Brian Anthony Claudio-Ruiz v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued May 28, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00358-CR
———————————
BRIAN ANTHONY CLAUDIO-RUIZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 184th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1729166

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Brian Anthony Claudio-Ruiz of the first-degree felony

offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child.1 The trial court assessed Claudio-

1
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(v).
Ruiz’s punishment at thirty-five years’ confinement. The court also imposed a $100

“Child Abuse Prevention Fine” and assessed $520 in court costs.

In three issues on appeal, Claudio-Ruiz contends that (1) his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge a prospective juror for cause

after she indicated she could not be fair and impartial; (2) this Court should modify

the judgment to remove $157 in court costs; and (3) the trial court improperly

assessed the “Child Abuse Prevention Fine,” which does not apply to offenses

committed before January 1, 2020.

We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Background

A grand jury indicted Claudio-Ruiz for aggravated sexual assault of a child,

D.C., his younger half-sister. The only facts concerning the offense itself that are

relevant to the appellate issues relate to when the offense allegedly occurred. The

indictment alleged that the offense occurred “on or about March 1, 2011.”2 The

complainant, who was born in 1998, testified that Claudio-Ruiz sexually abused her

2
The jury charge informed the jury that the State was not required to prove that the
offense occurred on the date alleged in the indictment. Rather, “[i]t is sufficient if
the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on or
after November 23, 2010, the date of the defendant’s seventeenth birthday, and
before September 29, 2021, the date the indictment was filed.” The complainant
testified that the last incident of abuse occurred around March 2011. She was 20 or
21 when she reported the abuse to police. She did not have “any type of relationship”
with Claudio-Ruiz at the time of her report.
2
over the course of several years, from when she was eight years old to twelve years

old. That time frame roughly corresponds to 2006 through 2011.

The other facts relevant to this appeal occurred during voir dire. During the

trial court’s portion of voir dire, it read the indictment and asked the prospective

jurors about several different legal concepts. It then asked the venire whether they

had personal experience with the subject matter of the case:

I understand that the nature of this subject matter is very difficult to talk
about, and I don’t want to talk about it if you-all have any sort of prior
experiences with this. Okay? But here’s what I am going to ask you,
because I want to be cognizant of the fact that people have lived life
before today, and you have experiences that might preclude you from
being a fair and impartial juror in this case. First part of my question is:
Do you have an experience with this subject matter as a victim, or will
you—or you yourself were accused or you know somebody who has
been falsely accused. So that’s part one, okay, do you have the
experience? And the second part of this question is, if your answer is
yes, can you set that aside, listen to the facts in this case, and be fair and
impartial to either side. Okay? First part, do you have the experience
one way or another. You have been affected by it, either you were a
victim, you had to testify in a trial, you know someone close to you who
has been, and because of that, you can be fair in a case like this, or you
can’t be fair in a case like this. So two-part. Everybody understand?
You have the experience, and can you be fair. Row one, I need you to
raise your cards if you have the experience.

On the first row, 9 out of 15 people raised their cards, and the court questioned each

of them about their answers to the two questions. When the court asked Juror 12,

they answered, “No and yes.” The court clarified that Juror 12 did not “have the

experience,” and when Juror 12 confirmed they did not have personal experience,

the court reminded the panel that “the question is only if you have had the
3
experience.” The court questioned the panel row-by-row, asking the prospective

jurors if they “have the experience.” On the third row, five prospective jurors raised

their juror cards, but Juror 45 did not.

When the court reached the end of the panel, it asked whether it missed anyone

and ended up questioning four additional prospective jurors, including Juror 45:

The Court: Anybody I missed? Did I miss somebody? Raise your
hand.
Juror 44: Yes and no.
The Court: What? 44, was that your response, or 45?
Juror 44: I was yes and no, and also for you, she didn’t answer.
The Court: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, hold on. Only raise your
juror card number when I get to your row and tell me what
your response is. So if you did not raise your juror card
number at this—when I just went through your rows,
please raise your hands now. Who did not—who did not
raise their hand when I first asked? What is your number?
And I need your juror card number.
Juror 18: 18, and no. And to be fair, yes. I didn’t have that
experience.
The Court: And you can be fair. 24?
Juror 24: My answer is because I didn’t have the experience, so I
didn’t want to just answer just based—
The Court: Okay.
Juror 24: Because the question was if I have the experience would I
be fair or not.
The Court: Okay.
Juror 24: I do not have the experience, so I chose not to answer.
The Court: Okay. Well, can you be fair?

4
Juror 24: Yes, ma’am, definitely.
The Court: Okay. Now, anybody else? 44, I don’t have you down. Are
you now saying you’re raising your hand?
Juror 44: Yes.
The Court: Okay.
Juror 44: Yes and no.
The Court: And 45?
Juror 45: No and no.

The court did not question Juror 45 any further and moved on to a new topic.

At the close of voir dire, the trial court and the parties went row-by-row and

discussed challenges for cause. For the third row, the court stated that it had five

jurors that it intended to strike for cause, but it did not name Juror 45. Defense

counsel stated, “I have also No. 45 saying they couldn’t be fair.” Neither the

prosecutor nor the trial court had Juror 45 on their lists of potential challenges for

cause. Following this discussion, the court brought two prospective jurors to the

bench for further questioning at defense counsel’s request, but Juror 45 was not one

of them.

Before the parties made their peremptory strikes, the trial court and defense

counsel returned to Juror 45’s ability to be fair:

Counsel: Judge, on my note pad, I have No. 45 saying or at least
implying that they couldn’t be fair.
The Court: We’re not going based on implications. Are there any
cause questions that were asked from either the Court’s,

5
the State’s, or the Defense’s voir dire where this witness—
this panel member said that he could not be fair?
Counsel: I have it written down, Judge, that they did it during the
State’s voir dire that he said he couldn’t be fair.
The Court: I don’t have that. I don’t have that. And I remember 44
raising their hand when I asked fair and impartial, and I
said who is raising their hands, is it 44 or 45? 44 did not
raise—excuse me. 45 did not raise her hand. It was only
44.

Neither the State nor defense counsel exercised a peremptory strike against Juror 45,

and she was ultimately selected as a juror.

The jury found Claudio-Ruiz guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child,

and the trial court assessed his punishment at thirty-five years’ confinement. The

judgment of conviction imposed a $100 “Child Abuse Prevention Fine” and assessed

$290 in court costs and $130 in reimbursement fees. The “Criminal Bill of Cost”

assessed $520 in court costs, including $185 for “Consolidated Court Cost – State,”

$105 for “Consolidated Court Cost – Local,” and $100 for “Child Abuse

Prevention.”

Claudio-Ruiz did not move for a new trial. This appeal followed.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first issue, Claudio-Ruiz argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to challenge Juror 45 for cause.

Alternatively, he argues that if this Court concludes that trial counsel did challenge

6
Juror 45 for cause, counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve this

challenge for appellate review.

A. Standard of Review

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective

assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 685–86 (1984). To prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, the

defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient

and that the deficiency prejudiced him. Ex parte Lane, 670 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2023). A defendant’s “[f]ailure to succeed on either prong is fatal to the

ineffectiveness claim.” Id. The defendant bears the burden to establish ineffective

assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Salinas, 664 S.W.3d 894,

909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

“An attorney is deficient if his performance falls below an objective standard

of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms, considering the facts of

the case viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of the representation.” Ex

parte Lane, 670 S.W.3d at 671; Ex parte Salinas, 664 S.W.3d at 909 (“Counsel

performs deficiently if he has ‘made errors so serious’ that it cannot be said he

functioned as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)). We presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance

to the defendant and “made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

7
professional judgment.” Ex parte Salinas, 664 S.W.3d at 909; see Hart v. State, 667

S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (stating that defendant must overcome

“strong presumption” that counsel’s actions “might be considered sound trial

strategy” (quotation omitted)). We evaluate counsel’s performance as of the time of

his conduct, “not through ‘the distorting effects of hindsight.’” Ex parte Salinas, 664

S.W.3d at 909 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90); Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782

(stating that we make deficiency determination “in light of all the circumstances”).

Counsel’s deficient performance is prejudicial “only if those errors were so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, that is, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Ex parte Salinas, 664 S.W.3d at 909. The defendant must show that but

for counsel’s deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that the result of

his trial would have been different. Id. A “reasonable probability” is “one sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 909–10.

An ineffective assistance claim must be “firmly rooted in the record.” Hart,

667 S.W.3d at 782. Usually, the record on direct appeal is not sufficient to show that

counsel’s representation was “so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic

decision-making as to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

reasonable and professional.” Id. (quotation omitted). Courts should ordinarily

afford counsel an opportunity to explain his conduct “before being denounced as

ineffective.” Id. When counsel is not given such an opportunity and the record on

8
direct appeal is undeveloped, courts usually assume that a strategic motive exists “if

any can be imagined” and conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient “only

if the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in

it.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Counsel’s actions are considered deficient only if the

court finds, as a matter of law, that no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial

counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

B. Challenging a Juror for Cause

“A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging

some fact which renders the juror incapable or unfit to serve on the jury.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(a); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury . . . .”). Either the State or the defense may challenge a prospective juror for

cause if the juror “has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant,” and

the defense may make a challenge for cause if the juror has a bias or prejudice against

any of the applicable law upon which the defense is entitled to rely. TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 35.16(a)(9), (c)(2). The trial court must excuse the prospective juror “if

bias or prejudice would impair the juror’s ability to carry out his oath and

instructions in accordance with the law.” Comeaux v. State, 445 S.W.3d 745, 749

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

9
To preserve error concerning a trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge

for cause, the defendant must show that: (1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge

for cause; (2) he used a peremptory challenge on the complained-of prospective

juror; (3) his peremptory challenges were exhausted; (4) his request for additional

peremptory challenges was denied; and (5) an objectionable juror sat on the jury.

Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Comeaux, 445

S.W.3d at 749 (requiring that defendant demonstrate same five steps to establish

harm from erroneous denial of challenge for cause).

C. Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Challenge Juror 45
for Cause

The Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury, “like any other right,” may

be waived or forfeited “by the defendant in the interest of overall trial strategy.”

State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(a) (providing that while certain statutory bases for challenges

for cause cannot be forfeited, “[a]ll other grounds for challenge,” including whether

prospective juror has bias or prejudice in favor of or against defendant, “may be

waived by the party or parties in whose favor such grounds of challenge exist”).

Whether to make or preserve a challenge for cause is “subject to the legitimate

strategic or tactical decision-making processes of defense counsel during the course

of trial.” Morales, 253 S.W.3d at 697; Hebert v. State, 489 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“Decisions relating to challenging

10
prospective jurors for cause or striking prospective jurors are strategic and

tactical.”).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to find that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance when counsel, in a possession with intent to deliver case, did

not challenge a prospective juror—a former narcotics officer—who indicated that

he knew the defendant “by virtue of [his] employment,” agreed that he “probably

would not be able to be a fair and impartial juror,” and stated that he “couldn’t be

impartial.” Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 444–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per

curiam). The court could not say “that under no circumstances could defense counsel

justifiably fail to exercise a challenge for cause or peremptory strike against a

venireman who deemed himself incapable of serving on the jury in a fair and

impartial manner.” Id. at 446. Rather, the court could conceive several possible

strategic reasons for why defense counsel did not challenge the juror. Id. at 446–47.

On the silent record, although the court did not “know whether counsel for appellant

in fact utilized this or any other particular strategy” in not challenging the juror, it

also could not say “with any confidence” that counsel “was not functioning within

prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 447 (quotation omitted). The court therefore

11
found “insufficient basis in the present record to overcome” the presumption that

counsel acted within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.3 Id.

Here, the parties first dispute whether defense counsel challenged Juror 45 for

cause. Claudio-Ruiz argues that defense counsel did not make such a challenge and

that this failure constituted ineffective assistance because despite first stating that

she did not have personal experience with the subject matter of the case, Juror 45

then stated that she could not be fair and impartial. The State argues that trial counsel

twice attempted to challenge Juror 45 for cause, pointing to the two discussions

3
The Court of Criminal Appeals—like this Court—has followed Delrio and
repeatedly declined to find ineffective assistance when trial counsel did not
challenge a possibly biased juror for cause (or did not preserve error by following
up an unsuccessful challenge for cause with a peremptory challenge) but nothing in
the record indicated that the choice was not strategic or tactical. See, e.g., State v.
Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“If it is permissible for trial
counsel to retain a juror who is actually biased for strategic or tactical reasons, then
a fortiori, trial counsel must be permitted to make a strategic or tactical decision to
retain a juror who is only presumably biased by virtue of her status as an assistant
district attorney.”); Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(“The record in the instant case [a robbery] is also silent as to why appellant’s trial
counsel failed to challenge venire member Supinski [who stated that he had been a
victim of a robbery and believed that experience “probably would” impact his
impartiality]. . . . To hold trial counsel’s decision not to strike or challenge venire
member Supinski in the instant case as ineffective assistance would also call for
speculation. The record in the instant case lends no support for such holding.”);
Notias v. State, 491 S.W.3d 371, 377–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
pet.) (concluding that defendant did not establish deficient performance prong of
Strickland when trial counsel did not challenge or strike prospective juror who
expressed bias against defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify because, on
silent record, Court could not exclude possibility of strategic motivation and
counsel’s decision was not so outrageous no competent attorney would have reached
that decision).
12
defense counsel had with the trial court in which they disagreed concerning Juror

45’s statement and her impartiality.

Regardless of whether defense counsel either did not challenge Juror 45 for

cause (as Claudio-Ruiz contends) or did challenge Juror 45 for cause (as the State

contends) but did not prevail on this challenge and then failed to preserve error by

exercising a peremptory challenge against Juror 45, the analysis is the same. The

decision not to challenge for cause or peremptorily strike an actually or presumably

biased prospective juror can be a reasonable strategic choice. See id. at 446–47

(failing to challenge actually biased prospective juror for cause); Morales, 253

S.W.3d at 698 (following unsuccessful challenge for cause, failing to preserve any

error by peremptorily striking presumably biased prospective juror).

Jury selection can be highly dependent on subtle visual cues and differences

in juror demeanor, considerations that do not typically make their way into an

appellate record. See, e.g., Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 680 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012) (stating, in context of Batson challenge, that “the demeanor of a potential juror

is a valid reason to exercise a peremptory strike”); cf. Tracy v. State, 597 S.W.3d

502, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge

for cause with considerable deference because the trial judge is in the best position

to evaluate a veniremember’s demeanor and responses.”). It is possible that upon

learning that the trial court did not agree that there was a basis to challenge Juror 45

13
for cause due to partiality, counsel decided not to press the point or exercise a

peremptory strike against Juror 45 because she was preferable to other options

among the prospective jurors remaining on the venire. See Morales, 253 S.W.3d at

698 (“[T]he trial court could rationally infer that the appellant’s trial attorneys made

a difficult tactical decision to leave Wyatt on the jury because, even though she was

an assistant district attorney, she was still preferable to the other prospective jurors

against whom they exercised their allotted peremptory challenges.”).

Claudio-Ruiz attempts to distinguish this case from Delrio and its progeny,

arguing that unlike the silent record in those cases, here, “the record is not silent as

to trial counsel’s belief that Juror Number 45 stated that she could not be fair.”

Claudio-Ruiz is correct that trial counsel stated on the record that he did not believe

Juror 45 could be fair and impartial based on Juror 45’s response to the trial court’s

question. However, Claudio-Ruiz did not raise ineffective assistance in a motion for

new trial, and therefore the record is silent concerning counsel’s motivation or

reasoning for not challenging Juror 45, whether through a challenge for cause or

peremptory strike. And that is the relevant consideration under Delrio. See 840

S.W.2d at 447 (“Of course we do not and cannot know whether counsel for appellant

in fact utilized this or any other particular strategy. . . . Consistently with Strickland,

we must presume that counsel is better positioned than the appellate court to judge

the pragmatism of the particular case, and that he made all significant decisions in

14
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” (quotation omitted)); Jackson v.

State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“The record in the instant case

is also silent as to why appellant’s trial counsel failed to challenge venire member

Supinski. . . . Due to the lack of evidence in the record concerning trial counsel’s

reasons for not challenging or striking venire member Supinski, we are unable to

conclude that appellant’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient.”).

The failure to challenge a prospective juror—even an actually biased

prospective juror—can be part of a reasonable trial strategy. Here, trial counsel was

not given an opportunity to explain his rationale for not challenging Juror 45. On

this record, we cannot say that counsel’s conduct was “so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782

(quotation omitted). We conclude that Claudio-Ruiz has not met his burden to

overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s actions constituted sound trial

strategy and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 781. We

hold that Claudio-Ruiz has not established that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance.

We overrule Claudio-Ruiz’s first issue.

15
Assessment of Court Costs and Fines

In his second and third issues, Claudio-Ruiz challenges the trial court’s

imposition of two court costs and a fine: $185 for “Consolidated Court Cost – State”;

$105 for “Consolidated Court Cost – Local”; and $100 for “Child Abuse Prevention

Fine.”

A. State and Local Consolidated Court Costs

The Local Government Code contains provisions mandating the payment of

certain costs and fees upon conviction of an offense. Section 133.102(a)—the State

Consolidated Court Cost—requires “[a] person convicted of an offense” to pay $185

as a court cost “on conviction of a felony.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 133.102(a)(1).

Section 134.101(a)—the Local Consolidated Court Cost—requires, “in addition to

all other costs,” a person convicted of a felony to pay $105 as a court cost on

conviction. Id. § 134.101(a).

In his appellate brief, Claudio-Ruiz argues that the judgment and the criminal

bill of cost were erroneous in two respects. First, although he agrees that imposition

of the State Consolidated Court Cost was appropriate, he disagrees with the amount.

He argues that section 133.102(a) had been amended in 2019 to raise the amount of

the cost from $133 to $185, but in doing so, the Legislature specified that the change

applied only to a cost “on conviction for an offense committed on or after the

effective date of this Act,” January 1, 2020. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg.,

16
R.S., ch. 1352, §§ 1.03, 5.01, 5.04, sec. 133.102(a), 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981,

3982, 4035 (emphasis added). Because he committed the offense in March 2011, at

the latest, the prior version of section 133.102(a) controlled, and the proper amount

of this cost was $133, not $185. Second, he argues that the Local Consolidated Court

Cost should not have been imposed at all because that cost requirement was first

enacted by the 2019 Legislature and, again, only applied to offenses committed on

or after January 1, 2020. See id. §§ 1.05, 5.01, 5.04, sec. 134.101, 2019 Tex. Gen.

Laws at 3985, 4035. The State initially agreed that we should reduce the amount of

the State Consolidated Court Cost and delete the Local Consolidated Court Cost.

Days after the State filed its appellate brief, the Court of Criminal Appeals

issued Bradshaw v. State, which addressed the proper amount of the State

Consolidated Court Cost when a defendant commits an offense before—but is

convicted after—the 2019 amendments became effective. See 707 S.W.3d 412 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2024). In that opinion, the court construed the enabling language of the

2019 amendments to section 133.102(a) and the language of Government Code

section 51.608, a statute providing that “[n]otwithstanding any other law that

establishes the amount of a court cost” collected in a criminal proceeding “based on

the law in effect on the date the offense was committed, the amount of a court cost

imposed on the defendant in a criminal proceeding must be the amount established

under the law in effect on the date the defendant is convicted of the offense.” See

17
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 51.608 (emphasis added). The court concluded that section

51.608 trumps the enabling language of the 2019 amendments. Bradshaw, 707

S.W.3d at 417. Thus, “anyone who committed an offense before 1/1/2020 but is

convicted after 1/1/2020 . . . is subject to the current version of the Cost Act.” Id. at

418.

Under Bradshaw,4 we must apply the version of section 133.102(a) in effect

at the time of Claudio-Ruiz’s conviction in May 2024. The criminal bill of cost

therefore properly imposed a $185 State Consolidated Court Cost. See TEX. LOC.

GOV’T CODE § 133.102(a). Similarly, because section 134.101 was in effect at the

time of Claudio-Ruiz’s conviction, the bill of cost properly imposed a $105 Local

Consolidated Court Cost. See Joseph v. State, No. 01-23-00937-CR, 2025 WL

714982, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2025, no pet.) (en banc) (per

curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that while Bradshaw

court did not specifically address section 134.101, that court cost was added in same

act that amended section 133.102 and therefore shared same enabling language that

was construed in Bradshaw).

4
Claudio-Ruiz disagrees with the rationale of Bradshaw but acknowledges that we
are bound to follow it under principles of vertical stare decisis. See Brooks v. State,
590 S.W.3d 35, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (quotation
omitted) (“When the Court of Criminal Appeals has deliberately and unequivocally
interpreted the law in a criminal matter, we must adhere to its interpretation under
the dictates of vertical stare decisis.” (quotation omitted)).
18
We overrule Claudio-Ruiz’s second issue.

B. Child Abuse Prevention Fine

Prior to January 1, 2020, Code of Criminal Procedure article 102.0186(a) was

entitled “Additional Costs Attendant to Certain Child Sexual Assault and Related

Convictions” and provided that a person convicted of several different offenses,

including aggravated sexual assault of a child, “shall pay $100 on conviction of the

offense.” See Act of May 18, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 593, § 3.24, art. 102.0186,

2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1120, 1137 (amended 2019).

In the same bill that amended Local Government Code section 133.102(a) and

added section 134.101, the 2019 Legislature changed the title of article 102.0186 to

“Fine for Certain Child Sexual Assault and Related Convictions” and reclassified

the required $100 payment as a fine. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.0186(a);

Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, §§ 2.39, 2.40, art. 102.0186(a), 2019

Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4006; McCarter v. State, 722 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.). As stated above, the Legislature provided that

“the changes in law made by this Act apply only to a cost, fee, or fine on conviction

for an offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act,” and “[a]n offense

committed before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect on

the date the offense was committed.” See Act of May 23, 2019, §§ 5.01, 5.04, 2019

Tex. Gen. Laws at 4035.

19
Claudio-Ruiz argues that the trial court improperly imposed the $100 Child

Abuse Prevention Fine because his offense was committed in 2011, years before the

Legislature reclassified this cost as a fine, and therefore we should modify the

judgment to delete this fine. The State agrees that the court erred by including the

$100 Child Abuse Prevention Fine in the judgment and that we should modify the

judgment to delete this fine. We agree.5 See Rodriguez v. State, — S.W.3d —, No.

01-23-00721-CR, 2025 WL 1373693, at *15–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

May 13, 2025, pet. ref’d); Baptiste v. State, No. 01-23-00504-CR, 2025 WL

1298310, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2025, pet. granted) (mem.

op., not designated for publication); Brusco v. State, No. 14-25-00030-CR, 2026 WL

472412, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.,

5
We note that imposition of the Child Abuse Prevention Fine in the judgment was
improper for another reason: it was not orally pronounced at Claudio-Ruiz’s
sentencing. Fines are punitive in nature and are part of a defendant’s sentence.
Anastassov v. State, 664 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Unlike court
costs, which are nonpunitive and compensatory in nature, fines generally must be
orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence at sentencing. Armstrong v. State,
340 S.W.3d 759, 766–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); McCarter v. State, 722 S.W.3d
138, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.). As a fine, the Child Abuse
Prevention Fine must be included in the trial court’s oral pronouncement of a
defendant’s sentence, and if it is not, the judgment should be modified to delete the
fine. Rodriguez v. State, — S.W.3d —, No. 01-23-00721-CR, 2025 WL 1373693,
at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 13, 2025, pet. ref’d); see Abad v. State,
729 S.W.3d 108, 116–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.); Fugett
v. State, 721 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2025, no pet.). Here, when the
court orally pronounced Claudio-Ruiz’s sentence, it stated only that it was
sentencing him to thirty-five years’ confinement. It did not mention any fines. It was
therefore improper for the trial court to include the Child Abuse Prevention Fine in
the judgment.
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not designated for publication); see also Fugett v. State, 721 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2025, no pet.) (following Bradshaw and concluding that “[b]ecause

Appellant was not convicted until 2024, the legislative reclassification of the Child

Abuse Prevention assessment of $100 from a ‘cost’ to a ‘fine’ applies”); Rhodes v.

State, 712 S.W.3d 226, 235 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, no pet.) (same).

We sustain Claudio-Ruiz’s third issue and modify the judgment of conviction

to delete references to the $100 Child Abuse Prevention Fine.

Conclusion

We modify the judgment of the trial court in two respects:

• On Page 1 of the judgment under “Fines,” we delete the amount of
$100.
• On Page 2 of the judgment under “Fines Imposed Include,” we uncheck
the box next to “Child Abuse Prevention Fine (Art. 102[.]0186 Code
Crim. Proc) ($100).”

We affirm the judgment as modified.

David Gunn
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Johnson.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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