In the Interest of J.S., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed November 6, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00079-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF J.S., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11177-CX

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
Appellant-mother’s 1 parental rights to her child, J.S. 2 On appeal, Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that:
(1) termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest; and (2) the
Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) made reasonable

1
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.S.’s biological father, who did not file a
notice of appeal.
2
We use initials to refer to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
efforts to return the child prior to the commencement of the final termination
hearing. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2), (f) 3 (West Supp. 2024). We
affirm the trial court’s order.
Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. FAM. § 161.001(b). To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed
in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and that termination is in the best interest of the
child. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree
of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West
2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional
well-being; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangered his physical or emotional well-being.
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The trial court further found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding

3
We note that the legislature added subsection (f) to Section 161.001 effective September 1, 2023.
Act of May 25, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 1, 7, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 1644–45 (codified at FAM.
§ 161.001(f)). This change in the law only applies to suits affecting the parent-child relationship filed on
or after the effective date of this statutory amendment. Id. §§ 7–8. As set out below, the Department filed
the petition to terminate the parent-child relationship on August 22, 2023. Thus, we apply the law in effect
at the time the suit was filed below.

2
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002) then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such,
when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley
factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the

3
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals
or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the
parent. Id.
To support a best-interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that
the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at
548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied)
(citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship
is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825,

4
829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past
conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the
future if the child is returned to the custody of the parent. In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d
321, 326 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the factfinder may
infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs
an inability or unwillingness by the parent to meet the child’s physical and emotional
needs in the future. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 326; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-
00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
The Evidence Presented at Trial
The Department has been involved in Appellant’s life for over a decade for
“[s]everal allegations of domestic violence and drug use.” Prior to J.S.’s birth on
December 7, 2018, the parent-child relationship between Appellant and her two
daughters was terminated.
In July 2023, Department investigator Thomas Moore attempted to contact
Appellant regarding additional allegations of neglectful supervision, drug use, and
physical abuse of J.S. Appellant and five-year-old J.S. were living with Appellant’s
boyfriend, Lorne Roach, a physically abusive methamphetamine user. Moore
visited Appellant’s home twice before she answered the door; she remained
uncooperative, and would not permit Moore inside the home or to observe J.S.
Because Moore was unable to ensure J.S.’s safety, he obtained a court order
requiring Appellant, Roach, and J.S. to submit to hair follicle drug testing. After
J.S. and both adults tested positive for methamphetamine, the Department
endeavored to avoid removal with a safety plan. However, as a result of Appellant’s

5
continued obstinance, the Department sought and was granted temporary managing
conservatorship of J.S. on August 22, 2023, the same date that it filed the underlying
termination proceeding.
The Department created a family plan of service for Appellant, which the trial
court amended and adopted as a court order in October 2023. Appellant’s service
plan required that she maintain sobriety, submit to drug testing within twenty-four
hours of her case manager’s directive to test, complete a substance abuse assessment
and treatment program, individual counseling, a psychological evaluation, parenting
classes, and a domestic violence course. Appellant was also ordered to maintain a
safe, drug-free home environment, obtain legal employment and reliable
transportation, and she was prohibited from interfering with her drug test results by
dying or modifying her hair, or by cutting or polishing her nails. Finally, the trial
court further clarified that anyone in a relationship with Appellant or with whom she
resides “shall complete parenting classes and random drug testing.”
Appellant acknowledged that J.S. was exposed to methamphetamine, and that
it caused the child harm. She completed her parenting classes and counseling,
maintained consistent contact with the Department, and attended parent-child
visitation. However, she bleached her hair at least once, kept her fingernails and
toenails too short to provide a sample for drug testing, then tested positive for
methamphetamine in December 2024.
The final termination hearing commenced on February 12 and concluded on
March 17, 2025. Christophe Mwungura, the 2INgage 4 case manager, testified that

4
The Department contracts with 2INgage to provide case management services to meet the needs
of children, youth, and families. See In re J.A., No. 07-22-00350-CV, 2023 WL 3305176, at *2 n.5 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo May 8, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that 2INgage is “a state contractor
providing case management and family services designed to achieve permanency”); see also In re A.S.,
No. 02-23-00160-CV, 2023 WL 4779826, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem.
op.).

6
J.S. has lived in a foster home in Brownwood since January 2024. He was seven
years old and in first grade when the final hearing began, was receiving special
accommodations in school, and was doing well. J.S. exhibited behavioral issues
such as fighting and needed several medications for his attention deficit hyperactive
disorder (ADHD) and his sleep disorder. J.S.’s current placement is not an adoptive
home, but his foster parents are willing to care for him until he is adopted.
Appellant and J.S.’s biological father testified at the final hearing. Appellant
attributed J.S.’s uncontrollable outbursts and other behavioral issues to “autism by
injury.” She explained that “[s]ince the day [J.S.] was born it was just a complete
nightmare . . . just the situation that he was born into.” Appellant testified that as a
result of physical abuse, J.S. suffered a cracked skull and had a traumatic brain
injury; specifically, damage to his frontal lobe, which limited his ability to regulate
his emotions and senses. This led to unpredictable behaviors such as asking
strangers if he could go home with them and threatening to kill Appellant and her
then-husband.
Appellant moved residences five times between J.S.’s removal and the final
termination hearing on February 12, 2025. Her abusive relationship with Roach
ended in September 2024 after what she described as a “major falling out with the
police involved.” Their “physical altercations” and “police interactions” resulted in
their eviction. Soon thereafter, Appellant moved in with her new boyfriend, Nathan
Fort. Fort provided a urine sample for drug testing once but refused to submit to
hair follicle drug testing. Despite the trial court’s order, Appellant’s position was
that Fort “is an adult” and she “cannot force him to test” because it was her, not Fort,
“who got in trouble for doing something wrong.” She added that Fort was “in the
process of moving out” of their shared home because they were no longer together.

7
Despite Appellant’s claim that she worked multiple jobs since J.S.’s removal,
she did not provide proof of employment until March 2025, and it did not reflect her
cash “bonuses that [she] get[s] from [her] boss.” She also did not have reliable
transportation, which was important due to J.S.’s need for additional services and
transportation to his appointments and school.
Finally, Appellant admitted to knowing that Roach was a methamphetamine
user, and that she prioritized Roach over her child. She denied using
methamphetamine since December 2023 after separating from Roach and had no
explanation for testing positive in December 2024.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the referring court terminated Appellant’s
parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and found termination to be
in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.0001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). In
support of its decision, the trial court explained:
[T]he child’s desires are not necessarily dispositive of best
interest as it relates to termination, and a long and continuing history of
poor choices that endanger a child can’t necessarily be cured in the 30
to 60 days before a case goes to trial.
This child needs the opportunity at some stability and to not be
exposed to drugs and to the lifestyle of drug addiction. . . .
The [c]ourt also finds [Appellant’s] testimony . . . to not be
credible.
This appeal followed.
Best Interest of the Child
In her first issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is
in the best interest of the child. She premises her issue on the contention that the
evidence showed that she had a stable home and income, and that she had been drug
free for over a year. Appellant further asserts that “the Department left the child in

8
foster care limbo, failed to search for relative placements, and provided little or no
support for services.”
“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-
circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee,
411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72). We
reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty to disturb the
determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving
the requisite due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence in
the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed
a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
best interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best-interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other words, the absence of
evidence regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best-interest finding,
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.) (quoting In re A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179, at *6
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). Consequently, “evidence
relating to one single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a
finding that termination is in the best interests of the child.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552
(quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)).
And evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may be

9
probative of the child’s best interest. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex.
2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28).
The Department presented clear and convincing evidence that Appellant
endangered J.S., which also supports the trial court’s firm belief that terminating
her parental rights was in J.S.’s best interest. Significantly, Appellant’s
methamphetamine use posed multiple potential dangers to the child and “implicates
most of the Holley factors.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). A parent’s continuing pattern of drug use can support
a best-interest finding due to the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and
prolonged absence from the child[].” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 281 (Tex. 2024).
Such risks were present in this case—Appellant acknowledged that J.S.’s positive
drug test was the result of exposure from hers and Roach’s methamphetamine use.
See In re C.S., 717 S.W.3d 1, 22 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. granted) (“The
children’s positive drug tests permit the strong inference that they were exposed to
marihuana through [a]ppellant’s illegal drug use, which . . . is indicative of an
endangering environment.”); In re N.T., No. 02-24-00067-CV, 2024 WL 2066375,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming a
conduct-based endangerment finding based in part on the children testing positive
for marihuana and cocaine upon removal). Appellant also tested positive for
methamphetamine less than three months before the final hearing. Although she
denied using illegal drugs since December 2023—several months after J.S. was
removed—she bleached her hair and kept her nails short, which could be reasonably
interpreted by the trial court as attempts to obscure drug test results. As such, the
trial court was permitted to disbelieve Appellant’s testimony and form a firm
conviction or belief that Appellant’s illegal drug use was an ongoing concern. See
J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551; In re Z.J.B., No. 14-18-00759-CV, 2019 WL 347474, at *5,

10
*7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 29, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (a
parent’s single positive drug screen and his failure to submit to three additional drug
screenings suggested continued illegal drug use by him and weighed in favor of the
trial court’s best-interest finding); see also In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“Parental drug abuse reflects poor
judgment and may be a factor to consider in determining a child’s best interest.”).
In addition to Appellant’s history of substance abuse, her past illegal activity
and history with the Department support the trial court’s best interest finding. See
In re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 WL 6787523, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The factfinder may consider prior CPS history
of neglect, drug use, or lack of care for the children.”). Notwithstanding the
Department’s resources expended for years on keeping Appellant’s children in her
care, her parental rights to her two daughters were terminated shortly before J.S. was
born. Appellant also conceded at trial that she was previously involved in drug
dealing. Such conduct undoubtedly “exposes the [child] to the possibility that
[Appellant] may be impaired or imprisoned,” which weighs in favor of finding that
termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in J.S.’s best interest. See J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 551.
Furthermore, Appellant failed to establish an ability to secure and maintain a
safe, stable home environment free from drug use and violence. See J.W., 645
S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable and uncertain living situation in
upholding the trial court’s best-interest finding); In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 905
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“Physical violence in the home leads to an
unstable and unpredictable environment for children.”); In re K.G., No. 11-24-
00236-CV, 2025 WL 477650, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 13, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.). She instead demonstrated a pattern of choosing physically abusive drug

11
users as companions—“[i]nappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons
who live in the child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a
regular basis” is an important consideration in the trial court’s best interest analysis.
See J.D.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family Protective Servs., 458 S.W.3d 33, 41, 45 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (considering such conduct as “part of the ‘conditions
or surroundings’ of the child’s home” in addressing the trial court’s endangerment
and best interest findings). Not only did Appellant fail to remove J.S. from the
endangering environment created by her and Roach; she conceded that J.S. was
“born into” an abusive situation. In re S.V., No. 02-23-00188-CV, 2023 WL
5967890, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(affirming a conduct-based endangerment finding based in part on evidence that
“both drugs and drug users were finding their way into the children’s home”);
M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-17-00104-CV, 2017 WL
3379114, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering
a parent’s continued association with “people who smoke marihuana all the time” as
evidence of endangerment). Appellant nevertheless chose to remain in an
endangering environment that led to J.S. being abused and suffering life-altering
injuries. See In re A.H., No. 11-24-00075-CV, 2024 WL 3879987, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Aug. 21, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Appellant broadcasted the
father’s ongoing aggression and violence on social media, rather than attempting to
protect [the child] from it.”). The trial court could have rationally inferred that
relinquishing J.S. to Appellant’s care would be contrary to his best interest. See In
re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).

12
Appellant completed several of her service plan requirements, but tested
positive for methamphetamine, demonstrated that her living situation frequently
changed and was uncertain at best, failed to timely provide proof of legal income,
and did not have reliable transportation. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (A parent’s
failure to complete court-ordered services can support a best-interest finding.); In re
J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)
(“A fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to complete the
services required to regain possession of [her] child that [she] does not have the
ability to motivate [herself] to seek out available resources needed now or in the
future.”). Given that the Department’s and the trial court’s primary concerns were
J.S.’s exposure to drugs and violence, Appellant’s recent improvement was
insufficient to alleviate the trial court’s concerns for the child’s safety and well-
being. See N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 479 (“[R]ecent improvement alone is not sufficient
to avoid termination of parental rights.”). Appellant’s uncertain living situation and
failure to comply with her service plan further support the trial court’s best-interest
finding. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable
home, and failure to comply with his family service plan support a finding that
termination is in the best interest of the child.”).
Most importantly, given the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry,
we may not discount the child’s improvement since removal. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d
at 746–47. “Stability and permanence are paramount” in a child’s upbringing. In re
J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied).
And although “[e]vidence about placement plans and adoption are, of course,
relevant to best interest,” a “lack of evidence about definitive plans for permanent
placement and adoption cannot be the dispositive factor.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.

13
Otherwise, terminations would regularly be subject to reversal on the sole ground
that “an adoptive family has yet to be located.” Id. Here, J.S.’s foster parents are
willing to care for him until he is adopted. J.S. is doing well there, and they are
meeting his needs. Appellant, by contrast, has not alleviated the Department’s and
the trial court’s concern that J.S. would be abused or exposed to illegal drugs were
he returned to her. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Considering the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, the
emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the emotional and
physical needs of the child now and in the future, Appellant’s lack of parental
abilities and stability, and her criminal conduct, history with the Department, and
drug use, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best
interest of the child. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Section 161.001(f): “Reasonable Efforts to Return the Child”
In her second issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to her before the final
termination hearing, but a continuing danger in her home prevented the return of the
child. See FAM. § 161.001(f). For parental termination suits filed by the Department
on or after September 1, 2023, the trial court may not terminate the parent-child
relationship unless:
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence and describes in
writing with specificity in a separate section of the order that . . . the
department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent
before the commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those
reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that
prevents the return of the child to the parent[.]

14
Act of May 25, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 1, 7, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 1644–
45 (codified at FAM. § 161.001(f)). The Department’s implementation of a family
service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return the child to the
parent. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 328–29 (collecting cases). The evidence presented
at trial demonstrates continual efforts of the Department to assist Appellant to make
necessary changes to qualify for and facilitate a safe return of the child to the home.
Here, the Department filed the petition to terminate the parent-child
relationship on August 22, 2023. Because Section 161.001(f) was not the law in
effect when the Department initiated the underlying suit, it does not apply. See id.;
see also In re E.R.M., No. 05-25-00678-CV, 2025 WL 2898005, at *4 n.2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); In re Z.K.L., No. 06-25-00003-
CV, 2025 WL 1021490, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 7, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.); In re Z.E.C., No. 08-23-00282-CV, 2024 WL 779616, at *9 (Tex. App.—El
Paso Feb. 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s
second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

November 6, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

15