Roger Scott Wilson v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 24, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00011-CR
__________

ROGER SCOTT WILSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 23171-B

OPINION
A jury found Appellant, Roger Scott Wilson, guilty of aggravated kidnapping,
a first-degree felony, and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a $10,000
fine. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(a)–(c) (West 2019). The trial court
sentenced Appellant accordingly. In three issues, Appellant challenges the trial
court’s judgment, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction; (2) the finding of the use of a deadly weapon is unsupported and
improper; and (3) the trial court assessed excessive fees for Appellant’s arrest and
the issuance of subpoenas to witnesses in conjunction with Appellant’s case. We
modify and affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
A grand jury indicted Appellant for intentionally or knowingly abducting
Priscilla Limon by restricting her movements without her consent, such as to
interfere with her liberty, by confining her, with the intent to prevent her liberation,
by secreting or holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found, with the
intent to inflict bodily injury or terrorize her. See id. § 20.04(a)(4), (5). The
indictment further alleged that Appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during
the commission of the offense, “namely, tape, drawstring bag, and hands.” See id.
§ 20.04(b). At trial, there was testimony from multiple witnesses.
A. Witness Testimonies
Lindsey Hoxsey testified that she is the communications manager for Abilene
Police Department (APD) dispatch and custodian of the 9-1-1 records. Hoxsey
explained that there were calls for service at a home on South 14th Street in Abilene
on April 22 and 24, 2021, which were recorded and admitted as exhibits. On
April 22, a female caller told APD dispatch that three unknown people entered her
home. On April 24, the same caller stated that the “same guys that . . . came over
here the first time” broke down her door and some windows.
APD Officer Matthew Stiles testified that on April 22, 2021, he was
dispatched to a house on South 14th Street. Officer Stiles spoke with the caller who
said there were approximately three people wearing masks. Officer Stiles checked
the area but, other than the calling party, he did not locate anyone. Officer Stiles
also responded to the call on April 24, 2021. However, this time Officer Stiles
observed a broken window and a door that was kicked in. Again, other than the
2
calling party, Officer Stiles did not find anyone in the area. APD Detective Jeremiah
Shaeffer, who was a patrol officer at the time, responded to the second call on South
14th as well. Detective Shaeffer opined that the door was “broken in half . . . by
extreme violence.”
Oscar Villarreal resided at the house on South 14th. Villarreal explained that
leading up to the break-ins, he gave Limon a place to stay for a few days. However,
Villarreal said that he “r[a]n her off” because “[s]he would just be staring down on
[him] when [he] was asleep” and he would awaken to see her right in front of his
face. After Villarreal asked her to leave, Limon insisted that he owed her money.
Although Villarreal was not sure of the date, he recalled three people coming into
his home through his back door wearing masks and carrying “bats and stuff.”
Tracy Prater testified that she was friends with Appellant and Limon.
According to Prater, she picked Limon up at a 7-Eleven in Abilene and took her to
a house on Shelton Street on April 25, 2021, because a man named George Frosch
had taken Limon’s belongings and Appellant said he would help get them back. By
phone, Appellant provided Prater directions, which she followed, until seeing
Appellant standing outside waiting, at which point she dropped Limon off. Prater
later “heard a couple different stories” from Appellant about Limon’s disappearance,
including one where “they” burned her body, though Appellant never admitted to
participating.
Johnathan Garcia testified that he rented the house at 902 Shelton from his
grandfather and that several people would come and go to use drugs or stay. Garcia
recalled some of the individuals that stayed there in April 2021, included Blake
Britner, Ashley Alaniz, and Bruce Gordon. Garcia also noted that Appellant had
been over to the house a handful of times. Garcia first met Limon in late April 2021,
when she went to 902 Shelton and fought with Alaniz. Although Garcia could not
recall whether Appellant was present for the fight, he did recall Appellant being
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present later in the evening. At that time, Limon was restrained to a chair with tape.
Garcia later witnessed Appellant and Britner put Limon into a toolbox belonging to
Frosch. Limon’s feet and hands were bound, and she was resisting. Garcia saw
Britner and Appellant load the toolbox into Alaniz’s Chevrolet Tahoe and Britner
drove away. Garcia never saw Limon again. Garcia testified that Britner directed
him to dismantle the chair in which Limon had been restrained.
Sallie Bagwell, also known as Sallie Driffill, also resided at 902 Shelton in
April 2021. Bagwell recalled being awakened by a fight between Alaniz and Limon
but did not see Appellant present. Shortly thereafter, Bagwell overheard Britner and
Limon arguing over whether Limon had disclosed to law enforcement that they were
involved in the home invasion two nights prior. Bagwell then saw Britner and
Appellant “going through” Limon’s phone. Bagwell overheard Britner say that
“they were just going to scare [Limon].” Bagwell denied that Limon was bound to
the chair.
Frosch testified that he had pleaded guilty to the aggravated kidnapping of
Limon. Frosch described Appellant as a friend. Frosch knew Limon because they
dated and used methamphetamine together. Frosch explained that he picked Limon
up from Allsups in the early morning hours of April 25, 2021, and the two spent the
night together. When Frosch awoke, he discovered that Limon had stolen $40
and three grams of methamphetamine from him. Frosch later saw Limon behind
a 7-Eleven but when he attempted to confront her, she dropped her backpack and
bicycle and ran. Frosch put Limon’s belongings into the back of his pickup.
Frosch further testified that Limon told him that Appellant and a couple other
people kicked Villarreal’s door in. Frosch notified Appellant that Limon told him
about the home invasion. According to Frosch, Prater made Limon get into the car
to take her to 902 Shelton—Prater also told Frosch that the people there wanted to
speak with him. Appellant received a call from Frosch that Limon was on her way
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to 902 Shelton to recover her backpack and bicycle. Frosch explained that Limon
was already outside 902 Shelton when he arrived, and Appellant told him that Britner
and Jason Cardenas wanted to speak with him. Frosch eventually went inside, where
he saw Limon taped to a chair. Cardenas asked Frosch if Limon told Frosch that
they committed a home invasion, to which he answered affirmatively. Before
leaving, Appellant asked Frosh if his toolbox was for sale, to which Frosch
responded, “Everything is for sale.” Frosch traded his toolbox for drugs and left
with Appellant and Sikes.
Frosch dropped Sikes off and then he and Appellant went to Frosch’s house
to use the drugs he just traded for. Appellant eventually requested that Frosch take
him back to 902 Shelton and he complied. Frosch did not see Alaniz’s Tahoe when
they arrived. Four or five days later, Frosch began hearing rumors about what
happened to Limon, prompting Frosch to go on a “fishing expedition” to get
information from Appellant. That is when Appellant told Frosch that Limon’s body
was disposed of in Frosch’s toolbox. Frosch stated that when he and Appellant were
in jail, Appellant explained that he and Alaniz tied Limon’s hands behind her back
and put her in the toolbox.
Alaniz testified that she has known Appellant since she was fifteen years old
and considered him her brother. In April 2021, Alaniz was romantically involved
with Britner and would stay with him at 902 Shelton, which she described as a “trap
house.” Alaniz recalled that Limon told Appellant that Villarreal sexually assaulted
her and stole from her. Appellant agreed to help Limon get her stuff back, along
with Britner, Bruce Gordon, and Cardenas. Alaniz drove them to Villarreal’s house
and knocked on the door but nobody answered, so Appellant “kicked in the door.”
Villarreal fired shots and the group ran.
Alaniz next saw Limon the following day behind 7-Eleven, where Alaniz,
Nicole Sikes, Britner, Cardenas, and Appellant confronted Limon about turning
5
them in for the events at Villarreal’s home. Alaniz described Appellant as being
“pretty upset” about Limon potentially reporting them. Later that same day, Limon
arrived at 902 Shelton. Alaniz stated that she, Limon, Appellant, Britner, Frosch,
Garcia, Sikes, Anthony Aguilar, and Bagwell were present. Alaniz explained that
she fought Limon because Appellant wanted her to stop Limon from “running her
mouth.”
According to Alaniz, once the fight ended, Bagwell taped Limon to the chair.
Alaniz overheard Frosch and Britner “having a conversation about how to get rid of
[Limon].” Frosh and Appellant left 902 Shelton while Alaniz went to a hotel room
to take a shower. A few hours later, Alaniz returned to 902 Shelton to discover a
note on the den door that no one was to enter that room. Britner disclosed to Alaniz
that Limon lied about her accusations against Villarreal. Frosh then dropped
Appellant back off at 902 Shelton. Although Alaniz denied seeing Limon in the
house after she returned, she explained that she knew Limon was still there because
Britner told her so. While Alaniz was in the bedroom, she heard Limon “screaming
for [Britner], telling [Britner] no.” Alaniz confirmed that Appellant was in the room
with Limon, Britner, Gordon, Aguilar, Garcia, and Cardenas.
Alaniz left her bedroom and saw “[Limon] in the chair with her head down,”
with a clear bag over her head, and her hands still taped to the chair. Limon was not
moving, and Alaniz could not tell if she was breathing. Britner asked Alaniz to clean
out her Tahoe but she refused so Sikes did. Britner and Gordon left in Alaniz’s
Tahoe while she, Appellant, and Nikki stayed back. Frosch’s toolbox and Limon
were also gone.
Britner testified that he was currently incarcerated after pleading guilty to the
aggravated kidnapping of Limon. Britner described Appellant as a friend and
acknowledged that the two used drugs together. Britner denied that Appellant was
present on the day Limon was at 902 Shelton and insisted that Appellant “had
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nothing to do with” what happened to her. Britner acknowledged speaking to law
enforcement about the events but testified that he was “high that day” and that if he
said Appellant was involved, “it was a lie.” Britner conceded that his gang, the
Aryan Brotherhood, had a policy against testifying in court. Britner recognized that
a transcript of his interview showed that he told law enforcement that Appellant
carried Limon in the toolbox to Alaniz’s Tahoe but Britner insisted that he did not
recall making the statements. Britner subsequently admitted that Appellant was
present that day but that “[h]e ended up leaving before all this went down.”
Dean Zupancic testified that he was a heavy equipment operator for the City
of Abilene in May 2021. On May 5, 2021, Zupancic went to repair a main line at a
pump station when he discovered human remains in a creek. Zupancic explained
that they had received significant rainfall in the days leading up to the discovery,
causing debris to build up where the body was.
Lacy Loudermilk is a captain with Texas Parks & Wildlife. On May 5, 2021,
Captain Loudermilk and several other game wardens were called to the pump station
to assist in recovering the body. Captain Loudermilk explained that the corpse, a
woman, was tangled up in debris, which required them to use tools to free her.
Captain Loudermilk estimated that the body had been there for “a few days” based
on her experience recovering drowning victims.
Dr. Tasha Zemrus is the deputy chief medical examiner for the Tarrant County
Medical Examiner’s Office, which assisted Taylor County with autopsies in 2021.
The Medical Examiner’s Office identified the body as Limon through her
fingerprints. 1 According to the autopsy report, Limon’s body arrived mostly
unclothed with “two t-shirts that were up over her head.” Additionally, “there was
a cloth bag that had a drawstring on it that was over her head that was secured with

1
Appellant was neither charged with nor tried for Limon’s death.
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clear tape around the bag,” “a camouflage gaiter that was also around [her] head that
was secured by tape,” more tape around the lower part of her face, and an orange rag
partially in her mouth. Limon’s hands were bound behind her back with black tape.
The medical examiner determined that Limon died from asphyxiation, which could
have been from the items on her head; however, it was also possible that Limon
drowned.
Dylan Mueller testified that he had been in jail with Aguilar when Aguilar
confessed to suffocating Limon with Britner. However, Mueller acknowledged that
Aguilar’s statement to him only related to Limon’s death and nothing else.
APD Detective Jeff Cowan testified that Britner did not appear “high” or
intoxicated during his interview. Reading from the interview transcript, Detective
Cowan stated that Britner told him that Appellant put a handkerchief or gaiter in
Limon’s mouth, “bark[ed] out orders,” and taped her to the chair. On cross-
examination, Detective Cowan confirmed that no fingerprints or DNA linked
Appellant to the crime. Detective Cowan opined that the drawstring bag, gaiter, and
tape on Limon’s head were used as a deadly weapon.
B. Appellant’s Three Interviews
During the course of the investigation, Appellant participated in three
interviews, which were recorded and admitted as exhibits and played for the jury.
During the first interview, which was taken on May 14, 2021, Appellant told
Detective Cowan that he last interacted with Limon approximately one week prior,
when she stayed with Appellant and his girlfriend. Appellant explained that Limon
“started acting really strange” and argued with his girlfriend over Limon stealing
their belongings. According to Appellant, he asked Limon to leave because of the
theft, and he did not see her again. Detective Cowan told Appellant that he had
information that Appellant was present during Limon’s last days, causing Appellant
to become agitated.
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In Appellant’s second interview, taken on June 16, 2021, he disclosed that
“[he] knew everything that happened from start to finish” with Limon. Appellant
told detectives that Limon told him that Villarreal assaulted and stole from her, so
Appellant offered to help her. Appellant “tried” to help Limon get her stuff back
from Villarreal but Villarreal shot at him. At one point, Appellant admitted to being
at 902 Shelton “that evening,” but later said that “[he] didn’t go to Shelton that
night.” Appellant told detectives that Gordon, Britner, and Alaniz killed Limon, but
later wavered and said he did not “know for a fact” who killed Limon. Appellant
became agitated, yelled at detectives, and terminated the interview.
When the detectives prepared to arrest Appellant and transport him to the jail,
Appellant explained that he wanted to continue the interview. Appellant stated that
he did not know Limon was at 902 Shelton, when Frosch’s toolbox was unloaded,
until they went inside. Appellant acknowledged that he was at 902 Shelton when
Alaniz and Limon fought but he did not see it. However, Appellant subsequently
acknowledged that he told Alaniz to “shut [Limon’s] f-----g mouth,” but he denied
that he told Alaniz to “whoop” Limon. He then said that he told the women present
at 902 Shelton to “check” Limon. According to Appellant, he looked around the
corner after the fight to see Alaniz helping Limon up. Appellant told detectives that
he helped move Frosch’s toolbox onto the porch but that was it. Appellant reported
that Britner later told him they saw something in Limon’s phone about the alleged
home invasion, but Britner would not explain what.
In Appellant’s third interview, he denied that there was a home invasion at
Villarreal’s. However, Appellant stated that he only went the first night and that the
second night others had gone. Appellant explained that he went to 902 Shelton
because Frosch told him that the people there wanted to speak with Frosch about
what Limon told him. Appellant went to 902 Shelton to help Frosch—shortly
thereafter, Prater dropped Limon off at the house at Limon’s request. Appellant told
9
detectives that when he walked inside, Britner and Alaniz were questioning Limon
when Alaniz suddenly “jump[ed] on” Limon. Appellant stated that he pulled Alaniz
off of Limon. Appellant later thought he saw Limon taped to the chair but was not
sure. Frosch, Appellant, and Sikes were leaving when Britner asked Frosch if he
wanted to sell his toolbox. This time, Appellant denied moving the toolbox.
Appellant also denied that he said anything to Alaniz about “women taking care of
women” before the fight, but instead said it after the fight had begun to stop the men
from jumping in. Appellant also explained that he only went to Villarreal’s the first
night and did so alone—others went the second night. Appellant said that when he
went back to 902 Shelton after leaving with Frosch, he only retrieved his bicycle and
left; he did not go inside. Appellant said he first learned of Limon’s death when
Britner, Gordon, and Alaniz showed up at his apartment at 3:00 a.m. and informed
him of it.
C. Appellant’s Testimony
At trial, Appellant’s testimony was substantially the same as his third
interview, except that he testified that Britner had asked Appellant to bring Frosch
over. Appellant also acknowledged that he gave Prater directions on how to get to
902 Shelton. In contrast to his previous statements, Appellant said that Frosch left
before Limon arrived but returned a few minutes after she did. Appellant also
testified that he helped Alaniz and Limon up after their fight. Appellant
acknowledged writing two letters to Alaniz while they were awaiting trial. In both
letters, Appellant wrote to Alaniz that she could not have participated in the later
events because the two of them were together all night.
The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Appellant’s Conviction
In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Specifically, Appellant contends

10
that the evidence merely supports his presence at the scene of the crime, not his
active involvement or encouragement.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must “consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has
proven the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Baltimore v.
State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Edward v. State, 635
S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must
“presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution” and
defer to the factfinder’s factual determinations. Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756,
762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012)). “[A] reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007).
Under this standard, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including
evidence that may have been improperly admitted, and we treat direct and
11
circumstantial evidence equally. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Starks v. State, 684 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no
pet.). In this regard, it is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the
defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient
to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland, no pet.). Each fact
need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we may not use
a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). But “juries trump both trial and appellate judges on weight-of-evidence
determinations.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence
produced at trial against “the [essential] elements of the offense as defined by the
hypothetically correct jury charge.” Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2024); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
“The hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Turley, 691 S.W.3d at 617
(citing Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). “The

12
law authorized by the indictment consists of the statutory elements of the offense as
modified by the indictment allegations.” Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341.
As relevant here, a person commits aggravated kidnapping “if he intentionally
or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to . . . inflict bodily injury on”
or “terrorize” the person, or if he “intentionally or knowingly abducts another person
and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.” PENAL
§ 20.04(a)(4), (5), (b). To “[a]bduct” a person “means to restrain a person with intent
to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not
likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force.” Id. § 20.01(2).
“‘Restrain’ means to restrict a person’s movements without consent, so as to
interfere substantially with the person’s liberty, by moving the person from one place
to another or by confining the person.” Id. § 20.01(1). Restraint is “without consent”
if “accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception.” Id. § 20.01(1)(A); see
Holmes v. State, 873 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no pet.)
(explaining that “[c]onfining is not defined in the Penal Code or by case law; thus,
we use its common meaning when reviewing the evidence,” which may include
imprisoning, enclosing, detaining, relegating to certain limits, or trapping the
victim).
A “[d]eadly weapon” is “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use
is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). “‘Serious
bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that
causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46).
To convict a defendant under the law of parties, the jury had to determine that
the defendant was criminally responsible for the acts of another. PENAL § 7.01(a)
(West 2021). “A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the
offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is
13
criminally responsible, or by both.” Id. Section 7.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code
provides that a “person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the
conduct of another if . . . acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of
the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person
to commit the offense.” Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Generally, the trial court may instruct the
jury on the law of parties if “there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that
the defendant is criminally responsible under the law of parties.” Ladd v. State, 3
S.W.3d 547, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trial court may consider the events
that took place before, during, and after the commission of the crime. See Paredes v.
State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537,
545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Additionally, allegations that a party is guilty under
the law of parties need not be specifically pled in the indictment. Barrera v. State,
321 S.W.3d 137, 144 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref’d).
B. Analysis
Appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict him of
aggravated kidnapping either individually or through the law of parties. As a
primary actor, Appellant contends that the only evidence of criminal activity was
various witnesses testifying that Appellant placed Limon in the toolbox. Appellant
posits that Limon was already deceased at that time and kidnapping requires a live
person. As for being a party to aggravated kidnapping, Appellant argues that the
evidence only showed his mere presence at the crime scene, not active promotion,
encouragement, or assistance in the aggravated kidnapping. It is important to note
that Appellant does not contest whether Limon was kidnapped or whether the
kidnapping was aggravated—Appellant only contests his involvement in it.
Appellant fails to consider important evidence and testimony that supports his
conviction for aggravated kidnapping either as a primary actor or as a party. See
PENAL § 20.04(a)(4), (5), (b); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. For example, Prater testified
14
that she took Limon to 902 Shelton at Appellant’s direction. Frosch provided similar
testimony and, although Appellant’s own explanation varied throughout the
investigation, he corroborated Prater’s testimony at trial. Alaniz testified that she
fought Limon at Appellant’s behest. And Appellant at times provided corroborating
statements regarding such behest, although he denied that his intent was for Alaniz
to fight Limon. Additionally, as Appellant acknowledges, several witnesses testified
to seeing him and another person place Limon into the toolbox or the toolbox into
Alaniz’s Tahoe. Although Appellant insists Limon was deceased when she was
placed into the toolbox—and by extension, the toolbox into the Tahoe—there was
no evidence directly stating such. Although Alaniz testified that Limon was tied to
the chair and not moving before being placed into the toolbox, Alaniz never testified
that Limon was dead. Moreover, Garcia testified that Limon was conscious and
resisting as she was being placed into the toolbox. Several witnesses testified that
Limon was bound to the chair and that her hands and feet were bound when she was
placed in the toolbox. See PENAL § 20.01(1), (2) (defining “restrain” and “abduct”).
It was up to the jury to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, such as whether
Limon was alive when she was placed into the toolbox and by whom. See Jackson,
443 U.S. at 326; see also Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762. Similarly, the jury was able
to judge Appellant’s intent to kidnap Limon from his actions, such as directing Prater
to bring Limon to 902 Shelton. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (“[O]ne’s acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of one’s
intent.” (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, no pet.))). In determining his guilt, the jury also could have considered
Appellant’s potential motive: stopping Limon from talking about the alleged home
invasion or punishment for her already having done so. See Nisbett v. State, 552
S.W.3d 244, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“While motive is not by itself enough to
establish guilt of a crime, it is a significant circumstance indicating guilt.”); Garcia,
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667 S.W.3d at 761 (permitting jurors to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence). Finally, to support the aggravating factors for kidnapping, the jury could
have considered Bagwell’s testimony that the group’s actions were intended to scare
Limon, the fact that Limon was moved from the location and her sequential demise
following those intended acts. See PENAL § 20.04(a)(4), (5), (b); Garcia, 667
S.W.3d at 761. Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence from
which a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant committed aggravated kidnapping against Limon as either a primary actor
or a party. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
Deadly Weapon Finding
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the inclusion of a deadly weapon
finding in the judgment, arguing that the jury did not make an affirmative finding as
to such and that it cannot be inferred from the verdict. The State agrees with
Appellant.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
As we have said, a “deadly weapon” is “anything that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”
PENAL 1.07(a)(17). A deadly weapon finding is reviewed by viewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether any
rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the object used
or exhibited constituted a deadly weapon. Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490, 493
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “In order to sustain a deadly-weapon finding, the evidence
must demonstrate that: 1) the object meets the definition of a deadly weapon; 2) the
deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the transaction on which the felony
conviction was based; and 3) other people were put in actual danger.” Id. at 494.
Generally, a deadly weapon finding must be expressly and affirmatively made by
the trier of fact. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
16
There are three ways a court can determine if the trier of fact made an
affirmative deadly weapon finding: (1) the indictment alleged the use of a deadly
weapon and the defendant was found guilty “as charged in the indictment”; (2) the
indictment alleged use of a per se deadly weapon (e.g., a firearm); or (3) the jury
made an express finding of fact pursuant to a special issue during the punishment
phase of trial.2 Id. (citing Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985)). However, it is insufficient that the jury’s verdict implies the use of a deadly
weapon. Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Instead, the
use of a deadly weapon must be a necessary component of the offense as charged.
Roots v. State, 419 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing
Polk, 693 S.W.2d at 394). In some scenarios, the trial court may make necessary
inferences to conclude that the jury affirmatively found the use of a deadly weapon,
such as where the crime alleged could only have been committed with a deadly
weapon. Id. at 746–47 (noting a distinction between an “express” finding and an
“affirmative” one).
B. Analysis
Appellant correctly points out that while the grand jury’s indictment alleges
the use of a deadly weapon, that is not the sole factor that could support aggravated
kidnapping. See PENAL § 20.04(a), (b); Duran, 492 S.W.3d 746. Here, the jury was
not asked to make an express finding that Appellant used a deadly weapon, and the
jury returned a general verdict. See Duran, 492 S.W.3d 746. Appellant’s guilt was
not conditioned on the use of a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense
as there were other aggravating factors alleged in the indictment. See PENAL
§ 20.04(a)(4), (5); Lafleur, 106 S.W.3d at 95; Roots, 419 S.W.3d at 724. Appellant’s

2
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals set out an additional circumstance where the jury makes an
express finding that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited in lesser-included offenses. Duran, 492 S.W.3d
at 747. That scenario is inapplicable to this appeal.
17
second issue is sustained, and we modify the judgment accordingly. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 43.2(b); Malbrough v. State, 612 S.W.3d 537, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (recognizing an appellate court’s authority to delete a deadly
weapon finding).
Fees
In his third issue, Appellant challenges the fees assessed against him by the
trial court. In particular, Appellant argues that the $55 warrant-arrest fee should be
$50 and that the $375 witness-summoning fee should be $220.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets out specific fees that a defendant
shall be ordered to pay to reimburse the services of peace officers related to their
trial. See CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011. For example, a defendant may be ordered to
pay $50 to reimburse the execution of an arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro fine.
Id. art. 102.011(a)(2). Moreover, a defendant shall be ordered to reimburse $5 for
the summoning of a witness. Id. art. 102.011(a)(3). “Article 102.011 does not
condition the imposition of the witness . . . fee upon which party summoned the
witness.” London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). However,
“[a]n officer may not impose a cost for a service not performed.” CRIM. PROC.
art. 103.002.
“A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting court costs is
reviewable on direct appeal in a criminal case.” Ballinger v. State, 405 S.W.3d 346,
349 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.) (citing Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759,
767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). “We measure sufficiency by reviewing the record in
the light most favorable to the award.” Ballinger, 405 S.W.3d at 349 (citing
Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).
If we are called to construe a statute, we focus our attention on the literal text
and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its
18
enactment. Whitfield v. State, 430 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). “This strict reading
of the statutory language is necessary because ‘the text of the statute is the law in the
sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through
compromise, and submitted to the Governor.’” Id. (quoting Boykin, 818 S.W.3d at
785).
B. Analysis
Appellant argues that he was assessed $55 for his initial arrest, as
demonstrated by the bill of costs, in violation of article 102.011(a)(2). The State
counters by stating: “The fee in this case reflects $50 for the execution of the arrest
warrant and $5 for commitment on re-arrest.” However, the bill of costs identifies
the $55 as being for the initial arrest warrant fee. Moreover, we find no
evidence in the record supporting a charge for Appellant’s rearrest. Accordingly,
we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support a $55 assessment. See
CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(a)(2); Cardenas, 403 S.W.3d at 382. We modify the bill
of costs and judgment to reflect “$50” for the initial arrest warrant fee. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 43.2(b); Ballinger, 405 S.W.3d at 349.
Appellant next argues that the $375 assessed for summoning witnesses should
only be $220 because only forty-four subpoenas were actually served. See CRIM.
PROC. art 102.011(a)(3) (permitting $5 for “summoning a witness”). The State
responds by noting that seventy-five subpoenas were issued for witnesses, but only
forty-four were served. We must interpret the statute at issue, and we do so as guided
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Kahookele wherein the court
instructed:

19
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de
novo.

When we interpret statutes, we focus on the literal text and
attempt to discern its fair, objective meaning. We give effect to the
plain meaning of the statutory text, reading it in context and construing
it according to the rules of grammar and common usage. We assume
that every word has been used for a purpose, and we give effect to each
word, phrase, clause, and sentence if reasonably possible. Generally, a
statute’s expression of one thing implies the exclusion of other,
unexpressed things.

We look not only at the statute but also other provisions within
the whole statutory scheme.
640 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted).
We consider whether the statutory scheme permits reimbursements for
unserved witness subpoenas. We first focus on the literal text of
Article 102.011(a)(3), which provided:
(a) A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the
following reimbursement fees for services performed in the case by
a peace officer:3
....

(3) $5 for summoning a witness. 4
CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(a)(3) (emphasis added).

3
As alleged in the indictment, Appellant committed the offense on or about May 5, 2021. We note
that the legislature amended Article 102.011(a) to, among other things, reword Subsection (a) to the
following: “A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the following reimbursement
fees to defray the cost of the services provided in the case by a peace officer.” Id. We refer to the law in
effect on the date the offense was committed. See Act of May 26, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 919, §§ 4, 22–
23, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 2352, 2352–53, 2355–56 (An offense committed before September 1, 2021, the
effective date of the act, “is governed by the law in effect on the date the offense was committed.”).

The word “summoning” is also used in Article 102.011(a)(7): “$5 for summoning a jury, if a jury
4

is summoned.” With regard to Article 102.011(a)(7), we find no reported cases on point defining
“summoning” as used in that portion of the statute.
20
Because the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not define “summon” or
“summoning a witness,” for purposes of Article 102.011(a)(3), we give effect to the
plain meaning of the term and the phrase, and we take and understand their “usual
acceptation in common language.” See id. art. 3.01; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011
(West 2013). As relevant here, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “summon” as “[t]o
command (a person) by service of a summons to appear in court.” Summon,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Merriam-Webster defines “summon”
as “to command by service of a summons to appear in court.” Summon, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/summon (last
visited April 22, 2025). Implicit in either definition is that the individual being
summoned actually received the summon or command. Stated in the inverse, a
person who has not received the summon or command cannot be said to have been
adequately summoned. Accordingly, we interpret the term “summoning,” as used
in the statute, as the act of commanding by the service of a summons. This
conclusion is consistent with the text of Article 102.011. See Whitfield, 430 S.W.3d
at 408 (statutory construction focuses on a review of the statutory text).
Article 102.011(a)(3) does not provide for reimbursement for “the issuance of a
subpoena,” which would be completed by a clerk, but instead the “summoning of a
witness” by a peace officer, indicating actual delivery. See CRIM PROC.
art. 102.011(a)(3); Whitfield, 430 S.W.3d at 408. Additionally, “[a]n officer may
not impose a cost for a service not performed.” See CRIM PROC. art. 103.002. As
applicable here, we conclude that in order for a defendant to be compelled to
reimburse the cost of services by a peace officer, the peace officer must serve the
subpoena. See id. By a strict reading of the statute’s plain language, we conclude
that the mere creation of a subpoena does not trigger a defendant’s duty to reimburse.
See id. art. 102.011(a)(3); Whitfield, 430 S.W.3d at 408.

21
Appellant argues that of all the subpoenas issued, only forty-four witnesses
were duly summoned. While the State does not contest Appellant’s calculation, it
also does not expressly agree but notes that our sister courts have held, in
unpublished cases, that a defendant cannot be charged for unserved subpoenas. See
Wilson v. State, No. 05-22-00452-CR, 2023 WL 4758470, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 26, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Robles v. State,
No. 01-16-00199-CR, 2018 WL 1056482, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Feb. 27, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because these
cases are unpublished memorandum opinions, they have no precedential value. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(a). However, they are instructive and support our conclusion
that Article 102.011(a)(3) requires that a witness actually be summoned—meaning
the subpoena must be delivered or served—for a defendant to be responsible for the
fee. See Wilson, 2023 WL 4758470, at *2; Robles, 2018 WL 1056482, at *6.
Forty-eight subpoenas were delivered or served in this case. “[T]he intent of
the statute is to reimburse the costs borne by the peace officer.” Ramirez v. State,
410 S.W.3d 359, 365–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d)
(construing “the statute to require a $5 fee for each witness summoned each time the
witness is summoned,” because the legislative intent would not be fully realized “by
allowing only one payment for summoning a witness regardless of the number of
times that witness would have to be summoned.”); see Allen v. State, 614 S.W.3d
736, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (“Article 102.011(a)(3) . . . seek[s] to reimburse
the expenses . . . actually incurred by peace officers in serving process on witnesses
needed for the defendant’s proceedings.”). Thus, Appellant should have been
assessed $240 for the “Summons Witness” fee. See CRIM PROC. art. 102.011(a)(3);
Junior v. State, 676 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no
pet.) (deleting the assessment where “nothing in the record demonstrat[ed] that a
peace officer served a subpoena on any witness or conveyed or attached any
22
witness”), abrogated on other grounds by Bradshaw v. State, 707 S.W.3d 412, 415,
420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).
Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue is sustained to the extent that it requests
that we correct the witness-summons fee.
This Court’s Ruling
We modify the bill of costs to reflect $50 for the initial arrest warrant fee and
$240 for fees charged for summoning witnesses. We modify the judgment to delete
the deadly weapon finding and modify the reimbursement fees to be $290. As
modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

April 24, 2025
Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

23