Cristian Escarcega v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 17, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00008-CR
__________

CRISTIAN ESCARCEGA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 161st District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. B-22-0009-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Appellant, Cristian Escarcega, guilty of the first-degree murder
of Jesse Sanchez and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02(b), (c) (West Supp. 2024). The trial court sentenced Appellant
accordingly. In two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of his conviction and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting an autopsy photograph where “the prejudicial value was great.” See TEX.
R. EVID. 403. We affirm.
Background
On the evening of October 31, 2021, Officer Tyler Thelen with the Odessa
Police Department (OPD) was working off duty as a security guard for a local bar
when he heard gunshots originating from an adjacent parking lot. Officer Thelen
approached the noise and saw “muzzle flashes” originating from two males standing
beside a dark gray Nissan.1 At trial, Officer Thelen explained that the driver’s side
door and front passenger door of the Nissan were both open, and the two men had
been standing “halfway in and out of the vehicle,” respectively. The men then got
into the Nissan and quickly drove away with the vehicle’s headlights off.2 Sanchez
was later discovered lying face down underneath a white pickup, parked across from
the initial location of the Nissan.
Travis Fraser, a former patrol sergeant with the University of Texas System
Police, testified that he was responding to the call of shots fired when he observed a
gray Nissan pulling out of the parking lot with no headlights on, driving at a “very
high rate of speed.” Sergeant Fraser immediately activated his lights and siren and
pursued the vehicle. A chase ensued, reaching speeds of approximately 104 miles
per hour. Sergeant Fraser testified that he never lost sight of the vehicle, and he was
the lead officer in the pursuit until Ector County officials assumed control.
A patrol officer with the Ector County Sheriff’s Office was in pursuit, and his
dash camera recorded the Nissan slowing down on a dirt road moments before the

1
Officer Thelen’s body camera recording was admitted into evidence at trial, and Officer Thelen
can be heard yelling out that a “dark gray Nissan” had just sped away.
2
Surveillance footage from a nearby bar captured the shooting from a distance.

2
vehicle’s two occupants jumped out of the vehicle and attempted to evade police on
foot. Both men were apprehended shortly thereafter. The driver of the vehicle was
identified as Martin Hernandez, and the passenger was identified as Appellant.
Following Appellant’s arrest, his hands were swabbed for gunshot residue (GSR).
Rebekah Lloyd, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety
(DPS), testified that Appellant’s results were “consistent with either a person fir[ing]
a weapon or being in the immediate proximity of a weapon that is being fired, or
came in contact with a surface that had gunshot primer residue.”
During Appellant’s attempted escape, Matt Muehlbrad, a former Ector County
Sherriff’s Office patrol lieutenant, had remained with the abandoned Nissan. After
ensuring that there was no one else inside the vehicle, Lieutenant Muehlbrad, along
with other officers, located an armored vest, a 9-millimeter handgun, and an AR-15
rifle in the front-passenger-seat area.
In the parking lot where the shooting occurred, officers recovered several
projectiles, as well as seventeen 9-millimeter shell casings and fifteen .223 shell
casings. Darrell Morgan, a firearms examiner with the DPS crime lab in Lubbock,
confirmed that the projectiles and shell casings came from the firearms recovered in
the Nissan. DPS Ranger Brian Burney testified that based on the location of the
shell casings recovered and the known location of the vehicles involved, there were
two shooters: one, utilizing a 9-millimeter handgun, who would have been standing
outside the vehicle near the passenger side; and the other, using the AR-15, who was
likely standing near the driver’s side. Ranger Burney further testified that it
appeared that Sanchez had been ambushed as he was getting into his vehicle. As
part of the investigation, OPD Detective James Santana reviewed surveillance
footage from nearby bars and testified that Hernandez and Appellant had been
waiting for thirty-three minutes in the parking lot before the shooting.

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Dr. Luisa Florez, a forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy on Sanchez.
Dr. Florez explained that although Sanchez had been shot several times, sustaining
gunshot wounds to his right forearm, left shoulder, and right thigh, the cause of death
was “blood loss due to the injuries of the left iliac.” The bullet projectile severed an
internal blood vessel that caused the death of Sanchez. Dr. Florez additionally
opined that two different types of weapons had been used in the shooting: a “high
velocity rifle” believed to have caused the lethal injury, and a handgun that caused
the injuries on Sanchez’s arms and shoulder. Twenty-four autopsy photographs
were admitted into evidence depicting Sanchez’s various injuries.
At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed on the law of parties. The
jury found Appellant guilty of murder as charged in the indictment and assessed his
punishment at life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant first argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
murder. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to establish that he was the
person who shot Sanchez.
A. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must “consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has
proven the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Baltimore v.

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State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Edward v. State, 635
S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Therefore, “[i]f the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court
must ‘presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution’
and defer to the jury’s factual determinations.” Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756,
762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012)). “[A] reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 663, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007).
Under this standard, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including
evidence that may have been improperly admitted, and we treat direct and
circumstantial evidence equally. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Starks v. State, 684 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no
pet.). In this regard, it is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the
defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient
to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.).
Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force
of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we may not

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use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). But “juries trump both trial and appellate judges on weight-of-evidence
determinations.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
B. Applicable Law
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence
produced at trial against “the essential elements of the offense as defined by the
hypothetically correct jury charge.” Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2024); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
“The hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Turley, 691 S.W.3d at 617
(citing Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). “The
law authorized by the indictment consists of the statutory elements of the offense as
modified by the indictment allegations.” Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341.
Here, Appellant was charged with Sanchez’s murder under two theories:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causing Sanchez’s death by shooting him with a
firearm; and (2) with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to Sanchez, committing
an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting him with a firearm, causing his
death. See PENAL § 19.02(b)(1), (2). These two methods of committing murder are
not separate offenses, but rather are alternative methods of committing the same
offense. See Walter v. State, 581 S.W.3d 957, 968 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet.

6
ref’d); Moreno v. State, No. 11-22-00235-CR, 2024 WL 2965171, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Eastland June 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The trial court’s charge additionally allowed Appellant to be convicted either
as a primary actor or as a party. See PENAL § 7.01(a) (West 2021). “[U]nder the law
of parties, the State may enlarge an accused’s criminal responsibility to include acts
in which he may not be the principal actor.” Boston v. State, 373 S.W.3d 832, 837
(Tex. App.—Austin 2012), aff’d, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see
Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d 531, 540 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583
S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A person may be convicted as a party to an
offense “if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another
for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.” PENAL § 7.01(a); Gross v. State,
380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A person is criminally responsible
for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, with the intent to promote or
assist the commission of the offense, the person solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or
attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2) (West Supp.
2024). When determining whether a person is a party to an offense, courts “may
look to ‘events before, during, and after the commission of the offense.’” Gross,
380 S.W.3d at 186 (quoting Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 468–69 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977)).
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a defendant’s status as a party,
but “[t]here must be sufficient evidence of an understanding and common design to
commit the offense.” Walter, 581 S.W.3d at 975–76 (quoting Gross, 380 S.W.3d at
186); see Patterson v. State, 606 S.W.3d 3, 24 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2020, pet. ref’d) (“Under the law of parties, ‘direct evidence’ of each
element of the offense ‘is not required.’” (quoting Alcala v. State, 476 S.W.3d 1, 17–
18 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, pet. ref’d))). “Each fact need not

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point directly to the guilt of the defendant, as long as the cumulative effect of the
facts [is] sufficient to support the conviction under the law of parties.” Gross, 380
S.W.3d at 186.
C. Analysis
Appellant argues that the “evidence is legally insufficient to support [his]
principal or party liability as the shooter” because no one witnessed him carrying or
firing a weapon, and he was “not expressly identif[ied] . . . as the man who pulled
the trigger at Sanchez.” The State maintains that the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to establish Appellant’s guilt either as the principal actor or as a party. We
agree with the State.
First, we note that it is undisputed that two weapons were involved in the
shooting that resulted in Sanchez’s death. Officer Thelen unequivocally testified
that he witnessed “muzzle flashes” and the distinct sound of two different types of
gunfire coming from two males standing separately next to a dark gray Nissan. The
firearms examiner testified that projectiles and shell casings recovered from the
crime scene came from two different weapons. And the medical examiner
concluded that two different types of bullets had been used in the shooting, and it
was bullets from a “high velocity rifle” that were believed to have caused Sanchez’s
lethal injury.
With respect to Appellant’s contention that neither he nor Hernandez were the
two shooters, we find the argument unavailing. Immediately after the shooting,
Officer Thelen witnessed two men get into the Nissan and “fly” out of the parking
lot. See Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Having
the opportunity to murder someone and then fleeing the crime scene is a
circumstance of guilt.”). The men engaged several law enforcement agencies in a
high-speed pursuit before ultimately abandoning the Nissan and attempting to flee

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on foot. See id.; see also Ranson v. State, No. 11-16-00111-CR, 2018 WL 2022691,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2018, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (concluding circumstances such as running away from the crime
scene together after a shooting was evidence that “the jury could further infer an
agreement or common purpose to commit murder”). Both men were located and
identified shortly thereafter as Hernandez and Appellant. No other individuals were
found inside the Nissan that Appellant and Hernandez abandoned that could have
partaken in the shooting.
Moreover, a 9-millimeter handgun and an AR-15 rifle were recovered from
the front-passenger-seat area of the abandoned Nissan, and the firearms examiner
connected the firearms found inside the Nissan to the projectiles and shell casings
recovered from the crime scene. See Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016) (concluding that finding the murder weapon in appellant’s
possession days after the shooting was evidence of appellant’s guilt); Trejo v. State,
594 S.W.3d 790, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (concluding
the same where the murder weapon was recovered near the scene of appellant’s car
accident the same evening as the shooting); see also Torres v. State, 343 S.W.3d
297, 302 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence was sufficient to
establish that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused victim’s death, in part,
because the firearms examiner testified that “the shell casing was fired from the
chamber of the [recovered firearm]”). Ranger Burney further opined that, based on
the location of the shell casings recovered and the known location of the vehicles
involved, there were not just two weapons but two shooters. Finally, Appellant’s
GSR testing results were revealed to have been “consistent with either a person
fir[ing] a weapon or being in the immediate proximity of a weapon that is being
fired, or came in contact with a surface that had gunshot primer residue.” See

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Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d at 510; see also Marion v. State, No. 13-23-00199-CR, 2024
WL 1665659, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 18, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Considering the GSR results together
with all the evidence presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could have reasonably
concluded that Marion had GSR on his hands because he fired the gun at Tina.”);
Parkman v. State, No. 02-22-00280-CR, 2023 WL 7210160, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Nov. 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering
the fact that the appellant “had particles consistent with GSR on their hands” in its
sufficiency analysis).
The combined and cumulative force of the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, provides a rational basis for the jury’s reasonable and
necessary inference that Appellant was a shooter. See Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762;
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16–17. And irrespective if it was Appellant or Hernandez
who took the fatal shot, there is sufficient evidence that, at minimum, Appellant
aided or attempted to aid Hernandez in committing the offense and was, therefore,
criminally responsible for Hernandez’s conduct under the law of parties. See PENAL
§ 7.01; Gross, 380 S.W.3d at 186.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that there is
sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond
a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the murder of Sanchez as either a
primary actor or as a party. See Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341. We overrule
Appellant’s first issue.
The Probative Value of the Photograph was Not Outweighed
by the Substantially Danger of Unfair Prejudice
In his second issue, Appellant argues that, pursuant to Rule 403 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an autopsy

10
photograph depicting an internal view of the fatal injury sustained by Sanchez. See
TEX. R. EVID. 403.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review the trial court’s admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and
principles or when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. Id. at 669 (citing
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim App. 1990)). Therefore, we
uphold a trial court’s ruling on admissibility if it is within the “zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)
(quoting Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).
To be admissible, a trial court must first determine that the evidence is
relevant. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Relevant
evidence is any evidence that has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence that is also of consequence in the action.
TEX. R. EVID. 401. Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may nonetheless be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403.
“Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption
that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Hayes v. State, 85
S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 376);
see Martin v. State, 570 S.W.3d 426, 437 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d). In
this regard, Rule 403 only protects a criminal defendant against unfair prejudice, not
all prejudice. Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 865 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet.
ref’d). “Rule 403 requires exclusion of evidence only when there exists a clear

11
disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative
value.” Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Therefore, in
reviewing a trial court’s Rule 403 determination, we will reverse the trial court’s
ruling only if a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841,
847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 392; Martin, 570 S.W.3d
at 437.
“Texas Rule of Evidence 403 is one of judicial economy.” Hart v. State, 688
S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). “[I]n reviewing a trial court’s Rule 403
determination, we will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if a clear abuse of
discretion is shown.” Herrera v. State, 676 S.W.3d 896, 908 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, no pet.); see Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
Our analysis under Rule 403 includes, but is not limited to, the consideration
of the following factors: “(1) the strength of the evidence’s probative value, (2) the
potential for the evidence to ‘impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless
indelible way,’ (3) [t]he amount of time required at trial to develop the evidence, and
(4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891 (quoting
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389–90 (op. on reh’g)); Gigliobianco v. State, 210
S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When, as here, the evidence at issue
is a photograph, additional relevant factors include “the number of exhibits offered,
their gruesomeness, their detail, their size, whether they are in color or black-and-
white, whether they are close-up, whether the body depicted is clothed or naked, the
availability of other means of proof, and other circumstances unique to the individual
case.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Carrera v.
State, No. 11-22-00245-CR, 2024 WL 2194613, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland May
16, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

12
B. Analysis
The complained-of photograph was admitted through the testimony of
Dr. Florez, who performed the autopsy on Sanchez. Dr. Florez noted that although
multiple gunshot wounds perforated Sanchez’s body, his cause of death was due to
the blood loss from left iliac injuries. Dr. Florez explained that the challenged
photograph depicted “the only injury that was fatal.” Dr. Florez elaborated, “[I]t
shows the extent of the damage. Because that part of the bone is a solid piece of
bone. So it takes up a lot of force to break that bone, and it also shows the damage
to the vessels. That is what caused the patient to bleed out.” With this testimony in
mind, we proceed with our review of the Rule 403 factors.
1. Probative Value and State’s Need
The first and last factors focus on the probative force of and the State’s need
for the evidence. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891. “‘Probative value’ refers to the
inherent probative force of an item of evidence—how strongly it serves to make the
existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable.” Herrera, 676 S.W.3d at
909; see Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891. The single autopsy photograph that was
challenged by Appellant is probative and is necessary to show the full extent of the
injuries Appellant inflicted on Sanchez, specifically, the wound that proved fatal,
while acting as an aid for the jury to understand the corresponding autopsy conducted
by Dr. Florez. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891; see also Hayes, 85 S.W.3d at 816
(concluding that autopsy photographs showing entry and exit wounds were relevant
to explain the way in which the victim was killed); Chavez v. State, No. 08-16-
00084-CR, 2018 WL 2715219, at *9 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 6, 2018, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding same where evidence was
photograph of the victim’s brain after the medical examiner had removed the top of
her skull because it showed evidence of internal injuries not otherwise visible

13
externally and was “helpful to the jury in understanding [the medical examiner’s]
explanation of the injuries [the victim] sustained”). These factors weigh in favor of
admission.
2. Prejudicial Dangers
The second factor focuses on “whether the evidence has a ‘tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis,’ usually emotional in nature.” Hart, 688 S.W.3d at
894 (quoting Valadez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)). The
autopsy photograph was a close-up, color image of Sanchez’s internal injuries;
however, the nature of the photograph is weighed against the fact that it demonstrates
that the injuries were the result of Appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. That one of
the bullet fragments severed a bone in the back and a blood vessel that resulted in
death—not just injury— and that the cause of death was not coincidentally the result
of other enigmatic cause is highly probative. See Hayes, 85 S.W.3d at 816
(“Changes rendered by the autopsy process are of minor significance if the
disturbing nature of the photograph is primarily due to the injuries caused by the
appellant.”); see also Lopez v. State, 582 S.W.3d 377, 397 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he one photograph depicting Delfino’s skin removed,
revealing internal injuries . . . was ‘admissible and highly probative.’”); Simonton v.
State, No. 14-23-00362-CR, 2024 WL 3948218, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Aug. 27, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(concluding that trial court did not err in admitting photograph of a medical container
filled with a substance identified as Complainant’s blood because the “photograph
also was the only exhibit admitted to show the extent of the bleeding caused by
Complainant’s injuries”); Carter v. State, No. 11-17-00264-CR, 2019 WL 4316812,
at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (concluding the same where photographs had been admitted, depicting

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a close-up of the inside of the victim’s skull showing damage caused by the alleged
weapon after the victim’s brain and eyes had already been removed, reasoning “a
trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting such photographs when it would
otherwise be difficult to show a victim’s injury without altering the body in some
way). This factor weighs in favor of admission.
3. Time Needed to Develop the Evidence
The third factor concerns the amount of “trial time dedicated to the
development of the evidence such that its introduction caused undue delay.” Hart,
688 S.W.3d at 893. Because the concern is the extent to which the jury is distracted
from considering the charged offense, the time needed to develop the evidence
“necessarily includes any testimony introduced regarding the evidence, including
cross-examination, redirect examination, and any rebuttal offered by the defense in
response to the evidence.” Id. The record reflects that the time needed to develop
the evidence through Dr. Florez was relatively minimal. The State presented
eighteen witnesses over the course of three days. The complained-of autopsy
photograph constituted but one of almost 200 photograph exhibits proffered by the
State and approximately two pages of Dr. Florez’s eighteen pages of testimony. See
Luna v. State, 687 S.W.3d 79, 99 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d) (concluding
that the complained-of testimony, which consisted of twenty-two pages out of the
State’s 180-page case-in-chief, was “only a small portion of trial” and could “hardly
be deemed to be excessive”); see also Claudio v. State, No. 11-22-00141-CR, 2023
WL 4629037, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (concluding the same where the amount of time that was
dedicated to offer and admit the photographs only spanned two and one-half pages
of the record). This factor weighs in favor of admission.

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4. Balancing the Factors
We have considered all the aforementioned factors and conclude that the
factors weigh in favor of the admission of the photograph. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at
891; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. The photograph, though prejudicial, was
neither unfairly prejudicial nor lacking in probative value. See Luna, 687 S.W.3d at
104 (“Rule 403 is concerned not with prejudicial evidence, but with evidence that is
unfairly prejudicial.”). The single photograph did not serve to distract the jury or
suggest a decision on an improper basis, and the time taken to admit and discuss the
photograph was not inordinate. See Hart, 688 S.W.3d at 891. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the autopsy photograph under
Rule 403. See Herrera, 676 S.W.3d at 908; see, e.g., Callaway v. State, 546 S.W.3d
899, 910–12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d) (concluding trial court did not
abuse its discretion in two admitted autopsy photographs showing internal damage
caused by the appellant’s bullet). We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

April 17, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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