Jose Jaime Rodriguez v. Rafael Henriquez and Suyapa Gutierrez

Opinion issued February 19, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00135-CV
———————————
JOSE JAIME RODRIGUEZ, Appellant
V.
RAFAEL HENRIQUEZ AND SUYAPA GUTIERREZ, Appellees

On Appeal from the 234th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2020-06359

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal concerns competing claims to title to a plot of land in Harris

County. Appellant Jose Jaime Rodriguez maintains that he owns the real property

because he provided the purchase money in 2018 when title was fraudulently taken

in his associate Rafael Henriquez’s name. Appellee Suyapa Gutierrez maintains
that she owns the property because she and her late husband purchased it from

Henriquez in 2020, and she proved the chain of title. The trial court concluded that

Rodriguez did not have equitable or superior title to the real property, and that

Gutierrez, who acted in good faith and without fraud, has legal title.

The trial court further concluded that Henriquez committed statutory and

common law fraud in connection with the purchase of the real property in

December 2018 and its sale in 2020, and in connection with the purchase of four

items of personal property. The trial court ordered that Rodriguez recover from

Henriquez actual damages on his fraud claims regarding the four items of personal

property, along with treble damages under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices

Act, attorney’s fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest. The trial court did

not award any damages on Rodriguez’s fraud claim regarding the real property.

Finally, the trial court implicitly denied Rodriguez’s motion for sanctions,

which asserted that counsel for Gutierrez had misrepresented the facts and holdings

of certain cases in argument before the court.

In three issues, Rodriguez challenges the trial court’s determination that

Gutierrez has legal title to the property, implicit denial of his motion for sanctions,

and failure to award equitable relief for Henriquez’s fraud in connection with the

purchase and sale of the real property.

2
We affirm the trial court’s judgment quieting title to the property in

Gutierrez, and we thus conclude that Rodriguez was not entitled to equitable relief

in connection with the purchase and sale of the real property. We also affirm the

trial court’s implicit denial of Rodriguez’s motion for sanctions.

Background

I. Relationship of Parties

Rodriguez is the owner of E. Rodriguez Plumbing, which he founded in

2010. Rodriguez met Henriquez in 2016 at a park where Rodriguez sponsored and

managed a soccer team and Henriquez worked part-time in private security. Early

in their relationship, Henriquez helped Rodriguez, who is not fluent in English, buy

a truck. In June 2018, Rodriguez hired Henriquez as an administrative assistant for

his business, E. Rodriguez Plumbing.

II. 2018 Purchase of 9410 Irby Street

The property at issue in this case is located at 9410 Irby Street in Harris

County, Texas. Before December 19, 2018, it was owned by Taurus Properties,

whose president was Ramiro Flores. At that time, it was vacant, undeveloped, and

lacked signs or other indications of use or possession.1

1
Some facts in the background are taken from the unchallenged findings of fact of
the trial court.
3
According to Rodriguez, he began negotiating with Flores to buy the

property in May 2018. Henriquez was not involved in the negotiations. Rodriguez

maintains that by December 2018, he and Flores had agreed on a purchase price of

$65,000 and set the date for closing.2 Rodriguez, who was unable to walk due to

severe injuries he sustained not long before the closing, remained in the car, while

Henriquez, who had driven him, went inside to the closing. Rodriguez testified that

he had authorized Henriquez to attend the closing on his behalf and that Henriquez

had told him that he would bring documents to him to sign in the car if necessary.

Rodriguez said that he did not expect Henriquez to take title to the property in his

own name.

Rodriguez maintained that he paid the purchase price of $65,000 with a

combination of a check drawn on his account, the E. Rodriguez Plumbing account,

and cash, which he gave to Henriquez to bring inside the building. Rodriguez

attached to his affidavit a photocopy of a check from E. Rodriguez Plumbing to

North Star Title Company for $64,770.96. The settlement statement showed

“Rafael Henriquez” as the “borrower,” and the grantee on the warranty deed was
2
In his deposition, Rodriguez testified that his agreement to buy the property from
Flores for $65,000 was an oral agreement; he never signed a written contract. He
testified that he recalled signing documents to purchase his house, but he did not
sign documents in connection with the purchase of 9410 Irby Street. When asked
if he thought it strange that he did not sign documents, Rodriguez said: “When I
bought my house, that was through financing, and I had to sign the title and go to
the title company for the signatures, but now it was a cash purchase, and that’s
completely different. Mr. Rafael [Henriquez] told me that if there was any
problems, he was going to bring the documents for me to sign.”
4
Henriquez. But Rodriguez’s address appeared beneath Henriquez’s name on the

warranty deed, and Rodriguez said that Henriquez had never lived there.

After the closing in December 2018, Rodriguez engaged contractors to clear

trees, compact and level the lot, and build a fence. Henriquez continued to work for

Rodriguez until November 2019, when he quit after refusing to give Rodriguez a

$24,000 payment for work performed by E. Rodriguez Plumbing.3

III. 2020 Sale of 9410 Irby Street

A. Henriquez lists the property for sale.

In January 2020, Henriquez contacted Monica Marchant, a real estate agent,

and told her that he wanted to sell 9410 Irby Street as soon as possible because he

was moving to Miami for business and needed the money. Henriquez told

Marchant that he paid $65,000, but he was willing to sell it for $55,000 because he

needed to sell quickly. Marchant asked for the deed and the survey and if there was

any problem that would interfere with the sale. Henriquez denied any such

problems and provided her with the deed. Marchant called William Gutierrez, a

client who was looking to buy land as an investment for his children. Henriquez

and William Gutierrez negotiated and agreed on a purchase price of $42,000.

3
The record includes additional evidence regarding Henriquez’s fraudulent practice
of assisting Rodriguez in purchasing vehicles and equipment (paid by Rodriguez)
and putting title in his name. These acts of fraud are not in issue in this appeal.
5
B. Rodriguez tells Gutierrez that he owns the property.

On Saturday, January 25, 2020, William Gutierrez, his wife Suyapa, and

their adult son drove to the property, and William took pictures. Jose Quintanilla,

who was working at the property for E. Rodriguez Plumbing, noticed them arrive.

Quintanilla asked the driver why he was taking pictures. William told Quintanilla

that he was inspecting the property because he planned to buy it from Henriquez.

Quintanilla informed him that Henriquez was not the owner, and that “Henriquez

was trying to steal from him and Mr. Rodriguez.”

When Rodriguez called Quintanilla to check on his progress, he spoke to

William by phone. Standing outside the car, Quintanilla heard William identify

himself, repeat what he had told Quintanilla, say that he did not know that

Henriquez was not the owner, and state that he was told the property was for sale.

William recalled the phone call the same way, adding that Rodriguez told him that

Henriquez is a “con artist” and to “be careful with him.” Rodriguez recalled the

conversation as “very, very short . . . . three or four words that we exchanged.

Because he . . . said he was going to come back to talk, and he never did.” Though

Suyapa Gutierrez said she did not hear the conversation, she recalled that her

husband said someone other than Henriquez was claiming to own the property.

6
William then contacted his real estate agent, Monica Marchant,4 who

confronted Henriquez about Rodriguez’s assertion of ownership. Henriquez told

Marchant that he was the sole owner of the property as shown on the deed, and that

Rodriguez was a former business partner who was “crazy.” Henriquez told

Marchant to “forget about them,” and that Rodriguez was a shameless liar and thief

(“ladrón”). Marchant relayed Henriquez’s response William, who told her that if

the title was clear, he and his wife would buy the property. Marchant verified

Henriquez’s title with the title company, and assured William that the title was

clear.

C. Henriquez sells the property to Gutierrez, and Rodriguez files
suit.

On January 29, 2020, Henriquez conveyed 9410 Irby Street to the

Gutierrezes. Later that day, at 5:40 p.m., Rodriguez filed suit against Henriquez for

trespass to try title, seeking title to and possession of the real property, damages,

interest, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees. The warranty deed reflecting the sale

from Henriquez to the Gutierrezes was recorded the following day, January 30,

2020, at 8:26 a.m. Just over seven hours later, at 4:02 p.m. on January 30, 2020,

Rodriguez recorded a notice of lis pendens in the real property records of Harris

County regarding the lawsuit against Henriquez.

4
Gutierrez recalled that her husband told the realtor, Marchant, to investigate
whether there were problems that would interfere with the purchase.
7
In March 2020, the Gutierrezes intervened in Rodriguez’s lawsuit, asserting

that they had purchased the property by warranty deed on January 29, 2020, and

that they “had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s [Rodriguez’s] alleged interest in the

Property.” They pled causes of action for trespass to try title against Rodriguez and

fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment against Henriquez.

About a year later, William died, and his wife continued the litigation.

D. Rodriguez seeks a default judgment against Henriquez for fraud
and other claims.

In August 2021, the trial court granted Rodriguez’s motion for death penalty

sanctions against Henriquez based on “his egregious discovery abuse” and his

repeated refusal to comply with the trial court’s orders. 5 In doing so, the court

struck Henriquez’s original answer and any other defensive pleadings filed by him

or on his behalf. About seven months later, Rodriguez amended his petition adding

claims for damages from the removal of trees from the property, and statutory and

common law fraud in regard to both the 2018 purchase of the property and the

5
“[D]iscovery sanctions can be used to adjudicate the merits of a party’s claims
when a party’s hindrance of the discovery process justifies a presumption that its
claims lack merit.” Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2004); see TEX.
R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(5) (authorizing trial court to enter, as discovery sanction, “an
order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until
the order is obeyed, or dismissing with or without prejudice the action or
proceedings or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party”); see also In re Noble Drilling (Jim Thompson), LLC, 449
S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Discovery
sanctions that adjudicate a party’s claims and defenses and preclude presentation
of the case’s merits are considered death penalty sanctions.”).
8
2020 sale. Rodriguez sought reformation of the 2018 warranty deed, rescission of

the 2020 warranty deed, and, in the alternative, recognition of a purchase money

resulting trust because he paid the purchase price of the property in 2018.

Rodriguez pleaded conversion and violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act in

regard to the real property, as well as two vehicles, two excavators, and the money

paid by an apartment complex for work performed by Rodriguez Plumbing.

Contemporaneous with his amended petition, Rodriguez moved for a post-answer

default judgment on his claims against Henriquez.

In September 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Rodriguez’s motion for

default judgment, during which Rodriguez testified, and exhibits were admitted.

Rodriguez testified that he paid $65,000 for the property, and after the closing, he

spent $21,000 to install a fence on the property, $5,500 to install a gate, $13,000 to

clear the land, $28,000 to level the land, $11,500 for architectural plans for a shop,

and $1,770 for a City permit.

E. Rodriguez seeks sanctions against Suyapa Gutierrez and her
attorneys.

Rodriguez sought sanctions against Suyapa Gutierrez and her attorneys

under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 13, and Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code, arguing that Gutierrez’s pleadings were groundless

(“without a basis in law or fact”) and brought in bad faith (by misstating the law

and acting with intent to protect Fidelity National Title from its indemnification

9
duty rather than to protect Gutierrez’s interest).6 Rodriguez argued that Suyapa was

not a bona fide purchaser and that during the litigation she falsely claimed that she

had no knowledge that anyone other than Henriquez was claiming an interest in the

property. Rodriguez asserted that Gutierrez had both actual and constructive notice

of his claims, but she and her attorneys argued that she was a bona fide purchaser

by misrepresenting to the trial court the holding of various cases.

F. The parties submit their claims to the court on a stipulated record.

The trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the sanctions motion on

November 20, 2023, and then the parties submitted the case to the court for

determination based on an agreed stipulated record.

The stipulated record included deposition excerpts and other exhibits, some

of which were offered without objection. One such exhibit offered without

objection was Intervenor’s I-03, a business records affidavit and attached records

from North Star Title regarding the sale of the property from Taurus Properties to

6
Rodriguez also sought sanctions under Chapter 9 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. “Chapter 9 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code also
addresses frivolous pleadings and claims, but its application is limited to
proceedings in which neither Rule 13 nor Chapter 10 applies. . . . Chapter 9 has
largely been subsumed by subsequent revisions to the code.” Nath v. Tex.
Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 362 n.6 (Tex. 2014); see Cynthia Nguyen, An
Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure?: Frivolous Litigation Diagnosis
Under Texas Government Code Chapters 9 and 10, and Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 13, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1083–84 (2000) (theorizing “it would be
difficult to conceive of a scenario in which Chapter 9 would be applicable,” and
noting that “there are only a handful of cases that even cite Chapter 9, and these
date from before the 1999 amendment to Section 9.012”).
10
Rafael Henriquez. These documents included the warranty deed, the settlement

statement, and the purchase agreement between Henriquez and Taurus Properties

for the purchase of 9410 Irby Street, for $65,000, dated December 11, 2018. There

was also a money order for $650.00 made out to North Star Title from Rafael

Henriquez, with a memo line stating “9410 Irby.”

G. The trial court finds that Henriquez committed fraud against
Rodriguez, but Gutierrez has superior title to the property.

The trial court granted judgment in favor of Gutierrez on her trespass to try

title claim, finding that she had proven chain of title and that her title was superior

to that claimed by Rodriguez. In its findings of fact, the court found that Henriquez

represented to Gutierrez that he owned the property and that his ownership of legal

title was memorialized in the 2018 deed. The court further found that Rodriguez,

who was a stranger to Gutierrez, represented that he, not Henriquez, owned the

property, but before the sale, there were no records in the Harris County Real

Property Records indicating that Rodriguez had any interest in or claim to the

property. The court found that “Mrs. Gutierrez could only surmise, guess, or

conjecture as to [Rodrguez’s] representation.” The court also found: “At all

relevant times, Mrs. Gutierrez’s conduct has been honest in fact, free of improper

motive or willful ignorance of the facts at hand.”

In its conclusions of law, the trial court found that Rodriguez “appears

nowhere in the chain of title from Taurus . . . to Henriquez.” The court also

11
concluded that Rodriguez had not shown “an equitable right to the [p]roperty,” “an

equitable title superior to Mrs. Gutierrez’s legal title,” or “an interest to the

[p]roperty that is valid or enforceable.”

The trial court further concluded that Henriquez committed statutory and

common law fraud in connection with the purchase of the real property in

December 2018 and its sale in 2020, and in connection with the purchase of four

items of personal property. The trial court ordered that Rodriguez recover from

Henriquez actual damages on his fraud claims regarding the four items of personal

property, along with treble damages under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices

Act, attorney’s fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest. The trial court did

not award any damages on Rodriguez’s fraud claim regarding the real property.

The court did not rule on Rodriguez’s motion for sanctions, but the final

judgment stated that “[a]ll other relief requested and not granted herein is denied,”

and stated that it was final and appealable. Thus, the trial court implicitly denied

Rodriguez’s motion for sanctions.

This appeal followed.

Analysis

I. The trial court correctly held that Gutierrez has legal title.

In his first issue, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by misapplying

the law regarding who has title to the real property. Rodriguez does not dispute that

12
Gutierrez has proven that she holds legal title through a chain-of-title analysis.7 But

he argues that he has equitable title by virtue of a purchase money resulting trust

and that his title is superior to that of Gutierrez. Gutierrez argues that Rodriguez

has not proven the existence of a purchase money resulting trust because the

evidence (1) demonstrates that Henriquez purchased the property in 2018 and

(2) suggests that the check from Rodriguez’s plumbing company may have been a

loan.8

7
“A trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands,
tenements, or other real property.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 22.001(a); see Brumley v.
McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826, 831–32 (Tex. 2021). In a trespass-to-try-title action, a
plaintiff may prove legal title by establishing: (1) a regular chain of title of
conveyances from the sovereign to the plaintiff; (2) a superior title to that of the
defendant out of a common source; (3) title by limitations (i.e., adverse
possession); or (4) possession that has not been abandoned. Brumley, 616 S.W.3d
at 832. In its findings of fact, the trial court found that (1) before December 19,
2018, the record owner of 9410 Irby Street was Taurus Properties, (2) Henriquez
received legal title to the property from Taurus Properties and that deed was
recorded in the Harris County Real Property Records; (3) Gutierrez received legal
title to the property from Henriquez and that deed was recorded in the Harris
County Real Property Records; (4) Rodriguez appears nowhere in the chain of title
from Taurus Properties to Henriquez to Gutierrez; and (5) Gutierrez’s chain of title
is unbroken. Rodriguez has not challenged these findings of fact on appeal,
making Gutierrez’s chain of title conclusive. See Tenaska Energy, Inc. v.
Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014) (“We defer to
unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by some evidence.”).
8
She also argues that, even if Rodriguez had shown the existence of a purchase
money resulting trust, she was nevertheless a bona fide purchaser because neither
Rodriguez’s statement that he was the owner nor his purported use of the property
created actual or constructive notice that would defeat her status as a bona fide
purchaser.

13
A. Standards of Review

On appeal, both parties frame the standard of review as being either a

challenge to the trial court’s legal conclusions (Rodriguez) or a challenge to the

trial court’s findings of fact (Gutierrez). We disagree with this framing of this

issue. Rather than presenting issues specifically challenging the trial court’s

findings of fact for sufficiency of the evidence or conceding the findings of fact but

disagreeing with the conclusion, Rodriguez maintains that the trial court’s

judgment was incorrect because of his alleged purchase money resulting trust.9

“When a plaintiff challenges the judgment entered against him following a

bench trial and argues that he established his cause of action as a matter of law, we

will apply the same standard of review applicable to the denial of a plaintiff’s

motion for directed verdict.” Jackson v. Jefferson, No. 01-15-00344-CV, 2016 WL

5400431, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem.

op.). “A denial of a motion for directed verdict may be reversed when the evidence

conclusively proves a fact that establishes a party’s right to judgment as a matter of

law and there is no evidence to the contrary.” See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. C

9
“Rodriguez was entitled to have the Court declare him the equitable owner of the
Property under the theory of a purchase money resulting trust because the focus of
a purchase money resulting trust is on the question of consideration. Rodriguez
established below that he paid the full consideration for the purchase of the
Property.” Appellant’s Br. 49–50.
14
Springs 300, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.

denied) (stating standard of review for denial of directed verdict).

We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for directed verdict

under the legal sufficiency standard of review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168

S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). “When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an

adverse finding on an issue on which [he] has the burden of proof, [he] must

demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital

facts in support of the issue.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241

(Tex. 2001).

Here, Rodriguez was required to demonstrate on appeal that the evidence

conclusively showed the existence of a purchase money resulting trust. “Evidence

is conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions.”10 City

10
In her brief, Gutierrez argued that Rodriguez was required to prove the existence
of a purchase money resulting trust by clear and convincing evidence. Appellee’s
Br. 22–23. Ordinarily, because “there is strong presumption in favor of the
correctness of a deed as written and executed,” Davis v. Gayer, No. 01-03-00165-
CV, 2004 WL 638140, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 1, 2004, pet.
denied) (mem. op.), a party seeking to establish the existence of a purchase money
resulting trust must do so by clear and convincing evidence. See Chang v. Liu, No.
01-22-00529-CV, 2024 WL 4628401, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct.
31, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Clear and convincing evidence is the measure or
degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. State v.
K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. 2010). Because Rodriguez was the plaintiff and
had the burden of proof on the question of the purchase money resulting trust, he
must meet a higher burden on appeal and demonstrate that the record includes
conclusive proof of his claim, i.e., proof as to which reasonable people could not
15
of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816 . “In general, we recognize several types of evidence

as being conclusive, including undisputed evidence that allows just one logical

inference, undisputed evidence of undeniable physical facts, undisputed evidence

admitted to be true, and disputed evidence that definitively negates contrary proof

in some fashion, such as a scientifically reliable diagnostic test establishing

paternity in the face of contrary testimony.” Prosper Florida, Inc. v. Spicy World

of USA, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 661, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.)

(citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 814–16). “Unless the evidence is conclusive,

the factfinder is entitled to weigh the evidence and to assess witness credibility.”

See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816–17.

B. Purchase Money Resulting Trust

The doctrine of resulting trust, or purchase money resulting trust, “is

invoked to prevent unjust enrichment.” Nolana Dev. Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d

246, 250 (Tex. 1984). “When title to property is taken in the name of someone

other than the person who advances the purchase price, a resulting trust is created

in favor of the payor.” Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley, 809 S.W.2d 218,

220 (Tex. 1991); see Nolana Dev. Ass’n, 682 S.W.2d at 250; Cohrs v. Scott, 338

S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Haynes v. Molina, No. 01-19-00917-CV, 2021 WL

4155822, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 14, 2021, pet. denied) (mem.

differ in their conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex.
2005).
16
op.) (“A party who provides all or a portion of the purchase price acquires

equitable title when the deed is executed.”). A resulting trust arises when title

passes because the law presumes that the party who pays for the property is the

true owner and the party in whom legal title is taken is holding the property for the

benefit of the true owner. E.g., Haynes, 2021 WL 4155822, at *5–6; Troxel v.

Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).

Exceptions exist, for example when the facts give rise to the presumption of

a gift, like when parents pay the purchase price for property and put title in the

name of a child, Amador v. Berrospe, 961 S.W.2d 205, 07–08 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. denied), or when someone pays the purchase price as

a loan and the title is taken in the name of the borrower. See Sahagun v. Ibarra, 90

S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

Because “there is strong presumption in favor of the correctness of a deed as

written and executed,” Davis v. Gayer, No. 01-03-00165-CV, 2004 WL 638140, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 1, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.), the law

is suspicious of resulting trusts. Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 298. Ordinarily, a a party

seeking to establish the existence of a purchase money resulting trust must do so

by clear and convincing evidence. See Chang v. Liu, No. 01-22-00529-CV, 2024

WL 4628401, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 31, 2024, no pet.) (mem.

op.).

17
C. Resulting Trust Not Shown

On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by determining

ownership based on the chain of title instead of awarding him title to the property

based on his alleged purchase money resulting trust. For Rodriguez to prevail on

appeal, he must first conclusively show that the evidence supports his claim that a

purchase money resulting trust was created. Rodriguez maintains that he paid the

full purchase price of the property and title was fraudulently conveyed to

Henriquez. The evidence includes a cashier’s check made out to “North Start [sic]

Title Company” for $64,770.96 indicating that the remitter was E. Rodriguez

Plumbing. Rodriguez testified that he paid the purchase price from his bank

account, which was the same account he used for his plumbing business. He

testified that he negotiated the purchase price over several months, and that

Henriquez was not involved in the negotiations. Rodriguez said that Henriquez

drove him to the closing due to his physical limitations at the time, and that he

orally authorized Henriquez to act on his behalf at the closing and to bring him

papers to sign if necessary. Rodriguez testified that he did not intend for Henriquez

to take title to the property in his own name.

The stipulated evidence also includes a real estate contract showing only

Henriquez as the buyer. It is dated December 11, 2018, ten days before closing,

18
and it was accompanied by a copy of a money order from Henriquez to North Star

Title for $650.00 with a memo stating “9410 Irby.”

The evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that Rodriguez, in his

personal capacity, paid the purchase price in the “character of a purchaser” as

necessary to support the presumption of a purchase money resulting trust. Lifemark

Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983,

writ ref’d n.r.e.) (internal citations omitted).

The record evidence shows that Rodriguez and Henriquez had known each

other for at least two years before Henriquez began working for him. During that

time, Henriquez had assisted Rodriguez with the purchase of a vehicle. The

evidence about the agreement to purchase the property in 2018 is disputed.

Rodriguez testified that he negotiated with Flores for several months before

reaching an agreement about the purchase price. On the other hand, the record also

includes a written purchase agreement showing Henriquez as the purchaser, as well

as a money order for $650.00 made out to North Star Title from Rafael Henriquez,

with a memo line stating “9410 Irby.” While Rodriguez’s testimony suggests that

he intended to be the purchaser, the documentary evidence shows that the

agreement was for Henriquez to buy the property.

The cashier’s check and Rodriguez’s testimony that the E. Rodriguez

Plumbing account was his personal account is some evidence that Rodriguez

19
advanced the money to pay for the property. However, in light of the years-long

relationship he had with Henriquez and the purchase agreement between

Henriquez and Taurus Properties, a reasonable fact finder could have believed that

the check was intended to be a loan.

Rodriguez’s burden on appeal was to show that the record conclusively

proved his assertion that he paid the purchase money and was the beneficiary of a

purchase money resulting trust. Because the evidence would allow reasonable

people to differ in their conclusions—either Rodriguez advanced the money as a

purchaser or he loaned it to Henriquez, a friend and employee—it is not

conclusive. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816. Rodriguez did not carry his

burden on appeal, and we overrule this issue.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly denying the
motion for sanctions.

In his second issue, Rodriguez challenges the trial court’s implicit denial of

his motion for sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Chapter 10 of

the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion

for sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp.,

446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014); Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex.

2007). Under this standard, “[a]lthough we view conflicting evidence favorably to

the court’s decision, we are not bound by a trial court’s fact findings or conclusions

of law and must, instead, review the entire record independently to determine

20
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods.,

LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Tex. 2020). “[We] may reverse the trial court’s ruling

only if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles,

such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614.

As in Nath, the requested sanctions in this case involve pleadings and other

filings. See Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 361. Rule 13 provides that pleadings that are

groundless and in bad faith, intended to harass, or false when made are

sanctionable:

The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them
that they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of their knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry the instrument is not groundless and brought in bad
faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment.
Attorneys or parties who . . . make statements in pleading which they
know to be groundless and false, for the purpose of securing a delay
of the trial of the cause, shall be held guilty of a contempt . . . .

Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are
filed in good faith. No sanctions under this rule may be imposed
except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the
sanction order. “Groundless” for purposes of this rule means no basis
in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. . . .

TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. “Rule 13 does not permit sanctions on the issue of

groundlessness alone. Rather, the filing in question must be groundless and also

either brought in bad faith, brought for the purpose of harassment, or false when

made.” Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 362–63.

21
“Chapter 10 allows sanctions for pleadings filed with an improper purpose

or that lack legal or factual support.” Id. at 362. It provides that by signing a

pleading or motion, a signatory attests that:

(1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper
purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation;

(2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleading or
motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law; [and]

(3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or
motion has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified
allegation or factual contention, is likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery. . . .

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.001. Pleadings that violate these requirements

are sanctionable. Id. § 10.004(a). But a court may not sanction a represented party

under section 10.001 for unfounded legal contentions. Id. § 10.004(d).

Rodriguez’s sanctions request was based on his contention that Gutierrez’s

pleading was false when made because she knew that Rodriguez told her husband

that he, not Henriquez, owned the property. The sanctions request was also

grounded on Rodriguez’s assertion that Gutierrez’s pleadings and motions included

unfounded legal contentions about the application of the bona fide purchaser

doctrine, which were based on misrepresentations of caselaw.

22
To prevail on appeal, Rodriguez must demonstrate that the trial court abused

its discretion because the record shows that Gutierrez’s assertion that she had no

knowledge of any other legal claims to property was false and that her pleadings

and motions actually included unfounded legal contentions about the application of

the bona fide purchaser doctrine. While our holding that Rodriguez did not

demonstrate the existence of a purchase money resulting trust is sufficient to

dispose of his first issue without consideration of the bona fide purchaser doctrine,

see section I.C., supra, his bona fide purchaser arguments are relevant to his claim

about the denial of his sanctions motion. Accordingly, we now consider those

arguments.

Ordinarily, an unrecorded conveyance of real property is void as to a

subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice of third-party

claims, who is referred to as a “bona fide purchaser.” Madison v. Gordon, 39

S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001); see TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.001(a) (“A conveyance of

real property or an interest in real property or a mortgage or deed of trust is void as

to a creditor or to a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without

notice unless the instrument has been acknowledged, sworn to, or proved and filed

for record as required by law.”). Status as a bona fide purchaser is typically an

affirmative defense to a title dispute. Madison, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001);

see 425 Soledad, Ltd. v. CRVI Riverwalk Hosp., LLC, 709 S.W.3d 551, 559 & n.21

23
(Tex. 2024). However, when a plaintiff claims an equitable title, he assumes the

burden of proving that the subsequent purchaser of the legal title was not a bona

fide purchaser. Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 907

(Tex. 1982); see also Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (“In

the absence of evidence showing [Petitioner, who held legal title,] was not a bona

fide purchaser its position was superior to a claimant asserting an equitable interest

only.”).

Because Rodriguez’s claim is based on an equitable interest—a purchase

money resulting trust—to prevail, he was required to show that Gutierrez was not a

bona fide purchaser. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 637 S.W.2d at 907. Throughout

this litigation, Rodriguez has argued that his and Quintanilla’s conversations with

William, in which both men informed William that Rodriguez, not Henriquez,

owned the property, provided both William and Suyapa with actual notice of a

third-party claim and that notice was sufficient to defeat their status as bona fide

purchasers. In addition, Rodriguez also argues that the work he did on the property,

including fencing, and Quintanilla’s presence on the land when the Gutierrezes

inspected it, provided additional notice of their claim.

“For property interests, notice has two forms: actual and constructive. Actual

notice is personal knowledge or those things which a reasonably diligent inquiry

and exercise of the means of information at hand would have disclosed. When a

24
duty to inquire exists, negligent ignorance has the same effect in law as actual

knowledge.” 425 Soledad, Ltd., 709 S.W.3d at 560 (internal quotations omitted).

But not every piece of information or statement made to a would-be bona fide

purchaser amounts to notice. See Hue Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (holding that evidence that

“provides nothing more than basis for surmise, guess, or conjecture” as to third-

party’s interest is no more than a scintilla of evidence of actual knowledge).

“Generally, the question of whether a party has notice is a question of fact; it

becomes a question of law only when there is no room for ordinary minds to differ

as to the proper conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 323.

Here, the evidence shows that Quintanilla and Rodriguez told the

Gutierrezes that Rodriguez, not Henriquez, owned the property, and they accused

Henriquez of trying to steal from Rodriguez and Gutierrez. After Gutierrez asked

his realtor to investigate, Henriquez said that he, not Rodriguez, owned the

property, and Henriquez called Rodriguez a thief. Far from leaving no room for

ordinary minds to differ, these competing statements directly contradicted each

other, providing no basis for Gutierrez to acquire actual knowledge of the fact of a

third party’s claim of a legal interest in the property. Instead, the competing

statements provided no more than a basis for surmise, guess, or speculation. See id.

at 324. Moreover, Gutierrez, through Marchant and the title company, investigated

25
and found nothing indicating that Rodriguez had a legal claim to the property.

Indeed, she could not have found anything because Rodriguez’s lawsuit and lis

pendens were filed only after the closing of the property sale.

In the trial court, Rodriguez also contended that Gutierrez had constructive

notice of his claim because, prior to closing, she visited the property and saw (1) a

fully fenced and gated property, (2) that was leveled and cleared of brush, trash,

and debris, (3) protected by guard dogs, and (4) occupied by Quintanilla who told

them he was working for Rodriguez.

In Madison v. Gordon, the Texas Supreme Court explained that a purchaser

may be charged with constructive notice of an occupant’s claims to real property

when the occupant’s possession of the land is visible, open, exclusive, and

unequivocal. 39 S.W.3d at 606. In that circumstance, the purchaser “is charged

with notice of all the occupant’s claims the purchaser might have reasonably

discovered on proper inquiry.” Id. at 606. However, when such possession is

ambiguous or equivocal, or may appear subservient or attributable to the legal title

holder, then the act of possession does not constitute actual or constructive notice

of unrecorded property claims. Id. at 607.

Here, there were no structures, no signs, and no indication that Rodriguez or

his plumbing company were occupiers or possessors of the land, aside from the

statements we have already discussed. The existence of a fence and a gate is

26
evidence that someone put it there, but alone it is not evidence as to who put it on

the property. The same is true for the dogs and the work that had been done to

clear trees and level the land. Quintanilla’s presence on the land is not evidence of

open, visible or unequivocal acts of occupancy because the record shows that he

worked for Rodriguez’s plumbing company, which did jobs for a variety of clients

in a variety of locations. From the perspective of a purchaser—Gutierrez—the

presence of a contract worker on the property is not openly or visibly inconsistent

with Henriquez’s ownership. We conclude that Gutierrez did not have constructive

notice of Rodriguez’s claims of ownership of the property based on Quintanilla’s

presence, the gate, the fence, the cleared trees, the leveled ground, or the presence

of dogs. See id. at 606–07.

Having reached these conclusions, we hold that Rodriguez did not

demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

sanctions. We overrule Rodriguez’s second issue.

III. The trial court did not err by failing to grant reformation and rescission
giving legal title to Rodriguez.

In his third issue, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by failing to

reform and rescind the deeds in this case based on its finding that Henriquez

committed statutory fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of 9410 Irby

Street. In light of our holdings in sections I and II of this opinion, we conclude that

Rodriguez was not entitled to legal title to 9410 Irby Street, and thus the trial court

27
did not err in failing to award Rodriguez the specific remedies of reformation and

rescission. We overrule Rodriguez’s third issue.11

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey and Dokupil.

11
In this Court, Rodriguez’s original brief sought additional monetary damages for
Henriquez’s statutory fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of 9410 Irby
Street. In that brief, Rodriguez argued that the court erred by failing to award any
damages for those acts of fraud. However, Rodriguez filed an amended brief, in
which he abandoned that issue and substituted his third issue, in which he
specifically challenged the trial court’s failure to award him title to the property as
damages for Henriquez’s fraud. Accordingly, we do not consider whether the trial
court erred by failing to award Rodriguez any monetary damages for Henriquez’s
acts of fraud in connection with 9410 Irby Street.
28