Adam Odell Lenamond v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-23-00144-CR

Adam Odell Lenamond,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
77th District Court of Limestone County, Texas
Judge Patrick H. Simmons, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 15414-A

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Adam Odell Lenamond was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a

child under 14 years of age and sentenced to 60 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL

CODE 21.02(b). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Lenamond’s motion for mistrial and motion for new trial, and because

Lenamond did not preserve his facial challenge to the constitutionality of the

continuous sexual abuse statute, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Lenamond does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his conviction. Thus, we do not discuss the facts of this case.

MISTRIAL

In his first issue, Lenamond complains the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Lenamond’s motion for mistrial based on Lenamond’s

discovery that a member of the gallery in the courtroom was allegedly coaching

the victim, E.H., during her testimony.

During a break in the trial proceedings after E.H.’s testimony,

Lenamond requested a motion for mistrial because a spectator, later identified

as the victim assistance coordinator, was alleged to have coached E.H. during

her testimony. In support of this motion, Lenamond called four witnesses:

Karen Harrison, Dave Hildebrandt, Kim Rumfield, and E.H.

Harrison, who had a prior relationship with Lenamond, testified that a

woman in the courtroom would smile and nod or “smile and slightly shake her

head to the left and right.” Harrison claimed the woman’s head moving was

consistent with E.H.’s answers of “yes” and “no.” Harrison did not see the

woman use her hands at all to signal E.H. Hildebrandt, Lenamond’s bondsman

and counsel’s former son-in-law, testified he saw the same woman nod her head

“yes” during E.H.’s direct testimony when E.H. “would kind of stop for a little

while.” He did not see the nod to any specific question and did not see the

Lenamond v. State Page 2
woman shake her head no. Rumfield, Lenamond’s daughter, also said she

noticed the woman “steadily shaking her head ‘yes/no’ as questions were being

asked [of E.H.].” Rumfield testified it started when E.H. was asked if “she had

to put her mouth on there.” At first, she thought the motion by the woman was

just a nervous tic, but then thought it was more deliberate.

E.H. was the last witness to testify. She did not know why she was being

called back to the stand. She had not been in the courtroom when the motion

for mistrial was made or when the mistrial witnesses had testified. E.H.

testified that the victim assistance coordinator did not help her answer any of

the questions asked of E.H. during her trial testimony. The coordinator had

only signaled E.H. to drink water.

After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court noted on the

record that “…from the Court’s perspective, I may be the only one or one of the

few that’s actually staring out into the courtroom and I did not notice

anything.” He then denied the motion for mistrial.

A mistrial is appropriate only in extreme circumstances for a narrow

class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880,

884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699-700 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

Lenamond v. State Page 3
court's ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of

the ruling. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The

ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Id.

Three of the witnesses called to testify were interested witnesses for

Lenamond. E.H., who did not know why she had been called back into court,

denied any instructions from the victim assistance coordinator except to drink

water. Even the trial court could not see any coaching by the coordinator.

Accordingly, considering the particular facts of this case, we cannot say the

trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Lenamond’s first issue is overruled.

NEW TRIAL

In his second issue, Lenamond asserts the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to grant Lenamond’s motion for new trial based upon

newly discovered evidence: a video of the victim assistance coordinator during

E.H.’s testimony. Lenamond contends he should have been granted a new trial

because the video corroborated what witnesses said at the motion for mistrial

hearing.

A new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence

favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial. TEX. CODE CRIM.

Lenamond v. State Page 4
PROC. ANN. art. 40.001. To obtain relief under article 40.001, the defendant

must satisfy the following four-prong test: (1) the newly discovered evidence

was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the

defendant's failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the

defendant's lack of due diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not

merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new

evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different result in a

new trial. State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence,

regardless of whether the evidence is controverted, and its ruling will be

reversed only for an abuse of discretion, that is, if it is arbitrary or unsupported

by any reasonable view of the evidence. Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 372

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). If the movant fails to establish any one of these

elements, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the motion

for new trial. Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2007, no pet.); Shafer v. State, 82 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2002, pet. ref'd).

At the motion for new trial hearing, Lenamond introduced a video of a

woman, later identified as the victim assistance coordinator, sitting on the

front row of the courtroom gallery who, arguably, made some slight nodding

Lenamond v. State Page 5
motions. 1 Lenamond’s brother took the video with his cell phone during

Lenamond’s trial. Both parties vigorously argued about whether Lenamond or

his attorney knew of or could have discovered the video at the time of the trial.

Regardless, this video merely corroborated the witnesses’ testimony at

the motion for mistrial hearing. Further, there is no evidence or argument

that the video would probably bring about a different result in a new trial. On

appeal, Lenamond asserts that the video would probably bring about a

different result in the previously denied motion for mistrial. That is not a

factor in our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial. As the

State argued to the trial court, “This is not a hearing to supplemental [sic] his

Motion for Mistrial. This is a hearing where he is arguing he wants a new trial

to be able to present this evidence to a jury.” Lenamond requested a new trial.

There was nothing presented at trial or on appeal that this video would

probably bring about a different result in a new trial.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion for new trial, and Lenamond’s second issue is overruled.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE

In his third and final issue, Lenamond asserts that Texas Penal Code

Section 21.02, the continuous sexual abuse statute, is facially unconstitutional.

1
The video also showed the woman making drinking motions which corroborated E.H.’s testimony
during the motion for mistrial regarding the only signals the woman made to her.

Lenamond v. State Page 6
Lenamond concedes that he did not preserve this issue by objecting at trial and

that this Court cannot properly address it. 2 See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d

428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a

statute may not be raised for the first time on appeal). Lenamond’s third issue

is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Lenamond’s issues on appeal, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

LEE HARRIS
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: May 8, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
[CRPM]

2
Lenamond raises this issue to preserve the error for potential review in the Court of Criminal
Appeals.

Lenamond v. State Page 7