In Re MBC Energy Services, Inc and Robert Douglas Woods,Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 21, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00052-CV
__________

IN RE MBC ENERGY SERVICES, INC. AND ROBERT
DOUGLAS WOODS, JR.

Original Mandamus Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This mandamus proceeding concerns the efforts by Relators, the defendants
in the proceeding below, to obtain funding information from the plaintiff and his
medical providers for the plaintiff’s medical care. Relators MBC Energy Services,
Inc. and Robert Douglas Woods, Jr. state their first issue1 as follows:
Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion in denying
discovery concerning the amounts the Treaters were paid by the
Funders for the medical services they provided to [Daniel] Sunde and
the relationship between the Treaters, the Funders, and Sunde’s

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Relators assert in their second issue that they lack an adequate appellate remedy.
lawyers, which is relevant to the reasonableness of medical expenses
and the Treaters’ bias?
Relators complain that the trial court abused its discretion in two respects: 1) when
it refused to grant their motion to compel the depositions of several witnesses that
Relators describe as “Funders and Treaters,” and 2) when it denied Relators’ motion
to compel with respect to various interrogatories and requests for production of
documents to which the real party in interest, Daniel Sunde, objected. In a global
order, the trial court denied Relators motion to compel without addressing the
specific complaints raised in the motion. Because we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Relators’ motion to compel, we conditionally grant
mandamus relief.
Factual and Procedural Background
Sunde brought suit against Relators alleging that, on April 6, 2023, he was
injured in a motor vehicle accident that was caused by their negligence. Specifically,
Sunde alleged that he was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was struck by Woods,
who was acting in the course and scope of his employment with MBC. After Sunde
filed suit, Diuber Reyes Perez and Raymond Smith intervened in the lawsuit,
alleging that they were likewise injured in the same accident.
The discovery that is sought by Relators concerns the relationship between
Sunde’s attorneys, several of Sunde’s medical providers, and three companies:
Access Healthcare Management, Elite Medical Care, and CareCapital, LLC.
Relators allege that the parties have established a series of funding “arrangements”
that operate to artificially inflate Sunde’s claimed medical expenses.
The first alleged funding arrangement involves Dr. Gassan Chaiban and
Allied Health, a clinic that is affiliated with Dr. Chaiban. Allied Health is located in
Lake Charles, Louisiana. There is evidence that Sunde was referred to Allied Health
and Dr. Chaiban through Sunde’s attorneys. Chaiban’s records list Access as
2
Sunde’s “insurance company.” However, on its website, Access purports to be a
company that provides “medical lien funding to help medical providers increase cash
flow and eliminate financial risks while treating personal injury patients.” Access
claims to do this by “purchas[ing] accounts receivables from physicians” and
assisting the medical provider by providing “patient management[] and law firm
communications.” There is also evidence from an expert retained by counsel for
Relators demonstrating that Allied’s billing is substantially higher “compared to
what providers typically receive . . . for similar services.”
The second alleged funding arrangement involves Dr. Mohammed (M.K.)
Hazma, who is a neuropsychologist at The Neurobehavioral Clinic in Port Neches.
Relators allege that a company known as Elite Medical Care “funded” Sunde’s visit
to Dr. Hazma, and then billed Sunde for his services, pointing to a medical billing
affidavit executed by Mayra Zuniga. However, the affidavit in question merely
indicates that Elite was billing for Dr. Hazma’s services. It does not show that Elite
“funded” the visit to Dr. Hazma.
The third alleged arrangement involves Dr. Gina Armstrong of the Texas
Brain Center and Dr. Ramiro Hernandez of River Oaks Hospital & Clinics (formerly
AD Hospital East LLC). Both of these entities are based in Houston. CareCapital
claims that it serves as a “administrative billings-and-collections agent” for each of
these providers. However, Relators maintain that this contention does not fully
disclose the entirety of the relationship between CareCapital, the providers in
question, and Sunde’s attorneys.
The record contains evidence that supports a referral relationship between
Access, Sunde’s attorneys, and the providers that operate within the Access network
and/or the networks of Access subsidiaries. In November 2023, for example,
Dr. Patrick Hayes, a psychiatrist, gave testimony about the relationships among

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these entities in a multiparty lawsuit arising out of Hurricane Zeta. Dr. Hayes
testified that he does not have a relationship with the attorneys that represent Sunde
in this lawsuit. However, he does have a relationship with Access, which serves as
a “clinical case manager.” Furthermore, it is Dr. Hayes’s understanding that, when
a case arises that falls into Dr. Hayes’s areas of practice, Access in turn refers the
patients to Dr. Hayes. Dr. Hayes’s office then bills Access for its services in
accordance with an established fee schedule, and Access pays for the services, but
also receives a “contracted rate” for its management services.
Similarly, in March of 2024, Stephanie Garcia, appearing as a corporate
representative of CareCapital, appeared for a deposition in an unrelated personal
injury lawsuit then pending in Harris County. In her deposition, Garcia testified that,
as a part of its business practices, CareCapital enters into arrangements with medical
providers to purchase their accounts receivable at a discounted rate, anticipating that
it will recover the full amounts of the receivables once the case is resolved through
settlement or an award at trial.
Relators assert that the amounts the providers are “willing to accept for their
medical services through the sale of their accounts receivable is—at a minimum—
relevant to determining the reasonable cost of the medical services Sunde received.”
Additionally, Relators argue that evidence of the relationship between these parties
demonstrates bias because the arrangement “ultimately incentivizes the [providers]
to render the most severe diagnoses, recommend more expensive treatment, and
inflate medical bills,” which in turn motivates the funding companies to “continue
to feed them more patients.”
On September 8, 2023, the trial court signed an Agreed Discovery Control
Plan and Scheduling Order that set a deadline of April 22, 2024 for Sunde and the
intervenors to disclose expert witnesses. The scheduling order also established a

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discovery deadline of July 8, 2024. Thereafter, on March 26, 2024, the trial court
signed an Agreed Amended Docket Control Order, which among other things,
extended the deadline for the disclosure of Sunde’s and intervenors’ expert witnesses
until June 28, 2024 and a deadline for discovery until August 23, 2024.
On June 28, 2024, Sunde responded to a set of interrogatories and requests for
production that were served on him by Woods. The interrogatories and requests for
production included several inquiries into the arrangements between Sunde and his
medical providers regarding the payment of Sunde’s medical bills. For example, in
Interrogatory No. 6, Woods sought the following from Sunde: “Identify, by name,
address, and contact information, all medical and mental health providers that have
provided you with medical services or equipment related to the Incident under a
letter of protection or any form of deferred compensation agreement, whether written
or oral.” Sunde provided the following response:
Plaintiff objects to this request on the basis it is overly broad,
unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff further objects to the extent
this request is irrelevant and constitutes a fishing expedition. Subject to
the foregoing objections, there are no letters of protection and Plaintiff
is unaware of any agreements.
Interrogatory No. 7 sought the identity of “all persons or entities providing any
funding or financing for your medical services or equipment in relation to the
Lawsuit.” Sunde made the same objections to this interrogatory followed by the
statement “[n]one at this time.” Sunde made similar objections to requests for
production seeking the same type of funding information.
Although Sunde objected to most of these requests on several grounds, he also
provided answers and/or responses that were subject to his objections. Sunde’s
answers denied the existence of any specific financial arrangements, such as letters

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of protection or “factoring,” but it is unclear as to whether the qualified nature of his
answers limits the scope of information that Sunde is providing.
On July 23, 2024, counsel for Sunde transmitted to Relators a series of
documents that included records for Dr. Ramiro Hernandez, River Oaks Hospital,
Texas Brain Center, and Dr. Gina M. Armstrong. Thereafter, on August 8, 2024,
the trial court signed a Second Agreed Amended Docket Control Order, which
extended the deadline for plaintiffs to disclose experts until August 28, 2024, and
extended the discovery deadline until November 15, 2024. Among other things, the
order specifically provided that “[a]ll . . . depositions must be completed by
[November 15, 2024].”
Sunde filed his designation of experts on August 28, 2024, the deadline date
for the designation of experts. In it, he designated “retained experts” and “non-
retained experts.” Included within the non-retained experts were “physicians and
medical facilities [that] have knowledge of Plaintiff’s injuries and medical
treatment.” He further indicated that they may testify about “reasonable costs for
medical care in the past and future, and the need, if any, for future treatment.”
On August 29, a paralegal employed by counsel for Relators inquired about
dates for the depositions of “the plaintiffs’ retained experts.” Counsel for Relators
then followed up with a second communication on August 30 again asking for
dates for the depositions. Later on the same date, counsel for Sunde responded to
the e-mail, stating that “[w]e’ll get dates for [plaintiffs’ retained experts] after the
party depos are complete.” Counsel for Relators then responded that the parties
should not delay in setting dates “since it generally takes weeks or months to get
expert depositions scheduled.” In reply, counsel for Sunde indicated that “the dates
won’t be in September,” but did not provide any available dates beyond September.

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On September 16, 2024, counsel for Sunde transmitted to Relators a series of
records that included the billing records of Elite Medical Care. Sunde claims that
other records for Elite Medical Care had been previously produced on May 22, 2024.
In support of this claim, Sunde points to an e-mail that his counsel transmitted to
counsel for Relators on May 22, which includes a link to document production from
Sunde. The e-mail contains the names of several digital files that were produced at
the time.
Sunde contends that the records that were produced on September 16 also
indicated that Dr. Nadia Ramsey was the owner of Elite Medical Care and that Mayra
Zuniga was the custodian of records of Elite Medical Care. However, the record
only includes the names of the digital files that were produced. It does not include
the contents of the document production itself.2
On the same date, counsel for Relators again attempted to solicit dates for
medical expert depositions of Allied Health, Access Healthcare Management, and a
medical doctor. Counsel for Sunde again responded that “[a]ny depositions of
medical/experts will occur after party depositions are complete.” In the same e-mail,
counsel for Sunde stated that she was “booked most of the rest of the year, so it
would not be helpful to provide you dates I’m not available.”
It appears that, in early October, counsel for Relators again attempted to
schedule depositions. In an e-mail dated October 18, counsel indicated that, based
on his firm’s inquiries, only five dates were available “between now and

2
Counsel for Sunde states that this court can examine the contents of hyperlinks contained within
the record that point to copies of the documents on the internet. We decline to undertake such an
examination. Such documents have not been made part of the record before us, and there is likewise no
indication that they were before the trial court when it considered the motion to compel. See In re Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (When making a determination as
to whether mandamus should issue, the supreme court “must focus on the record that was before the [trial]
court.”); see also In re Allstate Ins. Co., 232 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, orig. proceeding)
(“[O]ur review is limited to the record as it existed before the trial court at the time of the decision.”).

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November 15.” In the same e-mail, he listed over twenty deposition requests that
had been made by various parties to the lawsuit. He then inquired about whether a
continuance of the February 2, 2025 trial setting would be opposed. However,
according to counsel for Relators, no response was made to those inquiries.
On October 22, 2024, Relators issued a series of notices announcing their
intention to take the depositions of Armstrong, Hernandez, The Texas Brain Center,
and AD Hospital.
Three days later, Sunde moved to quash those depositions on the grounds that
“[d]efendant unilaterally served the deposition notices,” and stated that his counsel
was unavailable. As a result of the motion to quash, all of the depositions were
automatically stayed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.4.
On November 5, Relators noticed the depositions of Elite Medical
Care, Ramsey, and Zuniga. These depositions were scheduled to proceed on
November 15, the same day that the discovery period was set to expire. Three days
later, the parties whose depositions had been requested moved to quash their notices,
indicating that they were unavailable. Consequently, those depositions were
likewise automatically stayed. See id.
On November 15, Relators filed the motion to compel that is the subject of
this mandamus action, together with a verified motion for continuance. In their
motion, Relators sought an order compelling the depositions of Elite Medical Care,
Ramsey, Zuniga, River Oaks Hospital, The Texas Brain Center, Armstrong, and
Hernandez. Additionally, the motion asked the court to compel Sunde to “remove
all objections and provide all information and documents responsive” to six of
Relators’ interrogatories and ten of its requests for production.
The trial court heard Relators’ motion to compel and motion for continuance
on December 12, 2024. The trial court by written order denied the motion to compel

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on December 18, 2024. On the same day, the trial court granted the motion for
continuance and reset the trial for March 31, 2025. On March 10, 2025, Relators
filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining about the trial court’s rulings on
the motion to compel.
Mandamus
Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that is “available only in limited
circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). With respect
to the first requirement, a trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. In re
Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam). In addition, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what
the law is or in applying it to the facts, a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to
correctly analyze or apply the law. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135; see also In
re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
The rule is clear: before parties bring a discovery-related matter to the trial
court’s attention, they are required to confer in an effort to resolve the disputed
issues. TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.2. “This requirement should not be ignored, nor should
it be observed in a pro forma fashion.” In re Scherer, 684 S.W.3d 875, 882 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, orig. proceeding). When conferring, counsel for the parties
are under a duty to cooperate and to “make any agreements reasonably necessary for
the efficient disposition of the case.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.2. Such agreements
accomplish a full and fair adjudication of the litigant’s rights, serving the overall
purposes of discovery. See Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996).

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We observe that in this proceeding, it does not appear that the parties have
engaged in a good-faith effort to satisfy their duties to effectuate the mandates of the
trial court’s discovery control plan in a timely manner or to confer in good-faith in
an effort to resolve any problems relating to the scheduling and timely completion
of discovery.
Laches
Before reaching the merits of the petition, we address Sunde’s argument that
the petition should be dismissed as a result of the Relators’ delay in seeking
mandamus.
Mandamus is not an equitable remedy. Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858
S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993). However, its issuance is largely controlled by
equitable principles. Id. “One such principle is that ‘[e]quity aids the diligent and
not those who slumber on their rights.’” Id. (quoting Callahan v. Giles, 155 S.W.2d
793, 795 (Tex. 1941); see also In re Rino-K&K Compression, Inc., 656 S.W.3d 153,
161 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, orig. proceeding). As such, a party may waive its
right to mandamus relief where it “unduly or unreasonably delays filing a petition
for mandamus relief . . . unless the delay is justified.” In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 634
S.W.3d 38, 43 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). This waiver can be characterized as
an application of the equitable doctrine of laches. See, e.g., In re Laibe Corp., 307
S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). However, in addition to
demonstrating unreasonable delay, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of laches
must demonstrate its own good faith, as well as a “detrimental change in position
because of the delay.” Id.; see also In re Smith, No. 11-03-00409-CV, 2004 WL
308664, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 19, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
“Laches is a question of fact that should be determined by considering all of
the circumstances in each particular case.” In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 22–23

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(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding); see also In re MAF Indus.,
Inc., No. 13-20-00255-CV, 2020 WL 6158248, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Oct. 19, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Under ordinary circumstances, where there is no evidence that would justify
urgency, a delay of three months or less is not unreasonable. See In re Laibe, 307
S.W.3d at 318 (“A two-month delay in seeking mandamus relief is not necessarily
unreasonable.”); In re Cypress Tex. Lloyds, 437 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2011, orig. proceeding) (A delay of almost three months was not
unreasonable.); In re Jones, No. 12-19-00354-CV, 2019 WL 7373848, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Dec. 31, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that a delay of
almost three months did not support laches, and noting that, according to the relators,
the case below was abated and no trial date was set); see also In re SCI Tex. Funeral
Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (The court of
appeals erred when it denied mandamus based on six-month delay where movant
“explained the delay by establishing that it took three months to get the reporter’s
record.”).
Furthermore, delays of even longer periods of time may be reasonable when
the movant offers an adequate justification. In re MAF, 2020 WL 6158248, at *2
(A delay of almost four months was not unreasonable in light of the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic and the imminent release of important controlling authority.).
In this case, Relators delayed for approximately eighty-two days in seeking
mandamus. This delay of less than three months is well within the range of delays
that are generally considered to be reasonable.
We note that, in situations where a trial on the merits is imminent, Texas
courts will sometimes examine shorter periods of delay with greater scrutiny. See,
e.g., Int’l Awards, Inc. v. Medina, 900 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995,

11
no writ) (after four-month delay, petition was filed six days before trial); Bailey v.
Baker, 696 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (after
a delay of almost four months, petition was filed seventeen days before trial); In re
Auto Club Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-24-00960-CV, 2024 WL 4223702, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Sept. 18, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (applying laches where
“relators filed their mandamus petition almost three-and-a-half months after the trial
judge signed the challenged order and less than six weeks before the scheduled trial
date”). However, in this case, it is unlikely that any mandamus action could have
been resolved prior to the March 31 trial setting, even if Relators had sought
mandamus at an earlier date. As such, we conclude that the delay did not create a
detrimental change with respect to Sunde’s ability to proceed to trial. See In re
Laibe, 307 S.W.3d at 318.3
Relators offer a number of explanations for the amount of time that elapsed
while they prepared their mandamus petition. Our holding on this issue is based
solely on a determination that this mandamus action was filed within a period of
time that is generally considered to be acceptable for the purpose of avoiding a
dismissal based on laches. We do not address the question of whether Relators’
explanations would be reasonable under other circumstances. Therefore, we
conclude that eighty-two days was not an unreasonable period for Relators to seek
mandamus under the circumstances of this case.

3
It is possible Relators’ delays in issuing the discovery requests at issue, combined with their delay
in seeking mandamus, may have created an unnecessary delay in the proceedings. However, we assess the
reasonableness of the delay in filing a writ of mandamus based on the date the order that is the subject of
mandamus was issued, “not the issue that precipitated the request.” In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc.,
556 S.W.3d 347, 360 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding).

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General Relevancy of the Requested Discovery
As summarized in In re Central Oregon Truck Co.:
In K&L Auto, . . . we held that information about the billing
practices of medical providers is relevant and, with properly tailored
requests, discoverable in a personal-injury suit. As we explained there,
medical-billing information may bear on the reasonableness of the
amount charged, and reasonableness is an established limitation on the
recoverability of medical expenses as damages.
644 S.W.3d 668, 669 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re K&L Auto
Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 244–45, 250 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). In
K & L Auto, the court held that in a personal injury action, the lower negotiated rates
that health care providers charge to private insurers and public payors is relevant to
whether the higher “chargemaster” rates for which they billed the claimant were
reasonable. 627 S.W.3d at 250–51. Further, the court in K & L Auto noted that:
Our procedural rules govern the scope of permissible discovery.
Generally, the rules broadly permit discovery of “any matter that is not
privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). This includes information that “will be
inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.
Because the purpose of discovery is to enable courts to decide disputes
based on “what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed,” the
rules must be “liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the
fullest knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial.”
Id. at 247–48 (internal citations omitted).
Relators contend that the trial court should have granted the motion to compel
with respect to the requested discovery because it is relevant to the issue of what the
providers in question “ultimately receive[d] for their services—not just what they
bill[ed]—for the purpose of determining the amounts actually ‘paid or incurred’ and
the reasonable value of the medical services provided.” In light of the supreme court

13
precedent cited above, we conclude that the requested discovery concerning funding
information was both relevant and generally discoverable.
The Written Discovery
Relators’ motion to compel 4 asked the trial court to require Sunde to “remove
all objections” to its interrogatories and requests for production inquiring about
financial arrangements involved in the payment of Sunde’s medical expenses, and
to compel plaintiff to “provide all information and documents responsive” to such
requests.
Rule 193.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to “request a
hearing on an objection” to written discovery. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.4(a). When a
party seeks a ruling on an opponent’s objections to written discovery, its arguments
should focus on each individual request and objection, as opposed to more
generalized arguments that seek to strike an entire set of discovery requests. In re
Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); In re CAR
Fin. Services, Inc., No. 02-20-00157-CV, 2020 WL 4213839, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth July 23, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
In this case, “neither party has presented argument—here or in the trial
court—specific to each request.” See CAR Fin., 2020 WL 4213839, at *6. Instead,
the parties generally address the relevance of Relators’ interrogatories and requests
for production seeking information about the financial arrangements between Sunde
and his medical providers. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., No. 12-07-00387-CV, 2008
WL 541679, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 29, 2008, orig. proceeding) (“As in
American Optical, the parties here presented general arguments regarding the proper

4
We note that with its exhibits, Relators’ motion to compel was in excess of 1,100 pages.

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scope of discovery, but did not specifically focus on each individual discovery
request.”)
Additionally, the trial court did not rule on each of Sunde’s objections, but
instead signed a global order that states: “IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
[Relators’] Joint Motion to Compel Discovery is DENIED.” This order from the
trial court covers approximately six interrogatories and ten requests for production.
Sunde lodged approximately four objections to each of these interrogatories and nine
of the ten requests for production. Thus, the trial court’s order denying Relators’
motion to compel addresses approximately sixty objections with a single sentence.
Under these circumstances, it does not appear that the trial court considered each of
Sunde’s objections individually, as it should. See CAR Fin., 2020 WL 4213839, at
*6. (conditionally granting mandamus relief and ordering the trial court to
reconsider a discovery ruling that did not individually address discovery objections).
As such, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to individually consider
and rule on each of Sunde’s objections. See id. In this regard, it is more appropriate
for the trial court to address each objection first on a request-by-request and
objection-by-objection basis rather than for this court to attempt to address each of
them in this original proceeding. See id.
Requested Depositions
Relators also contend that the trial court should have granted the motion to
compel with respect to the depositions in question because they are relevant to the
issue of what the providers in question “ultimately receive[d] for their services.” In
response, Sunde argues, in part, that the motion to compel was properly denied based
solely on Relators’ failure to timely pursue the depositions at issue.
In Texas, all cases are governed by discovery control plans that are based on
the contents of the plaintiff’s initial pleadings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.1. Thereafter, the

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trial court is empowered to alter the discovery control plan. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.5.
The trial court may alter a discovery control plan at any time and is required to do
so “when the interest of justice requires.” Id. Among other things, each discovery
control plan includes a discovery period, which describes a timeframe within which
the parties must conduct discovery. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.2–.4.
Initially, we note that the “[t]reaters” that Relators sought to depose were not
designated as testifying experts until August 28, 2024, approximately sixty-nine
days before the expiration of the discovery deadline set forth in the trial court’s
docket control order that was in effect at the time. Further, counsel for Sunde was
less than cooperative in accommodating Relators’ requests for depositions. In this
regard, the dilemma that we address here might have been avoided if counsel had
dispensed with such gamesmanship and dilatory tactics, a practice which we do not
condone. The evidence before the trial court indicated that the Relators were
attempting to identify dates on which depositions could be taken as early as
September 2024, and that counsel for Sunde was consistently responding that she
was generally unavailable for depositions. Counsel for Sunde also insisted that party
depositions should be taken before the depositions of Sunde’s retained experts,
creating additional needless logistical complications. It also appears that counsel for
Sunde ignored Relators’ invitation to discuss the issue, making it impossible to
develop a reasonable plan for completing the requested discovery and proceeding to
trial in a timely fashion. By mid-October, it was apparent that there were only five
dates on which all of the parties could appear for depositions, even though more than
twenty deposition requests were pending at the time.
On the other hand, the record also indicates that counsel for Relators waited
until less than thirty days before the discovery cutoff date to signal their intention to

16
take the depositions at issue, further complicating the parties’ obligations to work
together in scheduling the requested discovery in a timely manner.
While the timing of the attempts to take the depositions of the treaters and
funders may be in controversy, the necessity for them appears to be paramount. The
depositions of the treaters and funders will potentially fill any gaps in the funding
information that Relators seek, particularly in light of the lack of responses to date
by Sunde to the written discovery seeking the funding information. Because of their
likely utility, the scheduling of the requested depositions of the treaters and funders
is a matter that calls for reexamination by the trial court.
No Adequate Remedy at Law
Because the discovery at issue may bear some relevance on the issue of the
reasonableness of the claimed medical expenses, and because such relevance may
not be apparent without further discovery, Relators are without an adequate remedy
at law. See K & L Auto, 627 S.W.3d at 256 (recognizing that mandamus can issue
when discovery is needed so that a reviewing court can “evaluate the effect of the
trial court’s error based on the record”) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843–44); see
also TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3 (“[I]t is not a ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible . . . if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).
Conclusion
The trial court should conduct a new hearing and consider and rule on the
objections to written discovery on a request-by-request and objection-by-objection
basis. See Am. Optical, 988 S.W.2d at 714 (conditionally granting mandamus and
instructing the trial court to reconsider motion); CAR Fin., 2020 WL 4213839, at * 6
(same). Additionally, the trial court should reconsider Relators’ requests to depose
the treaters and funders, particularly in its reconsideration of Sunde’s objections to

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the written discovery. As such, the trial court should discourage gamesmanship by
any and reopen discovery in this case to address the above.
This Court’s Ruling
We conditionally grant Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus in
connection with the written discovery at issue as well as Relators’ motion to compel
depositions. We direct the trial court to vacate its December 18, 2024 order that
denies Relators’ motion to compel. We further direct the trial court to reopen
discovery in this case for the reasons that we have expressed. A writ of mandamus
will issue only if the trial court fails to act by September 5, 2025.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

August 21, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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