Cameron Warren v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 14, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00153-CR
__________

CAMERON WARREN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR-2023-06482-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Cameron Warren, was charged by information with the Class A
misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI). See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 49.04(a), (d), 49.09(a) (West Supp. 2024). Appellant filed a speedy trial
demand and later a motion to dismiss alleging that the State violated his right to a
speedy trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. Subsequent to the trial
court’s ruling on Appellant’s motion, and pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement
between the parties, Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charged
offense. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court convicted Appellant
of the charged offense and sentenced him to confinement in the Denton County jail
for 365 days; however, the trial court suspended the imposition of this sentence and
placed Appellant on community supervision for twenty months.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to dismiss.1 We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant was arrested for DWI on September 13, 2022. On October 23,
2023, the State filed an information charging Appellant with this offense. Three
days later, counsel for Appellant filed a letter of representation, and an omnibus
motion that included, among other things, a generic “Demand for Speedy Trial”
without supporting arguments or case authority, and a request for discovery. On
December 29, 2023, and because the State had yet to produce the discovery that he
requested, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the State by its conduct
had violated his right to a speedy trial. On January 3, 2024, the State filed a motion
to amend its information, which the trial court granted the next day, to assert an
enhancement allegation that referenced Appellant’s prior misdemeanor DWI
conviction.
The trial court set a hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss for January 26,
2024. The hearing proceeded as scheduled and, after considering the evidence
presented—which consisted of only two exhibits—and trial counsels’ arguments,
the trial court on the same day denied Appellant’s motion and later signed findings
of fact and conclusions of law. On April 22, 2024, the trial court approved the
parties’ negotiated plea agreement, convicted Appellant of the charged offense,

1
Pursuant to Misc. Docket Order No. 24-9013 issued by the Texas Supreme Court on March 21,
2024, this appeal was transferred to us from the Second Court of Appeals. Therefore, as the transferee
court, we must decide the issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court
of Appeals if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
placed him on community supervision, and certified that Appellant reserved his right
to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a speedy-trial complaint is reviewed under a
bifurcated standard. Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808–09 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing
Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). In this regard, we
review a trial court’s determination of questions of law de novo to determine whether
there is sufficient presumptive prejudice to proceed to a Barker 2 analysis and the
weighing of the Barker factors; we review factual issues under an abuse of discretion
standard. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808–09; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282.
A review of the Barker factors necessarily involves factual determinations and
legal conclusions, but “[t]he balancing test as a whole . . . is a purely legal question”
that we review de novo. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282 (alterations in original) (quoting
Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 n.19). Under an abuse of discretion standard, we view
all the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We defer not
only to a trial court’s resolution of disputed facts; we also defer to the reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts that are necessary to support the trial court’s
findings. Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016);
Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808–09; Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005). In making its determinations, the trial court may believe or disbelieve
any evidence that is presented to it provided there is a reasonable and articulable
basis for doing so. Kelly, 163 S.W.3d at 728.

2
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (holding that a court’s evaluation of a speedy-trial
complaint includes a consideration of the length of delay, the reason(s) for delay, to what extent the
defendant has asserted this right, and any prejudice suffered by the defendant).
3
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss that is based on an
alleged speedy-trial violation “in light of the arguments, information, and evidence
that was available to the trial court at the time it ruled.” Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d
308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (emphasis added). Where, as here, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, we presume that the trial court resolved any factual
disputes or credibility determinations in favor of its ruling, and we defer to the
implied findings of fact that the record supports. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282
(citing Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648). In the end, we must uphold the trial court’s
ruling if it finds support in the record and is correct under any applicable theory of
law. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
III. Analysis
In Appellant’s sole issue, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to
state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that, “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808. The Texas
constitution provides the same protection. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. To trigger a
Barker speedy-trial analysis, the defendant must make a threshold showing that the
“interval between [the] accusation and [the date of] trial has crossed the threshold
[that separates] ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Gonzales, 435
S.W.3d at 808 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)). If
the defendant makes a showing of presumptive prejudice, courts must then consider
and weigh each Barker factor. Id. (citing State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821–22
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); Murphy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d).

4
After a person is arrested or charged, a speedy-trial complaint is triggered by
the passage of time that is deemed to be unreasonable enough under the
circumstances to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S 307, 313 (1971). Post-accusation delay that approaches
one year from the date the person is arrested or charged until trial commences “marks
the point at which courts deem the delay [to be] unreasonable enough to trigger the
Barker [i]nquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1.
When there is a threshold showing of presumptive prejudice, courts must
weigh and balance the Barker factors based on the conduct of the prosecution and
the defendant to determine whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy
trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313. The Barker
factors focus on (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason(s) for the delay,
(3) whether the defendant effectively asserted his speedy-trial right, and (4) the
prejudice caused to the defendant by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Balderas,
517 S.W.3d at 767; Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808. Because these factors are related,
no single factor is sufficient to establish a violation of the defendant’s right to a
speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 533; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281; Dragoo, 96
S.W.3d at 313. Instead, the four Barker factors “must be considered together along
with any other relevant circumstances” to determine whether a defendant has been
deprived of the right to a speedy trial. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281.
In balancing the parties’ respective conduct, the State has the burden to justify
the length of delay, while the defendant has the burden to prove that he effectively
asserted his right and was in turn prejudiced. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (citing
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531); see Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973). The defendant’s burden of proof on factors three and four “varies
inversely” with the State’s degree of culpability for the delay. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d
5
at 280. “Thus, the greater the State’s bad faith or official negligence and the longer
its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant must show actual prejudice or prove
diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 280–81.
The only possible remedy for a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy
trial is the dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice. Strunk v. United
States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Because dismissal of
the pending charge is an extreme remedy, courts should apply and balance the
Barker factors “with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that [a charge is]
dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and asserted
interest in a speedy trial has been infringed.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (emphasis
added). This is so because “[t]he constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not
[the] dismissal of the charges.” Id.
In this case, the trial court found that the first factor weighed against the State
and that the second factor was neutral and weighed only slightly against the State;
its findings on factors three and four weighed in favor of the State. Appellant argues
on appeal that the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was erroneous because
all Barker factors, not just factors one and two, weigh in favor of Appellant and show
that his right to a speedy trial was violated.
1. Presumptive Prejudice and the Length of the Delay
“The length of delay is a double inquiry: A court must consider whether the
delay is sufficiently long to even trigger a further analysis under the Barker factors,
and if it is, then the court must consider to what extent it stretches beyond this
triggering length.” Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924. In most instances, the length of
delay is measured from the date the defendant is arrested or formally charged until
the date that trial commences or the defendant’s formal demand for a speedy trial is
asserted. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313; Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809; Shaw, 117 S.W.3d
at 889; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (the defendant’s plea date was relied on to
6
determine the date that the delay calculation should end); Black v. State, No. 02-21-
00057-CR, 2022 WL 3464563, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 18, 2022, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). In the interest of justice, we
calculate the length of the delay that encompasses the greatest possible period of
time. See State v. Echols, No. 11-19-00209-CR, 2021 WL 2174148, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland May 28, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); State v. Davis, 549 S.W.3d 688, 698 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no
pet.).
Although the Supreme Court has held that, generally, a delay approaching one
year is sufficient to trigger a Barker speedy-trial inquiry, the precise length of the
delay that is needed depends on the facts and complexity of the case. See Doggett,
505 U.S. at 652 n.1; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–01; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. For
example, “the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably
less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
Additionally, “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused
intensifies over time.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. Thus, the longer the delay beyond
the triggering length, the more prejudicial the delay can be to the defendant.
Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649.
Here, Appellant was arrested on September 13, 2022; however, he was not
formally charged by information until October 23, 2023. Appellant filed a
boilerplate speedy trial demand three days later and subsequently a motion to dismiss
on December 29, 2023. The State has conceded (at the hearing and on appeal), and
the trial court found, that the length of the delay in this case—which extended from
the date of Appellant’s arrest (September 13, 2022) to the date that Appellant’s
motion to dismiss was heard (January 26, 2024)—was sufficient to trigger a review
of Appellant’s speedy-trial complaint. Thus, when the complained-of period of time
exceeds the minimum that is required to trigger such a review, as it does here, this
7
factor, generally, weighs against the State. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649; see
also Barringer v. State, 399 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.);
Schuman v. State, No. 11-22-00300-CR, 2024 WL 847692, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Feb. 29, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We agree with the trial court that the first Barker factor weighs against the
State. Nevertheless, while the delay in this case exceeds the minimum one-year
threshold, to determine whether there has been a speedy-trial violation, all Barker
factors must be weighed and balanced together. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281.
2. The Reason(s) for the Delay
The second Barker factor requires that the trial court review the State’s
reason(s) or justification for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Under Barker,
different reasons for the delay are assigned different weights. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d
at 768; Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822. Deliberate attempts to delay proceeding to trial
should weigh heavily against the State, while a valid reason or reasons for a delay
should not. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768; Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822. A more
neutral reason, such as official negligence or overcrowded trial court dockets, is
afforded less weight but, nevertheless, may weigh against the State, because the
ultimate responsibility for proceeding to trial expeditiously rests with the
State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d
at 650–51.
The State has the burden to provide a valid reason or reasons that would
excuse the delay, and “in light of a silent record or one containing reasons [that are]
insufficient to excuse the delay, it must be presumed that no valid reason for [the]
delay existed.” Turner v. State, 545 S.W.2d 133, 137–38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
Although an “unexplained” delay may weigh heavily against the State in some
instances, Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 810, if no evidence is presented that such a delay
on behalf of the State was deliberate, this factor will weigh against the State, but not
8
heavily. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649–51. Conversely, any delay that is caused by
or attributable to the defendant or defendant’s trial counsel generally weighs heavily
against the defendant. See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822; Lopez v. State, 478 S.W.3d
936, 943 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (holding that time
attributable to agreed resets should be excluded from a speedy trial calculation).
We note that Appellant and his trial counsel signed “reset” forms—which
have the effect of rescheduling case events to a later date—on November 27, 2023,
January 26, 2024, and February 26, 2024, actions which Appellant fails to
acknowledge on appeal. Thus, the time attributable to these resets must be excluded
from the speedy trial calculation. Lopez, 478 S.W.3d at 943. As such, the length of
delay of which Appellant complains here is significantly less than the three-year to
eight-year delays that the Court of Criminal Appeals has held weigh “heavily”
against the State. See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (eight-year delay); Dragoo, 96
S.W.3d at 314 (delay of three and one-half years); Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. To
the contrary, the delay in this case is more akin to the eight-month delay that the
Fifth Court of Appeals addressed in State v. Page, No. 05-18-01391-CR, 2020
WL 1899453, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication), authority upon which Appellant relies.
Appellant contends that the State failed to timely comply with its
Article 39.14(a) discovery obligations when it did not produce the discovery
requested by his trial counsel in the omnibus motion until more than three months
later, which disclosure occurred during the hearing on Appellant’s motion to
dismiss. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West Supp. 2024).
According to Appellant, such conduct in failing to timely produce discovery
constitutes extreme negligence or willful conduct on behalf of the State, which, in
the Barker analysis, weighs heavily in favor of Appellant. See Fuller v. State,
624 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d). Thus, Appellant
9
asserts that the State’s unexplained delays, official negligence, and disregard for its
discovery obligations weigh in favor of Appellant.
The State argues that it did not produce the requested discovery sooner
because Appellant’s discovery request was not served on or directed to the
prosecutor that was assigned to litigate the case; the State also notes that the
requested discovery was provided to Appellant and his trial counsel at the hearing
once the lead prosecutor became aware of this request. Despite this misstep, there
is no evidence that the State deliberately or intentionally withheld discovery. Thus,
the length of the State’s delay in producing Appellant’s requested discovery weighs
in favor of Appellant, but not heavily as he suggests. Richardson v. State, 631
S.W.3d 269, 276 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).
At the hearing, the State presented no testimony concerning the reason(s) for
the delay in (1) law enforcement completing its investigation, (2) formally charging
Appellant, or (3) proceeding to trial. Instead, the State offered the affidavit of
Brandie Bryson, the Administrative Manager for the Misdemeanor Intake Division
of the Denton County District Attorney’s Office, that outlined the timeline of events
and how the district attorney’s office processed this case. The trial court found that
“[t]here was no evidence or testimony [presented] for [the State’s] reason for the
delay.” However, the trial court determined that the second Barker factor weighed
only “slightly” against the State. Because the State did not explain or offer any valid
reason for the delay, and relying on Gonzales and Zamorano, Appellant argues that
this factor should weigh more heavily against the State.
In response, the State asserts that a reason for the delay in charging Appellant
was because the State did not receive the original case file from law enforcement
until eleven months after Appellant’s arrest. The State further avers that Appellant
did not present any evidence to show that it acted in bad faith or deliberately
attempted to delay proceeding to trial. We recognize that any delay attributable to
10
the State is generally not excused by blaming the inefficiencies of law enforcement
or testing agencies. Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *5–7 (delays by law enforcement
weigh against the State, but not heavily); see Fuller, 624 S.W.3d at 865; Ex parte
Martin, 33 S.W.3d 843, 846–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d) (op. on
reh’g). However, we agree with the State that there is no evidence that any delay by
it was either deliberate or intended to impair Appellant’s ability to develop a defense.
According to Appellant, the “overall” cause for the delay in prosecuting his
case was the State’s negligence or willful conduct. However, there is no evidence
in the record suggesting that the State deliberately attempted to delay the prosecution
of Appellant’s case. As such, and as the trial court found, we conclude that the
second Barker factor weighs against the State, but only slightly, not heavily as
Appellant contends. See Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314 (explaining that any delay
weighs against the State if not justified but that, to weigh heavily, there must be
evidence of “a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense”);
see also Barringer, 399 S.W.3d at 600.
3. Appellant’s Assertion of His Right to a Speedy Trial
A defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant was deprived of that right.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531–32. It is well-settled that the State bears the burden to
promptly bring the defendant to trial, but the defendant nonetheless has the burden
to prove that he effectively asserted his right to a speedy trial. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d
at 825; Davis, 549 S.W.3d at 704; Barringer, 399 S.W.3d at 599. A demand for a
speedy trial should be an unambiguous assertion that is clear enough to convey to
the trial court or the State that the defendant is asserting this right. Davis, 549
S.W.3d at 704 (citing Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013)); Bailey v. State, 885 S.W.2d 193, 201 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. ref’d).
As the length of the delay increases, a defendant who is diligent and desires to have
11
a speedy trial is, and should be, more likely to take some action to assure that his
trial commences promptly; thus, “inaction weighs more heavily against a violation
the longer the delay becomes.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d
at 314 (quoting George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, 42 Texas Practice Series:
Criminal Practice & Procedure § 23.40 (2d ed. 2001)).
Importantly, “[t]he constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not [to the]
dismissal of the charges.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. Filing a motion to dismiss
and requesting that the trial court dismiss the pending charges based on an alleged
speedy-trial violation, as opposed to filing a motion for speedy trial that instead
requests a prompt trial setting, attenuates the strength of a speedy-trial complaint
because it creates an inference that the defendant prefers no trial at all, rather than a
speedy trial. Id.; Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1983); Stiles v. State, 596 S.W.3d 361, 367–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d).
Appellant contends that: (1) he filed a speedy-trial demand at the first
opportunity; (2) the State’s delays and inaction prevented him from filing a speedy-
trial demand sooner and before this case was docketed; and (3) he moved for a
dismissal after discovery was not timely provided to him in response to his request.
In response, the State asserts that Appellant’s trial counsel served the speedy-trial
demand on an attorney who was not directly assigned to litigate the case and had an
unknown role in this prosecution.
On October 26, 2023, Appellant’s trial counsel filed a letter of representation,
and a six-page document entitled “Omnibus Requests,” which included, among other
things, a discovery request and a boilerplate, general demand for a speedy trial that
states as follows: “COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his attorney of
record, and requests a speedy trial of the charges filed against the above named
defendant. The defendant has a right to a speedy trial.” No arguments or supporting
12
authorities accompanied or were cited in this demand. After signing a “reset” form
on November 27, one month later Appellant’s trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss
alleging, generally, that the State had violated Appellant’s right to a speedy trial.
At the hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel claimed that he could not file any
documents or requests for discovery on behalf of Appellant until the State filed an
information and the case was docketed with the Denton County Clerk’s office. The
State responded that delaying or refusing to advocate in this manner was unnecessary
because Appellant’s trial counsel could have sent his requests to or otherwise
contacted the district attorney’s office to discuss his concerns, which routinely
occurs in such situations. This was not done. In fact, Appellant presented no
evidence that either he or his trial counsel contacted or attempted to follow up with
the State regarding Appellant’s requests for discovery or his demand for a speedy
trial before the hearing commenced. Moreover, neither Appellant nor his trial
counsel demanded a trial setting when they signed “reset” forms on November 27,
2023, and January 26, 2024; rather, they only requested a dismissal of the case.
Filing a motion to dismiss without requesting, in the alternative, an immediate trial
setting dilutes a speedy-trial complaint. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534–35; Balderas, 517
S.W.3d at 771; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283; Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *8–10.
Despite this, Appellant asserts that he aggressively demanded, sought, and
pursued a speedy trial, and thus moving for a dismissal was the appropriate course
of action because the delays that were attributable to the State caused him prejudice.
See Phillips, 650 S.W.2d at 401. However, moving for dismissal, as Appellant did
here, is only appropriate in such circumstances when defense counsel reasonably
and legitimately believes that a lengthy delay has resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. Id. Moreover, Appellant’s assertions and complaints are essentially
identical to and mirror those which the appellant advanced and the Second Court of
Appeals rejected in Black, an analysis that applies here and a decision with which
13
we agree. 2022 WL 3464563, at *5–12; see also Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 277, 282–85
(holding there was no speedy-trial violation where the defendant was arrested for
DWI, formally charged over one year later, and filed a motion to dismiss two months
after he was charged).
The trial court found that Appellant’s speedy trial assertions were pro forma,
short, lacking in “force” and legal argument, attenuated by the filing of a motion to
dismiss instead of a motion for speedy trial, and that Appellant desired a dismissal
and “to have no trial instead of a speedy one.” In so finding and making its
credibility determinations, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that
(1) Appellant could have filed a speedy trial demand at any time after his arrest,
which he did not do, (2) a pre-filing speedy-trial demand could have been made by
Appellant considering that Black is a case that originated from Denton County and
involved a misdemeanor offense, and (3) Appellant’s primary objective was to
obtain a dismissal of the information, not a speedy trial. We conclude that the record
supports the trial court’s findings, and we defer to its determinations, as we must.
See Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *8–10. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court
that the third Barker factor weighs against Appellant.
4. Prejudice to Appellant
The final Barker factor requires that we determine whether, and to what
extent, the defendant suffered prejudice because of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at
532. We assess the weight of any prejudice by considering the interests that the right
to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (2) to minimize the defendant’s anxiety and concern, if any; and (3) to
limit the possibility that the defendant’s defense would be impaired. Id. Of these
factors, “the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id.; Balderas, 517
S.W.3d at 772. However, the impairment of one’s defense is the “most difficult
14
form of speedy trial prejudice to prove.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. Here, Appellant
was not confined during the pendency of the case, and he presented no evidence at
the hearing of oppressive pretrial incarceration or any significant pretrial anxiety or
concerns. Thus, we focus on the final and most serious factor—the extent to which
Appellant’s defense was impaired, if at all. See Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315.
Under this factor, a defendant has the burden to show that he suffered some
prejudice; he need not necessarily make a showing of actual prejudice. Balderas,
517 S.W.3d at 772; Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826. Once the defendant makes a prima
facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the defendant
suffered no prejudice other than what would typically result from an ordinary delay.
Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280–81. “We assess prejudice according to a sliding scale.”
Hopper v. State, 495 S.W.3d 468, 479 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016),
aff’d, 520 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Proof of particularized prejudice is
not essential in every case because “excessive delay presumptively compromises the
reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added); see Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890. On the
other hand, the presumption of prejudice is extenuated by the defendant’s
acquiescence in the delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315.
Appellant claims that he is the caretaker for his “aging grandmother” and that
he experienced “unusual anxiety and concern” about how his potential incarceration
would prevent him from caring for her, and the attendant risks if the disposition of
this case was delayed. This, Appellant asserts, constitutes a specific degree of
anxiety that demonstrates prejudice. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654.
Nevertheless, Appellant presented no evidence at the hearing to support his
claims of anxiety or the potential impairment of his defense. Rather, Appellant relied
exclusively on the statements and arguments made by his trial counsel at the hearing
and the assertions outlined in his motion to dismiss. However, “statements of an
15
attorney on the record may be considered as evidence only if the attorney ‘is
speaking from first-hand knowledge.’” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 811–12 (quoting
State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). In this case, there
is no evidence of any such “first-hand” knowledge. Further, we may not consider
record evidence that was not before the trial court when it ruled. Balderas, 517
S.W.3d at 768; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313 (Rulings on a motion to dismiss for an
alleged speedy-trial violation should be reviewed “in light of the arguments,
information, and evidence that was available to the trial court at the time it ruled.”).
To show the circumstances of his living and familial situation, Appellant was
required to present some form of admissible evidence to support his assertions.
Here, Appellant did not, and the trial court found that no evidence was presented
concerning Appellant’s alleged anxiety and concerns because the only source of this
was derived from the statements and arguments made by his trial counsel during the
hearing. Thus, we may not consider these remarks in our prejudice analysis because
proper evidence of it was not before the trial court. See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at
768. Nevertheless, even if we did, prejudice cannot be shown because any anxiety,
inconvenience, or embarrassment that was allegedly caused by Appellant’s pending
charge would not be beyond that which would normally be experienced by any
defendant who is on bond for a second misdemeanor DWI charge. See Page, 2020
WL 1899453, at *10.
Relying on Clarke v. State, 928 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1996, pet. ref’d), Appellant argues that he made a prima facie showing of “some”
prejudice because, rather than responding to his speedy trial request and timely
producing discovery, the State instead chose to amend its information to include an
enhancement allegation of a prior DWI conviction that, Appellant asserts, increased
the “seriousness” of the pending charge to a DWI 2nd offense. Because of this,
Appellant claims that he was prevented from (1) contesting the “enhanced” charge
16
at trial, (2) pleading to a lesser offense (which is an indicator that Appellant did not
intend to go to trial), and (3) asserting a defense to the suspension of his driver’s
license. But contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the record shows that he was aware
that the offense for which he was charged in this case was a DWI 2nd offense
because the petition for an occupational license that he filed on January 17, 2023,
clearly states that this charge is a “DWI 2nd” offense. Nevertheless, Appellant
cannot show that he was prejudiced by the State alleging this enhancement because
(1) his prior DWI conviction became final prior to him being charged with the DWI
offense in this case, and (2) the DWI offense for which he was charged in this case
could have been enhanced, if necessary, at any point after his arrest.
Moreover, Appellant’s claim of prejudice on this point fails because the DWI
offense as originally charged, like the enhanced offense, is a Class A misdemeanor—
the original information alleged that an analysis of Appellant’s alcohol concentration
revealed a level of 0.15 or more. PENAL § 49.04(d). Therefore, the enhancement
and its alleged “serious consequences” are immaterial and could not have affected
Appellant’s punishment or the preparation of his defense.
Finally, Appellant argues that the State’s “excessive delay” in producing
discovery impeded his ability to prepare a defense to the pending DWI charge
because “how could he know whether crucial evidence had been lost or [a key
witness was] unavailable?” However, the requested discovery was provided to
Appellant and his trial counsel during the hearing and neither Appellant nor his trial
counsel requested that the trial court reconsider its denial of the motion to dismiss,
presumably after they reviewed the produced discovery.
Here, and despite Appellant’s repeated assertions, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that Appellant was prejudiced in any substantive manner, if at all,
by the delay. Thus, because Appellant failed to meet his burden to show that he was

17
prejudiced, we conclude, consistent with the trial court’s findings, that the fourth
Barker factor weighs against Appellant.
5. Balancing the Factors
As it has been said, we must weigh and balance the Barker factors together
“with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when
the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial
has been infringed.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 773 (quoting Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at
281). We must also give due deference to the trial court’s factual findings and any
reasonable inferences that find support in the record. Id. at 767–68. Based on the
record before us, when we consider, weigh, and balance all the Barker factors
together, and the evidence presented to the trial court, we cannot say that Appellant’s
right to a speedy trial was violated. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534–36; Cantu, 253
S.W.3d at 282; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648; Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *5–12.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion to dismiss. See Schuman, 2024 WL 847692, at *9–12 (an
eighteen-month delay between the defendant’s arrest and the commencement of trial
did not result in a speedy-trial violation); Lowe v. State, No. 11-15-00094-CR, 2017
WL 2588210, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (a thirty-five-month delay did not result in a speedy-trial
violation); Torres v. State, No. 11-13-00172-CR, 2015 WL 4438051, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(a seven-year delay between indictment and the commencement of trial did not result
in a speedy-trial violation); see also Barringer, 399 S.W.3d at 600–02 (an eight-year
delay did not constitute a speedy-trial violation).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

18
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

August 14, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

19