In the Interest of O.J.G. and O.E.G., Children v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00145-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF O.J.G. AND O.E.G., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT
OF BEE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Appellant J.G. (Mother) appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her

children, O.J.G. and O.E.G. 1 Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support: (1) termination pursuant to § 161.001(b)(1)(O), and (2) that

termination was in the children’s best interest. 2 We affirm.

1 We refer to the parties and children by their initials in accordance with the rules of appellate

procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2 Mother was the sole party to this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Pre-Trial

On August 1, 2023, the Department of Family and Protective Services

(Department) filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to O.J.G., who

was eleven at the time of trial, and O.E.G., who was approximately eighteen months old

at the time of trial. The petition was supported by an affidavit that alleged neglectful

supervision by Mother. According to the affidavit, Mother went to the hospital because

her water broke but she refused medical treatment and left the hospital against medical

advice. She later returned and gave birth to O.E.G, and both she and O.E.G. tested

positive for methamphetamines. Additionally, according to the affidavit, O.E.G.’s alleged

father was abusive toward Mother, and there was a concern that O.J.G. feels the pressure

of taking care of Mother and O.E.G.

Subsequently, the Department was awarded temporary managing conservatorship

of the children on August 15, 2023, and the case later proceeded to a bench trial via zoom

on January 24, 2025, and February 25, 2025.

B. Trial Record

After admitting nine exhibits, the Department called Lionel Vasquez to the stand.3

Vasquez, an investigator with the Department, testified that the children came to the

Department’s attention because Mother and O.E.G. tested positive for

methamphetamines when O.E.G. was born. During its investigation, the Department also

3 The nine exhibits are the original petition for protection of a child, for conservatorship, and for

termination in suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the affidavit in support of emergency removal,
temporary order following adversary hearing, the status hearing order, three family plans (to include one
for J.G., Mother), the permanency report to the court, and the guardian ad litem’s report to the court.

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obtained the results of the meconium test which were positive for methamphetamines.

The Department received another intake that O.J.G., nine years old at the time, was

acting as O.E.G.’s caretaker.

Initially, Vasquez explained, the Department tried to avoid removal by offering

Mother services through Family-Based Safety Services (FBSS)4 and to put in place a

safety plan that included a 24-hour monitor. However, the attempted safety plan failed

because Mother was unable to provide a monitor. This, coupled with the positive drug

test results, lead the Department to seek removal of the children. Vasquez confirmed that

Mother’s significant history of cases and reports against her were also a consideration

favoring removal. Vasquez clarified that he believed the Department had been working

on and off with Mother since 2013, and in the past she had been able to complete a family

plan of service for reunification.

Next, Taylor Jones, a Department caseworker, 5 testified that the case had been

ongoing for nineteen months, and Mother had not substantially complied with her court-

ordered family plan of service, with the primary components of such plan being individual

counseling, drug counseling, and parenting classes. Mother’s service plan also required

random hair follicle, urine, and oral swab drug testing. Jones stated that the Department’s

primary concern with Mother is her use of methamphetamines. Although Mother was

4 Family-Based Safety Services (FBSS) are designed to maintain children safely in their homes—

or make it possible for children to return home—by strengthening the ability of families to protect their
children and reducing threats to their safety. See Family-Based Safety Services (FBSS), Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services, https://www.dfps.texas.gov/child_protection/Family_Support/FBSS.asp
(last visited June 26, 2025).
5 Taylor Jones testified that there have been three caseworkers assigned to this case. She initially

handled the case followed by two after her, and then she returned to the case.
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offered rehab at the beginning of the case, in August of 2023, she did not attend until

nearly the end, in December of 2024.

Regarding drug testing, Jones explained that Mother failed six out of the ten urine

tests and four out of five hair follicle tests. She refused two oral swabs and was positive

on one. Jones clarified that Mother was offered eight hair follicle tests but only took five.

During the pendency of the case, Mother became pregnant again, 6 and admitted that she

used drugs during her pregnancy. Mother also admitted to using drugs in early December

of 2024.

On cross-examination, Jones stated that just before entering rehab on December

10, 2024, Mother tested positive on a urine test for methamphetamines, benzodiazepines,

and amphetamines. But she acknowledged that Mother was negative on a urine test

before trial. Jones also explained that Mother expressed interest in continuing her

residential treatment beyond thirty days in effort to show that she was attempting to

sustain sobriety, but there were no beds available to prolong her stay. Also, since being

discharged from residential treatment, Mother has participated in outpatient treatment

with A.G. 7 at home with her, and she completed three individual sessions and fifteen

group sessions.

Believing termination to be in the best interest of the children, Jones recommended

that all parental rights be terminated and that the children remain at their current

placement with the Morris family, which would like to adopt them. Jones stated that O.J.G.

had been placed with the Morris family previously, and the children have now been with

6 Mother gave birth to another child (A.G.) during the case.

7 A.G. is not a party to the suit.

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them for approximately nine months. They are “thriving,” “happy,” and “healthy” with the

Morris family, and the placement is stable, safe, and drug free. O.J.G. was doing well in

school and getting “straight A’s.” According to Jones, O.J.G. desires to remain with the

Morris family and be adopted by them. O.J.G. loves Mother but he does not want to return

to live with her. Jones clarified that O.J.G. has not indicated that he never wanted to see

his Mother again but when asked about how he feels about the possibility of having no

more visits with her, he stated he would “feel fine” about that.

Jones also explained that Mother has been participating in a battering intervention

program for approximately a month and a half as O.E.G.’s alleged father had a history of

being abusive to Mother and “then her with [O.J.G.’s father].” Jones observed some police

call outs to Mother’s home during her review of the case, but she believed if it was a call

out from Mother it was to have O.E.G.’s alleged father leave the home. Jones also

explained that after visits were decreased with Mother at one point they did not increase

because there was a period of time in which Mother would confirm and then cancel last

minute or not show.

On direct questioning from the trial court, Jones clarified that Mother admitted to

using after A.G. was born in November 2024 but before entering rehab on December 10.

She also clarified that although Mother completed drug counseling in April of 2024, she

was either not testing or testing positive for the Department so she was referred to another

provider to resume drug classes. However, Mother did not fully complete the classes.

Additionally, Jones explained that Mother was not fully compliant with her individual

counseling since she sporadically attended. She further explained that Mother completed

parenting classes but had been recommended to go back. Jones confirmed that the

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Department made monthly attempts to visit Mother’s home, but it was only able to view it

on seven occasions despite the case pending for nineteen months. She explained that

Mother would either not respond to their knock or call, or she would schedule with them

and then cancel.

Next, O.J.G.’s father, A.T. testified. 8 He stated that he would like the children to

remain with the Morris family and believes O.J.G. will have a good home with them. He

confirmed that he signed an affidavit of relinquishment with respect to O.J.G., and that he

believes it would be in the best interest of O.J.G. that his parental rights be terminated so

that an adoption can take place. Additionally, he testified that he believes it to be in

O.J.G.’s best interest that Mother’s rights be terminated as well.

Mother testified next on direct and confirmed that in the past she has been able to

successfully complete family service plans, but she was unable to do so this time. Mother

also testified that since completing rehab she has been “doing great” but conceded that

she previously used methamphetamines. She also conceded that using drugs while

pregnant with her youngest child was not safe. Mother acknowledged that she had not

completed her service plan because she “had a drug addiction” and “needed help.” Since

receiving that help, she said she feels that she has been completing the service plan, but

apologized for not going to rehab sooner. Mother also stated that she does not think her

children should have waited at all for her to get drug free, “[a]nd there are no excuses.

There aren’t any whatsoever.”

Brittany Morris testified next that she has known Mother and O.J.G.’s father for

eleven years. Morris stated that O.J.G. was previously placed in her home for about five

8 We observe the record implies that A.T. was in custody during his testimony.

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years and knows her family well. She stated O.J.G. and O.E.G. are doing excellent. Morris

confirmed that she and her husband would like to adopt the children and explained that

“it’s been [eleven] years, I think, of O.J.G. back and forth between [the Department] and

his mom. I think it’s—it’s been enough for this child.” Morris further explained that she

does not believe going back and forth is in O.J.G.’s best interest because “it’s really hurt

him. He—he’s struggling to just know that he’s—good, he’s safe, he’s loved, he’s taken

care of. And he doesn’t have to worry about when his next meal is going to come from

and if he’s going to be able to go to school the next day.”

Upon being recalled, Mother testified that she has maintained her same residence

for ten years with O.E.G. living there for “like a night” and O.J.G. the “whole time.”

Currently, she and A.G. live in the home, and she pays gas, electric and water. Mother

explained she also has two older children, aged sixteen and seventeen, that reside with

their father in San Antonio, but she nonetheless maintains a relationship with them, and

her daughter will be moving in with her over the summer.

Mother stated she had been cleaning houses and cutting grass to pay her bills and

take care of herself and her children. Before rehab, she explained that it had been “a little

bit more difficult due to my anemia,” as it impacted her ability to do things. Additionally,

Mother confirmed that at times the people she relied on to drive her to visits with her

children did not show or could not come. Mother could not drive herself because she

never owned a car. Mother denied refusing the Department entry into her home and

explained she was working, not available, or her phone was not working when the

Department called.

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Mother confirmed that she has admitted to having a methamphetamine addiction

and had not been forthcoming in the past. Mother explained that challenges she faced

that prevented her from going to residential treatment at the end of the summertime were

her bills and finding a home for her three pets. She further explained that if she did not

pay her bills she would not have had electricity. She was also concerned that if she did

not have electricity, then A.G. would be removed. She also explained that it took four

months to find a home for her pets.

Mother stated that residential treatment has made a great difference in her life,

and she was blessed to be able to take A.G. with her. She also stated that she participated

in every resource and attended every group session. She explained that the first drug test

taken when she entered was positive but never again during her stay. She stated she

attempted to stay longer than thirty days, which was reported to the trial court, but

believed a miscommunication prevented her from staying longer. Mother testified that

after discharge she diligently participated in online outpatient lessons.

Explaining her current pathway, Mother acknowledged she has not been

accountable in the past due to her drug addiction. Since completing rehab, however, she

has seen a big change in herself and has obtained valuable learning tools, such as

learning to understand her triggers. Additionally, a significant person that Mother lost at

the start of this case was her own mother. Mother has since developed some support

from friends and family, and she has a recovery coach. Mother acknowledged that there

is not much of a record of her recent behavior change, but she asked that she not be

removed from her children’s lives. She apologized for the length of time it has taken and

recognized that O.J.G. and O.E.G. need stability and safety. Mother said she is not asking

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that the children be removed from the care of the Morris family but to consider an option

less than termination.

Mother admitted four exhibits into evidence: a discharge plan from Santa Maria, 9

that reflects Mother achieved several discharge objectives; a client progress report from

Santa Maria that states among other things that “[Mother’s] attendance and participation

has been consistent”; a message showing that since re-enrolling Mother has been

attending a battering intervention program and has missed only one class; and four

certificates showing program course completions for relapse prevention and intensive

outpatient treatment (on April 29, 2024), individual counseling (on February 16, 2024),

and parenting (on September 27, 2023).

Lastly, Amie Gaitan, the guardian ad litem (GAL), testified that she has been

serving as the GAL for about a year, and she believes it is in the children’s best interest

to remain with the Morris family and that parental rights be terminated. Gaitan explained

that while Mother believes she has good intentions, she “does things on her terms and

on her time.” Gaitan also explained that when she was at Santa Maria during a visit with

the children, Mother made it very clear that she was going to go home and that she had

to go home so that she could maintain her housing assistance. Mother, she explained,

stated that she could not stay in rehab because maintaining her housing assistance where

she was living outside of rehab required that she and A.G. be physically present there,

but Gaitan verified with the housing authority that there was no such requirement. In other

9 We observe Santa Maria is where Mother went for inpatient residential treatment or stated
differently, rehab.
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words, Gaitan explained it was just another excuse for Mother to go home and not

complete ninety days of rehab, as required by the trial court.

Gaitan testified that “[O.J.G.] is very mature for his age.” Additionally, she

described two incidents in which she observed O.J.G. “shut down” around Mother. Gaitan

also explained that the main concern with Mother was her drug use. With regards to visits

to Mother’s home, she explained that she and the Department would show up at Mother’s

home after getting her approval to go, and then Mother would not allow them in the home.

On one occasion Gaitan was able to view the home, and she had concerns because all

the windows were covered, apart from the front door that did not securely lock, and the

other doors had furniture in front of them. At a certain point, Gaitan stopped trying to see

the home because Mother was very negative and said Gaitan’s visits were causing undue

stress on her child. Gaitan explained that Mother had so many excuses for why she would

not go to rebab that Gaitan had to start tracking them. The excuses mostly related to her

pets and utilities but also included Mother not wanting to travel to Houston, doing things

for her baby, packing her stuff, cleaning her yard, mowing the grass, and not wanting to

share a room with other females who had been incarcerated.

On cross-examination, Gaitan testified that she believes visits with Mother would

be detrimental for O.J.G. Gaitan stated that O.J.G. has requested that he would just like

to know that Mother is “okay” and that he is in “total agreement with the idea of adoption.”

Additionally, Gaitan testified that she personally believes it is the children’s best interest

to be adopted by the Morris family and to have no contact with Mother. She also confirmed

that it would be detrimental to the children’s development to allow Mother to have some

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kind of visitation schedule with the children if the trial court were to terminate Mother’s

parental rights.

C. Ruling

At the close of evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On

March 18, 2025, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to

O.J.G. and O.E.G. pursuant to predicate grounds (D), (E), and (O). See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court also found that termination was in the

children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). This accelerated appeal followed. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional

rights, Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985), and consequently, termination

proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014).

In parental termination proceedings, our legal and factual sufficiency standards honor this

elevated burden of proof while respecting the factfinder’s role. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

624, 630 (Tex. 2018).

Where the distinction lies between legal and factual sufficiency is in the extent to

which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered. Id. When conducting a

legal-sufficiency review, a “reviewing court cannot ignore undisputed evidence contrary

to the finding, but must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor

of the finding.” Id. at 630–31. Therefore, “[e]vidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding and considering undisputed

contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the

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finding was true.” Id. at 631.

On the other hand, factual sufficiency “requires weighing disputed evidence

contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” Id. We must consider

“whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved

it in favor of the finding” in a factual-sufficiency review. Id. “Evidence is factually

insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder

could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not

have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. Under both legal and

factual sufficiency standards, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility

of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In

re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see also In re I.R., No. 13-24-

00632-CV, 2025 WL1261430, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 1, 2025,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

A trier of fact must find two elements by clear and convincing evidence before it

can involuntarily terminate parental rights: (1) that a parent’s act or omission satisfies a

statutory ground for termination found in § 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code; and (2) that

termination is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1), (2);

In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 572. Clear and convincing evidence means “the degree of

proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007. “In a

bench trial, the trial court acts as the fact-finder and is the sole judge of witness credibility.”

In re A.M., 418 S.W.3d 830, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing Nguyen v.

Nguyen, 355 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)).

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III. TERMINATION GROUNDS

In her first issue, Mother argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence

supporting termination of her parental rights under § 161.001(b)(1)(O) because she

completed all material portions of her service plan by the time of trial, was free of drugs,

attended counseling, and provided a safe and stable home for another child. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The Department responds that Mother has waived

this complaint.

A. Applicable Law & Analysis

Because “only one predicate ground is necessary to support a judgment for

termination,” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b), a parent who hopes to prevail on the first statutory element must

successfully challenge each predicate finding by the trial court. See In re J.G.S., 574

S.W.3d 101, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). If, however, a parent

challenges a child-endangerment ground, due process mandates review of such ground

regardless of whether there are other predicate grounds to support termination. In re N.G.,

577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (“Allowing section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E)

findings to go unreviewed on appeal when the parent has presented the issue to the court

thus violates the parent’s due process and due course of law rights.”); see also In re I.R.,

2025 WL 1261430, at *6 (“Although only one predicate ground is necessary to support

termination, when the parent has preserved error as to Subsections (D) and (E),

concerning endangerment, we must review those grounds as a matter of due process.”).

Here, Mother has not presented a challenge on appeal to the child-endangerment

predicate grounds found by the trial court. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D),

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(E). Thus, Mother has forfeited any challenge she may have to those findings. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); Toliver v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“Holloway

does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings under [§]

161.001(1)(F), (N), and (O), and thus he waives any complaint about the sufficiency of

the evidence to support these findings.”); see also In re A.M.L., No. 13-17-00451-CV,

2017 WL 6545995, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 21, 2017, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (similar); J.T. v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00286-

CV, 2015 WL 6459607, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(similar).

Because we may affirm the trial court’s judgment of termination on the

unchallenged (D) and (E) grounds, it is unnecessary for this Court to review Mother’s

sufficiency challenge to predicate ground (O). See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 115 (“[I]f

multiple predicate grounds are found by the trial court, we may affirm on any one ground

because only one is necessary for termination of parental rights.” (citation omitted)); see

also In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (unnecessary

to review sufficiency arguments as to other grounds of termination when trial court’s

finding with respect to unchallenged ground can support termination order); see generally,

In re A.A., No. 10-24-00084-CV, 2024 WL 3717427, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 8, 2024,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (refusing to analyze Mother’s challenge to subsection (D) in light

of unchallenged (E) finding); C.W. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-19-

00654-CV, 2020 WL 828673, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“[W]e need not review Father’s challenge under Subsection (D) because the potential

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collateral consequences are triggered separately by the Subsection (E) portion of the trial

court’s judgment, which he does not challenge.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we

overrule Mother’s first issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

IV. BEST INTEREST

In her second issue, Mother argues there is legally and factually insufficient

evidence to find that termination was in the best interest of the children because Mother

completed all the material portions of her service plan and was providing a safe and stable

home for another child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). The Department

disagrees asserting that termination was in the best interest of the children.

A. Applicable Law

“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-

circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411

S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013). It is child-centered and focuses on the well-being, safety,

and development of the child. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. In Holley, the Supreme Court

identified several nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in determining the children’s

best interest. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). They include:

(1) the children’s desires; (2) the children’s present and future emotional and physical

needs; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the children; (4) the

parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist

those individuals to promote the children’s best interest; (6) the plans for the children by

those individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or

proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing

parent-child relationship is an improper one; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or

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omissions. Id. at 372. “With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors

need be proved.” In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet.

denied). “In analyzing these factors, the court must focus on the best interest of the child,

not the best interest of the parent.” In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 333 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2023, no pet.) (en banc) (citation omitted). We may also consider the statutory

factors in § 263.307 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307.

B. Analysis

As to the first Holley factor, O.E.G. was approximately eighteen months old when

Mother’s rights were terminated, and thus, she was too young to express her desires.

See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)

(“[T]he general rule is that when a child is too young to express herself, her desires are

neutral as to the trial court’s best-interest finding, unless there is circumstantial evidence

from which the factfinder could infer her desires by proxy.”). It is undisputed that both

children are well taken care of in their current placement with the Morris family. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; see also In re A.M.V., No. 04-25-00070-CV, 2025 WL

1512211, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 28, 2025, no. pet. h.) (mem. op.) (explaining

that in circumstances in which the child is young, “courts . . . have held a fact finder may

consider whether the child has bonded with the foster family, is well cared for by them,

and has spent minimal time with the parent” (citations omitted)).

O.J.G., eleven years old at the time of trial, did not testify himself but Gaitan

testified that he is “very mature for his age” and she and Jones conveyed his wishes of

adoption by the Morris family. See generally, In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 926 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (“[A] child’s preference should not be considered absent

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a showing of sufficient maturity . . . and there was no indication that any of the children

were sufficiently mature to express a preference as to their placement.”(internal citation

omitted)); see also In re C.J.A., No. 13-16-00635-CV, 2017 WL 2200301, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg March 16, 2017, no pet.) (explaining, among other things,

upon analyzing first Holley factor, that “[t]here was no evidence that [the seven-year-old

child] expressed an opinion regarding his desires about his relationship with [father] or

that he was mature enough to form one”). More specifically, according to Jones, O.J.G.

expressed his desire to remain with the Morris family and be adopted by them, and while

he loves Mother, he does not want to return to live with her. Additionally, he would “feel

fine” about having no more visits with her. Similarly, Gaitan stated that O.J.G. has only

requested to know “if [Mother is] okay,” but he is “in total agreement with the idea of

adoption.” Accordingly, the first factor supports termination.

It was uncontroverted at trial that, despite her parental rights being at stake, Mother

continued to use illicit drugs from inception to nearly the end of the case, which supports

the trial court’s best interest finding under the second, third, and fourth Holley factors. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Specifically, the record showed Mother and O.E.G. testified

positive for methamphetamines at birth, and Mother admitted to the Department’s

caseworker that she was still using drugs sixteen months later. See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d

595, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (“A mother’s use of

illegal drugs during pregnancy endangers the physical wellbeing of her unborn child.”); In

re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 5, 2019, pet. denied)

(“[P]arental substance abuse reflects poor judgment and may be a factor to consider in

determining a child’s best interest.”); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8)

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(listing as best-interest consideration: courts may consider history of substance abuse by

a child’s family or others who have access to a child’s home); In re J.V., No. 02-19-00392-

CV, 2020 WL 1540865, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(finding the second and third Holley factors weigh in favor of termination after discussing

Mother’s history of drug use, including methamphetamine use, after her child’s removal

among other things).

Mother asserts in her brief that “it is difficult for the Department to argue that the

children would be in danger in [Mother’s] care when they have found A.G. is not in danger

in her care.” However, best interest determinations are made on a “child-by-child basis.”

See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 611–12 (rejecting Mother’s suggestion that termination of

her rights with respect to her younger son but not her older son would be inappropriate

after explaining in part that “best-interest determinations must be made individually, on a

child-by-child basis, even with respect to children in the same family”) (citing In re

A.J.D.- J., 667 S.W.3d at 835).

Additionally, testimony from Jones showed that while Mother was at times drug

testing for the Department, she was positive on six of the ten urine tests, four of the five

hair follicle tests, one of three oral swabs, and she refused to take the other two. And

while Mother testified to “doing great” since rehab she conceded to having a drug

addiction, and using methamphetamines, a more “destructive” drug than others, during

the case. Id. at 608 (explaining that the evidence shows that mother’s drug use involves

“so-called hard drugs—cocaine and methamphetamine in particular—rather than less

destructive ones”). Accordingly, the second, third, and fourth factors weigh in favor of

termination.

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Relevant to the fifth factor, Mother admitted four certificates into evidence showing

completion of relapse prevention, intensive outpatient treatment, individual counseling,

and parenting classes. However, even assuming the trial court credited Mother with

completion of parenting classes and individual counseling, the certificates for both relapse

prevention and intensive outpatient treatment reflect a completion date of April 29, 2024.

The undisputed testimony revealed that Mother was using after this time period. See id.

(“When . . . the evidence shows the parent returned to drug use after rehabilitation, the

factfinder may reasonably find that the parent will, in all likelihood, continue using drugs

and therefore continues to pose a risk to his or her child’s well being.” (citation omitted)).

Additionally, while Mother’s decision to enter rehab and engage in outpatient treatment

services upon discharge is commendable, of significance, the record shows this decision

came less than two months shy of the dismissal date. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN.§ 263.401(a), (b); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (“[E]vidence of improved conduct,

especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long

history of drug use and irresponsible choices.”); see also In re A.M.R., 652 S.W.3d 117,

125 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. denied) (finding that the evidence was legally and

factually sufficient for the jury to have found that termination was in the best interest of

the child after explaining, among other things, that “Stephanie did not . . . make a

significant effort to participate in services until well over a year after [the child’s] removal

and very late in the proceedings”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11) (listing “the

willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal

changes within a reasonable period of time” as a best-interest factor). Accordingly, the

fifth factor weigh in favor of termination.

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Considering next the sixth and seventh Holley factors, the undisputed evidence

showed that the children were thriving, happy, and healthy in their current placement with

the Morris family and the family wanted to adopt them. Moreover, A.T. testified that he

would like the children to remain with the Morris family and believes O.J.G. will have a

good home with them. See In re G.A.C., 499 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016,

pet. denied) (“[A] child’s need for permanence through the establishment of a ‘stable,

permanent home’ has been recognized as the paramount consideration in determining

best interest.” (citation omitted)). On the other hand, Mother clarified that she is not asking

that the children be removed from the Morris family but that an option short of termination

be considered. In her brief, she contends that her plan “gives the children the most hope

and the most love; keep her rights open so that they can have a relationship with their

mother and their sibling, A.G., without cutting the placement out of the children’s lives.”

However, the Department presented evidence that Mother failed to show up for some

scheduled visitation. And Mother did not deny missing visits either, but instead offered a

reason for missing based on her means of transportation falling through. See Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 371–72; see also In re A.V.G.-P., No. 10-23-00294-CV, 2024 WL 1327908, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] parent’s failure to regularly

visit his children after removal may support a finding that termination of the parent’s rights

is in the children’s best interest.” (citation omitted)). Even if the trial court believed

Mother’s explanation, Gaitan testified that she believes continued visits with Mother after

termination would be detrimental to the children’s development and the trial court was

free to believe her testimony over Mother’s. See In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 117 (“We note,

that ‘[i]t is well established that, in a bench trial, the judge as the trier of fact weighs the

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evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts and

inconsistencies.’” (citation omitted)). Given the above evidence, the trial court could have

determined Mother’s proposed plan was not in the children’s best interest because it

would inject instability into their lives. When considering the totality of the evidence, these

factors too weigh in favor of termination.

Regarding the final two Holley factors, Mother testified that challenges she faced

which prevented her from attending treatment earlier were her bills and finding housing

for her three pets, and she asserts a similar argument, albeit phrased differently, on

appeal. Gaitan testified that Mother had so many excuses that she began writing them

down. The excuses mostly related to her pets and utilities but also included Mother not

wanting to travel to Houston, doing things for her baby, packing her stuff, cleaning her

yard, mowing the grass, and not wanting to share a room with other females who had

been incarcerated. And upon being asked how long her children should have to wait for

her to get drug free, Mother acknowledged she should have “gotten [her] stuff together

since the beginning,” she does not “think [her] children should have waited at all”, and

“there are no excuses.” Given such conflicting testimony, the trial court was free to

disbelieve Mother. See id.

We acknowledge that not all of the evidence is adverse to Mother. For example,

she testified to: maintaining the same residence for ten years, obtaining a negative urine

test before trial, completing thirty days of residential treatment, engaging in outpatient

treatment, having A.G. remain in her care, and maintaining a relationship with her two

older children. However, evidence cannot be read in isolation, and must be read in the

context of the entire record. See id. at 119. And when viewing all of the evidence in the

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light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could

have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630. Further, the

evidence to the contrary was not so significant as to preclude such a finding. See In re

A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630. We thus hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of the parent-child relationship between

Mother and the children was in their best interest, and we overrule Mother’s second issue.

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
10th day of July, 2025.

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