Reynaldo Gutierrez v. Hochheim Prairie Farm Mutual Insurance Company

Opinion filed August 29, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-25-00202-CV
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REYNALDO GUTIERREZ SR., Appellant
V.
HOCHHEIM PRAIRIE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 350th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 12628-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Reynaldo Gutierrez Sr., mailed a pro se notice of appeal to the trial
court after it granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss his claims for want of
prosecution. Because Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we dismiss
the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
On May 23, 2025, the trial court signed an order granting Appellee’s motion
to dismiss Appellant’s claims against it for want of prosecution. Appellant mailed
his pro se notice of appeal from the trial court’s order on June 12, 2025. For the
recipient’s address, Appellant provided the following: “Tayor Co. Courthouse c/o
350 District Court, 300 Oak St. Abilene, Tx 79602.” Appellant listed his name and
a residential address on the return address portion of the envelope. On July 21, 2025,
Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed in the Taylor County District Clerk’s Office.
Because the notice of appeal was not received by the district clerk’s office
within ten days after the filing deadline, we notified Appellant by letter that his
notice of appeal appeared to be untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.2(b). In our letter,
we requested that Appellant provide this court with a response showing grounds to
continue the appeal, and we notified him that the appeal was subject to dismissal.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). Appellant responded and complained about actions
by his former attorney, who withdrew from his case in September 2024,
approximately eight months prior to the trial court’s order. Appellant did not show
grounds to continue this appeal in his response.
Pursuant to Rule 9.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
document is considered timely filed if (1) it was sent to the proper clerk by the United
State Postal Service or a commercial delivery service, (2) it was placed in an
envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped, and (3) it was deposited or
delivered on or before the last day of filing. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.2(b)(1) (the mailbox
rule). However, even if all of these requirements are met, the document must be
received by the clerk’s office “within ten days after the filing deadline” to be
considered timely filed. Id.
In interpreting the mailbox rule that is found in Rule 5 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides substantially similar requirements as Rule 9.2(b) of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Texas Supreme Court has held, for civil
cases, that “mailing the document to the proper court address is conditionally
effective as mailing it to the proper court clerk’s address.” Stokes v. Aberdeen Ins.
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Co., 917 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. 1996) (emphasis omitted); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 5 (“If
any document is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in an
envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited in the mail on
or before the last day for filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not more
than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time.”). The
court clarified, for purposes of the mailbox rule, “[t]he clerk still must receive the
document within ten days to perfect the filing.” Stokes, 917 S.W.2d at 268;
McCray v. Mulder, No. 05-08-00420-CV, 2008 WL 2600700, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas July 2, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
In this case, the trial court signed and entered its order dismissing Appellant’s
claims on May 23, 2025. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial or other post-
judgment motion that would extend the deadline for him to file a notice of appeal.
As a result, absent a timely-filed motion for extension of time, he was required to
file the notice of appeal no later than June 23, and the district clerk’s office must
have received the notice no later than July 2 to invoke our jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.2(b)(1), 26.1, 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997)
(A party can no longer invoke an appellate court’s jurisdiction once the period for
granting a motion for extension of time has passed.). Instead, the document was
received and filed by the district clerk’s office on July 21, after the deadline to file
the notice of appeal and the deadline to file a motion for extension of time to file
such a notice had expired. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 26.3.
We are prohibited from suspending the Rules of Appellate Procedure “to alter
the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case.” TEX. R. APP. P. 2. Absent a timely
notice of appeal, this court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See
Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 564 (Tex. 2005); Garza v.
Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 227 S.W.3d 233, 233–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

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2007, no pet.); see also Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617. Because we are without
jurisdiction, we must dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

August 29, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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