Matthew Coday and Oil & Gas Workers Association, Inc. v. Wallace Dunn; Tisha Crow, Individually and D/B/A Crow Insurance; And Kris Crow, Individually and D/B/A Crow Insurance Agency

Opinion filed January 22, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
___________

Nos. 11-25-00247-CV & 11-25-00350-CV
___________

MATTHEW CODAY AND OIL & GAS WORKERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellants
V.
WALLACE DUNN; TISHA CROW, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A
CROW INSURANCE AGENCY; AND KRIS CROW,
INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A CROW INSURANCE AGENCY,
Appellees

On Appeal from the 358th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D24081005CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION
These appeals arise from the trial court’s orders in the same trial court cause
number granting Appellees’ motions to dismiss claims and counterclaims asserted
by Appellants, Matthew Coday and O&G Workers Association, Inc. (OGWA),
pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West 2020). We dismiss the appeals for want of
jurisdiction.
In the case below, Appellee Wallace Dunn sued Coday and OGWA for
defamation. Appellants’ counsel filed an answer on behalf of both defendants.
Counsel then asserted counterclaims on behalf of Coday for “First Amendment
Retaliation,” slander, defamation, libel, and negligent misrepresentation. Dunn filed
a motion to dismiss the counterclaims against him pursuant to the TCPA, which the
trial court granted. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 27.003, 27.009. The appeal of this
order bears our cause number 11-25-00247-CV.
Prior to the trial court’s order, counsel filed a third-party petition against
Appellees Tisha Crow and Kris Crow, both individually and d/b/a Crow Insurance
Agency (the Crows), 1 asserting claims for retaliation, slander, defamation,
conspiracy, tortious interference, and breach of fiduciary duty. The Crows also filed
a TCPA motion to dismiss the claims against them in this third-party petition, which
the trial court granted. Appellants’ counsel filed a subsequent notice of appeal from
the trial court’s subsequent order. The appeal of this order bears our cause number
11-25-00350-CV.
Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from
final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex.
2007); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). While a trial
court’s interlocutory order denying a party’s TCPA motion to dismiss is immediately
appealable, a trial court’s order granting such a motion is not appealable until the
trial court signs its final judgment in the case. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 51.014(a)(12) (authorizing an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of
a TCPA motion to dismiss); First Sabrepoint Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Farmland Partners

1
Counsel previously filed a third-party petition against several other defendants; however, those
claims were dismissed by agreement and with prejudice prior to Dunn’s TCPA motion.
2
Inc., 712 S.W.3d 75, 84 n.6 (Tex. 2025) (“While the TCPA permits an interlocutory
appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss, there is no provision for an
interlocutory appeal from the granting of such a motion.”) (internal citation
omitted); Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 841 (Statutes permitting interlocutory appeals
must be strictly construed as narrow exceptions to the general rule that only final
judgments are appealable.). In this regard, an order or judgment becomes final when
it (1) disposes of all parties and claims before the trial court or (2) “includes
unequivocal finality language that expressly disposes of all claims and parties.”
Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of
Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200).
The trial court did not include finality language in either order. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d
at 192–93.
Because this affects our jurisdiction, we requested a response from the parties
regarding whether parties and claims remained pending in the case below. In the
appeal with Dunn, Appellants’ counsel responds that his “counterclaim was de facto
[TCPA-]type conduct” and that, therefore, “[t]he granting of the motion to dismiss
acts, de facto, as denial of remedies that would be encompassed within the [TCPA].”
But he confirms that, [a]s matters stand, the primary case is pending and is at its
infancy.” In the appeal against the Crows, Appellants’ counsel asserts that the case
is “independent of the case between [Dunn] and Coday,” and therefore “comes
within the ‘Final Judgment’ Rule.” In each of their responses, Dunn and the Crows
confirm that claims and parties remain pending, and they each assert that the
respective appeals should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Based on the record and the responses in this cause, it appears that Dunn’s
claims against Coday and OGWA remain pending in the case below and that the trial
court’s orders do not include express (or implied) finality language. Therefore,
neither of the trial court’s orders constitute a final judgment. Because neither of the
3
trial court’s orders resulted in a final judgment and the orders are not independently
appealable, we are without jurisdiction to consider them. See First Sabrepoint, 712
S.W.3d at 84 n.6; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d 192–93. Therefore, we must dismiss the
appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
We dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

January 22, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

4