Eduardo Ramirez v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed October 23, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00135-CR
__________

EDUARDO RAMIREZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 238th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR58709

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Eduardo Ramirez, was indicted for the offense of continuous
violence against the family, a third-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 25.11(a), (e) (West Supp. 2024). The jury convicted Appellant of the charged
offense, and the trial court assessed his punishment at five years’ imprisonment in
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
The indictment charged, in relevant part, that during a period that was twelve
months or less in duration, Appellant on two or more occasions assaulted and caused
bodily injury to I.M., a person with whom he had a dating relationship.
Appellant and I.M. maintained a dating relationship from April 1, 2022, to no
later than October 3, 2022. I.M. testified that Appellant assaulted her on at least
three occasions during their relationship. I.M. was first assaulted by Appellant on
April 23, 2022. On that date, I.M. was working at Advance Auto Parts in Midland
and she asked Appellant to drive her vehicle to her workplace. When he arrived
there, they argued and I.M. asked Appellant to exit her vehicle; he refused. Instead,
after I.M. reached through the driver’s side window to open the door to her vehicle,
Appellant grabbed I.M.’s left arm and held onto it as he closed the driver’s side
window on her arm. I.M. asked Appellant several times to open the driver’s side
window so that her arm could be released but he refused to do so. I.M. testified that
she believed her arm remained trapped for approximately three minutes. I.M. began
experiencing pain in her left arm approximately forty-five minutes later and bruising
also developed.
The next assault occurred on June 12, 2022. On that date, I.M. and Appellant
argued, and he accused her of texting other men. During their argument, Appellant
pushed and grabbed I.M., and as she was attempting to defend herself “[h]is arm
rolled off of [I.M.’s] arm and [his elbow hit and] busted [her] lip,” which caused
bleeding and physical pain. I.M. testified that a few days later, Appellant punched
her on the shoulder with his fist after he accused her of flirting with the cashier at
T & T Donuts, causing physical pain and more bruising. After the assault at T & T

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Donuts, I.M. claimed that Appellant choked her with his hands “a few times”; she
stated that being choked was painful.
Appellant assaulted I.M. again on September 17, 2022. I.M. testified that they
were at her apartment, and she asked Appellant to discard a bag of popcorn that he
had been eating the previous night. I.M.’s dog then began eating the popcorn and
Appellant grabbed and hit the dog. They argued and I.M. told Appellant to leave
her apartment. According to I.M., Appellant thereafter attacked her, pushed her into
a corner in her bedroom, and punched her in the chest and stomach several times
with his fists. He also grabbed her throat with his right hand and hit her right ear
and the right side of her face with his left hand, causing pain, ringing, and throbbing
in her ear.
After the last assault, I.M. received medical treatment for the injury to her ear.
On October 3, 2022, she reported each incident of assault to law enforcement.
Appellant thereafter asked I.M. to meet him so that he could apologize; he also asked
her to withdraw the assault charges, and he sent her several text messages, some of
which stated: “I’m sorry for putting my hands on you” and “I feel f----d up about it.”
II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).

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When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899;
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676
S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s
role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is
to be afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia,
667 S.W.3d at 762 (“[A] reviewing court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may
not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the evidence.”); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Dewberry v. State,
4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). This standard is deferential and
accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder
resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d
516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally under this standard.
Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2021, pet. ref’d). The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt;
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the
defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish
guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not
point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of

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all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction.
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
we treat direct and circumstantial evidence the same, and we must consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi,
330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the
charged offense as defined by the hypothetically correct charge for the case.
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether
the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence
adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out
the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s
burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
III. Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction for continuous violence against the family. Specifically,
Appellant contends that (1) no rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that he assaulted I.M. and caused her to suffer bodily injury on two or more
occasions during the requisite period required by the statute, and (2) the State did
not prove that he intended to injure I.M. because any bodily injury she allegedly
suffered was the result of “mutual combat.”

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As relevant to this appeal, a person commits the offense of continuous
violence against the family if, during a period that is twelve months or less in
duration, the person commits two or more assaults that cause bodily injury to a
person with whom he has or had a dating relationship. See PENAL §§ 22.01(a)(1),
25.11(a); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b) (West 2019) (defining “dating
relationship” as a “relationship between individuals who have or have had a
continuing relationship of a romantic or intimate nature”); see also Arevalo v. State,
675 S.W.3d 833, 844 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). Here, there is no dispute
that Appellant and I.M. were in a dating relationship at the time the alleged assaultive
conduct occurred.
A person commits the offense of assault if the person intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. PENAL § 22.01(a)(1).
“Bodily injury” as defined in the Penal Code includes “physical pain.” Id.
§ 1.07(a)(8). “Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily
injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also
Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Hernandez v. State,
531 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.). Bodily injury also
encompasses “even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute
more than mere offensive touching.” Clark v. State, 461 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989)). Although direct evidence may be presented that an assault
victim experienced physical pain, a factfinder may also infer that the victim felt or
experienced physical pain because people of common intelligence understand the
effects of pain and some of its natural causes. See Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 688 (citing
Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 774 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)); Clark,
461 S.W.3d at 248.

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For purposes of this charged offense, a person acts intentionally “when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.” PENAL § 6.03(a) (West 2021). A person acts knowingly “when he is aware
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b). A person
acts recklessly “when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the . . . result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). Recklessness requires
that the defendant foresees the risk involved and in turn consciously ignores it.
Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
“Intent and knowledge are fact questions for the jury, and are almost always
proven through evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Manrique v.
State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring); Luna v.
State, 687 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d). A jury may infer
intent and knowledge from any facts that tend to prove its existence, “including the
acts, words, and conduct of the accused,” and “the nature of [the] wounds inflicted
on the victims.” Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting
Manrique, 994 S.W.2d at 649); Luna, 687 S.W.3d at 93.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the jury could have reasonably inferred
and found from the evidence that I.M. suffered physical pain, and thus bodily injury,
because of Appellant’s assaultive conduct, and that the collective assaults occurred
within a period of twelve months or less as the statute requires. See Garcia, 367
S.W.3d at 688; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 524; Bolton v. State, 619 S.W.2d 166, 167
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (testimony that relates to the extent of the victim’s injuries
is sufficient to show bodily injury). Here, I.M. testified that on different dates, all
within a six-month period, Appellant: (1) grabbed her arm and held onto it as he
rolled up and closed the driver’s side window to her vehicle, trapping her left arm;
(2) hit and “busted [her] lip” with his elbow; (3) punched her on her shoulder;

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(4) grabbed her throat with his hands and choked her “a few times” to the point that
on one occasion she could not breathe; (5) punched her multiple times in her chest
and stomach with his fists; and (6) hit her on the right side of her face and ear with
his left hand causing pain, ringing, and throbbing. As a result of these incidents,
I.M. suffered physical pain, and bruises developed. Moreover, Appellant later
apologized to I.M. for his assaultive behavior and admitted that his conduct was
inappropriate.
In addition to I.M.’s testimony, her medical records and several photographs,
which depicted the injuries that she sustained and the bruises that developed because
of Appellant’s assaults, were admitted and published to the jury. These images were
taken shortly after each assault and show visible bruising and red marks on I.M.’s
body, injuries that she claimed were caused by Appellant’s assaultive conduct.
Photographs of injuries that a victim sustained because of an assault, without more,
are sufficient to show bodily injury. See Morales v. State, No. 11-24-00099-CR,
2025 WL 2412847, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 21, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Hodges v. State, No. 10-18-00044-CR, 2020
WL 5415544, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Further, bodily injury may result even though an assault
victim does not immediately experience physical pain or other adverse symptoms
“at the moment” the assault occurs. Aguilar v. State, 263 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d).
We conclude that I.M.’s testimony, coupled with her medical records and the
photographs of her injuries, are sufficient to show, and allowed the jury to reasonably
infer that she experienced bodily injury because of Appellant’s assaultive conduct.
See Bin Fang v. State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,
no pet.) (holding that evidence of a bruise is sufficient to establish bodily injury);

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Settlemyre v. State, 489 S.W.3d 607, 608–09 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, pet. ref’d)
(scratch marks on an assault victim’s wrists constituted bodily injury); Goodin v.
State, 750 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, pet. ref’d)
(a jury may infer that bruising resulted from physical pain); see also Morales, 2025
WL 2412847, at *5; Harris v. State, 164 S.W.3d 775, 785 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (evidence of scratches on the victim’s collarbone and
testimony “that appellant punched her on the shoulder, pushed her on the couch, and
started choking her” was sufficient evidence of bodily injury).
Despite this, Appellant argues that I.M.’s injuries, if any, resulted from their
“mutual combat” and that I.M. was the aggressor. As such, Appellant contends that
there was no evidence presented to show that he intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly caused any bodily injury to her. However, in this case, as in all cases, the
jury may believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. Adelman v. State,
828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Reyes v. State, 465 S.W.3d 801, 805
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986)); see Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at
899. As the trier of fact, it is the jury’s duty, as the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility, to weigh and resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761–62; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 899.
As we have said, the jury could have reasonably inferred and found from the
evidence that Appellant, by his conduct, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
caused bodily injury to I.M. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 524. To convict Appellant,
the State was only required to prove one culpable mental state. And, in most
instances, the testimony of a single eyewitness, here I.M., can be sufficient to support

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a conviction. See Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971);
Morales, 2025 WL 2412847, at *5. The jury was also able to employ its common
sense in determining whether I.M. suffered bodily injury because of Appellant’s
assaultive conduct. See PENAL § 1.07(a)(8); Coleman v. State, 631 S.W.3d 744, 751
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d); Aguilar, 263 S.W.3d at 434
(citing Taylor v. State, 71 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet.
ref’d)). In this case, the jury’s apparent decision to credit and accept I.M.’s accounts
of the assaults committed upon her by Appellant was inherently a credibility
determination to which we defer under the Jackson standard.
We have reviewed the cumulative force of all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, and we conclude that the record contains
sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have logically inferred and
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offense of
continuous violence against the family as charged in the indictment. Accordingly,
we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

October 23, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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