In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00314-CV

In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile

On appeal from the
474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge E. Alan Bennett, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2025-53-J

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant C.C. challenges the juvenile court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction

and Order of Transfer to a Criminal Court on the basis that the court lacked

jurisdiction to proceed with the transfer hearing absent proper notice.

Contrary to the two issues presented, we find that the two-day personal

service requirement was satisfied and that the summons provided sufficient

notice that the purpose of the hearing was for the consideration of a

discretionary transfer to criminal court. We affirm the trial court’s Waiver of

Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to a Criminal Court.
Background

The State filed its Petition for Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court

(the “Petition”) alleging the C.C. committed the offense of aggravated robbery

by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon while committing theft. Attached to

the Petition was an Order directing C.C. to appear “on the 12th day June,

2025 at 9:30 A.M., in the 474th Judicial District Court of McLennan County,

located at the Bill Logue Juvenile Justice Center, Waco, Texas, for a hearing

on the State’s Petition for Discretionary Transfer to a Criminal District

Court.” Identical summons addressed to C.C. and C.C’s mother respectively

were issued May 22, 2025. Service was completed on both C.C. and his

mother on June 10, 2025.

The summons received by C.C. thrice mentioned the Petition for

Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court and attached a copy of the same.

The summons stated that the Petition would be heard on June 12, 2025. The

record does not reflect any hearing on the Petition or otherwise took place on

June 12, 2025. Subpoena applications were filed with the Clerk, reflecting a

setting date of August 4, 2025, but the record reflects no hearing on the

Petition on that date either. No subsequent summons was served.

The transfer hearing was held on August 14, 2025. The attorney for

C.C., C.C’s mother, and C.C. all attended the hearing. On the same day, the

In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 2
trial court signed the Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to a

Criminal Court pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. This appeal

followed.

In his appeal, C.C. raised two issues, alleging that (1) the juvenile court

lacked jurisdiction because TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.07(a)’s two-day,

personal-service requirement, incorporated by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 4.02(b), was not satisfied, and that (2) the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction

because the summons did not state that the hearing was for discretionary

transfer, as § 54.02(b) requires. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. The State did

not dispute that the appropriate standard of review is a de novo standard. 1

Issue One – Service Requirement was Satisfied

Section 53.07(a) of the Texas Family Code states, “the summons shall

be served upon him personally at least two days before the day of the

adjudication hearing.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.07. Here, there is no

dispute that the summons C.C. received on June 10, 2025, occurred more

than two days before the transfer hearing that took place on August 14, 2025.

C.C. argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the summons

received by C.C. was not received more than two days before the date listed

within the summons—June 12, 2025. Section 53.07(a) addresses the link

1 Even if the Court reviewed the trial court’s entry of Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to

a Criminal Court under an abuse of discretion standard, the result would not change.

In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 3
between the receipt of summons and the hearing, not a date listed within the

summons. The plain language of the statute requires only that a summons be

received two days before the hearing. Clear statutory text is determinative of

legislative intent. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437

(Tex. 2009). We are not persuaded to read in additional requirements about

the date listed within a summons, especially when nothing in the record

suggests that C.C., his mother, or his lawyer were deprived of actual notice of

the transfer hearing. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 853 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015) (the court notes evidence of actual notice in its evaluation of

waiver of defect in the service of summons). Such an argument is better

taken up with the legislature.

With regard to the change between the hearing date listed within the

summons and the actual date the hearing was held, courts across Texas have

agreed that if the record affirmatively shows that appellant received a

summons, jurisdiction would have then attached, and further summons

would not be required after each hearing postponement. See Matter of C.C.G.,

805 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied); In re E.S., No. 05-01-

01353-CV, 2002 WL 826960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2002, no pet.);

In re R.M., 648 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); In

the Matter of B.Y., 585 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1979, no

In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 4
writ); See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

Here, the record affirmatively shows that C.C. received a summons. Unlike

the case in Rodriguez, the record does not show that C.C. had to appear and

have the hearing reset within two days of first receiving his summons.

Rather, the first hearing and appearance that took place according to the

record is the transfer hearing that occurred August 14, 2025—more than two

months after C.C. received the summons.

Even if this Court was persuaded that the listed date of June 12, 2025,

within the summons created a defect in the summons, defects in summons do

not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and can be waived. Hidalgo v. State,

945 S.W. 2d 313, 318 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997), aff'd, 983 S.W. 2d 746

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In Rodriguez, the court found that the defect

associated with service of summons, namely a defect with the date listed in

the summons, was waivable. Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015). While there was no record to confirm such a waiver in

Rodriguez, here the record shows that C.C. and his attorney voluntarily

appeared and announced ready at the transfer hearing, that the trial court

advised C.C. of his rights and consequences, that C.C. understood and

acknowledged the rights and consequences, and that C.C. and his attorney

agreed to proceed.

In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 5
We find that the record affirmatively shows C.C. was served summons

more than two days prior to the transfer hearing, that jurisdiction attached,

and that a defect in the summons, if any, regarding the hearing date listed

therein, was waived.

Issue Two – Summons Sufficiently Stated Purpose of Hearing

C.C. complains that the summons served on him was invalid under

Section 54.02(b) of the Family Code because it did not state that the hearing

was for a discretionary transfer. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(b) Section

54.02(b) states:

The petition and notice requirements of Sections 53.04, 53.05,
53.06, and 53.07 of this code must be satisfied, and the summons
must state that the hearing is for the purpose of considering
discretionary transfer to criminal court.

See Id.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the summons need not

even expressly contain the words “to criminal court” to satisfy Section

54.02(b) if the summons expressly incorporates the attached petition by

reference and the petition contains references to criminal proceedings in

criminal court. Hardesty v. State, 659 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

Here, the summons did expressly contain the words “to criminal court” and

also attached the petition by reference. Specifically, the summons stated:

In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 6
AND WHEREAS, the said PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY
TRANSFER TO A CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT will be
heard by said Court, at BILL LOGUE JUVENILE JUSTICE
CENTER, 2601 GHOLSON ROAD, WACO, TEXAS, on the
12TH day of JUNE, 2025 at 9:30 o'clock AM

The above language makes clear that the express purpose of the

hearing is, at least in part, for the consideration of the Petition. The

summons, notifying C.C. “to appear … and to hear” the Petition, adequately

gives notice as to the purpose of the hearing and complies with Section

54.02(b). Polanco v. State, 914 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996,

pet. ref’d).

Conclusion

Because we find the court had proper jurisdiction to proceed with the

transfer hearing, we affirm the trial court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order

of Transfer to a Criminal Court.

LEE HARRIS
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: February 26, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
CV06

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