Jessie James Johnson Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 13, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00188-CR
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JESSIE JAMES JOHNSON JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 385th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR58588

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jessie James Johnson Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of
a controlled substance in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams,
a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d)
(West Supp. 2024). After the jury found him guilty, Appellant pleaded “true” to two
enhancement allegations, and the jury assessed his punishment at fifty years’
confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West 2019). The trial court
pronounced the sentence in accordance with the jury’s verdict. In one issue on
appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
We affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
Sergeant Ryan Raines of the Midland Police Department was on patrol on
August 19, 2022, when he observed a vehicle driving on the wrong side of the road
so he initiated a traffic stop. Appellant was identified as the driver of the vehicle,
and Atirya Green was identified as the sole passenger. 1 After observing what he
believed to be marihuana residue “on top of a Subway cup in a center cupholder” of
the vehicle’s front seat console, Sergeant Raines obtained consent from Appellant to
search the vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, the presence of marihuana residue was
confirmed and four grams of a substance, later confirmed to be cocaine, was found
hidden in the center compartment just in front of the center cupholders. The cocaine
was located inside three small baggies within a “miniature purse.” Appellant and
Green each denied knowledge of the cocaine. Sergeant Raines testified that
Appellant had $2,335 in cash in his possession, which included “three 100-dollar
bills . . . one 50-dollar bill . . . 84 20-dollar bills . . . 21 ten-dollar bills; 17 five-dollar
bills; and 10 one-dollar bills.”
Appellant was handcuffed and placed in the backseat of a patrol unit with
Green. Their communications in the patrol unit were recorded, and the recording
was admitted into evidence at trial. In the recording, Appellant can be heard telling
Green that he loved her and then, seconds later, stating: “You have to take it.” When

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Green initially provided officers with the wrong name and date of birth. She was later found to
have two outstanding warrants for misdemeanor offenses.

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Green began repeating that she could not, Appellant assured her that he would take
care of her, that she “would get probation,” and thereafter warned Green, “Baby, do
not cross me.” Green then asked, “How much is in there,” and Appellant responded,
“It’s—it’s nothing.”
Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must “consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has
proven the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Baltimore v.
State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Edward v. State, 635
S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must
“presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution” and
defer to the factfinder’s factual determinations. Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756,
762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012)). “[A] reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and

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credibility of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007).
Under this standard, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including
evidence that may have been improperly admitted, and treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Starks v. State, 684 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2024, no pet.); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2021, pet. ref’d). In this regard, it is not necessary that the evidence directly prove
the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient
to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.).
Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force
of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we may not
use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). But “juries trump both trial and appellate judges on weight-of-evidence
determinations.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
Applicable Law
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence
produced at trial against “the essential elements of the offense as defined by the
hypothetically correct jury charge.” Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex.

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Crim. App. 2024); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
“The hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Turley, 691 S.W.3d at 617
(citing Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). “The
law authorized by the indictment consists of the statutory elements of the offense as
modified by the indictment allegations.” Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341.
Here, Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance under
Section 481.115(d). See HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.115(d). To support a conviction
for this offense, the State was required to prove that Appellant intentionally or
knowingly possessed four grams or more but less than 200 grams of a controlled
substance listed in Penalty Group 1, namely, cocaine. See id. §§ 481.102(3)(D),
481.115(a), (d); Starks, 684 S.W.3d at 873. “‘Possession’ means actual care,
custody, control, or management.” PENAL § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2024). Thus,
the State was required to “show (1) that the accused exercised control, management,
or care over the substance and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was
contraband.” Robertson v. State, 636 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021,
no pet.); Redman v. State, No. 11-22-00057-CR, 2023 WL 4373534, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland July 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
A defendant’s “[m]ere presence at the location where drugs are found is
. . . insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those drugs.”
Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161–62; Smythe v. State, No. 11-21-00238-CR, 2023 WL
4239836, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). However, a factfinder may otherwise infer that the
defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the contraband if sufficient facts and

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circumstances support the inference of possession. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410,
413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In this regard, Texas courts have formulated the
“affirmative links” rule, which provides that “[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive
possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the
accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are
additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused
to the contraband.” Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Deshong v. State, 625
S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). The following links have been applied
to infer knowledge relating to the contraband upon a defendant:
(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether
the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and
the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under
the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant
possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the
defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether
the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive
gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether
other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the
defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs
were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was
enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of
cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a
consciousness of guilt.

Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12); see also Redman,
2023 WL 4373534, at *4 (“The affirmative links rule is routinely employed to
establish possession when the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place
where the drugs are found; it is designed ‘to protect the innocent bystander from
conviction based solely upon [her] fortuitous proximity to someone else’s drugs.’”

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(alteration in original) (quoting Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406). Further, it is “not
the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the
evidence, direct and circumstantial.” Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; see Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13. “Although these factors can help guide a court’s analysis, ultimately
the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson.” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).
Analysis
Appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he
intentionally or knowingly possessed the cocaine found inside his vehicle.
We begin by noting that the cumulative force of the evidence could have led
a rational juror to believe that the cocaine found inside the vehicle belonged to
Appellant. See Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341. Appellant was not merely present
where the cocaine was found—he was in close proximity to it as the cocaine was
within arm’s reach of the driver’s seat he occupied. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414
(assessing the appellant’s proximity to and accessibility of the contraband as a
factor); see also Runnels v. State, No. 11-17-00037-CR, 2019 WL 758469, at *4
(Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 21, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (considering that the drugs were “found in close proximity to the
passenger seat where [a]ppellant was sitting” as a factor indicating possession);
Diaz v. State, No. 11-16-00301-CR, 2018 WL 4496252, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering the
same when the appellant “was in the passenger seat of the pickup and the
methamphetamine was found inside a purse in the cab of the pickup”). Appellant
also had $2,335 in cash in his pockets at the time of the search. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d
at 414; see also Torres v. State, 466 S.W.3d 329, 333–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (concluding that evidence of $2,225 found in the appellant’s

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pocket could support an inference of drug possession with intent to deliver);
Retana v. State, No. 11-18-00044-CR, 2020 WL 976935, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Feb. 28, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(considering the more than $160 in the appellant’s possession as a factor linking the
appellant to the contraband found). Moreover, the jury heard the conversation
between Appellant and Green concerning the contraband, from which Appellant’s
culpability could be inferred. A rational jury could have concluded that Appellant’s
statements to Green, “You have to take it” and “do not cross me,” his repeated
assurances that he would “take care” of Green, and his answer to her question about
the amount of drugs found in the vehicle were evidence of Appellant’s knowledge
of and control over the cocaine. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018) (“As a reviewing court, we may not reevaluate the weight and
credibility of the evidence in the record and thereby substitute our own judgment for
that of the factfinder.”); see also Weedon v. State, No. 11-19-00347-CR, 2021 WL
4470443, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (considering appellant’s out-of-court statements as
evidence that he knowingly possessed the drugs); Mitchell v. State, No. 11-19-
00306-CR, 2021 WL 4097329, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 9, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding “the statements made by
Appellant during his jail telephone call indicated a consciousness of guilt,”
supporting his possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction).
Although (1) Appellant denied ownership of the cocaine, (2) the cocaine was
found inside a “miniature purse,” and (3) there was a female inside the vehicle with
him at the time, the mere existence of an alternative hypothesis (i.e., that only Green
possessed the cocaine) does not render the evidence against Appellant insufficient.
See Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[W]e will not

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usurp the role of the fact finder by factoring into our sufficiency analysis an
alternative ‘hypothesis inconsistent with the guilt of the accused.’”) (quoting
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); Espino-Cruz v. State,
586 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (“Control
over the contraband may be exercised by more than one person.”); see also
Rodriguez v. State, No. 11-17-00214-CR, 2020 WL 1887716, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Apr. 16, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(concluding the jury was free to reject a co-defendant’s claim of exclusive ownership
of cocaine found inside a pickup where the appellant was also present). Furthermore,
while we observe the absence of some affirmative links in this case, this absence
“does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the affirmative
links present.” See Mixon v. State, 481 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Jones v. State, 466 S.W.3d 252, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)); see also Carmona v. State, No. 11-22-00125-CR, 2023
WL 8631438, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (concluding sufficient affirmative links present despite
several missing links, such as, no evidence that the drugs were in plain view, that
she or her passenger were under the influence, that she made incriminating
statements, that she attempted to flee, or that she possessed large amounts of cash);
Davenport v. State, No. 13-17-00363-CR, 2019 WL 613275, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 14, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (same).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that
there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the
cocaine found inside his vehicle. See Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341; Tate, 500

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S.W.3d at 417–18; Espino-Cruz, 586 S.W.3d at 543; see also HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 481.115(a); PENAL § 1.07(a)(39). We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

February 13, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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