Kristen L. Bechtel v. the State of Texas

CourtListener 9405636Txctapp12Jun 8, 2023

Full text

NO. 12-23-00003-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

KRISTEN L. BECHTEL, § APPEAL FROM THE 349TH
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kristen L. Bechtel appeals from her conviction for possession of substance in penalty
group I. In one issue, Appellant challenges the time payment fee included in the court costs the
trial court assessed against her. We modify the trial court’s judgment and the bill of costs to
remove the time payment fee, and affirm the judgment as modified.

BACKGROUND
On December 9, 2021, Appellant pleaded “guilty” to the offense of possession of
substance in penalty group I, less than one gram. The court deferred a finding of guilt and placed
Appellant on community supervision for a period of five years. On February 22, 2022, the State
moved to proceed with adjudication of guilt and sentencing. On November 30, the trial court
adjudicated Appellant “guilty” and assessed punishment of two years’ imprisonment. The trial
court also ordered Appellant to pay $410.00 in court costs. Neither the trial court’s judgment nor
the then-available bill of costs were itemized. This appeal followed.
The Anderson County District Clerk’s itemized bill of costs was certified on March 24,
2023, several months after sentencing, and included a $15.00 time payment fee as part of the
$410.00 in total court costs. The District Clerk supplemented the appellate record with the
itemized bill of costs.
ASSESSMENT OF TIME PAYMENT FEE
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court prematurely assessed the time
payment fee in its judgment.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
On appeal, courts review the assessment of court costs to determine whether a basis
exists for the cost, rather than whether there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each
cost. Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also Armstrong v.
State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (court costs are not part of a sentence, but “a
nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial
of the case”). Court costs may not be assessed against a criminal defendant for which a cost is
not expressly provided by law. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.002 (West 2021).
When a trial court improperly includes amounts in assessed court costs, the proper appellate
remedy is to reform the judgment to delete the improper fees. Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250,
252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a person convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor pay a reimbursement fee of $15.00 if the person fails to pay any part of a fine,
court costs, or restitution within 30 days after the court enters the judgment ordering such
payment. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030 (West 2021). However, in Dulin v. State,
620 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that a
pending appeal suspends a defendant’s duty to pay fines, court costs, and restitution, which duty
is triggered only by a final judgment. Dulin, 620 S.W.3d at 133. Thus, the pendency of an
appeal “stops the clock” for purposes of the time payment fee. Id. A trial court’s assessment of
a time payment fee before the appellate mandate issues therefore lacks any basis and is
premature. See id.; Pruitt v. State, 646 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.).
Analysis
Appellant’s timely notice of this appeal suspended her duty to pay the court costs
imposed in the judgment adjudicating her guilt and stopped the figurative clock on the thirty-day
payment period which would trigger the time payment fee. Dulin, 620 S.W.3d at 133. These
appellate proceedings are still pending, and no court of appeals has issued a mandate.
This Court has the authority to modify incorrect judgments when it has available the
information necessary to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–

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28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Because the imposition of the time payment fee is premature until
thirty days after the resolution of an appeal, the time payment fee assessed herein must be struck.
We sustain Appellant’s sole issue.

DISPOSITION
Having sustained Appellant’s only issue, we modify both the bill of costs and the trial
court’s judgment to remove the time payment fee. Our ruling is without prejudice to future
assessment of the time payment fee if, more than thirty days after our mandate issues, Appellant
fails to completely pay any fine, court costs, or restitution she owes. As modified, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

GREG NEELEY
Justice

Opinion delivered June 8, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

3
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 8, 2023

NO. 12-23-00003-CR

KRISTEN L. BECHTEL,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 349th District Court
of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 349CR-21-35,229)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the bill of costs and the
judgment of the court below should be modified and as modified, affirmed.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the bill of costs
and the judgment of the court below be modified to remove the time payment fee; in all other
respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed; and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

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