Roman Angelo Royal v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed December 12, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

Nos. 11-23-00147-CR & 11-23-00148-CR
__________

ROMAN ANGELO ROYAL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 132nd District Court
Scurry County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 11108 & 11110

OPINION
In a trial of consolidated causes, a jury convicted Appellant, Roman Angelo
Royal, of aggravated assault against a public servant, a first-degree felony, and
evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(b)(2)(B), 38.04(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2024). The jury, having
found the enhancement allegation to be “true,” assessed Appellant’s punishment at
imprisonment for ninety-nine years in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for the aggravated-assault conviction, and twenty
years for the evading-with-a-vehicle conviction. Id. § 12.42(b) (West 2019). The
trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly.
In six issues on appeal, Appellant challenges: (1) the trial court’s
determination that he was competent to stand trial; (2) the trial court’s finding that
he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel; (3) the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his conviction for aggravated assault against a public servant; (5) the trial
court’s assessment of court costs; and (6) clerical errors in the trial court’s
judgments. We modify and affirm.
I. Factual Background
On November 14, 2022, around 3:30 p.m., Officer Mitchell Silva, with the
Snyder Police Department, observed Appellant driving a tan or gold Buick; he then
began following Appellant. Officer Shane Rackley, who was also on patrol,
informed Officer Silva that Appellant had an outstanding warrant. As Appellant
turned into an alleyway, Officer Silva attempted to initiate a traffic stop. However,
Appellant continued driving until he saw Officer Rackley enter the alley from the
opposite street.
The officers approached Appellant’s closed driver side window, referred to
Appellant by name, and advised him that he was wanted for committing a
misdemeanor offense in a contiguous county. Appellant refused to identify himself
and ignored the officers’ commands to roll down the driver side window, cracking
it only to aggressively contest his identity, and continued to rebuff law
enforcement’s repeated commands for the next thirty to forty-five minutes. Snyder

2
Police Chief Brian Haggard and Lieutenant Mike Counts eventually arrived at the
scene because Appellant demanded to speak to “somebody with rank.”
When Appellant began calling 9-1-1 to argue with dispatch, the officers
decided to arrest him for “[tying] up 9-1-1” and preventing dispatch from receiving
incoming emergency calls. See PENAL §§ 42.061–.062 (West 2016); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (West 2015). Due to Appellant’s persistent defiance,
the officers attempted to forcefully extricate him from the vehicle. Chief Haggard
used an asp baton to “knock[] a hole in the [driver side] window so [they] could get
the vehicle unlocked.” When Officer Rackley reached through the broken window
with part of his hand to deploy pepper spray, Appellant “slammed [the vehicle] into
drive, hit the gas[,] and sped off.” Officer Rackley was “barely able to get [his]
hand” out of the window as Appellant fled in the vehicle, and as a result he sustained
“a bunch of cuts on [his] right hand.” Appellant crashed into two police vehicles as
he sped away.
Police lost sight of Appellant until around 5:30 p.m., when they were
investigating “a possible break-in” on a ranch outside the city limits. That evening,
Appellant stole Nona Key’s tractor from her barn, led police on a pursuit through
her ranch, then drove the tractor into a stock tank, totaling it. Stranded in the middle
of the stock tank and surrounded by law enforcement from multiple jurisdictions,
Appellant remained in the tractor for over an hour until police eventually deployed
a pepper ball gun into the tractor’s cab. Despite this, Appellant stood on the hood
of the tractor, still refusing to comply with the officers’ commands. Appellant
finally swam to shore and was apprehended after Lieutenant Counts shot him with
the pepper ball gun. He was subsequently indicted for evading arrest or detention
with a vehicle and aggravated assault against a public servant.

3
From arraignment onward, Appellant claimed to only understand and
acknowledge “universal law and natural law.” When the trial court asked Appellant
whether he understood the nature of the charges pending against him, he replied:
[APPELLANT]: I do not understand any charges against me,
because the only thing I do understand is universal law . . . .
[TRIAL COURT]: Are you aware of the maximum penalty for
each of these charges?
[APPELLANT]: I don’t accept your charges . . . I do not accept
the charges. I am not the trustee or the all capitalized name that you
keep trying to operate through.
....
[TRIAL COURT]: Do you believe that you are mentally
competent?
[APPELLANT]: I am definitely competent.
[TRIAL COURT]: Do you understand that if you are found
guilty --
[APPELLANT]: I do not understand --
[TRIAL COURT]: -- of one or more of these crimes --
[APPELLANT]: -- the charges or crimes.
[TRIAL COURT]: -- this might result in an order that sentences
be served consecutively, and that is one after the other?
[APPELLANT]: No, I don’t understand that . . . I do not
understand nothing you’re asking me or you’re telling me . . . . Once
again, I do not understand anything you’re saying because it seems like
to me this Court is privateers for a Jolly Roger flag anyways. It’s not
an American flag of peace.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress challenging the propriety of the traffic
stop, which the trial court denied. Robert Jones was Appellant’s retained trial
counsel at the hearing on the motion. Prior to jury selection, Appellant again
declared that “nobody in this courtroom has permission to act on my behalf,” and

4
that Jones was “hereby fired.” Outside the presence of the venire panel, the trial
court discussed Appellant’s request and decision to represent himself:
[TRIAL COURT]: . . . You have the [Sixth] Amendment right
to have an attorney represent you . . . . Do you want an attorney
representing you and acting on your behalf?
....
[APPELLANT]: I stand as myself.
[TRIAL COURT]: Okay. You also have the [Sixth]
Amendment right to represent yourself if you want to. I’m trying really
hard to protect your rights . . . . I will not force you to accept someone
acting on your behalf . . . . I need to be sure that your decision to
represent yourself is not . . . made under coercion as a result of threats,
as a result of duress.
....
[APPELLANT]: I am competent in stating my own commercial
business. I do not need assistance.
The trial court asked Appellant his age, whether he graduated from high school, and
assessed his ability to read and write the English language. Although he refused to
provide his age and level of education, Appellant eventually confirmed that he
“speak[s] common English”; he had also submitted numerous handwritten pretrial
motions. The trial court then inquired as to whether Appellant was under the
influence of drugs:
[APPELLANT]: I’m not going to ensnare myself with words to
be used against me when you’re asking questions that have nothing to
do with my commercialized affairs.
[TRIAL COURT]: Are you under the influence of alcohol?
[APPELLANT]: Are you an American citizen?
[TRIAL COURT]: Have you ever been adjudicated to be
incompetent?
[APPELLANT]: . . . Do you believe in God?

5
[TRIAL COURT]: Have you been adjudicated . . . as
incompetent?
[APPELLANT]: I am competent in stating all my affairs.
....
[APPELLANT]: You know what, this is really an overthrow of
the Constitution, because as a natural living man I don’t believe you
can ask me these questions and expect me to answer.
[TRIAL COURT]: Are you currently suffering from any mental
disability?
[APPELLANT]: No, I’m not.
When asked whether he was familiar with the law or had previously represented
himself, Appellant steadfastly “reserve[d] [his] right to remain silent.” As the trial
court explained the elements of the pending charges and the punishment range for
each offense, Appellant intermittently interrupted with remarks such as: “I do
not understand any charges, and I do not stand under any charges. The only law
I understand is universal law and natural law.” And “I do not accept those charges
. . . I am a natural living man. I am not an all capitalized corporate fiction . . . .”
Any time Jones spoke, Appellant objected to him “speaking for or thinking on [his]
behalf,” and directed Jones to “just keep [his] thoughts to [himself].”
The trial court advised Appellant that if he represented himself, no one would
be responsible for assisting him. He confirmed that he did not want Jones’s
assistance: “[Jones] doesn’t even need to be in my business, period.” The trial court
inquired whether Appellant understood specific rules of evidence and criminal
procedure, and whether he knew how to select a jury, protect the record for purposes
of appeal, move for a mistrial or judgment of acquittal, and request or object to
proposed jury instructions. After Appellant continuously invoked his “right to
remain silent,” the trial court stated:

6
[TRIAL COURT]: . . . I find that your decision to represent
yourself is not a good decision to make.
[APPELLANT]: Well, I object to your decision . . . . My rights
are reserved.
[TRIAL COURT]: I think that you would be far better off if you
were defended by an attorney.
[APPELLANT]: I don’t need anyone to defend me.
[TRIAL COURT]: And I think it’s unwise of you to try to
represent yourself. You’re not familiar with the law . . . .
[APPELLANT]: You can’t make that legal determination on
what I’m familiar with because I didn’t answer your questions.
Appellant finally confirmed that he was not forced, threatened, or coerced into
waiving his right to counsel and asserting his right to self-representation. Ultimately,
the trial court found that Appellant was competent and that he knowingly and
voluntarily invoked his right to self-representation. The trial court concluded:
. . . [W]hat I’ve said is plain, it’s evident, and I find that -- I believe that
you are an intelligent young man because I have observed your ability
to analyze situations. I’ve observed your ability to express yourself
verbally. I have no indication at all that you have the inability to
understand these proceedings and to understand the roles that different
people have in this proceeding.
I find that you are mentally competent and that factors into my decision
to allow you to represent yourself.
Jones then began to suggest that Appellant should undergo a psychiatric evaluation
and urged his motion for a competency hearing. But Appellant interrupted: “I think
this guy is incompetent to even speak in the courtroom in my opinion.” The trial
court told Jones that he could call witnesses and present evidence in support of his
motion, but reiterated that, based on her observations, Appellant was mentally
competent. Jones asked Appellant’s mother if she wanted to testify, and after

7
another interjection from Appellant, Jones withdrew his motion and presented no
evidence regarding Appellant’s competency.
After that, Jones served as standby counsel for the duration of Appellant’s
trial. Appellant conferred with Jones throughout the guilt-innocence phase,
permitted him to present an opening statement, aid in cross-examination, and present
a closing argument. Appellant cross-examined most of the State’s witnesses, lodged
several objections to the State’s evidence and the exhibits it offered, and presented
the testimony of five witnesses in his defense. The jury found Appellant guilty of
both charged offenses, assessed his punishment, and the trial court sentenced
Appellant accordingly. This appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Aggravated Assault
Appellant contends in his fourth issue that the evidence is legally insufficient
to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault against a public servant.
A. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912,

8
915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. See CRIM. PROC. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762 (“[A]
reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment
for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.”).
“This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly
to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences,
we presume the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer
to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762.
We treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally under this standard.
Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ruiz v. State, 631
S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the
evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence
can alone be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414
S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. Each fact need not point directly
and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we may not use
a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Rather, we must
consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227,
232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

9
Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the
charged offense as defined by the hypothetically correct charge for the case.
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether
the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence
adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out
the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s
burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
B. The Evidence is Legally Sufficient to Support Appellant’s Conviction
As applicable to this case, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault
against a public servant by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing
bodily injury to a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty, and by
using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. PENAL
§§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B). With respect to causation, “[a] person is
criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct,
operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent
cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly
insufficient.” Id. § 6.04(a) (West 2021). While the defendant’s voluntary act or acts
must be a direct cause of the victim’s injuries, they need not be the sole cause.
Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Bodily-injury
assault is a result-oriented offense” and requires a showing that the accused at least

10
acted recklessly in causing the resulting bodily injury. Simms v. State, 629 S.W.3d
218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to the result of his conduct
when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the result will occur. PENAL § 6.03(c). “The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor’s standpoint.” Id. Recklessness does not require the awareness or conscious
disregard of a specific injury. See Simms, 629 S.W.3d at 223 (requiring proof of a
“reckless state of mind with respect to [the appellant’s] actions . . . but not with
respect to any particular result”). Rather, at the heart of recklessness is the conscious
disregard of the risk created by the actor’s conduct. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 751.
“Such a ‘devil may care’ or ‘not giving a damn’ attitude toward the risk distinguishes
the culpable mental state of criminal recklessness from that of criminal negligence.”
Id. at 751–52.
Here, the evidence established that Appellant, at the very least, recklessly
caused Officer Rackley’s hand injuries. The bodycam footage corroborated the
officers’ testimony—that as Officer Rackley placed his hand inside Appellant’s
vehicle to pepper spray Appellant, Appellant “hit the gas[,] and sped off with such
force that [Officer Rackley] was barely able to get [his] hand back away from the
window.” Therefore, a rational jury could have found that, as a result of Appellant’s
actions, Officer Rackley suffered cuts to his hand. A rational jury could likewise
have found that Appellant, knowing there were several officers standing near and
around his vehicle, was aware of and disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable
risk that he could cause bodily injury to others by “slamm[ing] [the vehicle] into
drive” and accelerating away from them. See PENAL §§ 6.03(c); 22.01(a)(1);

11
22.02(b)(2)(B). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to
support Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault against a public servant as
charged in the indictment.
We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
III. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Appellant argues in his third issue that the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to suppress evidence because the “[traffic] stop was unreasonable and not
based on any true facts, much less probable cause of a valid traffic violation.” But
Appellant was not stopped for committing a traffic violation. Rather, Officers
Rackley and Silva testified that they initiated the traffic stop based on their
knowledge that Appellant had an outstanding warrant for a Class A misdemeanor
offense that he committed in Mitchell County. The stop, therefore, was justified
based on the officers’ reasonable suspicion rather than the existence of probable
cause.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review.” Igboji v. State, 666 S.W.3d 607, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
We defer to a trial court’s findings of historical facts and determinations of mixed
questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor, so long as they are
supported by the record. State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App.
2023); State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). We conduct a
de novo review of a trial court’s legal conclusions and application of the law to facts
that do not depend on witness credibility and demeanor. Monjaras v. State, 664
S.W.3d 921, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57. “The trial
court’s ruling will be sustained if it is correct on any applicable theory of law and
the record reasonably supports it.” Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57–58. When, as in this

12
case, the trial court makes explicit fact findings, “we determine whether the
evidence, (viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling) supports
these fact findings.” State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)
(citing State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
A warrantless traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure that must be justified
by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 872. “Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has
specific articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts,
would lead the officer to reasonably conclude the person is, has been, or soon will
be engaged in criminal activity.” Id. “The [reasonable suspicion] standard requires
only ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for the stop.” Hamal v. State,
390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d
609, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). This is an objective inquiry that disregards the
subjective intent of the officer and looks, instead, to whether an objectively
justifiable basis for the detention existed. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906,
914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When determining whether reasonable suspicion
existed, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the cumulative
information known to cooperating officers at the time of the detention. Furr v. State,
499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d
621, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (“[U]nder [the] ‘collective knowledge’ doctrine,
when several officers are cooperating, their cumulative information may be
considered in assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” (quoting State v.
Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 569 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013))).
B. The Legality of the Traffic Stop
As we construe it, Appellant complains that when the officers initiated the
traffic stop, they “did not know who was driving,” and the only reason for the stop

13
was “to establish who was driving.”1 However, according to Officers Rackley and
Silva, the existence of Appellant’s outstanding warrant provided the basis for the
traffic stop.
An initial computer check that reveals that a vehicle’s driver may have
outstanding warrants contributes to the officer’s reasonable suspicion for a traffic
stop. See Gomez v. State, 234 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no
pet.); see also Garcia v. State, No. 11-21-00145-CR, 2024 WL 3528547, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Eastland July 25, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Beaudoin v. State, No. 01-10-00058-CR, 2011 WL 3612285, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 18, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“[T]he police officers’ initial computer search revealed one of
appellant’s outstanding warrants and provided reasonable suspicion for the initial
stop.”). Additionally, an officer is authorized to execute a warrant upon observing
a wanted person in public. See CRIM. PROC. art. 15.06 (arrest warrants “shall extend
to any part of the State; and any peace officer . . . shall be authorized to execute the
same in any county in this State”), art. 15.24 (“all reasonable means are permitted”
in executing an arrest warrant).
Despite Appellant’s assertion that his identity was unknown to the officers
prior to the stop, Officer Silva testified that he recognized Appellant as the driver of
the Buick. Further, Officers Silva and Rackley testified that they were familiar with
Appellant from previous encounters. Officer Silva crossed paths with Appellant
while working as a corrections officer where Appellant was incarcerated. Officer
Rackley first encountered Appellant in August 2022, approximately a year after his
release from prison. Appellant had locked his girlfriend, Kylen Ray, out of her

1
Appellant asserts in his brief that the officers “did not know who was driving the vehicle to justify
stopping the vehicle to establish who was driving the vehicle.”

14
apartment without her keys. Officer Rackley spoke to Appellant through the door
and was “able to clearly see him” through the window. He learned that Appellant
had an outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant but left the premises without
executing the warrant after Appellant tossed Ray’s keys outside.2
On November 12, 2022, Kim Davis, Ray’s mother, called police because
Appellant was “driving around [her] house, parking in front, yelling at [Ray],” and
“possibly banging on her door.” Davis photographed the Buick Appellant was
driving, including the license plate, and provided the photographs to police. On
November 14, one of the city’s license plate recognition cameras captured the Buick
driving into Snyder. While on patrol, Officer Rackley received an automatic alert3
with the photograph of the Buick and forwarded the Buick’s last known location to
Officer Silva. Officer Silva saw the Buick in a gas station parking lot, and
recognized Appellant as the driver. Although Appellant was wearing a face mask
and sunglasses when officers approached the Buick, Appellant’s face was uncovered
when Officer Silva saw him at the gas station. Officer Silva followed Appellant,
and initiated the traffic stop when Appellant turned into the alley.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, and affording appropriate
deference to the trial court’s implicit credibility determinations, as we must, we
conclude that Officer Rackley and Officer Silva articulated sufficient, specific facts
that constituted reasonable suspicion to support the basis for the traffic stop. See
Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667; Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim.

2
Officer Rackley explained that law enforcement may not forcefully enter a home to execute an
arrest warrant for a misdemeanor offense, but may do so under certain circumstances to execute a felony
arrest warrant. See CRIM. PROC. art. 15.25 (“In [the] case of [a] felony, the officer may break down the
door . . . for the purpose of making an arrest . . . .”); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981).
3
The previous day, Officer Rackley created a custom alert through the city’s “Flock Safety” system
of license plate recognition cameras to be notified by text message if any cameras captured the Buick
driving inside the city limits.

15
App. 2015). Officer Silva plainly recognized Appellant, and the officers’ collective
knowledge of Appellant’s outstanding warrant provided, at the very least, reasonable
suspicion to detain and investigate Appellant. See Haley v. State, 480 S.W.2d 644,
645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (stating that probable cause “clearly existed” for an
arrest when the warrant check revealed outstanding warrants); Brooks v. State, 76
S.W.3d 426, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he fact that
appellant had several outstanding warrants gave the officers probable cause to arrest
him.”). Given the objectively justifiable basis for the initial detention, the traffic
stop did not violate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
seizures. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914. Consequently, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
IV. Appellant’s Competency to Stand Trial
In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it found that he was competent to stand trial without holding a formal
competency hearing. He points to his “bizarre acts” and his inability “to set aside
sovereign-citizen-esque fixations and focus on facts and events” as evidence that he
was incompetent to stand trial.4
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”
McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Drope v.

4
Appellant contends that “his current medication regime while being housed at Bill Clements Unit”
shows that he “suffers from mental health issues.” This assertion is wholly unsubstantiated by the record
and has no bearing on Appellant’s mental competency at the time of trial.

16
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)). Convicting a defendant who is legally
incompetent violates due process of law. Id.
A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial and shall be found
competent to stand trial unless it is otherwise proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is incompetent. CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(b) (West 2018). “A
person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present
ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against the person.” Id. art. 46B.003(a). This standard aims to safeguard the
accuracy and reliability of the trial, enhance fairness of the criminal process,
maintain the dignity of the trial process, and make punishment more just. Morris v.
State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 286 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (discussing the rationale for
the competency standard articulated in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
“Competence to stand trial is rudimentary,” and the “rights deemed essential to a fair
trial”—the right to effective assistance of counsel, to summon, confront, and cross-
examine witnesses, and to testify on one’s own behalf or remain silent—depend on
it. Id. at 287 (quoting Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996)).
A trial court employs a two-step procedure for making competency
determinations: (1) an informal inquiry; and (2) a formal competency trial. Boyett v.
State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The trial court must conduct
an informal inquiry upon any “suggestion” from any credible source that the
defendant may be incompetent. Id.; see CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(a), (c), (c-1). If
the trial court determines at the informal inquiry stage that there is “some evidence
from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent
to stand trial,” it must then proceed to the second step—order that the defendant
submit to a psychiatric or psychological competency examination and, except for

17
certain exceptions, later hold a formal competency trial. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563
(quoting CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(c) then citing CRIM. PROC. arts. 46B.005(a), (b),
46B.021(b)).
The “some evidence” standard at the informal inquiry stage “requir[es] ‘more
than none or a scintilla’ of evidence that ‘rationally may lead to a conclusion of
incompetency.’” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564 (quoting Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d
676, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). There must be some evidence presented from
which it may rationally be inferred that: (1) the defendant suffers some degree of a
debilitating mental illness; (2) he obstinately refuses to cooperate with trial counsel
to his own apparent detriment; and (3) his mental illness is what fuels his obstinacy.
Id.; Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 696. In other words, “it is not enough to present evidence
of either a defendant’s mental illness alone or his refusal to cooperate with counsel—
rather, there must be some evidence indicating that the defendant’s refusal to
rationally engage with counsel is caused by his mental illness.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d
at 564.
Evidence relevant to these issues includes whether a defendant can:
(1) rationally understand the charges against [him] and the potential
consequences of the pending criminal proceedings; (2) disclose to
counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (3) engage in
a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the
adversarial nature of criminal proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate
courtroom behavior; and (6) testify.
Morris, 301 S.W.3d at 286 (quoting CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024); see CRIM. PROC.
arts. 46B.004(c-1).
The trial court is not required to follow any specific protocols in conducting
the informal inquiry. George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d); Duhamel v. State, No. 11-22-00192-CR, 2024
WL 2751285, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not

18
designated for publication). During its informal inquiry, the trial court, in making
this initial determination, “must consider only evidence of incompetency, and it must
not weigh evidence of competency against the evidence of incompetency.” Boyett,
545 S.W.3d at 564. “[T]he trial court’s first-hand factual assessment of [a
defendant’s] mental competency,” based on its observations of the defendant’s
mannerisms and behaviors, is “entitled to great deference.” McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d
at 713; Duhamel, 2024 WL 2751285, at *7. We therefore review challenges to the
adequacy of a trial court’s competency inquiry and its competency determination for
an abuse of discretion. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009), superseded by statute, CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004, as recognized in Turner,
422 S.W.3d at 692 & n.31 (explaining that the former “bona fide doubt standard” is
no longer used to determine competency); Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008); see also Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d).
We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and we must
uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Burch v. State, 541 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A trial court does not
abuse its discretion absent a showing that it acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, or
without reference to any guiding rules and principles. State v. Lerma, 639 S.W.3d
63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). An abuse of discretion occurs “only when no
reasonable view of the record could support” the trial court’s ruling. Id.
B. Sovereign Citizens’ Philosophy and Competency to Stand Trial
Appellant’s rhetoric throughout the proceedings is a familiar script frequently
espoused by “so-called ‘sovereign citizens’ who have plagued courtrooms across the
country.” Jemerson v. State, No. 02-23-00036-CR, 2023 WL 6889947, at *5 n.6
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

19
publication) (collecting cases); see also Lewis v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423, 430–31
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). This old tune that is comprised
of inaccurate case law quotes, self-serving readings and interpretations of the United
States Constitution, and proffered definitions from outdated legal dictionaries has
been summarily rejected by federal and state courts alike.5 Courts have further
acknowledged that although sovereign citizens’ particular brand of obstinacy may
arguably promote an initial suggestion of incompetency, they “typically have the
capacity to understand criminal proceedings and assist an attorney.” George F.
Parker, Competence to Stand Trial Evaluations of Sovereign Citizens: A Case Series
and Primer of Odd Political and Legal Beliefs, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & LAW 338,
344 (2014)6; see also, e.g., Lewis, 532 S.W.3d at 430–31. With this issue now before
us, we likewise conclude that simply espousing or promoting sovereign-citizen
beliefs neither suggests nor indicates that one is incompetent to stand trial. A cursory
examination of the movement’s foundational tenets reveals a clear, calculated
purpose behind the obstructive, chaotic behavior of those that subscribe to it.

5
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Neal, 776
F.3d 645, 657 (9th Cir. 2015) (Defendant’s sovereign-citizen beliefs and “numerous comments . . . disputing
jurisdiction and other ‘nonsensical’ issues such as calling the United States a corporation” did not display
a lack of competency); United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 954–56 (7th Cir. 2003) (A disruptive
defendant claiming to be a Moorish national, “copyrighted” his name, and sent invoices to government
officials who used his name did not warrant a competency hearing); Jemerson, 2023 WL 6889947, at *5
n.6; Ochoa v. State, No. 07-16-00400-CR, 2018 WL 1278714, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 12,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Defendant’s “repeated diatribes about trusts,
admiralty jurisdiction, military jurisdiction, the Uniform Commercial Code, fiduciaries, and the like,” albeit
bizarre, does not “fall into the category the Court of Criminal Appeals mentioned in McDaniel.”); Lewis,
532 S.W.3d at 430–31; see also Anderson v. Johnson, 554 P.3d 205 (Nev. 2024) (unpublished disposition),
No. 87098, 2024 WL 3841586, at *2 (Sovereign citizen beliefs “do not establish a lack of competence to
stand trial”); People v. Williams, 189 A.D.3d 1978, 1981 [3rd Dept. 2020] (“[T]he record reflects that [the]
defendant selectively exhibited behavior associated with adherents of the sovereign citizen’s movement,”
rather than evidence of incompetency); State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170400, 2019-Ohio-132,
2019 WL 258699, at *3 (Sovereign-citizen beliefs or other “fringe views” alone do not trigger the need for
a competency evaluation.).
6
Available at https://jaapl.org/content/jaapl/42/3/338.full.pdf.

20
Though the precise contours of the philosophy differ among various groups,
sovereign citizens believe they are beyond the reach of the government’s
jurisdiction. See United States v. Jones, 65 F.4th 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2023); United
States v. Jonassen, 759 F.3d 653, 657 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Sovereign citizens’ assert
that the federal government is illegitimate and insist that they are not subject to its
jurisdiction. The defense has ‘no conceivable validity in American law.’” (quoting
United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990))). They openly
renounce the legitimacy of the United States government and criminal justice system
by relying on curious and implausible interpretations of legal documents such as the
United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cheryl M. Paradis,
Elizabeth Owen & Gene McCullough, Evaluations of Urban Sovereign Citizens’
Competency to Stand Trial, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & LAW 158, 159 (2018)7;
Parker, supra at 343–46.
Importantly, the ideology’s inherent opposition to authority and subversion of
the legal process belies post-conviction assertions of incompetency. Sovereign-
citizen rhetoric portrays an awareness of the law, one’s constitutional rights, and a
broad understanding of the criminal justice system, while in concert with conscious
disobedience. For instance, they claim that names written in all capital letters do not
refer to “the ‘flesh and blood’ or [a] ‘natural’ person,” and that they are unburdened
by certain responsibilities such as securing a driver’s license or paying taxes, yet
they have the “inalienable or ‘God given’ right to travel.” See Paradis et.al., supra
at 159. Further, various groups have designed boilerplate legal templates that are
available online that use “impressive-sounding tomes” and “trappings of legitimacy
to maintain ignorance of mainstream legal interpretations and defend pseudolegal

7
Available at https://jaapl.org/content/jaapl/46/2/158.full.pdf.

21
ideas.” Colin McRoberts, Tinfoil Hats and Powdered Wigs: Thoughts on
Pseudolaw, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 637, 653 (2019).
Although their misinformed legal theories are rooted in an incomplete
familiarity with isolated principles that are stripped of their intended meaning, they
nevertheless grasp the nature of legal proceedings, and then knowingly defy it. See
id. at 653 (It “requires an almost aggressive ignorance of the relevant facts” to call
income tax and requiring drivers to be licensed unconstitutional.); see also Caesar
Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 80 MON. L.
REV. 153, 158–171 (2019) (explaining the origins of the movement and citing
sovereign citizen websites quoting the United States Constitution and Supreme
Court cases). Simply put, sovereign citizens attempt to play the fool with a hidden
hand—they are defiant by design, which necessarily entails having a rational
understanding of legal proceedings.
C. Appellant’s Competency to Stand Trial
In light of the foregoing, Appellant’s argument that his “sovereign-citizen-
esque fixations” is suggestive of his lack of competency to stand trial is unavailing.
He fervently protested throughout the proceedings that he only understood
“universal law and natural law,” “common law,” and the Uniform Commercial
Code. According to Appellant, he was “not a U.S. citizen or a federal citizen . . .
only an inhabitant of Texas.” And because he is “a secured party creditor and not a
secured party debtor,” the State of Texas as a government was “committing a
trespass against [him].” The trial court expressly determined that Appellant was
mentally competent to stand trial after thoroughly inquiring and admonishing him of
the risks of self-representation and his choice to represent himself at trial.
Despite Appellant’s confrontational, disruptive behavior and misguided legal
ramblings which has no application in a courtroom in Texas or elsewhere, his

22
conduct does not suggest that such a purported disconnect from reality would equate
to mental incompetence. See Lindsey v, State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 25 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (“Appellant’s lack of courtroom etiquette does
not equate to mental incompetence.”). Bizarre legal theories and unusual beliefs—
whether sincerely held or intentionally advanced to disrupt legal proceedings—are
a far cry from any indicia of incompetency. See James, 328 F.3d at 954–56; see also
Ochoa, 2018 WL 1278714, at *4–5 (the defendant’s “repeated diatribes about trusts,
admiralty jurisdiction, military jurisdiction, the Uniform Commercial Code,
fiduciaries, and the like,” albeit bizarre, did not require an informal inquiry into his
competency). As such, Appellant’s selective adoption of a typical sovereign-citizen
stance is hardly akin to being incompetent to stand trial.
Utilizing another sovereign-citizen tactic, Appellant claimed that he “[did] not
understand any [of the] charges [pending against him].” The refusal to cooperate,
rationally engage, or profess confusion and a lack of understanding is not enough to
demonstrate incompetency to stand trial, if it is evident that the defendant understood
the adversarial nature of the proceedings and was able to meaningfully participate.
See Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564; Clark, 592 S.W.3d at 928; see also Alhadad v. State,
No. 02-22-00201-CR, 2023 WL 4940621, at *1–2, 11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 3, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (upholding the
trial court’s competency determination despite the defendant’s erratic and disruptive
courtroom behavior, and professed lack of understanding of the pending charges).
Here, we conclude that the trial court rationally determined that Appellant’s
obstinacy was a legal tactic fueled by his belief in sovereign-citizen ideology, not by
any genuine or legitimate mental illness or disability for which there is no evidence.
Appellant further asserts that “[i]t is clear from reading the dry record . . . that
[he] suffers from mental health issues,” based on the following actions: (1) his

23
inability to differentiate between the prosecutor and his standby counsel;
(2) referring to the jurors as “witnesses”; (3) accusing the trial judge of “practicing
law”; and (4) because he “lodged an objection based on ‘conspiracy.’” To the
contrary, the record shows quite the opposite—throughout the trial, Appellant
manifested a clear grasp and understanding of the allegations, the adversarial nature
of the proceedings, and the ability to mount a defense to the charges.
Appellant, who is no stranger to the criminal justice system, brazenly
informed the trial court: “I don’t have to follow the rules.” To further illustrate,
amidst a contentious exchange during a pretrial hearing, Appellant candidly revealed
his knowledge and experience of trial proceedings to the trial court:
Since you’re speaking about trial, I doubt it will be possible for
somebody to produce a jury of my peers, because all jurors are selected
from pools of registered voters. And when people register to vote their
natural ability to talk in natural law is diminished and they become
fiction, so they are definitely not my peers.

See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.001(a)(1) (West Supp. 2024) (requiring that
prospective jurors be summoned from voter registration lists). During jury selection,
Appellant showed proper deference to the venire panel by ultimately following the
trial court’s directive to stand while addressing the prospective jurors. At trial,
Appellant contested the State’s redactions of Officer Rackley’s bodycam footage,
and argued that the “witnesses”—the jury—“should definitely hear why it was
edited.” It is therefore clear that Appellant aptly understood and distinguished the
jury’s role as the factfinder from the parties’ opportunity to present evidence through
witnesses. He simply misspoke when he referred to the jury as “witnesses.”
Appellant’s purported inability to distinguish his standby counsel from the
prosecutor is also unsubstantiated by the record. Appellant conferred with Jones and

24
asserted numerous objections throughout the State’s case-in-chief. For instance,
Appellant erupted during the State’s voir dire presentation:
[APPELLANT]: I don’t have to stand by and watch British
ministerial persecuting me any further [referring to the prosecutor].
[TRIAL COURT]: It appears to me that you are merely
attempting to disrupt, delay, cause any kind of trouble that you can.
[APPELLANT]: Well, he’s trying to fatigue the crowd before I
get a chance to talk. They want to ask me questions but he’s steadily
talking.
[TRIAL COURT]: This is how voir dire works, Mr. Royal.
Then, acknowledging the trial court’s authority, and perhaps realizing the benefit of
rational communication, Appellant asked: “Can you make him speed up or
something?” Consequently, Appellant was cognizant of the respective roles of the
prosecutor, Jones, and the trial court.
Finally, Appellant’s objections based on an alleged conspiracy and accusing
the trial court of practicing law are inapposite, and do not vitiate his comprehension
of the proceedings. Making irrelevant statements and attempting to inject
inadmissible evidence do not evince a lack of understanding, or an inability to
communicate or function rationally. See, e.g., Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 24 (“Lack of
legal skill or mediocre legal strategy does not show a defendant is incompetent to
stand trial.”). Further, Appellant’s deliberate opposition to “giv[ing] [the trial court]
recognition as authority” demonstrates his awareness of the trial court’s role. As
such, Appellant’s ramblings and bizarre behavior, “while imperfect and rude, at
times, did not suggest incompetency.” Id.; Lewis, 532 S.W.3d at 429–433 (the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an informal inquiry despite the
sovereign-citizen defendant’s obstructive behavior and professed lack of
understanding of relevant legal rules).

25
We cannot ignore the trial court’s first-hand factual assessment of Appellant’s
demeanor and mental competence, and we afford the trial court’s findings the
deference to which they are entitled. See McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 713. Guided by
its observations, the trial court, after thoroughly examining and admonishing
Appellant, correctly and rationally determined that Appellant (1) had an adequate
understanding of the charges pending against him, the parties’ roles, and the nature
of the proceedings, and (2) could adequately confer with standby counsel (Jones),
decide whether to testify on his own behalf, and maintain appropriate decorum when
he chose to do so. Further, he unequivocally advised the trial court, in response to
its inquiry, that he was mentally competent and did not have any mental disability
or illness. No evidence to the contrary was presented.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.
V. The Right to Self-Representation
Appellant contends in his second issue that the trial court erroneously granted
his timely and unequivocal request to invoke his right to self-representation. Relying
on the same facts to support his contention that he was not competent to stand trial,
he also argues that he lacked the competence to knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his right to counsel and invoke his right to self-representation for
purposes of trial. However, we reiterate that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it granted Appellant’s request.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
Every criminal defendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel and the reciprocal constitutional right to self-representation. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. The right to self-representation is separate from
the right to assistance of counsel, and to choose one is to forego the other. Osorio-
Lopez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 750, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing United States v.

26
Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 54 (2nd Cir. 1990)). But, to proceed pro se, a defendant must
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, and clearly and
unequivocally assert his right to self-representation. Id. (citing Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
A knowing and intelligent waiver requires a showing that the defendant was
warned of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,” and “his choice
[was] made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835); Osorio-Lopez, 663 S.W.3d
at 756. Whether the waiver of the right to assistance of counsel was effective
depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the consideration of a
defendant’s background, experience, and conduct. Osorio-Lopez, 663 S.W.3d at
756. However, inquiries concerning a defendant’s age, education, background, or
previous mental health history are not mandatory in every instance. Blankenship v.
State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
A defendant must be competent to choose and invoke his right to self-
representation before he can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to the
assistance of counsel and represent himself. Osorio-Lopez, 663 S.W.3d at 757
(citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399–400 (1993)). The competency to
effectively waive the right to counsel is the same as the standard for determining
one’s competency to stand trial, which requires a defendant to have: (1) the
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding”; and (2) “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010); see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008). “[A] defendant
need not have the skill and experience of a lawyer ‘to competently and intelligently
choose self-representation.’” Osorio-Lopez, 663 S.W.3d at 757 (quoting Faretta,
422 U.S. at 835). In this regard, the focus is not whether the defendant is competent

27
to represent himself at trial; rather, it is whether he is competent to effectively choose
to do so. Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400–01).
The trial court is in the best position to determine if the defendant is competent
to proceed pro se. See Chadwick, 309 S.W.3d at 562–63. We thus review the trial
court’s ruling on the defendant’s request for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 563.
Because one’s competency to choose self-representation is a mixed question of law
and fact that turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we afford almost
total deference to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 561. In doing so, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and imply any findings
of fact that are necessary to support its ruling, provided they are supported by the
record. Id.
B. Appellant’s Competency to Voluntarily Choose Self-Representation
A criminal defendant’s ability to competently choose self-representation and
to stand trial are distinct, yet related, inquiries. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174–75, 178.
Here, Appellant reasserts that his “fixations and delusions,” his lack of respect and
courtroom decorum, and his general inability “to conduct himself with the usual
decorum required in court” or “express his thoughts and arguments in a concise and
orderly fashion,” undermined the trial court’s conclusion that he competently chose
to represent himself.
Once again, Appellant’s argument is neither novel, meritorious, nor
persuasive. See, e.g., Jonassen, 759 F.3d at 660–61 & n.4 (concluding that a
sovereign citizen was competent to stand trial and, by extension, able to represent
himself). As with Appellant’s proclaimed confusion, his assertion of his right to
self-representation and simultaneous deflection during his admonishment exchange
with the trial court were part and parcel of his sovereign-citizen defense. See Jones,
65 F.4th at 930–31 (The appellant argued “that his legal theories were so outlandish

28
. . . that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
Not so, in our view.”). Pursuing that defense placed the trial court in a delicate
position, because the trial court has limited discretion to deny a defendant’s request
to invoke his right of self-representation. See Lewis, 532 S.W.3d at 430–31.
While a defendant may not use his rights “to manipulate the court” or “jack
the system around,” Huggins v. State, 674 S.W.3d 538, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023),
he “must be allowed to represent himself ‘if he truly wants to do so.’” Blankenship,
673 S.W.2d at 584 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817). This is so because, “[d]espite
[a] trial judge’s benevolent intentions,”
[T]he right to defend is personal. It is the defendant, not his lawyer or
the State, who will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It
is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. While we
may be skeptical of his election knowing that he may conduct his
defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.
Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 583; O’Brien v. State, 482 S.W.3d 593, 623 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015), aff’d, 544 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Here, Appellant unequivocally asserted his right of self-representation, and
persisted in his request even after the trial court patiently and properly admonished
him as to the perils and pitfalls of proceeding pro se. See Burgess v. State, 816
S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Appellant therefore made “a clear-eyed,
tactical decision” by choosing to defend himself at trial, and “the trial court had no
alternative but to respect [Appellant’s] right.” Jones, 65 F.4th at 930; Burgess, 816
S.W.2d at 429; see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984) (The denial
of the right of self-representation “is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis. The
right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”).
Moreover, Appellant was deliberately recalcitrant in response to the trial
court’s inquiries, refusing to divulge his age, education, and courtroom experience.

29
We reiterate, however, that Appellant’s ongoing disruptive conduct was no
indication that he was incompetent to waive his right to counsel and exercise his
right to represent himself. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999). “If such actions were probative of incompetence, one could effectively
avoid criminal justice through immature behavior.” Id. at 395.
Even so, by submitting several handwritten, pretrial, pro se motions,
Appellant made clear his literacy and general understanding of applicable legal
principles. Furthermore, his arguments, objections, and even his outbursts during
trial were “timely, topical, and logically related to the questions and answers offered
during the examination of other witnesses.” Id. Appellant cross-examined
witnesses, objected to evidence offered by the State, and presented witnesses in his
defense. While he may not have handled the stages of trial with the skill and finesse
of a seasoned trial attorney, his “[l]ack of legal skill or mediocre legal strategy” is
no indicia of incompetency. See Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 24; Demarsh v. State,
No. 02-15-00210-CR, 2016 WL 1267702, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 31,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Nor does a defendant’s
ill-informed legal strategy imply mental incompetence. See Jones, 65 F.4th at 930–
31; Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 24.
Appellant’s sovereign-citizen beliefs, however unwise, are not evidence that
he was incompetent to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel and
invoke his right to proceed pro se. He made conscious, strategic decisions, was
capable of rational communication, and irrefutably appreciated the adversarial
nature of the proceedings and the charges filed against him. See Lindsey, 544
S.W.3d at 26. We find nothing unfair in holding Appellant to his choice, as “the
Sixth Amendment protects the right of defendants to ‘go down in flames’” if they so

30
choose. Jones, 65 F.4th at 930–31 (quoting United States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978,
986 (8th Cir. 2012)).
In this instance, Appellant’s behavior supports, rather than undermines as he
suggests, the trial court’s determination that Appellant was competent to waive his
right to counsel and to proceed pro se. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by granting Appellant’s request to represent himself.
We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
VI. Clerical Errors in the Judgments of Conviction
In his fifth and sixth issues, Appellant correctly points out that court costs are
erroneously assessed in both judgments, and the Penal Code provision recited in one
judgment does not correspond to the offense for which he was convicted.
Pursuant to Article 102.073(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, court costs
may only be assessed once against a defendant who is convicted of multiple offenses
in a single criminal action. CRIM. PROC. art. 102.073(a). Here, Appellant was
convicted of two separate offenses in a single criminal action, yet each judgment
orders Appellant to pay court costs of $290. Consequently, court costs were
erroneously assessed in one of these causes. See id. art. 102.073(a).
An appellate court has the power to modify the trial court’s judgment to
make it speak the truth when it has the necessary information before it to do
so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993). Court costs are determined by “using the highest category of offense
that is possible based on the defendant’s convictions.” CRIM. PROC. art. 102.073(b).
Because the offense with the highest category for which Appellant was convicted is
the offense of aggravated assault against a public servant, a first-degree felony, we
retain the court costs assessed in that judgment (trial court cause no. 11110), and we
modify the trial court’s judgment and delete the $290 court costs assessment ordered

31
in trial court cause no. 11108 (the offense of evading arrest or detention with a
vehicle). See id. art. 102.073(b).
Additionally, the judgment of conviction in trial court cause no. 11108 recites
that Appellant was convicted under Penal Code Section 38.04(b)(1)(B); this is the
incorrect statute of conviction. Section 38.04(b)(2)(A) criminalizes using a vehicle
to evade arrest or detention. See PENAL § 38.04(b)(2)(A). Because we again have
the necessary information to make the judgment speak the truth, we modify the
judgment of conviction in trial court cause no. 11108 to recite the correct statute of
conviction, Penal Code Section 38.04(b)(2)(A). See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley,
865 S.W.2d at 27–28.
We sustain Appellant’s fifth and sixth issues, and we modify the trial court’s
judgment in trial cause no. 11108 as set forth above.
VII. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

December 12, 2024
Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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