Dominique Cunningham v. Teneshia Hudspeth

Opinion issued May 14, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00752-CV
———————————
DOMINIQUE CUNNINGHAM, Appellant
V.
TENESHIA HUDSPETH, Appellee

On Appeal from the 125th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2025-35689

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Dominique Cunningham, pro se, appeals the trial court’s order

granting Appellee Teneshia Hudspeth’s plea to the jurisdiction. She argues that the

trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction and that she was entitled to

findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

Cunningham sued Hudspeth, the Harris County Clerk, seeking an order to

unseal certain unidentified records she contends are in the custody of the county

clerk’s office. In her petition, titled “Suit on Account,” Cunningham appears to

allege that her fiduciary1 breached certain duties owed to her with respect to the

transfer of real property. Cunningham sought “only non-monetary relief to attain

judicial order for release of public information exempt from public disclosure.”

She sought a property deed and a statutory durable power of attorney along with

other related documents.

Cunningham alleged that the information sought was subject to a sealing

order, but she did not provide the source of the order, the reason for the order, the

date of the order, or any other information that would identify the sealing order. In

describing the relief sought, Cunningham pled that she was entitled to:

Release of recorded filings within County possession by authorized
release from the County Clerk Office’s administrative head
(Defendant) or its agent, under special right of access and vacatur of
the sealing order by certification of the Presiding Judge of the Court
with continuing jurisdiction or be certification of the Administrative
Judge or its agent.

(Emphasis in original.)

1
She identifies the fiduciary as Scott Carr with Prosperity Trust.

2
Hudspeth filed an original answer and contemporaneously, a plea to the

jurisdiction.

The Plea to the Jurisdiction

Hudspeth asserted three bases for relief in her plea to the jurisdiction. She

alleged that as a government entity, the county clerk’s office enjoys governmental

immunity from Cunningham’s lawsuit. Cunningham alleged in her second

amended petition that she was suing Hudspeth as an “administrative unit: Harris

County Clerk’s Office (governmental entity).” She later alleged she was suing

Hudspeth “in [her] official capacity as administrative head of Harris County

Clerk’s Office[.]” Thus, Hudspeth argued, Cunningham’s suit was actually a suit

against Harris County, and governmental immunity precluded her claims.

Hudspeth argued that Cunningham had not satisfied her burden to prove subject-

matter jurisdiction “by showing immunity does not apply or demonstrating the

governmental entity waived its immunity.”

Hudspeth also argued that Cuningham lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.

She asserted that Cunningham had not alleged an injury that was “fairly traceable

to [Hudspeth’s] conduct” and “likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”

Rather, she argued, any injury sustained by Cunningham was the result of an act of

a third party not before the trial court, a fact borne out by Cunningham’s pleadings,

which alleged that “Scott Carr” with Prosperity Trust “failed in [his] duty to

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account Plaintiff with a copy of the Notice of Hearing of Sealing Order that

contained the case number and other pertinent information.” Further, according to

Hudspeth, Cunningham had not made a formal request to Hudspeth’s office for the

information she sought, and Hudspeth’s office “cannot locate records if Plaintiff

does not provide sufficient information to do so.” To the extent Cuningham alleged

she was harmed by the sealed records, Hudspeth argued that action was not

attributable to her and she could not “unilaterally unseal th[e] documents without

violating a court order.”

Last, Hudspeth argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate another

court’s sealing order. According to the plea to the jurisdiction, Cunningham did not

plead facts indicating Hudspeth was a party to any lawsuit in which the records at

issue were sealed. Nor did Cunningham identify any other party or entity to the

lawsuit that purportedly led to sealing the records at issue. Hudspeth argued that

Cunningham was asking the court through Hudspeth “to reverse a prior court’s

finding with no notice to the person(s) who established the ‘specific, serious and

substantial interest’ in sealing the records or explanation as to why they were

sealed in the first place.”2 Because the court lacked standing to do so, Hudspeth

argued, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit.

2
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, which governs the sealing of court records,
only allows sealing upon a showing of a “specific, serious and substantial interest”
that “clearly outweighs” (1) the presumption of openness of court records to the
4
The Response

In her response, Cunningham argued first that she established subject matter

jurisdiction under Sections 552.001, 552.107, and 552.028 of the Texas Local

Government Code, because Chapter 552.001 “shall be liberally construed in favor

of granting a request for information.”3 Cunningham further argued that the

county’s governmental immunity was waived because Rule of Civil Procedure 76a

and Section 192.007 of the Local Government Code were implicated in her

claims.4, 5 Both pertain to records—the former to sealing and unsealing records and

general public and (2) any probable adverse effect likely to result form the sealing
on the general public health or safety. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1)(a).
3
Presumably, Cunningham meant in this paragraph to refer to the Texas
Government Code, which tracks the statutory provisions she purports to cite in her
response to the plea to the jurisdiction. Section 552.001(b) of the Texas
Government Code states, “This chapter shall be liberally construed in favor of
granting a request for information.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(b). Section
552.107 of the Texas Government Code addresses exceptions to disclosure of
certain public information. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.107. Section 552.028 of the
Government Code pertains to requests for information from incarcerated
individuals. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.028.
4
As noted, Rule 76a pertains to sealing court records. It provides in pertinent part
that “Any person may intervene as a matter of right at any time before or after
judgment to seal or unseal court records.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(7). Section 192.007
of the Local Government Code provides in pertinent part: “To release, transfer,
assign, or take another action relating to an instrument that is filed, registered, or
recorded in the office of the county clerk, a person must file, register, or record
another instrument relating to the action in the same manner as the original
instrument was required to be filed, registered, or recorded.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE § 192.007(a).
5
Rule 76a, which is purely procedural, does not implicate governmental immunity.
Moreover, Cunningham is not intervening in any suit to unseal records; rather, she
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the latter to obtaining records from the county clerk—but neither provision waives

governmental immunity. Cunningham also argued that venue was proper in the

court below. Cunningham did not explain how any of the cited sections conferred

subject matter jurisdiction on the court, nor did she provide any caselaw or other

relevant authority establishing that governmental immunity had been waived with

respect to her claims.

Cunningham also argued that her allegations established jurisdiction

allowing the trial court to vacate a sealing order. She argued that Rule 76a “serves

to point out laws regarding waiver of governmental immunity,” but she did not

identify any such laws. She argued that defense counsel has permission pursuant to

Rule 76[a] “to view Plaintiff’s kept record of criminal and civil action, however,

Defendant stands, by Original Answer, to negate facts of Plaintiff’s petition as

alleged fact; contending that the Court nor the Defense can satisfy the petitioned

relief, including vacatur of sealing order.”

Cunningham acknowledged in her response that her suit was the third one

she had filed involving the same subject matter.6 She argued that her “suit was not

brought a new and independent action, asking the trial court to unseal records that
were sealed by another court.
6
See Cunningham v. Duble, No. 01-25-00350-CV, 2026 WL 942428, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal
of suit Cunningham brought against Harris County Justice of the Peace Steve
Duble). The other lawsuit was brought by Cunningham against Harris County
Judge Lina Hidalgo seeking to “unseal” a deed and statutory durable power of
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filed in the court with continuing jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not have the

case number to the record.” It appeared she argued that her petition was a formal

request for the records she sought.

Last, Cunningham argued that Hudspeth “critically misinterpret[ed]” the

duties and responsibilities of the office of the county clerk. She argued that the

“sealed documents or record[s] [are] documents or record[s] that are exempt from

disclosure[.]”

The trial court granted Hudspeth’s plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal

ensued.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Subject matter jurisdiction is implicit in a court’s power to decide a case.

City of Hous. v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013). To establish subject

matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate affirmatively the

court’s jurisdiction to hear her claims. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590

S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004).

attorney. See Cause No. 2024-77884, Cunningham v. Hidalgo, In the 125th
District Court of Harris County, Texas. According to Hudspeth’s plea to the
jurisdiction, the latter case was dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

7
Cunningham sued Hudspeth “in [her] official capacity as administrative

head of Harris County Clerk’s Office[.]” The suit is thus against Harris County.

See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex. 2007) (“It is

fundamental that a suit against a state official is merely ‘another way of pleading

an action against the entity of which [the official] is an agent.’ A suit against a state

official in his official capacity ‘is not a suit against the official personally, for the

real party in interest is the entity.”’) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165 (1985) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).

As a political subdivision of the state, the County is immune from suit and

liability unless its immunity is waived by the Legislature. Stone v. Harris Cnty.,

No. 01-21-00384-CV, 2023 WL 5615812, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’

Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. 2022); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284

S.W.3d 366, 369–70 (Tex. 2009)7 (same; noting that “[w]ith the limited ultra vires

exception . . . governmental immunity protects government officers sued in their

7
“[G]overnmental immunity has two components: immunity from liability, which
bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from
suit, which bars suit against the entity altogether.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197
S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Immunity from suit bars an action against the State
and its subdivisions unless the Legislature has expressly consented to the suit.
Sweeny Cmty. Hosp. v. Mendez, 226 S.W.3d 584, 589 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “Immunity from suit [] presents a jurisdictional question of
whether the State has expressly consented to suit.” Gulf Coast Ctr. v. Curry, 658
S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tex. 2022).

8
official capacities to the extent that it protects their employers.”). Id. at 380.8

Because immunity from suit implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a

governmental entity can assert immunity from suit in a plea to jurisdiction. Dohlen

v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022).9

Lack of standing also may be the basis for a plea to the jurisdiction. Webre v.

Sneed, 358 S.W.3d 322, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (“Standing is

implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter

jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.”), aff’d, 465

S.W.3d 169 (Tex. 2015); see Haddy v. Caldwell, 355 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (“It is well established that a party’s standing may be

challenged by a plea to the jurisdiction[.]”).

Our review of a plea to the jurisdiction is de novo and mirrors the standard

of review for a traditional motion for summary judgment. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at

226, 228. We “take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and “indulge

8
“To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a
government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately
prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely
ministerial act.” Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d
329, 332 (Tex. 2022) (quoting City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372
(Tex. 2009)).
9
“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.
2004); TitleMax of Tex., Inc. v. City of Austin, 639 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.).

9
every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Id.

at 228.

“[A] court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction . . . may consider evidence and

must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Bland

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). If the defendant meets

its burden to establish the trial court lacks jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff, who must then show there is a question of material fact as to the

jurisdictional issue. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629,

635 (Tex. 2012). If the evidence raises a fact issue concerning jurisdiction, the plea

cannot be granted, and the fact finder must resolve the issue. Id. If, on the other

hand, the evidence is undisputed or does not raise a fact issue, the plea must be

determined as a matter of law. Id.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

In her first issue, Cunningham argues the trial court erred in granting the

plea to the jurisdiction because governmental immunity does not preclude her

claim against Hudspeth. She argues that her cause of action is not barred in light of

Section 27.001(4)(iii) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 76a.

Section 27.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides definitions

for the Texas Citizens Protection Act, a statute that has no bearing on the issues

10
here.10, 11 And, as noted, Rule 76a provides the standards and procedures for the

sealing of court records and appeals therefrom. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. Governmental

immunity is not contemplated in the rule.

The remainder of Cunningham’s argument does not address the plea to the

jurisdiction. Even though Hudspeth asserted three grounds in her plea to the

jurisdiction—governmental immunity, standing, and inability to vacate another

court’s order—Cunningham only addresses the governmental immunity and

vacatur arguments on appeal.12 “Generally speaking, an appellant must attack all

independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of ruling or

judgment.” Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 924 S.W.2d

187, 188 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)). If the appellant does not

address all independent bases that support the ruling or judgment, the reviewing

10
The Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”) “is a bulwark against retaliatory
lawsuits meant to intimidate or silence citizens on matters of public concern.”
Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. 2019). The TCPA is
intended “to identify and summarily dispose of lawsuits designed only to chill
First Amendment rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.” In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding).
11
Section 27.001(4)(iii) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines “exercise
of the right to petition” in the context of the TCPA as “an executive or other
proceeding before a department of the state or federal government or a subdivision
of the state or federal government[.]” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 27.001(4)(iii).
12
Indeed, in her brief, Cunningham avers Hudspeth prevailed on her “plea to [the]
jurisdiction claiming government immunity.”

11
court must affirm the ruling or judgment. Id. at 681 (applying rule to plea to

jurisdiction, overruling appellants’ issues because they challenged only some of

jurisdictional plea’s grounds). As we explained in Britton:

The reasoning is that, if an independent ground fully supports the
complained-of ruling or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error
to that independent ground, then (1) we must accept the validity of
that unchallenged independent ground . . . and thus (2) any error in the
grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged
independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or
judgment.

Id. (internal citation omitted).

Cunningham does not address the standing issue—that she failed to establish

she sustained an injury traceable to Hudspeth’s conduct. Standing has three prongs.

First, the plaintiff must plead facts that establish she was personally injured.

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 155 (Tex. 2012) (citing S. Tex.

Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2007). Second, the plaintiff’s

injury must be “fairly traceable” to the conduct of the defendant. Id. (citing Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Third, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must be

“likely to be redressed by the requested relief[.]” Id. (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).

Assuming without deciding that Cunningham satisfied the first standing

prong, she did not plead facts to establish the second or third. On the contrary, she

seems to attribute any injuries to the fiduciary whom she apparently claims failed

to provide her with information regarding the sealing order.

12
Finally, Cunningham argues in her brief that “suit was not filed in court of

continuing jurisdiction [] because [her] institutionally appointed fiduciary agent

faulted in rendering all imperative parts of service care, including a copy of the

notice of court proceeding and the sealing order that detailed the record case

number and the name and certification of the [j]udge with continuing jurisdiction.”

To the extent she intends for that statement to refute Hudspeth’s contention that the

court lacked jurisdiction to vacate another court’s sealing order, Cunningham’s

argument lacks merit.

According to Rule 76a, “Any person may intervene as a matter of right at

any time before or after judgment to seal or unseal court records. A court that

issues a sealing order retains continuing jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate that

order.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(7). Cunningham did not intervene. Rather, she filed a

new suit, which is not contemplated by Rule 76a.13 Cunningham has not directed

us to any authority that provides that a trial court may vacate a sealing order issued

by a different court, and we have not located any.14

13
“[A] third party with a justiciable interest in a pending suit may intervene as a
matter of right.” Ferchichi v. Whataburger Restaurants LLC, 713 S.W.3d 330, 339
(Tex. 2025) (citing In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Tex. 2008)
(orig. proceeding)); TEX. R. CIV. P. 60. Rule 60 “authorizes a party with a
justiciable interest in a pending suit to intervene in the suit as a matter of right.”
Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2019) (citing In re Union Carbide
Corp., 273 S.W.3d at 154).
14
See HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex. 2021)
(“Trial courts do retain jurisdiction to alter or vacate their own sealing orders, but
13
We overrule Cunningham’s first issue.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In her second issue, Cunningham argues the trial court erred by failing to

issue findings of fact and conclusions of law despite her requests. Cunningham was

not entitled to findings and conclusions.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296 provides in part:

In any case tried in the district or county court without a jury, any
party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. There was no trial in this case and there was no evidentiary

hearing held on the plea to the jurisdiction. The court was therefore not required to

file findings of fact and conclusions of law. “[F]indings of fact and conclusions of

law are not appropriate after . . . dismissal for want of jurisdiction without an

evidentiary hearing, dismissal based on the pleadings . . . [or] any judgment

rendered without an evidentiary hearing.” Leonard v. City of Burkburnett, No. 02-

22-00266-CV, 2023 WL 8940816, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 28, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Webb v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-21-00133-CV,

2022 WL 123219, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op.)); see U. Lawrence Boze’ & Assocs., P.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 368

S.W.3d 17, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“If the trial court

parties can move to reconsider an order on a motion to seal only by showing a
change in circumstances materially affecting the order.”) (emphasis added).
14
renders judgment as a matter of law, such as when a court grants a motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, findings and conclusions are not improper, but they

have no purpose and should not be requested or considered on appeal.”); see also

IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1997)

(stating dismissal for want of jurisdiction without evidentiary hearing is instance in

which “findings and conclusions can have no purpose and should not be requested,

made, or considered on appeal”).

We overrule Cunningham’s second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

15