George Y. Lohmann, Jr.; Doc Properties, LLC; Midland European Waxing I, LLC; And Midland Double Dave's Pizza, LLC v. EWC Franchise, LLC

Opinion filed September 11, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00095-CV
__________

GEORGE Y. LOHMANN, JR.; DOC PROPERTIES, LLC;
MIDLAND EUROPEAN WAXING I, LLC; AND MIDLAND
DOUBLE DAVE’S PIZZA, LLC, Appellants
V.
EWC FRANCHISE, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 441st District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV60338

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, George Y. Lohmann, Jr.; DOC Properties, LLC (DOC
Properties); Midland European Waxing I, LLC (European Waxing); and Midland
Double Dave’s Pizza, LLC (Double Dave’s), appeal a default judgment in favor of
Appellee, EWC Franchise, LLC (EWC). In three issues, Appellants argue that:
(1) the default judgment is void due to defective service of process; (2) the trial court
erred in granting a default judgment without notice after Appellants appeared; and
(3) the trial court’s attorney’s fees award is not supported by legally sufficient
evidence. We affirm in part, and we reverse and remand in part.
I. Factual and Procedural History
EWC sued Lohmann and DOC Properties for violating the Texas
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (TUFTA). See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 24.001–.013 (West 2023). EWC alleged it had domesticated a Florida judgment
in Texas in the amount of $583,951.73 against Lohmann and DOC Marketing, LLC.1
According to EWC, it applied for and was granted a postjudgment writ of
garnishment after learning through subpoena that Lohmann had sufficient funds at a
financial institution to satisfy the judgment. The financial institution filed an answer
to the garnishment action, responding that it now only held $48,579.62 of
Lohmann’s funds. In response to another subpoena, EWC learned that Lohmann
transferred $500,000 from his personal account to an account owned by DOC
Properties. EWC alleged that this “was a fraudulent transfer made with the intent to
hinder, delay, and defraud [Lohmann’s] creditors.” EWC sought injunctive relief, a
constructive trust, monetary damages, and attorney’s fees. On January 9, 2024,
EWC served Lohmann and DOC Properties with the original petition and application
for injunction by personal service at Lohmann’s home address, which also served as
the registered address of DOC Properties, for which Lohmann was the registered
agent.
Following a hearing fifteen days later, on January 24, 2024, which neither
Lohmann or DOC Properties attended, the trial court entered a temporary injunction

1
This is a separate entity from Appellant DOC Properties, and it is not a party to this appeal.

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restraining Lohmann and DOC Properties from transferring assets from their bank
accounts and ordering them to deposit $500,000 into the registry of the court.
On January 26, 2024, EWC filed a first amended petition adding European
Waxing and Double Dave’s as defendants. EWC alleged that Lohmann had a 100%
ownership interest in DOC Properties, European Waxing, and Double Dave’s and
that Lohmann used each entity to transfer funds that could have been used to satisfy
EWC’s judgment against Lohmann. In the first amended petition, EWC sought
additional injunctive relief against the newly added defendants. Later that day, the
trial court signed a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on EWC’s request
for a temporary injunction for February 9, 2024.
On February 2, 2024, EWC filed a motion for substituted service. EWC stated
that it attempted to serve Appellants with the first amended petition at the residential
address of Lohmann, who is the registered agent of each defendant, but was
unsuccessful. The motion was supported by the declaration of EWC’s counsel,
Suzanna C. Bonham. Bonham stated that EWC retained a private process server
who made two attempts to serve defendants with the amended petition. To the
motion for substituted service, Bonham attached her correspondence with the
process server detailing past attempts to serve Appellants. Bonham also attached
evidence that she e-mailed the first amended petition to Lohmann and his personal
attorney. The information regarding the process server’s attempts at service shows
only a voicemail left and later a phone conversation with Lohmann about meeting.
EWC requested that the trial court authorize substituted service of the first
amended petition, temporary restraining order, and citation by: (1) securely attaching
the documents to the front gate of Lohmann’s residence; (2) e-mailing the documents
to Lohmann; (3) e-mailing the documents to Lohmann’s personal attorney; “and/or”
(4) sending the documents to Lohmann by regular mail.

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The trial court granted EWC’s motion that same day and authorized service
by the means requested. The process server filed returns of service indicating that
all Appellants were served by “securely attaching to the front gate” of Lohmann’s
residence on February 3, 2024.
The trial court held a hearing on EWC’s request for temporary injunction, at
which Lohmann appeared pro se. The trial court asked Lohmann, “you’re here on
behalf of your other entity, [DOC] Properties, LLC, and the others that have been
served, correct?” Lohmann responded, “Yes, sir.” EWC then proceeded to present
argument in support of its request for injunctive relief, referencing evidence that it
previously filed and was admitted at the hearing. Lohmann then proceeded to
explain why the $500,000 transfer was not fraudulent. He explained that he
transferred the money before the “freeze on [his] banking accounts.” Lohmann
stated that there were no fraudulent transfers from DOC Properties to European
Waxing. He also stated that he was cooperative with the process server and that he
has never refused service. He claimed that funds were transferred for payroll and
phone answering services. Lohmann also stated that “things that were delivered
Saturday, they forced the process server to come over, tape stuff to the fence, and
the wind blew all that stuff all over” and that he had “no idea what was in there.”
Lohmann lodged an objection to EWC’s exhibits on relevance grounds, which the
trial court denied. Following the hearing, the trial court signed a temporary
injunction restraining Appellants from transferring assets from their bank accounts
and ordering them to deposit $500,000 into the registry of the court.
After Appellants failed to file an answer, EWC filed a motion for default
judgment against all Appellants on Friday, March 8, 2024. On Monday, March 11,
the trial court signed a final judgment, stating that the motion for default judgment
“was submitted to the [trial] [c]ourt for hearing on March 8, 2024,” granting the

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motion, and awarding: $639,694.61 in actual damages, $185,543.11 in attorney’s
fees, contingent appellate attorney’s fees, pre and postjudgment interest, and costs.
Lohmann, proceeding pro se and purportedly on behalf of DOC Properties,
but no other entity, filed a motion for new trial alleging that he “was deprived of due
process because the lack of proper notice of the trial at which the default judgment
was rendered.” Following a hearing on the motion for new trial conducted April 25,
2024, at which Lohmann did not appear, the trial court denied the motion. This
appeal followed.
II. Service
In their first issue, Appellants argue that “[t]he default judgment is void
because the service of process on Appellants by substitute service was invalid.”
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
“Personal jurisdiction, a vital component of a valid judgment, is dependent
‘upon citation issued and served in a manner provided for by law.’” In re E.R., 385
S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.
1990)). Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant is
a legal question that we review de novo. J. O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs., 604 S.W.3d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). Unless the record
shows an appearance, proper service of citation, or a written waiver of service at
the time the default judgment is entered, the trial court does not have
personal jurisdiction to render the default judgment against the defendant. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 124; U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Moss, 644 S.W.3d 130, 137 (Tex.
2022).
“We indulge no presumption in favor of valid issuance, service, or return of
citation.” Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020). “[A] default
judgment cannot withstand direct attack by a defendant who complains that he was

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not served in strict compliance with applicable requirements.” Wilson, 800 S.W.2d
at 836. A party may raise an issue alleging defective service for the first time on
appeal. See id. at 837; In re P. RJ E., 499 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
Rule 106(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, unless the
citation or an order of the court otherwise directs, the citation must be served by
“(1) delivering to the defendant, in person, a copy of the citation, showing the
delivery date, and of the petition; or (2) mailing to the defendant by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(a). Texas law also provides for personal service of a Texas
corporation by requiring the corporation to designate and continuously maintain a
registered agent for service of process. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.201(a)
(West 2020). A plaintiff may serve a corporation’s registered agent, its president,
or its vice president to perfect service of process on a defendant-corporation. Id.
§§ 5.201(b), 5.255(1); Zhao v. Sea Rock Inc., 659 S.W.3d 119, 127 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2022, pet. denied).
Under Rule 106(b), a trial court may authorize substituted service only after a
plaintiff has unsuccessfully attempted to effect service through Rule 106(a). See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(b); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298,
298–99 (Tex. 1993). When the trial court does so, the only authority for the
substituted service is the order itself. Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 317–18. Rule 106(b)
requires the party seeking substituted service to file a motion supported by a sworn
statement that must list “any location where the defendant can probably be found”
and state specifically the facts showing that the traditional methods of service have
been attempted unsuccessfully at that location. TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(b). If the trial
court grants the motion, it may authorize service:

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(1) by leaving a copy of the citation and of the petition with anyone
older than sixteen at the location specified in the statement; or
(2) in any other manner, including electronically by social media, email,
or other technology, that the statement or other evidence shows will be
reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit.
Id. “[S]ubstitute service is not authorized under Rule 106(b) without an affidavit
which meets the requirements of the rule demonstrating the necessity for other than
personal service.” Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836. An affidavit will not support
substituted service if it is conclusory or otherwise insufficient. Id.
B. Analysis
Appellants argue that the declaration supporting EWC’s motion for substitute
service is legally insufficient to support substitute service because it is not based on
personal knowledge, and it is conclusory. Appellants note that the declarant attests
that “the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief,” and
they argue that this is insufficient to establish that the declaration is based on
personal knowledge. Appellants further argue that the declaration and the exhibits
thereto establish that there were no attempts made at personal service such that
substitute service was not authorized. EWC responds that Lohmann’s appearance
in the lawsuit waived any issue of defective service. EWC also maintains that its
declaration was generally sufficient to support substitute service.
First, we note that EWC personally served Lohmann and DOC Properties with
its original petition, and Appellants do not argue that this instance of service was
defective. A plaintiff is not required to serve a nonanswering defendant with a new
citation for an amended petition. See In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2009).
(“While a nonanswering defendant must be served with a more onerous amended
petition in order for a default judgment to stand, we agree with the court of appeals
that Rule 21a service satisfies that requirement.”); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a.

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Accordingly, we overrule Appellants’ first issue as it pertains to Lohmann and DOC
Properties.
Second, Lohmann’s presence at the hearing did not cure any purported service
issues pertaining to European Waxing and Double Dave’s. It is true that “a party’s
appearance in a lawsuit cures any defect in the method of serving that party.”
Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 386 (Tex. 2022) (citing Baker v.
Monsanto Co., 111 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. 2003)). Lohmann is alleged to wholly
own European Waxing and Double Dave’s. As we have said, at the February 9,
2024 hearing, the trial court asked Lohmann, “you’re here on behalf of your other
entity, [DOC] Properties, LLC, and the others that have been served, correct?”
Lohmann responded, “Yes, sir.” However, corporations may appear in court and be
represented only by a licensed attorney. Rhojo Enters., LLC v. Stevens, 540 S.W.3d
621, 625 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, no pet.); Rabb Int’l, Inc. v. SHL Thai Food
Serv., LLC, 346 S.W.3d 208, 209 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).2
“[A] non-attorney representative cannot appear for a limited liability company or
present a case on its behalf.” Sherman v. Boston, 486 S.W.3d 88, 95–96 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). “An attempt to do so has no legal
effect.” Id. at 96. Therefore, we conclude that Lohmann’s presence at the hearing
did not constitute an appearance by European Waxing and Double Dave’s, and those
Appellants have not waived any issues regarding defective service. See Custom-
Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2002, no pet.) (“Because Heath was not a licensed attorney and therefore could not

2
A non-attorney’s answer on behalf of a corporation, although defective, may prevent a default
judgment against the corporation. See Rabb Int’l, 346 S.W.3d at 209–10; Guadalupe Econ. Servs. Corp. v.
Dehoyos, 183 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). But we have found no authority
standing for the proposition that a non-attorney corporate representative’s presence in court constitutes an
appearance for the corporation.

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represent Custom–Crete, his mere presence at trial does not equate to an
‘appearance’ at trial on behalf of Custom–Crete.”).
Next, we address Appellants’ contention that substituted service was defective
because EWC did not show by its declaration that it had attempted personal service.
As stated above, Bonham declared that a private process server made two attempts
to serve Appellants with the amended petition, and she attached correspondence with
the process server detailing EWC’s attempts to serve Appellants. However, the
attached exhibit shows the opposite:

As evidenced above, the process server did not make any attempts at personal
service, nor did it document any in the return of service. They merely arranged a
meet-up time by phone. This is insufficient to demonstrate the necessity for other
than personal service. See Coronado v. Norman, 111 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2003, pet. denied) (reversing default judgment because affidavit in support
of substitute service did not contain sufficient facts to satisfy Rule 106(b));
Medford v. Salter, 747 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1988, no writ) (reversing default judgment because affidavit in support of motion
for substitute service did not show specific facts that service had been attempted and
was deficient). Because EWC did not attempt to personally serve Double Dave’s or
European Waxing, substituted service on these Appellants is defective. See Wilson,
800 S.W.2d at 836 (“In this case, Dunn was not strictly served in compliance with

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Rule 106(b) because substitute service was not properly authorized absent the
affidavit explicitly required by the rule.”). We sustain Appellants’ first issue as to
Double Dave’s and European Waxing.
III. Notice
In their second issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting a
default judgment without notice. Because we have concluded that service was
defective regarding Double Dave’s and European Waxing, we need only address this
further issue as it pertains to Lohmann and DOC Properties.
A. Motion for New Trial & Notice
Under Texas law, a default judgment should be set aside and a new trial
granted when the defaulting party establishes that: (1) the failure to appear was not
intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was the result of an accident
or mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets up a meritorious defense, and
(3) granting the motion will occasion no delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.
Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)
(citing Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939)).
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 926. “When a defaulting party moving for new trial meets all
three elements of the Craddock test, then a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails
to grant a new trial.” Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 873 S.W.2d 381, 382
(Tex. 1994)). If the defaulting party demonstrates that they did not receive notice of
the dispositive hearing or the trial setting, then they are relieved from proving the
other Craddock elements. See Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d
809, 813 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam).
“[A] plaintiff may take the default judgment without further notice if the
defendant has not filed a written answer or otherwise ‘appeared’ in the action.”

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Schoendienst v. Haug, 399 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.)
(citing Wilson v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2004, pet. denied)). “But if the defendant has answered or ‘appeared’ in some
manner, due process thereafter entitles the defendant to notice of any trial setting—
and that includes a hearing on a motion for default judgment.” Id. (first citing LBL
Oil Co. v. Int’l Power Servs., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 390, 390–91 (Tex. 1989); then citing
In re Marriage of Runberg, 159 S.W.3d 194, 197 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no
pet.)). If a defendant has appeared, and the plaintiff obtains a default judgment
without notice, the defendant’s due process rights are violated, and the judgment
must be set aside. See LBL Oil Co., 777 S.W.2d at 390–91.
The defendant may, in person, or by attorney, or by his duly authorized
agent, enter an appearance in open court. Such appearance shall be
noted by the judge upon his docket and entered in the minutes, and shall
have the same force and effect as if the citation had been duly issued
and served as provided by law.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 120. “In the absence of a written answer, ‘whether a defendant is
considered to have “appeared” depends on the nature and quality of the party’s
activities in the case.’” Schoendienst, 399 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting Runberg, 159
S.W.3d at 198). This inquiry “considers the nature and quality of any written
documents the defendant has filed in the case, any participation in hearings, and any
other personal activity by the defendant.” Id. at 316–17.
“[A] party enters a general appearance when it (1) invokes the judgment of
the [trial] court on any question other than the court’s jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by
its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative action from the
court.” Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo,
142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004)). However, “a party who is a silent figurehead in
the courtroom, observing the proceedings without participating, has not” appeared.
Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

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2004, pet. denied). Ultimately, we look at “whether these acts by the defendant
amount to an implicit recognition of the court’s jurisdiction over the parties to decide
a question other than the existence of jurisdiction itself.” Schoendienst, 399 S.W.3d
at 317.
B. Analysis
Appellants argue that if Lohmann’s presence at the hearing on February 9
constituted an appearance on behalf of Lohmann and DOC Properties, then those
Appellants were entitled to notice of the default judgment hearing. Appellants
maintain that in the absence of notice, the default judgment must be reversed. In
contrast to its response to Appellants’ first issue, EWC argues that “Lohmann’s
participation at the February 9[] hearing is not enough to constitute a general
appearance.”
As previously explained, Lohmann’s presence at the hearing did not constitute
an appearance on behalf of any corporate entities, such as DOC Properties. See
Custom-Crete, 82 S.W.3d at 659. Regarding Lohmann personally, we note that, far
from being a silent observer, he contested the merits of EWC’s allegations that funds
were fraudulently transferred, and he objected to EWC’s evidence on relevance
grounds. Merely appearing at an injunction hearing may not constitute an
appearance, but actively participating in the hearing by arguing about the merits of
the underlying suit and objecting to evidence, does. Compare Perkola v. Koelling
and Assocs., Inc., 601 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ)
(“Perkola’s appearance at this [temporary injunction] hearing on an ancillary matter
was not an appearance in the main case.”), with Schoendienst, 399 S.W.3d at 318–
19 (holding in restricted appeal that the record showed that appellant was served, did
not file written answer, but “appeared” by entering into agreed temporary injunction,
thereby entitling her to notice of default judgment when considered in the context of

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the present record), Kaufman v. AmeriHealth Lab., LLC, No. 05-20-00504-CV, 2020
WL 6375336, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(concluding that “Kaufman voluntarily appeared through counsel at the [temporary
restraining order] hearing” where he “succeeded in modifying the [temporary
restraining order] based on counsel’s arguments, and argued he was not a signatory
to the consulting agreement thereby challenging AmeriHealth’s breach of contract
claim”), and Beistel v. Allen, No. 01-06-00246-CV, 2007 WL 1559840, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“While Texas courts have held
that a party who merely observes a proceeding without participating does not make
a general appearance, Beistel’s counsel participated when she objected to the
admission of Allen’s spreadsheet.”).
Considering the nature and quality of Lohmann’s actions at the temporary
injunction hearing, we conclude that his participation amounts to an implicit
recognition of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the parties. See Schoendienst, 399
S.W.3d at 316–17. Because he made an appearance, Lohmann was entitled to notice
of the hearing. See LBL Oil Co., 777 S.W.2d at 390–91. Because the record clearly
establishes that the trial court ruled on EWC’s motion for default judgment by
submission, without holding a hearing, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Lohmann’s motion for new trial. See Mabon, 369 S.W.3d at
813. Accordingly, we sustain Appellants’ second issue as to Lohmann only.
IV. Attorney’s Fees
Due to our resolution of Appellants’ first two issues, we address their third
issue only as it pertains to DOC Properties. Appellants argue that the trial court’s

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award of attorney’s fees to EWC must be reversed because the award includes fees
for work on a separate case.3
Attorney’s fees are recoverable only as provided by statute or by a contract
between the parties. Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain,
Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 52 (Tex. 2018). Section 24.013 of TUFTA provides that
the trial court “may award . . . reasonable attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”
BUS. & COM. § 24.013. Appellants’ complaint that EWC’s evidence of attorney’s
fees included fees for work not done in pursuing its TUFTA claim is an argument
that EWC failed to segregate its fees. It is generally true that the party seeking
attorney’s fees must “segregate fees between claims for which they are recoverable
and claims for which they are not.” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d
299, 311 (Tex. 2006). The alleged failure of a party to segregate the fees can be
waived if an adverse party fails to object that the attorney’s fees in dispute are not
properly segregated as to specific claims. See Green Int’l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d
384, 389 (Tex. 1997); Hizar v. Heflin, 672 S.W.3d 774, 802 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2023, pet. denied); see also Sprague v. Roberts, No. 11-23-00213-CV, 2025
WL 336964, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Lohmann’s motion for new trial did not raise an objection to the trial court’s
award of attorney’s fees. Importantly, even if the motion for new trial had raised the
issue, because Lohmann is a non-attorney representative he cannot appear for an
LLC entity and, therefore, the filing would be of no effect as it relates to DOC
Properties. See Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 96. Accordingly, Lohmann’s motion for
new trial did not preserve this issue for appellate review for DOC Properties.

3
Appellants allege that charges for fees sought in its Motion for Default Judgment recite charges
well before the present case was filed on December 28, 2023, and that the entries involve fees for
postjudgment discovery and procedures, which cannot possibly relate to this case when no judgment was
entered in this case until March 11, 2024.

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See Solis, 951 S.W.2d at 389; see also Rhodes v. Kelly, No. 05-16-00888-CV, 2017
WL 2774452, at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding
that appellant waived error on attorney’s fees issues, including segregation of fees,
by failing to address the issue in a motion for new trial or other proceedings in the
trial court). We overrule Appellants’ third issue.
V. This Court’s Ruling
We reverse the trial court’s default judgment against Lohmann, European
Waxing, and Double Dave’s, and we remand that portion of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the
trial court’s judgment including the default judgment against DOC Properties.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

September 11, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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