Steven Douglas Freeman v. Landon Northcutt

Opinion filed May 21, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00251-CV
__________

STEVEN DOUGLAS FREEMAN, Appellant
V.
LANDON NORTHCUTT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 266th District Court
Erath County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV37239

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant, Steven Douglas Freeman, sued his criminal defense attorney
Appellee, Landon Northcutt, for legal malpractice. The trial court granted
Northcutt’s combined motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. In a
single issue, Freeman argues the trial court erred in granting Northcutt’s motion
because his claim was not time barred. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Northcutt represented Freeman after Freeman was indicted for driving while
intoxicated, a third-degree felony enhanced by Freeman’s habitual offender status.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42(d), 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2025).
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Freeman pleaded guilty and was sentenced to
thirty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice on February 15, 2017.
Over five years later, in 2022, Freeman filed a legal malpractice suit against
Northcutt. In his petition and in his live pleading, Freeman alleged that Northcutt
“assured” Freeman “would not get prison time”; Northcutt failed to investigate and
adequately prepare for the case; and Freeman was “forced to accept” a thirty-year
sentence. In his second amended answer, Northcutt asserted a general denial and
alleged Freeman lacked the capacity to sue. Northcutt also argued that Freeman’s
suit was barred by the doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations.
On May 13, 2024, Northcutt filed a “Motion to Dismiss And/Or Motion for
Summary Judgment,” arguing that Freeman had filed his malpractice suit outside of
the two-year statute of limitations period. See Zive v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d 169,
174 (Tex. 2022) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a)). Northcutt
attached a copy of the trial court’s judgment of conviction as an exhibit. In a filing
titled “Controverted Facts in Response to [Northcutt’s] Motion to Dismiss And/Or
Motion for Summary Judgment,” Freeman contended that the “cause of action for
legal malpractice accrues when the client sustains a legal injury” and “[t]he date of
the legal injury is not to be confused with the time it is discovered or the date when
actual damages is fully ascertained.” Freeman, however, did not allege the date that
he incurred a legal injury nor the date that his cause of action accrued. Then, in an
amended response, Freeman claimed that he did not discover the legal injury until
April 1, 2022, after speaking with other inmates. Freeman stated, “It was suggested
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that I might have a l[e]gitimate lawsuit against [Northcutt] because [Northcutt]
blatantly lied and misled me into believing I would not receive prison time for my
current DWI.”
The trial court signed an order granting Northcutt’s combined motion on
June 19, 2024.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315
S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). A party moving for traditional summary judgment
bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to at
least one essential element of the cause of action being asserted and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)1; Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017). We review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the
nonmovant, and resolve any doubts against the motion. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005).
Where, as here, a defendant moves for summary judgment on the affirmative
defense of limitations, the defendant-movant must conclusively prove when the
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and conclusively negate the application of the
discovery rule and any tolling doctrines that have been pleaded as an exception to
limitations. See Gill v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.
Ct. 274 (2024). A defendant who conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is
entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315
S.W.3d 494, 509 (Tex. 2010).

1
We note that the Texas Supreme Court has recently revised Rule 166a. Although the “rewrite is
not intended to substantively change the law,” it has resulted in a renumbering of the provisions of the rule.
See Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket
No. 26-9012 (Tex. Feb. 27, 2026). The amendments to this rule only apply to motions for summary
judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026. Because Northcutt’s motion for summary judgment in this case
was filed prior to that date, we refer to the rule in effect at the time the motion was filed. See id.
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Legal malpractice claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations
period. Zive, 644 S.W.3d at 174. Generally, a legal malpractice claim accrues when
the client sustains a legal injury, or, in cases governed by the discovery rule, when
the client discovers or should have discovered through the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence the facts establishing the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing
Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. 1991)); Berry v. Berry,
646 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Tex. 2022); Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 120–
21 (Tex. 2001); see Erikson v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d at 557, 563 (Tex. 2019).
“[Limitations] run during periods when neither a direct appeal nor a post-conviction
proceeding is pending.” Gray v. Skelton, 595 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. 2020) (“[T]his
. . . satisfies our preference for bright lines in the statute-of-limitations context, and
cures the potential problem of malpractice claims being tolled until some
indeterminate time in the future when the convicted criminal seeks post-conviction
relief.”). Id. (internal citation omitted).
III. Analysis
Freeman argues on appeal that he “discovered” Northcutt’s alleged
malpractice in March 2022, and he filed his lawsuit shortly thereafter. While his
argument on appeal deviates slightly from his argument before the trial court—
wherein he maintained that he discovered the injury on April 1, 2022—his specified
injury remains the same. Freeman argues that Northcutt was ill-prepared and
misrepresented to Freeman whether he would receive “prison time.” Freeman’s
injury, therefore, should have been apparent to Freeman when he pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in open court on February 15, 2017.
Freeman’s live pleading contained no other allegations of any action or inaction on
Northcutt’s part that he “discovered” in 2022 that were not already known, or that
should have been known to Freeman in 2017. See Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 563; see
also Bailey v. Schneider, No. 13-11-00057-CV, 2011 WL 3652618, at *2 (Tex.
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App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 18, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding
legal malpractice suit was barred by statute of limitations where defendant-appellant
argued his former counsel-appellee was negligent in filing a habeas corpus petition
late but waited almost seven years to file suit); Kastner v. Martin & Drought, Inc.,
No. 04-07-00342-CV, 2009 WL 260601, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 4,
2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding same where appellant’s petition set forth
detailed account of attorney’s lack of preparation and inaction at a hearing, reasoning
that by attending the hearing himself, appellant “knew or should have known the
facts establishing his [legal malpractice] claim”). Because Freeman did not file his
malpractice suit until April 1, 2022, more than two years after he was sentenced and
should have discovered his legal injury, Northcutt has conclusively shown that this
suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 563.
To prevail in his motion for summary judgment based on limitations,
Northcutt was also required to “conclusively negate application of . . . any tolling
doctrines pleaded as an exception to limitations.” Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d
81, 90 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 563). However, Freeman did
not plead the applicability of any tolling doctrines, nor does he assert now on appeal
that a direct appeal of his underlying conviction is pending or that his claim has been
tolled as a result of any pending habeas application. See Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 156
(providing that the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice suit is tolled during
direct appeals and post-conviction proceedings); see also Gray, 595 S.W.3d at 639
(reaffirming the Hughes tolling principle). Freeman does not claim and has provided
no evidence that an appeal of the underlying conviction was taken or is pending.
There being no issue precluding the applicability of the statute of limitations
here, and Northcutt having conclusively shown its applicability, the trial court

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properly granted Northcutt’s motion for summary judgment.2 See Gill, 688 S.W.3d
at 868. We overrule Freeman’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

May 21, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

Having concluded that the trial court did not err in granting Northcutt’s motion for summary
2

judgment, we need not address Northcutt’s motion for dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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