In Re Bernabe Lemus v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00120-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE BERNABE LEMUS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Bernabe Lemus asserts that the trial

court 1 abused its discretion by granting a new trial in favor of real party in interest Ringo

Lamb Jr. in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle collision. Because the

trial court’s new trial order fails to provide the parties with “an understandable, reasonably

1 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 2020CCV-61637-4 in the County

Court at Law No. 4 of Nueces County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Mark H. Woerner. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2.
specific explanation” for setting aside the jury’s verdict, we conditionally grant the petition

for writ of mandamus in part and deny it in part as discussed herein. See In re Columbia

Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex. 2009) (orig.

proceeding).

I. BACKGROUND

Lamb filed suit against Lemus on grounds that he sustained “serious and disabling

personal injuries” when their vehicles collided at the intersection of Coleman Boulevard

and South Brownlee Boulevard in Corpus Christi, Texas. Lamb alleged that he was

traveling west on Coleman in a Chrysler 300 sedan and had come to a stop at the

intersection in accordance with the stop sign controlling his flow of traffic. Lemus, traveling

south on Brownlee in a Toyota Tundra truck, was not subject to a stop sign or other traffic

control device, and made a left-hand turn onto Coleman and collided with Lamb’s vehicle.

The specific factual circumstances surrounding the cause of the accident and Lamb’s

alleged injuries are disputed. In short, Lamb alleged that: Lemus was traveling at a high

rate of speed and did not slow down to turn onto Coleman; Lemus was intoxicated or

impaired; Lamb had brought his vehicle to a complete stop behind the stop sign; the

accident was violent; Lamb hit his head on the driver’s-side window causing personal

injuries; and Lemus attempted to leave the scene of the accident. In contrast, Lemus

argued that: Lamb had pulled past the stop sign into the intersection when the vehicles

collided; Lemus had slowed his vehicle to make the turn; he was not impaired; the

accident was minor in nature; and he did not attempt to leave the scene following the

accident.

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The parties’ dispute was submitted to a jury, which heard from only four witnesses:

Lamb; Lemus; Officer Albert Adame, who investigated the accident; and Elizabeth Del

Bosque, Lamb’s mother. In response to the first question in the jury charge, the jury found

that the negligence of neither Lamb nor Lemus “proximately cause[d] the injury in

question.” In accordance with the instructions in the charge, the jury did not answer the

other questions in the charge regarding the parties’ percentages of responsibility or the

amount of money that would compensate Lamb for his injuries, if any, resulting from the

occurrence in question.

Thereafter, Lamb filed a combined motion to set aside the jury’s verdict and motion

for new trial. Lamb asserted that the jury charge improperly asked if the negligence of any

party proximately caused the injury in question rather than the occurrence in question.

Lamb alleged that after trial, one of the jurors stated that the members of the jury believed

that Lemus caused the accident, but they could not ascertain if Lamb’s injuries were the

result of the accident. Lamb asserted that his medical record affidavits, which were not

contested, and testimony at trial established that Lemus caused the accident, and thus,

“[a]ffirmative findings of liability were not properly predicate to the damage questions” in

the charge. Lamb thus requested the trial court to set aside the jury verdict and grant a

new trial.

Lemus filed a response in opposition to Lamb’s motion. Lemus asserted that the

evidence was insufficient to establish that he caused Lamb’s injuries. Lemus further

asserted that the first question in the charge regarding whether Lemus or Lamb

proximately caused the injury in question did not improperly mingle the questions of

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damages and liability because, inter alia, the second question in the charge addressed

the percentage of negligence attributable to each party, and the third question asked

about Lemus’s damages.

On October 9, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Lamb’s combined motion and

that same day signed an order granting it “based on the reasons stated in said [m]otion,

the [j]ury’s finding against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, and

confusion in separation of liability and damages by the jury.” The trial court’s revision to

the order, striking through the preprinted “confusion” finding, is initialed by the trial court.

Lemus subsequently filed a motion for entry of judgment based on the jury’s verdict

and motion to set aside the new trial order, and Lamb filed a response thereto. On January

13, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Lemus’s motion and ultimately, on January 27,

2025, the trial court signed an order denying Lemus’s motion. This original proceeding

ensued. In one issue, Lemus asserts that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in

granting the motion for new trial and denying Lemus’s motion for entry of judgment on the

verdict. Specifically, Lemus argues that: (a) the new trial order is facially invalid because

it contains no specific, articulated reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate;

(b) there is no valid merits-based reason for granting the motion for new trial; and (c) the

trial court failed to fulfill its ministerial duty to enter judgment based on the jury’s verdict

where no irreconcilable conflict existed in the jury’s findings. We requested and received

a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Lamb and received a reply thereto

from Lemus.

II. MANDAMUS

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Mandamus relief provides an “extraordinary remedy.” In re Rogers, 690 S.W.3d

296, 302 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re USAA Gen. Indem.

Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). Mandamus is discretionary in

nature and it is governed by equitable principles. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d

653, 663 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, the relator must show that

the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by

appeal. In re Dall. HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In

this regard, there is no adequate remedy by appeal when the trial court abuses its

discretion by granting a new trial. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209–10.

III. NEW TRIALS

Trial courts possess “considerable authority to grant new trials” and have the duty

“to do so when they observe problems that threaten the integrity of the process and,

therefore, the reliability of [a jury’s] verdict.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289,

302 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding). However, because “disregarding a jury’s verdict is an

unusually serious act that imperils a constitutional value of immense importance—the

authority of a jury”—the trial court may only do so “when clearly supported by sound

reasons.” Id.

Those reasons must be specifically set forth in the order. Id.; see In re Davenport,

522 S.W.3d 452, 456–56 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). In other words, trial courts are

required to provide litigants with “an understandable, reasonably specific explanation” for

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setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial. In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex.

2016) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213). Trial

courts must do so because:

[A] vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict does not enhance
respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from transparency we
strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not sufficiently respect the
reasonable expectations of parties and the public when a lawsuit is tried to
a jury. Parties and the public generally expect that a trial followed by a jury
verdict will close the trial process. Those expectations may be overly
optimistic, practically speaking, but the parties and public are entitled to an
understandable, reasonably specific explanation why their expectations are
frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process
being nullified, and the case having to be retried.

In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. Generally, this requirement is satisfied when

a trial court’s stated reason is “a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate” and

“is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma

template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and

circumstances of the case at hand.” In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting In re United

Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding)). The new trial

order must show that it was granted “only after careful thought and for valid reasons.” In

re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456 (quoting In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at

688). In this regard, granting a new trial “in the interests of justice and fairness” is not a

sufficiently specific reason to grant a new trial, and such a generic rationale renders the

new trial order facially invalid. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206, 213; see In

re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689–90. Similarly, “the mere recitation of a legal

standard, such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence, will not suffice.” In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d

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at 689.

We may also look past the face of the new trial order to perform a merits-based

review of the validity of the trial court’s reasons for granting a new trial. In re Rudolph

Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 300; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173. We do so because

“[t]ransparency without accountability is meaningless.” In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,

Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). The Texas Supreme Court has

explained this review as follows:

Bent provided an illustration of how the kinds of inadequacies that may
require an appellate court to disregard a new-trial order can be distinct yet
closely related. A reason might be theoretically plausible, but if it is devoid
of reference to the evidence, it will be facially insufficient; orders that provide
no basis for the parties and appellate courts to confirm that the court’s
determination was the result of careful assessment of the actual evidence
in the case are conclusory. If the failure to invoke sufficient record support
is because there is none, or because . . . the evidence in fact rebuts the
stated reason, the deficiency is not merely facially insufficient but also
relates to the merits. Such a merits-based deficiency suggests that the
proffered reason is simply an error. And when a reason for a new trial
appears to conflate a legal problem with an evidentiary one, the appellate
court will likewise deem that reason inadequate because it fails on the
merits. In Bent, for example, one of the new-trial order’s reasons was
inadequate because “the trial court never pinpoints the events or dates it
believed triggered USAA’s prompt-payment obligation.” The court’s
explanation, we also said, “suggests a muddled legal- and factual-
sufficiency evaluation of the evidence.”

In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 301 (internal citations omitted). “It is simply

impermissible for the district court, no matter how strongly it disagrees, to substitute its

own judgment for the jury’s as a basis for a new trial.” Id. at 307.

IV. ANALYSIS

In one issue, Lemus asserts in relevant part that the trial court abused its discretion

by granting a new trial. Lemus requests that we direct the trial court to enter judgment on

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the jury’s verdict, or alternatively, direct it to vacate the new trial order and enter a new

order that complies with the applicable law. In contrast, Lamb contends that the trial court

acted within its discretion in granting a new trial, and that the new trial order was facially

valid and supported by the record.

A. Waiver of Facial Validity Contention

Lemus argues that the new trial order is facially invalid; however, Lamb asserts

that Lemus waived this argument because Lemus failed to object to the new trial order

on that ground in the trial court proceedings. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). In

support of this contention, Lamb notes that, at the hearing on Lemus’s motion to set aside

the new trial order, the trial court stated on the record that:

[I]if there was a problem with the Court’s written order granting the new trial,
the defense didn’t object to it or raise it. I think you’ve waived it if, in fact,
there was any deficiency in the order, which doesn’t go into any great detail.
Now, it might behoove the plaintiff to go ahead and submit a new order with
the reasons that I stated on the record.

We disagree that Lemus waived his objection regarding the facial validity of the

new trial order. Lemus’s motion for entry of judgment based on the verdict and motion to

set aside the order granting a new trial specifically stated that the “new trial order is facially

invalid” and included argument and authority in favor of this proposition. Further, at the

hearing on Lemus’s motion, his counsel verbally presented this argument to the trial court

during the hearing before the trial court made the foregoing statement regarding waiver.

Nevertheless, the trial court overruled Lemus’s motion. We conclude that this issue has

unequivocally been preserved for our review. See id.

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B. Facial Validity

Lemus argues that the new trial order is facially invalid because it fails to include

an analysis of the specific facts and circumstances of the case and fails to explain how

the evidence, or lack thereof, undermines the jury’s finding. The trial court’s order states,

in relevant part, that a new trial was warranted because the jury’s verdict was against the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence. This is a reason for which a new trial is

legally appropriate. See, e.g., In re United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 689. However, the

“mere recitation of a legal standard, such as a statement that a finding is against the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence, will not suffice.” Id.; see In re Bent, 487

S.W.3d at 176. To be facially valid, an order granting a new trial based on factual

insufficiency “must indicate that the trial judge considered the specific facts and

circumstances of the case at hand and explain how the evidence (or lack of evidence)

undermines the jury’s findings.” In re United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 689; see In re

Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 176; In re Cambell, 577 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding). The trial court’s order here did not do so.

Lamb argues, in essence, that this deficiency was remedied because his motion

for new trial “goes into great detail about the evidence and is incorporated into the [trial

court’s order] by reference.” We disagree. An order granting a new trial explaining only

that it is granted for the reasons stated in a motion for new trial does not satisfy the

requirement for the trial court to specifically set out its reasons for setting aside the jury’s

verdict and ordering a new trial. See In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; In re Columbia Med.

Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. In short, a new trial order that merely incorporates the reasons

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for a new trial that were provided by the movant does not satisfy the requirement for the

trial court to show that it is granting a new trial only after careful thought and for valid

reasons. See In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456; In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377

S.W.3d at 688. Instead, incorporating the reasons for granting a new trial by reference to

another pleading indicates a mere pro forma approach to the new trial, or stated

otherwise, merely rubber-stamps the reasons stated in the motion. See In re Bent, 487

S.W.3d at 173; In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688–89; see also In re

Simms, No. 14-19-00541-CV, 2019 WL 3822171, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Aug. 15, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (rejecting the proposition that

the trial court’s verbally expressed reasons for granting a new trial made it unnecessary

for the trial court to include those reasons in the new trial order).

Further, even if we were to conclude otherwise, Lamb’s motion for new trial does

not assert that the verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence. Rather, Lamb’s motion is premised on alleged jury charge error, and the motion

only tangentially discusses the evidence in support of that argument. 2 Specifically,

Lamb’s motion for new trial asserts that the first question in the jury charge amounted to

“an improper instruction,” and as such, Lamb “respectfully request[ed]” a new trial. Lamb

explained:

In the case before this Honorable Court, a determination of liability

2 The trial court appears to have disagreed with Lamb’s contention regarding charge error insofar

as it struck that rationale from its order granting a new trial. At the charge conference, Lamb’s counsel
asserted that Lemus’s proposed charge was not timely filed; however, when reviewing the proposed
charge, Lamb’s counsel informed the trial court and opposing counsel that “I think it’s okay.” The trial court
then stated, without contradiction, that “I’m going to assume, then, that [Lamb] has no objections to [the]
charge.” We note that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, “[o]ur review is restricted to the jury
charge as submitted when there was no objection to the instruction.” Seger v. Yorkshire Ins., 503 S.W.3d
388, 407 (Tex. 2016).
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was a contested, critical issue. Given the fact that [Lamb’s] testimony, [his]
Mother’s testimony and by the Affidavits establishing the necessity and cost
of the treatment received and Business Records were timely filed by [Lamb],
and no controverting affidavits were ever filed by the Defense, the
causation question was already answered. As such the Jury Charge
Question Number 1 was an improper instruction, and as such, [Lamb]
respectfully requests that the Court Set Aside the Jury Verdict and Grant
[Lamb’s] Motion for a New Trial.

....

In this case, the liability question was not separated from the
damages portion of the Jury Charge utilized. This served to confuse the
Jury’s charge as causation had already been established by virtue of
[Lamb’s] timely filed Affidavits of Cost and Necessity of Service and
Business Records properly admitted. Again, [Lemus] filed no controverting
affidavits. In this case the liability portion of the Jury Charge employed by
the Court was a controlling issue before reaching any determination
regarding damages.

....

In the case before this Honorable Court, the liability and damages
questions were not separated despite testimony from [Lamb], [Lamb’s]
Mother, and by [Lamb’s] timely filed Affidavits of Cost and Necessity of
Services, and Business Records. As such, [Lamb was] highly prejudiced by
the Jury Charge as submitted to the Jury. As was relayed by Juror #6, the
Jury all concluded that [Lemus] was at fault, and therefore should have
answered accordingly before addressing the Questions regarding
damages, including with regard to the damages supported by [Lamb’s]
testimony, [his mother’s] testimony, as well as by [Lamb’s] timely filed
Affidavits of Cost and Necessity of Service and Business Records.

....

In the case at Bar, both [Lamb] and witness, [Lamb’s mother],
testified that [Lamb] had never suffered from headaches or cervical issues
before the occurrence, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. It was only
after this crash that [Lamb] was diagnosed with daily migraine headaches
and cervical herniations. The testimony of Officer Adame established that
[Lemus] caused the wreck.

Thus, contrary to Lamb’s assertions in this original proceeding, his motion for new trial

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does not explain how the jury’s verdict was against the great weight and preponderance

of the evidence by explaining how the evidence, or lack of evidence, undermines the jury’s

verdict. See In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 300; In re United Scaffolding, Inc.,

377 S.W.3d at 689. Rather, Lamb references only a narrow slice of the evidence adduced

at trial, addressing only his medical records, the testimony he and his mother presented

regarding the lack of any pre-existing injury, and Officer Adame’s testimony that Lemus

“caused the wreck” to assert that there was error in the jury charge.

We do not consider that Lemus’s sparse mention of the evidence to be a “cogent

and reasonably specific explanation” regarding why the evidence was factually insufficient

to support the jury’s verdict. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688; see In re

Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. Thus, even if we were to accept Lamb’s

contention that we should refer to his motion for new trial to supply the explanation for the

trial court’s order granting the new trial, a proposition which we have rejected, his

explanation would not suffice.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s stated rationale for

ordering a new trial fails to meet the requirements for a new trial order as delineated by

the Texas Supreme Court. See In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688; In re

Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. We sustain Lemus’s issue to the extent that he

contends that the new trial order is facially invalid.

C. Merits Review

Lemus contends, however, that not only is the new trial order facially invalid, but

that it also fails on its merits. In general, when appellate courts conclude that a new trial

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order is facially invalid, they do not proceed to address the merits of the order before

allowing the trial court an opportunity to provide a sufficient explanation for its ruling. See

In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 180 (“Because we conclude the trial court’s explanation did not

meet Columbia and United Scaffolding’s facial requirements, we need not determine if

the trial court’s rationale is supported by the record.”); In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290

S.W.3d at 214) (“The trial court has not stated its specific grounds for refusing to enter

judgment on the jury verdict and granting a new trial. Thus, we decline to consider whether

mandamus relief is available as to the trial court’s action in disregarding the jury verdict.”).

Without a sufficient explanation, we “can only speculate about why the court ostensibly

circumvented a critical constitutional right.” In re Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 749.

Further, “[t]he trial court’s failure to properly state why it granted a new trial does not

mandate a conclusion that it did not have a valid reason for doing so.” In re United

Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 690; see also, e.g., In re Sanchez, No. 01-23-00309-CV, 2024

WL 2061673, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem.

op.) (granting mandamus relief as to facial insufficiency but denying relator’s request to

direct the trial court to render judgment on the verdict “[b]ecause the basis of the trial

court’s order setting aside the jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial is unclear”); In re

Cash, No. 03-20-00062-CV, 2020 WL 1881037, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 16, 2020,

orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“declin[ing] to extend mandamus review of an order

granting [a] new trial to include a merits review of the evidence underlying a facially invalid

order” where the order stated only that the verdict was “against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence and manifestly unjust”); In re Torres, No. 13-20-00019-

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CV, 2020 WL 1615667, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 2, 2020, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that a new trial order based on factual insufficiency

was facially invalid and declining to proceed with a merits-based review); In re Tex. Farm

Bureau Mut. Ins., No 01-19-00742-CV, 2020 WL 573249, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Feb. 6, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The remedy for a facially invalid order

is a remand to the trial court, which then has the option to deny the motion for new trial

or to sign an order that comports with Texas law.”). We note; however, that under certain

circumstances, merits review may be possible even if the new trial order fails to be facially

valid. See, e.g., In re Orren, 533 S.W.3d 926, 933 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig.

proceeding) (concluding that a new trial order was facially invalid because it provided a

reason that was “contrary to Texas law” and that review on the merits showed that “the

record does not support the trial court’s rationale for ordering a new trial”); see also In re

Esters, No. 12-17-00122-CV, 2017 WL 4675368, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 18, 2017,

orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that a new trial order providing a “muddled”

factual and legal sufficiency review of the evidence was “not facially valid” but that, in any

event, “the record does not support the trial court’s rationale for ordering a new trial”).

Under the circumstances presented here, where the stated reason for the trial

court’s ruling is legally appropriate, but the order is nevertheless facially invalid because

it fails to include a sufficient explanation, we conclude that a review of the merits would

be premature. Accordingly, to the extent that Lemus requests merits review and seeks

rendition of judgment, we deny his petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice.

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

Lamb’s response, and Lemus’s reply, is of the opinion that Lemus has met his burden to

obtain mandamus relief as discussed herein. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the

petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order of

October 9, 2024, and to either enter a new trial order in accordance with the foregoing

law or enter judgment on the jury’s verdict. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus in

part, without prejudice, to the extent that Lemus has requested that we direct the trial

court to enter judgment on the verdict. We deny Lemus’s request that we assess costs of

court against Lamb. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with

this memorandum opinion.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
20th day of June, 2025.

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