The State of Texas v. Charles Joseph Meras

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-18-00345-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellant
v.

CHARLES JOSEPH MERAS,
Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 1
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 20173335CR1

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

Charles Joseph Meras was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He

filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence arising from his detention and subsequent

arrest on the basis that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him for a violation

of section 545.060(a) of the Transportation Code. The trial court granted that motion.

Agreeing with the reasoning in support of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s four-judge

decision in Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 559-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), we reversed

the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
State v. Meras, 629 S.W.3d 284, 287 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020). Meras filed a petition for

discretionary review. Over two years later, in State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2022), the Court of Criminal Appeals impliedly, if not expressly, overruled Leming,

and shortly thereafter, vacated our judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration

in light of Hardin and to address any remaining issues necessary to the resolution of the

appeal. State v. Meras, No. PD-0120-20, 2023 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 19, at *2 (Crim. App.

Jan. 11, 2023).

The sole question on remand is whether the officer was reasonable in his

interpretation of section 545.060(a) of the Texas Traffic Code when he initiated a traffic

stop of Meras, notwithstanding that the officer was subsequently determined to be

mistaken. We hold the answer to that question is, yes.

At the time Meras was stopped, in September of 2017, there was no controlling

interpretation of section 545.060(a) from the Court of Criminal Appeals or from this

Court. See State v. Meras, 629 S.W.3d 284, 286 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020). A

controlling interpretation did not occur until the opinion in Hardin issued on November

2, 2022. As observed by Justice Slaughter in a concurring opinion, “this situation appears

to be a classic case of reasonable mistake of law by the officer who pulled Appellee over.”

State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 879(Tex. Crim. App. 2022), Slaughter, J., concurring. An

officer's reasonable but mistaken understanding of traffic law can give rise to reasonable

suspicion to justify a traffic stop. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57, 135 S. Ct. 530,

190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014). Thus, the officer's mistaken interpretation of section 545.060(a)

was “entirely reasonable in view of the nuanced statutory language and the conflicting

State v. Meras Page 2
caselaw from [the Court of Criminal Appeals] and the intermediate courts of appeals

interpreting it.” Id. The difference in this case from Hardin, however, is that in this case,

the State raised the mistake-of-law issue in the trial court as an affirmative ground to

deny the motion to suppress. Thus, because the State raised the issue, the trial court erred

by granting Meras's motion over that argument.

Accordingly, the trial court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress is

reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

TOM GRAY
Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed August 16, 2023
Do not publish
[CR25]

State v. Meras Page 3