In the Interest of A.B., R.B., and S.B., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed December 4, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-25-00172-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF A.B., R.B., AND S.B., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11364-CX

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant-Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her children, A.B., R.B., and S.B. 1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001
(West Supp. 2024). We affirm the order of termination.2

1
We use initials to refer to the children. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s alleged father and any unknown
fathers. The alleged father did not file a notice of appeal.
On January 23, 2024, the day after Appellant gave birth to S.B., the
Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) began investigating
a report of physical neglect by Appellant and the alleged father of S.B., eighteen-
month-old R.B., and four-year-old A.B. Appellant, the alleged father, and the three
children were living in a home with no running water that was “pending a
condemned status.” A.B. had an injury that appeared to be infected, and S.B. was
diagnosed with failure to thrive in February 2024. A.B. and R.B. were also
underweight, purportedly due to their limited access to food. After Appellant and
the alleged father went with the children to stay at the Salvation Army, the
Department gave them the opportunity to participate in family-based safety services3
(FBSS). The Department likewise provided information on housing resources and
items to meet the children’s basic needs, such as diapers, wipes, and lice kits.
On March 5, 2024, the family was “exited” from the Salvation Army after
Appellant and the alleged father repeatedly failed to comply with the rules. The
Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children, who
were subsequently drug tested and medically evaluated. R.B. and S.B. were positive
for codeine, and S.B. tested positive for marihuana. Medical testing revealed that
A.B. had Herpes 1, Hepatitis A, and Hepatitis B. R.B. had Hepatitis A. The children
were likely exposed to Hepatitis A and B through Appellant, and to oral herpes by
the alleged father. Even at the time of trial, A.B. was underweight, developmentally
far behind, and required neurosurgery. A.B. and R.B. were doing well in their foster

3
“Family-based safety services are protective services provided to a family whose children are not
in the conservatorship of the Department.” 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 700.710 (2021). The
Department’s Child Protective Services Division provides family-based safety services to families and
children “to: (1) protect the children from abuse and neglect; (2) help the family reduce the risk of future
abuse or neglect; and (3) prevent the removal of the children from their home.” Id.

2
home. S.B. was learning to walk, was eating well, and was transitioning to a
permanent home.
Neither Appellant nor the alleged father appeared for the final termination
hearing. Paternity was never established because the alleged father never submitted
to court-ordered genetic testing. The Department presented the testimony of the
FBSS caseworker and permanency case manager, who attested that neither
Appellant nor the alleged father demonstrated the ability to meet the children’s basic
needs such as food and stable housing with working utilities. Appellant was given
many resources through which she would have been able to secure employment and
necessities, but she and the alleged father instead chose to live in a park and in
temporary shelters for the majority of the case. Additionally, the alleged father
tested positive for methamphetamine and marihuana two months before the final
hearing and informed the case manager that he intended to continue using
marihuana. Appellant frequently missed required drug tests and knew that the
alleged father used drugs. Because Appellant never established that she could
maintain a legal source of income, safe housing, and other basic needs for her
children, the Department recommended that the trial court terminate the parent-child
relationship between Appellant and the children.
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant
endangered the children as set forth in Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and
failed to comply with the provisions of her court-ordered service plan under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(O). See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court
further found that termination was in the children’s best interest, and issued
its order terminating Appellant’s parental rights to A.B., R.B., and S.B. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2).

3
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this
court. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and
conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that there are
no arguable issues to present on appeal. Counsel certified to this court that he
provided Appellant with a copy of the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an
explanatory letter, and a copy of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Counsel
also advised Appellant of her right to object to his motion to withdraw, and to file a
pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5. As such, court-
appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders, Schulman, and
Kelly. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Appellant has not filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Following
the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed
the record in this case, and we agree that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and without
merit.
However, in light of the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re P.M.,
an Anders motion to withdraw “may be premature” if filed in the court of appeals
under the circumstances presented in this case. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in
the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”). The court
held in P.M. that, in parental termination cases, court-appointed counsel’s duty to
his or her client generally extends “through the exhaustion of [all] appeals.” Id. at
27–28. In this regard, “appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing a
petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” Id.

4
Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial
court’s order of termination.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

December 4, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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