Robert Brian Hendrickson v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00043-CR

Robert Brian Hendrickson,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
440th District Court of Coryell County, Texas
Judge Grant Kinsey, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 20-26445

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant, Robert Brian Hendrickson, guilty of the felony

offense of indecency with a child sexual contact. The jury assessed his

punishment at thirty years confinement. The trial court sentenced

Hendrickson accordingly. This appeal ensued. We will affirm.
A. Background Facts

In 2020, eleven-year-old I.H. made an outcry to her mother that her

father molested her. During the investigation, I.H. disclosed that when she

was nine years old, she and Hendrickson were sitting on the couch together

watching television when Hendrickson moved his hand under I.H.’s waistband

and undergarment and started a rubbing motion between her legs for a few

minutes.

During trial, the State sponsored Rachel Hodgdon, a licensed

professional counselor associate who had treated I.H., as an expert witness.

Hendrickson challenged Hodgdon’s qualifications under Rule 702. Following

the hearing, Hendrickson argued that Hodgdon’s testimony on the grounds

would bolster another witness’s testimony and that the diagnoses process was

not reliable. The trial court allowed Hodgdon to testify as an expert. Hodgdon

testified about the process for diagnosing I.H. with PTSD using a diagnostic

tool called the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and about the

treatment goals following the diagnosis.

B. Issue One

In his first issue, Hendrickson argues that the trial court erred in its

duty as the gatekeeper in admitting unqualified expert testimony pursuant to

Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.

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1. Preservation of Error

As a threshold issue, the State argues that Hendrickson has not properly

preserved his complaint on appeal. Specifically, the State claims that while

the complaint concerning Hodgdon’s general qualifications under Rule 702 and

the bolstering argument have been preserved, Hendrickson’s argument on

appeal, which challenges whether the administrative rules were complied

with, was not properly preserved. We assume without deciding that

Hendrickson properly preserved his complaint.

2. Authority

An expert’s qualifications and the admissibility of expert testimony are

subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Lagrone v. State, 942

S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We will not disturb the ruling if it

falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d

325, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when it

acts unreasonably or arbitrarily without reference to any guiding rules or

principles. State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the

expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier

of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID.

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702. A trial judge makes three separate inquiries, which must all be met before

admitting expert testimony: “(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason

of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject

matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and

(3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder in

deciding the case.” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

These conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability,

and (3) relevance. Id.

3. Analysis

Hendrickson argues that “no testimony was heard by the trial court”

concerning Hodgdon’s appropriate training and experience to administer and

interpret the tests as required by the administrative code. See 22 TEX. ADMIN.

CODE § 681.43 (“a licensee must not administer any test without the

appropriate training and experience to administer and interpret the test.”). He

acknowledges that Hodgdon did testify that once she had her license, she was

allowed to diagnose, but he argues that “such a bare statement can hardly be

allowed to demonstrate that Ms. Hodgdon met the administrative code

requirements.” However, Hodgdon also testified that she uses the CATS

diagnostic tool with many of her patients, that she first learned about it in

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graduate school, and that she had continuing training with the tool after

graduate school, both in her current job and when getting her license.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court could reasonably have

determined that the State established that Hodgdon had experience and

training in the area of administering and interpreting the CATS diagnostic

tool. See Beatley v. State, No. 10-02-118-CR, 2003 WL 21780952, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Waco July 30, 2003, pet. ref’d). Therefore, we cannot say that the trial

court abused its discretion in allowing Hodgdon to testify as an expert.

We overrule Hendrickson’s first issue.

C. Issue Two

In his second issue, Hendrickson argues the unqualified expert

testimony unlawfully bolstered I.H.’s guilt phase testimony.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed skepticism as to

whether “bolstering” remains viable as an independent ground of objection.

See Rivas v. State, 275 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Specifically,

the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that “a fundamental problem

with an objection to ‘bolstering’ is its inherent ambiguity.” Id. “Bolstering”

could refer to several evidentiary rules. See id. Because of the multifarious

origins of “bolstering,” courts have found concern with it as an objection on its

face. Id. In Rivas, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Rivas had

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made more specific objections other than a general “bolstering” objection and

“thus had preserved error with respect to those specific objections.” See id

(emphasis added).

Error is preserved if a complaint is made to the trial court by a timely

request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the ruling that the

complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to

make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were

apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Additionally, a

party’s “point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”

Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

At trial, Hendrickson objected that “it’s pretty clear that based on the

notes and the information gathered in the therapy sessions it’s going to help to

obviously bolster [I.H.], but [I.H.] is available to testify.” He later objected that

“it is obvious…that we are just going to bolster the testimony of the witness

who is available.” As best we can, we construe Hendrickson’s general

“bolstering” objection with the specific language that “[I.H.] is available to

testify” as a Rule 804 objection regarding exceptions to the rule against

hearsay when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.

On appeal, Hendrickson makes three main arguments to support his

claim of “bolstering.” First, he claims that the sole purpose of the evidence is

Hendrickson v. State Page 6
to convince the fact finder that a particular witness or source of evidence is

worthy of credit. This language relates to the definition of bolstering set forth

in Cohn and encompasses Rule 613(c). See Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819–

21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also Rivas, 275 S.W.3d at 886 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009) (Rule 613(c) seems to be covered under the “bolstering” objection “to the

extent it prevents the use of prior consistent statements of a witness for the

sole purpose of enhancing his credibility.”). Second, Hendrickson argues that

the credibility of the witness or source has not been attacked. This language

comports with a Rule 608(a) objection. See id. (Rule 608(a), which allows

opinion or reputation evidence as to the character of a party’s own witness for

truthfulness, but only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has

already been attacked by the opposing party). Finally, Hendrickson argues the

testimony does not make the existence of a consequential fact more or less

probable than it would be without the testimony. This language tracks with

relevance as defined in Rule 401. See TEX. R. EVID. 401.

Insofar as “bolstering” remains a viable, independent ground of

objection, Hendrickson’s appellate arguments do not comport with the

objection made at trial. See Wilson, 71 S.W, 3d at 349; See also Rivas, 275

S.W.3d at 886. Therefore, his arguments were not properly preserved for

appeal.

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We overrule Hendrickson’s second issue.

D. Conclusion

Having overruled both Hendrickson’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 26, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM

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