In Re Gentri Renee McLean v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed May 21, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-26-00118-CV
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IN RE GENTRI RENEE MCLEAN

Original Mandamus Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Gentri Renee McLean, and Real Party in Interest, Terry Allen
McLean, are the divorced parents of four children. Gentri filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in which she raises three issues challenging the trial court’s temporary
orders that changed her status as joint managing conservator with the exclusive right
to designate the children’s primary residence to possessory conservator. In her first
issue, Gentri challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings
required by Section 156.006(b)(1) of the Family Code. In her second issue, Gentri
challenges the “asymmetric drug-testing conditions” imposed against her. In her
third issue, Gentri asserts that she has no adequate remedy by appeal. Terry filed a
response. We conditionally grant the petition.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2025, Gentri and Terry agreed to a final decree of divorce that contained a
standard possession order with Gentri as the parent with the exclusive right to
designate the children’s primary residence. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.311–
.317 (West 2014 & Supp. 2025). Terry subsequently sought to modify the order
affecting the parent-child relationship and requested temporary orders naming him
as the parent with the right to designate the children’s primary residence.
During the temporary orders hearing on February 25, 2026, the Honorable
Brent Morgan, presiding judge of the 318th District Court of Midland County, orally
pronounced temporary orders that changed Gentri’s conservatorship status to a
possessory conservator, removed from her the right to designate the children’s
primary residence, and effectively granted Terry this exclusive right by designating
him sole managing conservator. See FAM. § 156.006(b) (relating to temporary
orders). The trial court issued a letter ruling the same day.
At the temporary orders hearing, Terry’s primary focus was Gentri’s
interference with his court-ordered possession of and access to the children. Gentri
explained that she violated the court’s visitation orders because the children “are
terrified of [Terry].” According to Gentri, all four children were participating in
counseling and extracurricular activities, and at least one of the children’s grades
had improved in the months leading up to the hearing.
Terry also alleged that Gentri was a cocaine user and was dating a married
man. The undisputed evidence demonstrated that Terry and Gentri submitted to hair
follicle drug screens prior to the hearing, and both tested positive for cocaine. Gentri
testified that she had not used cocaine in “over a year,” while Terry admitted to

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cocaine use in December 2025 with “three of [his] buddies.” When asked about the
children, Terry attested that he had not spoken to their teachers, did not know their
grades, did not know that the children were in counseling, and was unaware of any
present danger to the children’s physical health.
Prior to orally pronouncing its ruling, the trial court indicated its displeasure
with Gentri because she ignored its previous warning to “let the children see their
father . . . [for] his next visitation.” The trial court told Gentri:
I tried to warn your attorney. . . . Follow the court order. But
you couldn’t. You wanted to do it your way. If the kids were in so
much danger[,] where are the counselors? Where are the therapists?
Where are they? The[y] are not here because [the children] are not in
any danger. Because they are not here to support your side. Instead
you just denied [Terry] access.
Gentri previously filed a petition for writ of mandamus due to the trial court’s
failure to make the findings required by Section 156.006(b) of the Family Code,
which we conditionally granted. In re McLean, No. 11-26-00075-CV, 2026
WL 899121, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 2, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.); see FAM. § 156.006(b)(1). In this regard, the trial court’s prior order did not
specify that the change in designation was based on evidence that each child’s
present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional
development pursuant to Section 156.006(b), but rather the trial court stated that its
decision was because Gentri “denied [Terry] access” to the children after the trial
court warned her not to. McLean, 2026 WL 899121, at *2–3; see In re Sanchez, 228
S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding); In re Payne,
No. 10-11-00402-CV, 2011 WL 6091265, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 2, 2011,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
The trial court subsequently withdrew its orally pronounced temporary orders
and its February 26 letter ruling, and, without hearing additional evidence, issued

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another letter ruling and temporary orders. In its second letter ruling, the trial court
noted its concerns that Gentri’s hair follicle drug test was positive for cocaine, which
permitted the inference that she used drugs while in possession of the children. The
trial court further found that there was evidence presented at the hearing that “men
ha[d] spent the night with [Gentri] while [she] was in possession of the children,”
and the trial court was “gravely concerned men consumed illegal narcotics with
[Gentri] . . . while she was in possession of the children.” The trial court cited
Gentri’s testimony that her electricity was turned off once, “the children’s high
number of absences” from school, and Gentri’s intentional violations of the trial
court’s order permitting Terry’s possession and access to the children. Finally, the
trial court concluded based on Gentri’s positive drug test that her cocaine use was
“so great [that] it has affected her memory” of Terry’s schedule for possession and
access.
The trial court issued temporary orders on April 24, which (1) appointed Terry
temporary sole managing conservator with the exclusive right to designate the
children’s primary residence without regard to geographic location, and
(2) appointed Gentri temporary possessory conservator, reduced her possession and
access to the children until she provided a clean result from a 180-day hair follicle
test, ordered her to submit to a urinalysis forty-eight hours prior to visitation, and
provided that Gentri would “have a standard possession order with elections as
attached” in an exhibit after she submitted a clean result on the 180-day hair follicle
test.
Gentri filed the instant petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial
court’s temporary orders.

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Mandamus Standard of Review
Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that is “available only in limited
circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). As we have
said, “[a]n appeal is not an adequate remedy when a party complains of temporary
orders such as the one here.” In re Walser, 648 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2021, orig. proceeding). In this regard, “[t]emporary orders, entered while
a motion to modify in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is pending, are
interlocutory and there is no statutory provision for appeal of these orders.” Id. at
445 (citing In re Ostrofsky, 112 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, orig. proceeding)). Therefore, Gentri again has no adequate remedy by direct
appeal of the trial court’s temporary orders. 1
“A trial court abuses its discretion if ‘it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’” In re Cerberus
Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839); see In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282
(Tex. 2019). Because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is
or in applying it to the facts, a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly
analyze or apply the law. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135; see also In re J.B.
Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). To
demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, a party seeking mandamus relief must show

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As discussed, Gentri argues in what she designated as her third issue that she has no adequate
remedy by appeal. While she is correct, and we sustain her third issue, that is only the beginning of our
inquiry in this mandamus proceeding. See Walser, 648 S.W.3d at 445.

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that the trial court “could have reached only one conclusion and that a contrary
finding is thus arbitrary and unreasonable.” In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d
595, 604 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). “[A]n appellate court may not substitute
its judgment for the trial court’s determination of factual or other matters committed
to the trial court’s discretion, even if the mandamus court would have decided the
issue differently.” Id. Alternatively, the party may demonstrate that the trial court
erred in “determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts, even when the
law is unsettled.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Application of Family Code Section 156.006(b)(1)
In Gentri’s first issue, she contends that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion by issuing its temporary orders that changed the designation of the parent
with the exclusive right to determine the children’s primary residence.
Pursuant to Section 156.006 of the Texas Family Code, a trial court may not
render a temporary order that changes the designation of the person who has the
exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children under the final
order unless: (1) the temporary order is in the best interest of the children; and
(2) “the order is necessary because [each] child’s present circumstances would
significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.” FAM.
§ 156.006(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 156.006 imposes a high burden on the
movant to present sufficient evidence to establish the “significant impairment”
requirement. Walser, 648 S.W.3d at 446; see In re J.W., No. 02-18-00419-CV, 2019
WL 2223216, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.). “A temporary order that deprives a custodial parent of any discretion inherent
in the right to determine the child[ren]’s primary residence has the effect of changing
the designation of the person with the exclusive right to designate the child[ren]’s

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primary residence.” In re Strickland, 358 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2012, orig. proceeding) (discussing FAM. § 156.006(b)).
Terry, as the movant below, held the high burden imposed by
Section 156.006(b) to present evidence of bad acts or omissions committed against
the children. See Walser, 648 S.W.3d at 446; In re Eddins, No. 05-16-01451-CV,
2017 WL 2443138, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 5, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.); see also In re C.G., No. 04-13-00749-CV, 2014 WL 3928612, at *8 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Aug. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (placing this burden on the
movant). Such acts or omissions are “more grave than [the] violation of a divorce
decree or alienation of a child from a parent.” In re Barker, No. 03-21-00036-CV,
2021 WL 833970, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 4, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.) (quoting In re Serio, No. 03-14-00786-CV, 2014 WL 7458735, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). As we explained in our
previous opinion, “[e]vidence of parental alienation, violations of the divorce decree,
or a poor relationship between the joint managing conservators”—such as the
circumstances before the trial court in this case—is insufficient to establish
significant impairment. McLean, 2026 WL 899121, at *2–3 (quoting In re Haddad,
No. 04-25-00484-CV, 2026 WL 517517, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 25,
2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (collecting cases)). Rather, evidence of the
complained-of conduct must show that the associated impairment has been, and will
continue to be, significant. In re E.R.D., 671 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, no pet.); see also In re Lee, No. 04-19-00440-CV, 2019 WL 3642640, at *4
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 7, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting that
“[t]he trial court’s concern about [the mother’s] stress level” was insufficient to
satisfy the high statutory burden of establishing significant impairment).

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Here, even accepting Terry’s general allegations as true, he presented no
evidence beyond “general concern[s]” of any impairment to the children’s physical
health or emotional well-being. See In re Morehead, No. 06-21-00052-CV, 2021
WL 3669607, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 18, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.). For instance, the parties alluded to law enforcement involvement and contact
with the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), yet there
was no testimony from a Department caseworker, investigator, or law enforcement
about the parties’ alleged concerns. See, e.g., In re Adkins, No. 04-23-00705-CV,
2024 WL 697093, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 21, 2024, orig. proceeding)
(mem. op.) (sufficient evidence of significant impairment which included
Department caseworker’s testimony of the impact of the father’s neglectful
supervision on the children’s “immediate health and safety”). Nor did Terry
introduce specific, statutorily required proof of each child’s present environment or
circumstances. See Strickland, 358 S.W.3d at 822–23 (“Father’s general allegations
here do not show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly
impair their emotional development.”); Haddad, 2026 WL 517517, at *5.
Consequently, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical
health or emotional development. See FAM. § 156.006(b)(1); Lee, 2019
WL 3642640, at *4. We conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by
issuing the temporary orders that named Terry sole managing conservator with the
exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. See FAM.
§ 156.006(b)(1). We sustain Gentri’s first issue.

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Temporary Orders to Submit to Drug Testing
In her second issue, Gentri challenges the trial court’s imposition of drug-
testing requirements as a “punitive measure” and “asymmetric” because Terry was
not required to submit to drug testing.
In suits affecting the parent-child relationship, which includes suits for
modification, trial courts have broad authority to enter temporary orders “for the
safety and welfare of the child.” FAM. §§ 105.001(a), 156.006(a); see In re
Perricone, No. 11-25-00078-CV, 2025 WL 1184127, at *2, *4 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Apr. 24, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). An order that “imposes
restrictions or limitations on a parent’s right to possession of or access to a child may
not exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the child.” FAM.
§ 153.193 (West 2014); see also FAM. § 153.002 (“The best interest of the child shall
always be the primary consideration . . . in determining the issues of conservatorship
and possession of and access to the child.”). Correspondingly, “[t]rial courts can
‘fashion an order that restricts possession or access so as to eliminate any danger to
the physical or emotional welfare of the child.’” Schneider v. Schneider, No. 01-22-
00774-CV, 2024 WL 3349082, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2024,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re R.D.Y., 51 S.W.3d 314, 323 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)). To that end, trial courts may generally require parents
to submit to drug testing if it is supported by sufficient evidence. See id. (finding no
abuse of discretion in trial court’s requirement that the mother to undergo drug
testing as a restriction on her possession and access); see also, e.g., In re Rodriguez,
No. 09-25-00430-CV, 2025 WL 3237080, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 20,
2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (evidence of possible drug use by the father
supported trial court’s temporary order for the father to submit to drug testing); In re
Tullos, No. 12-22-00228-CV, 2022 WL 4793718, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 30,

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2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (observing that Texas law recognizes that a drug-
free home environment and sober parents promote the safety and welfare of
children).
Here, however, we have concluded that the evidence presented at the hearing
did not support the trial court’s order that effectively changed the parent with the
exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. As such, the temporary
orders in their entirety must be vacated, and we need not address Gentri’s
contentions in her second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 52.8(d).
This Court’s Ruling
Accordingly, we conditionally grant Gentri’s petition for writ of mandamus
and direct Judge Morgan to vacate the letter ruling he issued on April 9 and the
temporary orders he signed on April 24, 2026. A writ of mandamus will only issue
if he fails to act by June 5, 2026.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

May 21, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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