Auto Mechanics Service Plus, LLC and Mohammad Al-Barnawi, Individually v. G. Michael Ragoss

NUMBER 13-23-00412-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

AUTO MECHANICS SERVICE
PLUS, LLC AND MOHAMMAD
AL-BARNAWI, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellants,

v.

G. MICHAEL RAGOSS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

Appellants Auto Mechanics Service Plus, LLC and Mohammad Al-Barnawi,

individually, appeal an “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Reform Judgment.” Appellants

argue the subject order is void because the trial court’s plenary power had expired. We
vacate and render.

I. BACKGROUND

This litigation involves a dispute related to automobile repairs. Appellee G. Michael

Ragoss filed a petition asserting the following claims: deceptive trade practices,

conversion, common law fraud, negligent hiring, supervision, and/or management, and

breach of contract.

A bench trial was held on October 18, 2022. Three days later the trial court issued

an order (First Order) stating:

On this the 21st day of October, 2022 the Court took under consideration
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court, having
reviewed the pleadings, and having heard argument of counsel, and having
considered the evidence, is of the opinion that the said request for monies
should be granted as follows.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant Auto Mechanics Service Plus and Mohammad Al-Barnawi be
ordered to pay Plaintiff, Michael Ragoss the sum of $1,365.22 within 90
days of the date of this order.

SIGNED this the 21st day of October, 2022.

Almost seven months later, sua sponte, the trial court issued another order

(Second Order) that states:

On this the 8th day of May, 2023, the Court took under consideration the
pleadings, argument of counsel, and having considered the evidence, is of
the opinion that the said request for monies spent should be granted as
follows.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, AND DECREED that Defendant Auto
Mechanics Service Plus and Mohammad Al-Barnawi be ordered to pay
Plaintiff, Michael Ragoss the sum of $1,365.22 within 90 days of the date of
this order.

SIGNED this the 8th day of May, 2023.

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Twenty-nine days after the Second Order, Ragoss filed “Plaintiff’s Motion to

Reform Judgment” seeking to “modify, correct, or reform the judgment” and averring that

the trial court’s monetary award was inadequate. The trial court granted the motion,

vacated the Second Order, and awarded a larger sum of money in a Third Order.

Abating the appeal, this Court inquired as to the finality of the Third Order. The trial

court responded as follows:

This is in response to the Court of Appeal’s Order of Abatement. This Court signed
an order dated August 19, 2023. This Court fully intended the judgment to dispose
of all claims and all parties. Further there exists no other pending claims or parties
pending before it in this matter.[ 1]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

A challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that

we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.

2004). A challenge to the trial court’s authority to amend or modify a prior judgment is a

challenge to its plenary jurisdiction and is reviewed de novo. See, Coleman v. Sitel Corp.,

21 S.W.3d 411, 413 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.).

III. DISCUSSION

First, this Court must determine whether the First Order was final and appealable,

triggering the trial court’s thirty-day plenary power period. Second, the Court will address

the effect of the subsequent orders.

1 The reporter’s record was not filed in this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1 (“The appellate record

consists of the clerk’s record and, if necessary to the appeal, the reporter’s record.”), 37.3(c) (“[T]he
appellate court may—after first giving the appellant notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure—consider
and decide those issues or points that do not require a reporter’s record for a decision.”). The Court finds
the reporter’s record is not necessary to this appeal given that the three relevant orders and the trial court’s
statement are before us.
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A. Finality

A judgment is final if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record.

Garcia v. Comm’rs Ct. of Cameron Cnty., 101 S.W.3d 778, 784 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, a “judgment need not expressly

dispose of all issues and claims in order to be final.” Vaughn v. Drennon, 324 S.W.3d

560, 562 (Tex. 2010). The law does not require that a final judgment be in any particular

form. Garcia, 101 S.W.3d at 784. No magic language is required. Patel v. Nations

Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2023). Rather, the Aldridge presumption

establishes that a judgment issued after a conventional trial on the merits is presumed to

be a final, appealable judgment. Vaughn, 324 S.W.3d at 562. The Supreme Court of

Texas rationalized the necessity of the Aldridge presumption by explaining that simplicity

and certainty is imperative in determining the time for perfecting an appeal, and poor

draftsmanship or careless oversight should not render judgments interlocutory when such

judgments were intended to be final. Id. As a result, “unless a trial court orders a separate

trial to resolve a specific issue, there is a presumption that the trial court’s judgment

disposes of all claims and issues in the case.” Id.

In the present case, a bench trial was held on October 18, 2022. Three days later,

the trial court issued the First Order awarding damages. The trial court never ordered a

separate trial to resolve any specific issues, and there were no other pending issues or

claims. Therefore, pursuant to the Aldridge presumption, we presume the First Order to

be final and appealable. See id.

Any doubts as to a post-trial judgment’s finality must be resolved by determining

the intention of the trial court. Id. Here, while the trial court’s First Order states that a

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“Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” was considered, it granted the specified relief

after “hear[ing] argument” and “considering the evidence.” No partial summary judgment

motion ever existed in this cause. And the only argument and evidence before the trial

court was from the bench trial held three days prior. As a result, the trial court could have

referred only to the bench trial argument and evidence, and mention of a “partial motion

for summary judgment” was a typographical error. This error was corrected, sua sponte,

by the Second Order awarding the same damages. Furthermore, in response to our

inquiry, the trial court expressed its intent to dispose of all claims and all parties via the

Third Order. The Third Order expressly vacates and reforms the Second Order, and the

Second Order is identical in substance to the First Order. In other words, the Second

Order was intended to correct the First Order, and the Third Order was intended to reform

the Second Order. Thus, it is clear that, if the trial court intended the Third Order to be

final, then it necessarily intended both the Second Order and the First Order to be final at

the time each was signed.

For these reasons, the First Order was a final and appealable judgment when

rendered on October 21, 2022.

B. Modifications to Judgment

Given the First Order’s finality, we now turn to the effect, if any, of the trial court’s

subsequent modifications of the First Order. Following signature of a final judgment, trial

courts maintain plenary power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform a final judgment for

thirty days. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (f). Accordingly, the trial court’s plenary power expired

on November 20, 2022. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (f).

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The law distinguishes two kinds of corrections to final judgments: clerical errors

and judicial errors. Clerical errors may be corrected by the trial court at any time. In re

Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Tex. 2018). A clerical error is one which, after being

corrected, does not change the terms of the judgment as rendered. Cappadonna Elec.

Mgmt. v. Cameron County., 180 S.W.3d 364, 375 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2005, no pet.). It is merely a discrepancy between the entry of a judgment in the record

and the judgment that was actually rendered by the court and does not arise from judicial

reasoning or determination. Hernandez v. Lopez, 288 S.W.3d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see Martinez v. Olmos, No. 13-18-00650-CV, 2020 WL

5054794, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 9, 2020, pet. struck) (mem.

op.). In contrast, judicial errors may only be corrected before the expiration of the trial

court’s plenary power. Id. (holding orders correcting judicial errors beyond the period of

the court’s plenary power are void (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (f))). A judicial error

occurs in the rendering, rather than the entering, of a judgment and arises from a mistake

of law or fact that requires judicial reasoning to fix. In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d

451, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

For example, a trial court’s insertion of “4,00.00” in the place of “4,000.00” in a

judgment was a clerical error. SLT Dealer Grp v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., 336 S.W.3d

822, 832–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). In another example, a trial

court’s statement that dismissal was pursuant to a motion for “sanctions” rather than a

motion for “summary judgment” was a clerical error where the trial court actually

considered a summary judgment motion and not a sanctions motion. Butler v. Cont’l

Airlines, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). On

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the other hand, changing substantive terms, such as awarding different numerical

amounts or different property than was originally rendered, is correction of a judicial error.

See In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 458–60; see also Montemayor v. Garcia,

No. 13-09-00342-CV, 2011 WL 578603, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

Feb. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

i. Second Order

The Second Order was identical in substance to the First Order except that it

excluded the reference to a summary judgment motion. Both orders purported that the

trial court reviewed the pleadings, argument, and evidence and assessed the same

monetary award and payment terms. No summary judgment existed in the record. Similar

to the Butler court, the trial court did not actually render decision on a summary judgment

motion when it signed the First Order but rather made a typographical error. 31 S.W.3d

at 648. The trial court sought to correct that error by filing the Second Order which

removed the incorrect and inapplicable language. See id.

This is a correction that involves error in entry of information and does not change

the substance of the original judgment rendered. See Cappadonna, 180 S.W.3d at 375.

It does not involve alteration to the amount, type, or nature of the award originally

reasoned and rendered by the trial court. In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 458–

60; see also Montemayor, 2011 WL 578603 at *2–3. For these reasons, we conclude the

Second Order corrected a clerical error, and the trial court was authorized to do so months

after its plenary power expired. 2

2 A trial court typically corrects a clerical error on a party’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 316, 329b(f); see, In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d 451, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The parties did not address whether the Second Order was properly entered in
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ii. Third Order

The Third Order purported to vacate and reform the Second Order. It included a

higher monetary sum awarded and new awards such as interest and court costs. It also

labeled the new sum awarded as “economic damages.”

The foregoing changes are not changes involving errors in entry or recording of

the actual judgment rendered but involve the exercise of judicial reasoning and

discernment to change the substance of the original judgment rendered. See In re

Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 458–60. In fact, Ragoss’s motion which prompted the

Third Order argues the trial court failed to order the full relief Ragoss believed he proved

his entitlement to at trial. Such is a motion seeking the trial court’s reconsideration of the

kind, type, and amount of its previous rendering, not a motion for the trial court to correct

a clerical error. See id.; see also Montemayor, 2011 WL 578603 at *2–3. Thus, these

changes are corrections of judicial errors. See In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at

458–60; see also Montemayor, 2011 WL 578603 at *2–3. Such corrections could have

only been made before the expiration of the trial court’s plenary power on November 20,

2022. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (f). However, the Third Order was entered several

months after that date.

Therefore, the Third Order is void. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 825. We

sustain Appellants’ issue on appeal.

accordance with Rule 316 or 329b(f) when the trial court entered the order sua sponte. Because the parties
did not challenge the trial court’s authority to enter the Second Order, and we conclude that the Second
Order intended to correct a clerical error, we will treat the Second Order as a judgment nunc pro tunc. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f) (providing that “the court may at any time correct a clerical error in the record of a
judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316”).
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IV. CONCLUSION

We vacate the trial court’s judgment entered on August 19, 2023, and render

judgment reinstating the trial court’s May 8, 2023, judgment.

JON WEST
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
31st day of July, 2025.

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