The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator TX LP No. AJ0303, Robert Earl Scott, Beverly Scott, and Robert Carl Scott

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-23-00356-CV

The State of Texas,
Appellant

v.

2007 Lincoln Navigator TX LP No. AJ0303, Robert Earl Scott, Beverly
Scott, and Robert Carl Scott,
Appellees

On appeal from the
361st District Court of Brazos County, Texas
Judge David G. Hilburn, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 17-002507-CV-361

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State of Texas appeals a final judgment denying the State’s

request for forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator (“Navigator”), declaring

Robert Earl Scott and Beverly Scott (“Parents”) of Robert Carl Scott (“R.C.

Scott”) were innocent owners, and ordering the vehicle be returned to the

Parents. The State argued that it proved by a preponderance of the evidence

that the Navigator was subject to forfeiture under Chapter 59 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, that R.C. Scott was an equitable owner of the Navigator,

and that the Parents of R.C. Scott were not innocent owners under 59.02(c)

and 59.02(h)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We agree that the

Navigator was subject to forfeiture and that R.C. Scott was an equitable

owner of the same. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s Order and render

judgment granting forfeiture.

Background

On or about September 1, 2017, R.C. Scott was driving the Navigator

when he was arrested and charged with Evading in a Vehicle as well as

Driving While Intoxicated 3rd or More. Police alleged R.C. Scott drove

without headlights, drove on the wrong side of the road, showed signs of

intoxication, refused to get out of the Navigator, almost hit an officer while

driving off from the traffic stop, and violated traffic laws during the police’s

pursuit of R.C. Scott in the Navigator. R.C. Scott was later indicted on these

charges and pled guilty to both charges on April 25, 2019.

The Parents hold the title to the Navigator. R.C. Scott was listed as an

insured driver on the insurance policy for the Navigator since the time the

vehicle was purchased. R.C. Scott’s parole-mandated interlock device was

installed on the Navigator. The mother of R.C. Scott testified that R.C. Scott

had to start the Navigator for the Parents because the Parents could not

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 2
operate the interlock device. There was no evidence that any other vehicle

owned or operated by R.C. Scott had a parole-mandated interlock device

installed. R.C. Scott’s mother alleges that R.C. Scott’s primary vehicle was a

Chevrolet Impala, which she was driving on the date of R.C. Scott’s

September 2017 arrest. In responses to interrogatories, the Parents

identified R.C. Scott’s father as the owner of the Impala. There is no

evidence that there was an interlock device installed on the Impala or that

the Parents needed R.C. Scott to start the Impala. R.C. Scott’s mother

testified that R.C. Scott drove the Navigator multiple times in a month and

that R.C. Scott otherwise walked or was picked up by friends or the Parents.

On the date of the September 2017 arrest, R.C. Scott’s mother knew

R.C. Scott was driving the Navigator around recreationally. Both Parents

were aware of their son’s prior criminal behavior involving vehicles.

Prior to his arrest on September 1, 2017, R.C. Scott had been arrested

and convicted numerous times for vehicle-related charges including Driving

While Intoxicated, Obstruction of a Highway, and Evading Arrest or

Detention with a Vehicle. In January 2010, while operating the same

Navigator at issue here, R.C. Scott was arrested for Driving While

Intoxicated and Failure to Stop and Give Information after a hit-and-run

collision. The accident report for the 2010 collision lists R.C. Scott as the

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 3
owner of the Navigator. In at least three other vehicle-related arrests, R.C.

Scott was operating the Impala. Testimony supports that the Parents were

aware of R.C. Scott’s substance abuse issues and knew he had a history of

Driving While Intoxicated.

Following the September 2017 arrest, the State of Texas filed its Notice

of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture. The Parents and R.C. Scott answered,

generally denying the allegations contained therein and asserting the

affirmative defense of innocent owner pursuant to Article 59.02(c) of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Following a bench trial, the trial court

entered a judgment in favor of the Parents. This appeal followed.

The Navigator is Subject to Forfeiture

Because a forfeiture proceeding under Chapter 59 is a civil in rem

proceeding subject to the rules applicable to civil trials and appeals generally,

the appropriate standard of review depends on which party had the burden of

proof on the issue at trial. One Ford Mustang v. State, 231 S.W.3d 445, 448–

49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.). For the State to prevail in a forfeiture

proceeding under Chapter 59, it is required to prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture to the State. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.05(b); see also $43,774.00 in U.S. Currency v. State,

266 S.W.3d 178, 182 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). In an appeal

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 4
of a finding in which an appellant has the burden of proof, the appellant

“must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of

law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis, 46

S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).

To prevail in a forfeiture proceeding, the State must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the property seized is “contraband” and

thus subject to forfeiture. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.05(b). “Contraband”

is defined as “property of any nature ... used in the commission of ... any

offense under Chapter 49, Penal Code, that is punishable as a felony of the

third degree or state jail felony, if the defendant has been previously

convicted three times of an offense under that chapter.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 59.01(2)(A)(v). State v. One 2015 Jeep VIN 1C4NJCBA1FD436982,

No. 04-19-00779-CV, 2020 WL 7365453, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Dec. 16, 2020, no pet.). An offense under section 49.04 of the Penal Code is a

third-degree felony if the person has previously been convicted two times of

any other offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while

intoxicated. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 49.09(b)(2).

In the present case, the vehicle was “contraband” because the evidence

showed that R.C. Scott used the vehicle to commit a third-degree felony

(Driving While Intoxicated), and he had three previous Driving While

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 5
Intoxicated convictions. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.01(2)(A)(v). R.C.

Scott pled guilty to Driving While Intoxicated for each of his arrests on

October 21, 2009, January 24, 2010, and December 28, 2012. There is no

dispute that on September 1, 2017, the Navigator was used in the

commission of Evading Arrest or Detention with a Vehicle and Driving While

Intoxicated Third or More. R.C. Scott pled guilty to those charges. The State

established, as a matter of law, that the Navigator was contraband subject to

forfeiture under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

R.C. Scott was an Equitable Owner of the Navigator

Having concluded that the Navigator was subject to forfeiture, we turn

to the State’s challenge of the Parents’ innocent-owner defense. The

innocent-owner defense prevents forfeiture if the claimant demonstrates, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he acquired and perfected the interest

prior to or during the act giving rise to the forfeiture, and did not know or

should not reasonably have known of the act giving rise to the forfeiture or

that it was likely to occur at or before the time of acquiring and perfecting the

interest. One (1) 2002 Jeep, Vin #£1J4GK48K52W123230 v. State, No. 13-09-

667-CV, 2010 WL 2697142, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

July 8, 2010, no pet.).

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 6
Texas asset forfeiture law defines an “owner” as “a person who claims

an equitable or legal ownership interest in property.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 59.01(6). There may be more than one owner, and the innocent-owner

defense cannot apply unless all the owners are innocent owners. 2004

Volkswagen Jetta v. State, 285 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no

pet.). If one of the owners knows of the act giving rise to the forfeiture, then

it is irrelevant if the other owners knew or reasonably should have known.

Id. Texas courts have noted that allowing the innocent-owner defense in

instances when not all owners are innocent owners would create a loophole

undercutting the purpose of the forfeiture statute. Arnold v. State, 793

S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ).

A party not on the title to a vehicle may still be an equitable owner of

the vehicle based on other factors. One Ford Mustang v. State, 231 S.W.3d

445, 451 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (“The name on the certificate of

title is not conclusive of ownership”). While a registered owner is certainly an

owner of a vehicle for forfeiture purposes, other parties may have acquired an

equitable interest in a vehicle through other means. Id. Being the primary

driver of the vehicle can establish equitable ownership. 2004 Volkswagen

Jetta, 285 S.W.3d at 511. In 2002 Jeep, the court found that an equitable

ownership was established because the person was listed on the insurance,

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 7
allowed to drive the vehicle regularly, kept hair ties in the vehicle, and was

the primary user of the vehicle. One (1) 2002 Jeep, Vin

#£1J4GK48K52W123230 v. State, No. 13-09-667-CV, 2010 WL 2697142, at *2

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 8, 2010, no pet.). In that case, the

court found the driver to be an equitable owner despite testimony that the

driver did not live with the titled owner and that the driver rarely drove the

vehicle. Id.

Here, R.C. Scott regularly drove the Navigator. He drove the

Navigator, not the Impala or another vehicle, to parole appointments, to the

interlock office, and to take his mother to the doctor. In an accident report

from a previous collision that involved R.C. Scott driving the Navigator, R.C.

Scott was listed as the owner. R.C. Scott was listed as an insured driver of

the Navigator from the time of the initial purchase of the vehicle. R.C. Scott

remained on the insurance policy for the Navigator even after living

separately from his Parents and after several vehicle-related arrests. R.C.

Scott’s parole-mandated interlock device was installed only on the Navigator.

Seemingly, the Navigator was the only vehicle that R.C. Scott could legally

drive. The Parents could not operate or start the Navigator without R.C.

Scott’s presence due to the interlock device. We are persuaded that R.C. Scott

had an interest in the Navigator.

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 8
The above facts conclusively established that R.C. Scott was an

equitable owner of the Navigator. As such, the Parents cannot meet their

burden to prove that every owner of the Navigator qualifies for the innocent-

owner defense. Whether or not the Parents were innocent owners is not

relevant. The affirmative defense fails.

Conclusion

The State established that the Navigator was subject to forfeiture

under Chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that R.C. Scott was

an equitable owner of the Navigator. R.C. Scott was not an innocent owner

under 59.02(c) or 59.02(h)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

We reverse the trial court’s Order and render judgment granting

forfeiture.

LEE HARRIS
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 16, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Harris, and
Senior Justice Davis 1
Reversed and rendered
CV06

1 The Honorable Rex Davis, Senior Justice (Retired) of the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting by

assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002,
75.003.

The State of Texas v. 2007 Lincoln Navigator Page 9