Shaun Russell Conley v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 27, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00316-CR
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SHAUN RUSSELL CONLEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 70th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A-21-1162-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Shaun Russell Conley, pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony
offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021(a)(1)(B), (e) (West 2019). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement between
Appellant and the State, the trial court sentenced Appellant on December 15, 2022
to confinement for twenty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal from
the trial court’s judgment of conviction. We dismiss the appeal.
We notified Appellant by letter that his pro se notice of appeal appeared to be
untimely and that the appeal may be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a). In our
letter, we requested that Appellant’s counsel respond and show grounds to continue
the appeal. Neither Appellant nor his counsel has filed a response.
Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal must
be filed either (1) within thirty days after the date that sentence is imposed in open
court or (2) if the defendant timely files a motion for new trial, within ninety days
after the date that sentence is imposed in open court. Id. Appellant filed his pro se
notice of appeal over two years after his sentence was imposed in open court. The
notice of appeal was therefore untimely. Absent a timely filed notice of appeal, we
do not have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208,
210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522–23 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996); Rodarte v. State, 860 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Furthermore, Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which
the punishment imposed does not exceed the punishment agreed to by the parties, “a
defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion
filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal,
or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2018).
Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here. We note that Rule 25.2 does
not permit a plea-bargaining defendant to appeal matters related to the voluntariness
of the plea unless the defendant has obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.
See Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Carender v. State,
155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

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The documents on file in this appeal show that Appellant entered into a plea
bargain agreement and that the trial court assessed his punishment in accordance
with that plea bargain agreement. Further, the trial court certified that Appellant has
no right of appeal. The trial court’s certification was signed by Appellant,
Appellant’s trial counsel, and the presiding judge of the trial court. The documents
on file in this court support the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. State, 154
S.W.3d 610, 613–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Thus, even if Appellant had timely perfected an appeal, his appeal would have
been prohibited by Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
provides that an appellate court must dismiss an appeal without further action when
there is no certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal. TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see
Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613–14.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

February 27, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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