Jesus Trevino Castillo v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 15, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-22-00266-CR
__________

JESUS TREVINO CASTILLO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 385th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR54219

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jesus Trevino Castillo, was charged by indictment with two counts
of aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony, and five counts
of indecency with a child, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 21.11(a)(1), (d), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (e) (West 2019). A jury found Appellant
guilty of all seven counts. For each of the aggravated-sexual-assault convictions,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for life in the Correctional
Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and ordered the
sentences to run consecutively. The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at
fifteen years’ confinement for each of the indecency-with-a-child convictions and
ordered the sentences to run consecutively to the aggravated-sexual-assault
convictions and concurrently with each indecency-with-a-child conviction.
Appellant challenges his convictions in two issues on appeal, arguing that:
(1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) there are clerical
errors in the judgments that require correction.
We previously sustained Appellant’s second issue, abated this appeal, and
remanded the cause to the trial court to enter corrected judgments of conviction that
reflect the proper standardized felony judgment forms and contain all of the
statutorily mandated information. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4; Felder v. State, No. 03-13-
00706-CR, 2014 WL 3560426, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin July 18, 2014, no pet.) (per
curiam) (mem. op.). We further ordered the district clerk to forward a supplemental
clerk’s record containing the trial court’s corrected judgments within thirty days of
the date of the order. We reinstated this appeal after the trial court entered corrected
judgments and after receiving the supplemental reporter’s record. We now address
Appellant’s remaining issue and affirm the corrected judgments.
Factual Background
In August of 2018, T.R. managed a Sonic restaurant in Midland while caring
for her two children, nine-year-old B.L., and thirteen-year-old D.M. Because of her
work schedule, T.R. often called upon friends, including Appellant, to pick up the
children from school, and take them dinner.
One evening, Appellant took B.L. and D.M. food, and went inside rather than
leaving immediately. D.M. returned to his room to play videogames as he typically

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would after retrieving his dinner, and B.L. remained in the living room. Appellant
sat next to B.L. on the couch and started “rubbing [her] on [her] arms” and back, and
touched her thighs. “[T]hat’s as far as he went” that first time. But on at least four
more occasions over the next few weeks, Appellant’s behavior escalated. In addition
to rubbing her back, arms, stomach, and thighs—“the same spots”—Appellant
carried B.L. to her mother’s bedroom and removed her clothing. He then touched
and licked her breasts and areola, penetrated her vagina with two of his fingers, and
licked her vagina. B.L. described how Appellant manipulated her areola, how “[i]t
hurt” when he penetrated her with his fingers, and how “[i]t tickled” when he licked
the “inside of . . . [her] vagina.”
After each time Appellant sexually assaulted B.L., she was scared, and would
awake at night wondering: “How am I going to tell my mom[?]” It was not until
May of 2019 that B.L. finally disclosed the sexual abuse to her school counselor.
B.L. was taken to the Midland Rape Crisis and Children’s Advocacy Center where
Erin Sabulsky conducted a forensic interview. Nurse Michelle Awbrey performed
B.L.’s sexual assault exam, during which B.L. gave an account consistent to what
she told Sabulsky.
Police contacted Appellant, and he voluntarily spoke to Midland Police
Department Investigator Joe Rogers. Appellant initially denied being alone with
B.L. for longer than five or ten minutes at a time when he would take her home from
school. He subsequently admitted that he went inside and watched television with
B.L. while D.M. was in his room. Appellant told Investigator Rogers that he could
not “explain detail by detail,” but maintained “that he didn’t do anything.”
Appellant was indicted for two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child
for penetrating B.L.’s vagina with his fingers and his tongue. He was charged with
five additional counts of indecency with a child for touching and licking B.L.’s

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breast and touching her genitals. The jury found Appellant guilty of all seven counts
as alleged. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment on each of the
aggravated-sexual-assault convictions, and fifteen years’ confinement for each of
the indecency-with-a-child convictions.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his
convictions based on the lack of physical evidence and other witnesses to
corroborate B.L.’s testimony. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Lee v. State,
676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). Under the Jackson
standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State,
667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. We
defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the
weight their testimony is to be afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13
(West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762 (“[A] reviewing court does not sit as a
thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by
reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.”). “This familiar standard
gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in
the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at

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319). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762.
We treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally under this standard.
Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ruiz v. State, 631
S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the
evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence
can alone be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414
S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. Each fact need not point directly
and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances
is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence
must be considered cumulatively, we may not use a “divide and conquer” strategy
for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446,
448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 873 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013)). Rather, we must consider the cumulative force of all the
evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Appellant contends that because “[t]here was no physical, forensic, or medical
evidence to corroborate” B.L.’s testimony, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. But,
in so arguing, he acknowledges the well-settled law that a conviction for aggravated
sexual assault or indecency with a child “is supportable on the uncorroborated
testimony” of a child victim alone. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07 (West 2023).
As charged in this case, a person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child
if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ

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of a child by any means. PENAL § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). A person commits the offense
of indecency with a child if, with a child younger than seventeen years of age, the
person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in
sexual contact. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” is any touching committed with
the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person: (1) of the child’s anus,
breast, or any part of the genitals; or (2) of any part of the child’s body with a
person’s anus, breast, or any part of the genitals. Id. § 21.11(c).
Here, viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for
aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. The uncorroborated
testimony of a child victim is alone sufficient to support a conviction for a sexual
offense. Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet.
ref’d) (citing CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07); see also Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130,
134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Thus, the lack of physical evidence or other witnesses
besides B.L. to the sexual abuse is irrelevant to our sufficiency analysis, as we cannot
consider or speculate as to what was not presented at trial. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761–62; see also Taylor v. State, 555 S.W.3d 765, 775
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e may not consider evidence not
presented to the jury in our sufficiency review.”).
B.L. testified that Appellant touched and licked her breast, touched her vagina,
and penetrated it with his fingers and tongue on or about the dates alleged in the
indictment. It is undisputed that B.L. was under fourteen years of age at the time of
the offense. B.L.’s testimony, without more, would have been sufficient to support
Appellant’s convictions for indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault.
Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 328.

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Even so, the other evidence presented corroborated B.L.’s account. The State
called seven witnesses in addition to B.L. D.M., T.R., and Appellant confirmed that
Appellant would bring D.M. and B.L. dinner while T.R. was at work. D.M. also
testified that Appellant delivered food to him and B.L. “quite a bit,” and that he
would immediately return to his room to play videogames with the door closed and
his headset on. Appellant further admitted to police that he sat with B.L. on the
couch while D.M. was in his room playing videogames. Consequently, the jury
could have rationally and logically inferred that Appellant had created the
opportunity to sequester himself with a nonfamilial child to commit the charged
offenses as B.L. described. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the absence of “physical, forensic, or
medical evidence,” Nurse Awbrey explained that the lack of physical injuries or
physical signs of sexual abuse is not uncommon, especially given the time that had
elapsed between the offense dates and B.L.’s outcry. B.L.’s testimony at trial was
consistent with her 2019 outcry to Sabulsky, and her detailed history she gave to
Nurse Awbrey. The jury was free to believe that there was no credible evidence of
a motive by the nine-year-old to falsely accuse Appellant of such abuse, and
Appellant suggests no motive for B.L. to falsely accuse him. The jury could have
rationally decided to believe B.L.’s testimony and disbelieve Appellant’s denials,
and we defer to that credibility determination. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see
also Espinoza v. State, No. 11-19-00232-CR, 2022 WL 3903774, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 31, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offenses for which Appellant was convicted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

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This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the corrected judgments of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

August 15, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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