a reasonable presumption in favor of preserving the award, as we are required to

do. See In re Chestnut Energy Partners, Inc., 300 S.W.3d at 397. This is an evident

mistake in labeling that the trial court should have corrected as the statute required

without need for remand. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091; see also

Rouse, 2022 WL 17840426, at *10, n.10; Brad Herriage, 2017 WL 5559570, at *6. It is

evident from the record and award’s face that this was an oversight on the arbitrator’s

part. See Roehrs, 246 S.W.3d at 813; see also Shah, 2018 WL 6218071, at *3. This does

not render the award ambiguous such that it requires a remand. See Gunnerson, 477

S.W.3d at 856. Hofer’s argument that it is unclear whether the arbitrator intended to award

“something else” because of this labeling mistake is unconvincing and without support in

light of the record.

We therefore sustain Hofer’s first issue in part, in that we remand the judgment to

the trial court with instructions to modify the judgment to reflect correction of the arbitration

award pursuant to § 171.091 to change all references of “the Project” to “the Brazos

Promenade” and all references to the “Brazos Lofts” to “Burnett Lofts.” See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091(a)(1)(B). We otherwise overrule Hofer’s first issue.

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C. Vacating Arbitration Award

Hofer next argues the entire arbitration award should be vacated because the

award was not faithful to the parties’ contractual terms.

1. Applicable Law

Texas courts are required to vacate arbitration awards if the arbitrator exceeded

his powers. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(3)(A); Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d

at 494–95. “In arbitration conducted by agreement of the parties, the rule is well

established that ‘[a]n arbitrator derives his power from the parties’ agreement to submit

to arbitration.’” Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2011) (quoting City

of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. 2009) (further citations omitted)).

Therefore, the parties’ contracted intentions control the extent of the arbitrator’s powers,

and the arbitrator is limited to the matters submitted, whether “expressly or by necessary

implication.” O’Grady, 506 S.W.3d at 126 (quoting Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk,

208 S.W.3d 696, 705 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)); Quinn, 339 S.W.3d at

90 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010)). The

parties’ agreed criteria governs the arbitration, and an arbitrator exceeds his authority in

deciding an issue if he ignores the agreed criteria. See City of Beaumont v. Int’l Ass’n of

Firefighters, Loc. Union No. 399, 241 S.W.3d 208, 215 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no

pet.).

However, “[w]e give strong deference to the arbitrator with respect to issues

properly left to the arbitrator’s resolution.” O’Grady, 506 S.W.3d at 124–25. “[A]ny doubts

concerning the scope of what is arbitrable should be resolved in favor of the arbitration.”

Id. (quoting Centex/Vestal v. Friendship W. Baptist Church, 314 S.W.3d 677, 684 (Tex.

12
App—Dallas 2010, pet. denied)). An arbitrator exceeds his authority only “when he

disregards the contract and dispenses his own idea of justice.” D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v.

Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)

(collecting cases)). “Contentions that the arbitrator’s reasoning was legally erroneous or

internally inconsistent, or that the arbitrator misinterpreted the contract or misapplied the

law do not provide a basis for vacating an award.” Denbury Offshore, LLC v. Texcal

Energy S. Tex., L.P., 513 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no

pet.). “Because the parties bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement,

an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must stand,

regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits.” Id. (quoting Oxford Health Plans LLC v.

Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 564 (2013) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added)).

2. Discussion

Hofer claims that the arbitration award improperly awarded termination damages

despite the arbitrator “appear[ing] to find abandonment” on Hofer’s part. According to

Hofer, the arbitration agreement limited the arbitrator’s ability to award damages only in

strict compliance with the subcontract’s stated remedies.

Hofer’s position is a classic instance of arguing that the arbitrator mistakenly

applied the law and was internally inconsistent. Hofer’s claims all revolve around its view

that the arbitrator mixed up the legal standards for various damage types. But even

assuming Hofer is entirely correct that the arbitrator improperly awarded termination

damages despite an abandonment finding, this does not mean the arbitrator disregarded

the contract or “dispens[ing] his own idea of justice.” Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d at 534.

Instead, Hofer alleges that the arbitrator “misapplied the law,” which precedent

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clearly holds does “not provide a basis for vacating an award.” Denbury Offshore, LLC,

513 S.W.3d at 520; see Hazar, 124 S.W.3d at 429. Further, Hofer’s argument that the

arbitrator was narrowly limited by the subcontract terms does not comport with the broad

arbitration language used in the initial arbitration agreement. Without specific limiting

language, such as limiting the arbitrator from rendering a decision containing a reversible

error of law, the arbitrator maintains broad authority to resolve all disputes in the scope

of the agreement. See, e.g., Quinn, 339 S.W.3d at 88; see also Ron v. Ron, No. 01-22-

00731-CV, 2024 WL 5249159, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2024, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“Absent restrictive language, an arbitrator has broad discretion to

fashion an appropriate remedy.”).

Here, the arbitration agreement broadly gave the arbitrator authority to resolve “all

claims, disputes, and other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Agreement

or the breach thereof.” The language Hofer references from the second arbitration

agreement3 for its argument is likewise broad when reviewing the full sentence:

“[p]ursuant to the terms of each written Construction Contract, Links and Hofer agree to

submit any and all claims arising out of said projects to binding Arbitration.” Contrary to

Hofer’s claims, there is no limitation that would prevent the arbitrator from acting as he

did in crafting the award here.

Because the arbitrator applied damages within the scope of the subcontract, even

if he misapplied legal standards, the decision “must stand.” Denbury Offshore, LLC, 513

S.W.3d at 520. We overrule Hofer’s second issue.

3 The second agreement incorporated the language of the first agreement.

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D. Judgment Interest

In its third issue, Hofer argues the judgment should be modified to remove recovery

of “post-award, pre-judgment interest.”

1. Applicable Law

Texas courts are generally authorized to assess post-judgment interest in money

judgments that accrues on the date judgment is rendered and ends on the date the

judgment is paid. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.005(a). Post-judgment interest accrues on

the entire judgment, “including court costs awarded in the judgment and prejudgment

interest.” Id. § 304.003(a). Prejudgment interest is authorized for judgments in property

damage cases. Id. § 304.102. Prejudgment interest “accrues on the amount of a judgment

during the period beginning on the earlier of the 180th day after the date the defendant

receives written notice of a claim or the date the suit is filed and ending on the day

preceding the date judgment is rendered.” Id. § 304.104.

Generally, “[a]rbitration awards earn post-judgment interest in the same manner

as other judgments.” Pillitteri v. Brown, 165 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004,

no pet.). A party is statutorily entitled to recover post-judgment interest on a final judgment

confirming an arbitration award. Bluestone Res., Inc. v. First Nat’l Cap., LLC, 644 S.W.3d

815, 817 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied). However, the Texas Arbitration Act does

not authorize award of post-judgment interest in a judgment confirming an arbitration

award if the arbitrator did not award post-judgment interest. ETC Intrastate Procurement

Co., v. JSW Steels (USA), Inc., 620 S.W.3d 168, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2021, no pet.).

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2. Discussion

The arbitration award initially awarded pre-judgment interest of $254,130, but, as

stipulated by Links, prejudgment interest should have only begun to accrue, at the

earliest, on January 2, 2023, when initial pre-suit notice was sent. On this basis, the final

judgment awarded pre-judgment interest of “$120,849.83 through June 28, 2024 and

$222.56 a day until a final judgment is signed” and also awarded post-judgment interest

from the date of the final judgment at a rate of 8.5%. According to Hofer, it was improper

for the judgment to include any prejudgment interest from the date of the arbitration

award, January 11, 2024, to July 7, 2024,—the date the judgment was signed—because

the arbitration award itself did not award prejudgment interest up to and including entry

of the judgment. Instead, Hofer asserts that the judgment should be modified for

prejudgment interest to only accrue from January 2, 2023, to January 10, 2024, the day

before the award. Hofer further contends that any attempt by the arbitrator to award post-

judgment interest is invalid and unauthorized.

Conversely, appellees argue the arbitrator’s award did provide for interest to

accrue after entry of the award until paid because the award authorizes interest to

commence from thirty-one days following the award until the award is paid in full.

Appellees argue this language authorized the trial court to award prejudgment interest

from February 12, 2024, (i.e. the thirty-first day after the award) to July 7, 2024, in its

judgment4 and that the award’s characterization of this interest as post-judgment interest

is a semantic distinction without significance.

We agree with appellees that the interest the arbitrator awarded is properly

4 Appellees concede that the arbitration award did not authorize the trial court to award any interest

attributable to the thirty-one day period following entry of the award.

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characterized as prejudgment interest. Based on our review, we conclude that it was

proper for the trial court to award interest from February 12, 2024, to July 7, 2024. Our

guiding principle is to indulge “reasonable presumptions” to affirm an arbitration award.

See In re Chestnut Energy Partners, Inc., 300 S.W.3d at 397. While Hofer argues that the

arbitration award only authorized award of post-judgment interest to run after the award

and that such award is impermissible, the arbitrator’s award sought to apply interest from

the time following the thirty-first day after the award until the award is paid. While the

arbitrator classified that as post-judgment interest, the trial court’s entry of a final judgment

made the period from February 12, 2024 to July 7, 2024, “pre-judgment” by fact.

Accordingly, it is a “reasonable presumption” to affirm the arbitration award’s award of

interest as one of prejudgment interest. See id.

Hofer relies on Blumberg v. Bergh for its argument that an arbitration award is not

permitted to award post-judgment interest. No. XX-XXXXXXX-CV, 2005 WL 1047592 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 5, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). Hofer further argues Blumberg’s

holding prohibits the award of interest on this post-award, pre-judgment period. We note

that our sister courts appear to be in conflict on the exact parameters of when interest

can be awarded following an arbitration award. See Bluestone Res., Inc., 644 S.W.3d at

817.

We need not resolve that conflict in determination of this issue today because

Blumberg is distinguishable from the present facts. In Blumberg, the trial court’s judgment

“not only confirmed the arbitration award, but also added post-award, prejudgment

interest to the amount awarded by the arbitrator.” Id. at 816. The judgment then set post-

judgment interest to accrue on the total amount owed, including post-award interest,

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without the arbitration award authorizing such interest. Id. (citing Blumberg, 2005 WL

1047592, at *6). Thus, the central error of the trial court was that the arbitration award did

authorize any such award of interest. Id.

Conversely, here, the arbitration award did expressly authorize award of interest

on the period between February 12, 2024, to July 7, 2024. Therefore, Blumberg’s holding

is not applicable here. The final judgment thus need only be corrected to match what the

arbitrator expressly authorized.

Accordingly, we sustain Hofer’s third issue only in part so as to remand to the trial

court with instructions to render judgment (1) omitting all prejudgment interest awarded

between January 11, 2024, to February 12, 2024, and (2) providing that post-judgment

interest shall accrue only on the modified judgment amount.

E. Liens

In its fourth and final issue, Hofer argues the judgment should be modified to

remove relief regarding two liens Hofer attached to the construction properties. The final

judgment ordered that Hofer’s lien affidavits “are removed and are invalid as a matter of

law and shall be removed by [Hofer] from the Tarrant and McLennan County official public

records no later than ten days after the date of this Final Judgment.” Hofer asserts that it

was improper for the judgment to remove and invalidate its liens for two reasons: (1) the

arbitration award did not address the request for lien relief, and (2) the judgment’s

requirement that Hofer remove the liens from the “official public records” is impossible to

satisfy. Appellees assert this relief was proper and comports with the award.

The parties do not dispute that the arbitration award does not directly discuss the

merits of the lien claims. However, appellees argue that, because the arbitration award

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included a Mother Hubbard clause stating “[a]ll relief not expressly granted herein is,

hereby, denied,” it should be interpreted as having denied Hofer’s request for lien relief.

“Mother Hubbard clauses are problematic because they are open to interpretation.” Farm

Bureau Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015). The Texas

Supreme Court has “rejected the notion that a Mother Hubbard clause gives ‘any indicia

of finality in any order not issued after a conventional trial.’” Id. (quoting Lehmann v. Har-

Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. 2001)). “Thus, Mother Hubbard clauses do not, on

their face, implicitly dispose of claims not expressly mentioned in the order.” Id. at 164.

There is scant authority regarding the ability of a trial court to explicitly deny relief

unmentioned in an arbitration award containing a Mother Hubbard clause. However,

those cases examining whether a trial court can modify an arbitration award to add relief

not expressly addressed by the arbitration all find it improper. See, e.g., Guerra v. L&F

Distribs., LLC, 521 S.W.3d 878, 887–88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (finding

trial court’s modification of award to make subject to tax withholding was improper); see

also Thomas Petroleum, Inc. v. Morris, 355 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2011, pet. denied); Barnes v. Old Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 03-07-00404-CV, 2010 WL

668913, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 26, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). While appellees

argue that the arbitration award does not provide for the enforcement of the liens Hofer

sought at the arbitration hearing, see Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163, the Texas Supreme

Court has disavowed the use of Mother Hubbard clauses to implicitly dispose of claims.

Id. at 164.

Moreover, and on a more basic level, the statutory scheme makes clear that a trial

court should modify or correct—not clarify—an award on a limited basis. TEX. CIV. PRAC.

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& REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091; see id. § 171.087. In this case, clarifying an award to

address the merits of a claim, i.e., ordering specific relief sought by a party, exceeds the

trial court’s statutory authority for judicial review by presuming the arbitrator’s intent. See

id. § 171.091. As obvious as it may be based on the reading of the Mother Hubbard clause

and the relief Links obtained against Hofer, the Texas Arbitration Act leaves to the

arbitrator the resolution of all matters submitted to arbitration and the rendering of a

conclusive award; the courts cannot deduce through interpretation of an award that the

arbitrator should have intended to order the removal of liens when denying a claim for

relief. It is for the courts to simply limit their review of an arbitration award as directed by

statute and seek clarification from the arbitrator when it is necessary.

Therefore, we find it was improper for the trial court to modify the arbitration award

in its final judgment to include explicit relief removing the liens. Instead, we find that the

award is ambiguous because it purports to be final without addressing Hofer’s lien-based

claim. See Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d at 855–56. The proper recourse was for the trial court

to remand the award back to the arbitrator for the limited purpose of clarifying the

arbitrator’s disposal of the lien issues, though this “is but a preface to confirmation of the

award.” See Werline, 307 S.W.3d at 270–71. We sustain Hofer’s fourth issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and remand with instructions to

remand to the arbitrator for the sole purpose of clarifying the arbitrator’s intended relief

regarding Hofer’s liens. Upon receiving the arbitrator’s amended award, we further

instruct the trial court to render judgment (1) reflecting the arbitrator’s clarifications on the

lien relief; (2) correcting the arbitration award pursuant to § 171.091 to change all

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references of “the Project” to “the Brazos Promenade” and all references to the “Brazos

Lofts” to “Burnett Lofts”; and (3) modifying the judgment to omit all prejudgment interest

awarded between January 11, 2024, to February 12, 2024 and to provide that post-

judgment interest shall accrue only on the modified judgment amount. We otherwise

affirm the final judgment.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
4th day of December, 2025.

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