In the Interest of R.N., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed March 20, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00265-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF R.N., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 35th District Court
Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV2401004

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Because this is an attempt to appeal from temporary orders entered in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), we dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
In the underlying SAPCR, the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the
infant child, R.N., 1 after the child’s continued “failure to thrive” in the mother’s and
father’s care. On January 25, 2024, the parties appeared for a full adversary hearing
before the associate judge, who found that: (1) there was a danger to the physical
health or safety of R.N. caused by the parents’ acts or failures to act, and remaining

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We use initials to refer to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
in the home would be contrary to R.N.’s welfare; (2) the Department made
reasonable efforts to eliminate or prevent R.N.’s removal, but immediate removal
was required for the child’s protection; and (3) reasonable efforts were made to
enable R.N.’s return to the home, but there was a substantial risk of a continuing
danger if she were returned. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(g)(1)–(3) (West
Supp. 2024). After a permanency hearing on August 29, 2024, the associate judge
issued an order containing findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to
return the child to the parents’ home, but there was a continuing danger to the
physical health or safety of the child such that returning her to the parents’ home
would be contrary to her welfare. See FAM. § 263.002(c). Following a de novo
permanency hearing before the trial court on September 30, the trial court denied the
father’s request to change the associate judge’s ruling. See id. § 201.012 (West
2020) (right to a de novo hearing before the referring court), § 201.015 (request and
procedure for de novo hearing). The father filed a notice of appeal.
It is well established that temporary orders in a SAPCR cannot be challenged
on appeal. See FAM. § 105.001(e) (“Temporary orders rendered under this section
are not subject to interlocutory appeal.”); see, e.g., In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239,
248–49 & n.8 (Tex. 2013) (citing Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex.
1991) (orig. proceeding) (holding that mandamus relief was appropriate because trial
court’s temporary orders were not subject to interlocutory appeal)); In re K.B., 683
S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, orig. proceeding). A trial court’s
decision to allow the Department to maintain custody of a child following an
adversary hearing is reviewable, if at all, through a petition for writ of mandamus.
In re J.D.S., 494 S.W.3d 387, 389 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no pet.) (citing In re
Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 614 (Tex. 2008)). A trial
court’s written orders issued after a full adversary hearing, status hearings, and
permanency hearings in a Department-initiated proceeding are temporary orders not
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subject to interlocutory appeal. See generally FAM. § 105.001(e), § 262.201(h),
263.002(c), § 263.202, § 263.306.
The father and the Department filed briefs in this cause. According to the
father’s notice of appeal, he is attempting to appeal the trial court’s limited de novo
review of the associate judge’s findings following the August 29 permanency
hearing. Yet the father’s brief only addresses the associate judge’s findings made
pursuant to Section 262.201(g)(3) of the Family Code, the provision applicable to
the full adversary hearing that was held on January 25 in this case. Regardless of
which order the father is attempting to appeal, the result is the same: we do not have
jurisdiction to review either temporary order.
By letter dated March 6, 2025, the Clerk of this Court notified the father that
this appeal was subject to dismissal because it appeared no final, appealable
judgment or order had been signed by the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3, 44.3.
In the same letter, the father was advised that this appeal would be dismissed unless
a response was filed showing grounds to continue the appeal. The father filed a
response stating only that he “accepts the ruling of the court” rather than showing
grounds to continue this appeal.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

March 20, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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