Eric Owens v. Nicole L. Johnson

Opinion issued January 29, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00137-CV
———————————
ERIC OWENS, Appellant
V.
NICOLE JOHNSON, Appellee

On Appeal from the 311th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-48297

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order that (1) modified Eric Owens’s

monthly child-support obligation to his ex-wife, Nicole Johnson, and (2) confirmed

the amount of an arrearage for child support that Owens already owed to Johnson.
Challenging this order, Owens makes two arguments. First, he argues the trial

court abused its discretion in its modification of his monthly child-support

obligation. Even though the trial court lowered the amount he owed, he contends the

trial court miscalculated his income by relying on an online military pay calculator

to determine his income as a soldier and by failing to credit Owens’s own calculation

of his income. Thus, he argues, the new amount is still too high. Second, Owens

argues the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the child-support arrearage;

he bases his argument on his characterization of evidence he introduced.

But Owens’s arguments do not support reversal on this record. To begin, the

record shows the trial court did not rely on the online military pay calculator he

challenges. Instead, the court excluded that evidence as hearsay. Moreover, fact

disputes that turned on credibility assessments existed concerning Owens’s

calculation of his income and the child-support arrearage. The trial court sitting as

factfinder had to resolve these credibility issues, and we cannot revisit these

credibility issues based on our review of the appellate record. Accordingly, Owens

has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion here. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Lawsuit

Owens filed suit seeking to modify the amount of child support he owed under

a previous order. Johnson answered, countersued, and moved to enforce the existing

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child-support order, alleging that Owens had failed to pay amounts he owed.

Bench Trial

Owens and Johnson tried their dispute to the bench over the course of three

days in 2023. Only Owens and Johnson testified. They relied on various exhibits.

A. Monthly Child Support

A September 18, 2020 Order entered in another state required Owens to pay

Johnson $1,820.71 per month in child support for the two children they had together.

This Order was premised on a monthly gross income of $4,773.69 for Owens.

Owens’s assertions

Owens asserted that his income had decreased, warranting a reduction in his

obligation. Specifically, Owens testified that, when the previous Order issued, he

was a staff sergeant on active duty with ten years of service in the United States

Army. He argued that although he held the same rank at the time of this trial, with

twelve years of service, his service status had changed. Owens stated that while he

remained on active duty, he did so as member of the guard or reserve, and that this

change in status had altered his gross income.

Owens also testified that he previously received housing and food allowances

for which he was no longer eligible. He testified that his remarriage to another

service member affected his eligibility for a housing allowance. He said only one of

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them could receive such an allowance, and, according to him, his wife did. And he

said loss of these allowances reduced his monthly gross income by almost $1,500.

Owens testified that his monthly gross income was now $3,304.26.

Owens also testified that his expenses for the children’s medical and dental

insurance increased. When the previous Order issued, Owens says he paid $0 per

month for medical coverage for the children and $30 per month for their dental

insurance. But he testified that he now pays $450.30 monthly for their insurance,

with medical coverage costing $150 and dental coverage costing $300.30.

In sum, accounting for expenses, Owens asserted that his net monthly income

was now $2,361.51. Applying the legal guideline for child support, he consequently

asserted his monthly child-support obligation should be $531.34.

On cross-examination, Owens conceded that his pay was being garnished but

that this was not shown on the Military Leave and Earnings Statements he introduced

into evidence. He stated that this might be reflected in some other Defense Finance

and Accounting Service document or record.

Moreover, Owens acknowledged that he had not provided evidence of his

income as of trial—even though this information could be obtained through the

Army’s MyPay website. He said that one can only log in to this website via a

government computer on post due to security. Barring logging in, Owens said, he

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would need to request this information from his unit’s finance section (which he did

not do, as far as the record shows).

Finally, when asked if it would surprise him that the Army reported to the

Office of the Attorney General that he has a higher income than claimed, Owens

said, “yes.”

Johnson’s assertions

Johnson’s testimony was different. She asserted that Owens still had housing

and food allowances—although she conceded that she had no documentary proof to

support her assertion and that she is not an expert regarding military benefits.

Johnson also disputed Owens’s testimony about increased costs for the

children’s medical and dental insurance. She testified it was not possible that the

cost for dental coverage had increased a thousandfold in just three years’ time, and

she maintained that “there’s no cost to the soldiers” for medical insurance.

By Johnson’s calculation, Owens’s monthly child-support obligation should

be $1,237.43. She based her calculation on the reported income of a staff sergeant

with twelve years of service, as calculated by an online military pay calculator. Her

calculation assumed that Owens was receiving housing and food allowances.

Owens objected that the online military pay calculator was inadmissible

hearsay when Johnson tried to introduce it into evidence. The trial court sustained

his objection, thereby excluding the online military pay calculator.

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B. Child-Support Arrearage

As to the child-support arrearage, Johnson relied on the Attorney General’s

records. Based on these records, which reflected a child-support arrearage, she said

Owens owed $6,896.31 in past due child support.

Owens, on the other hand, asserted that the September 18, 2020 Order had

been in place for 35 months, obligating him to pay $63,700 in child support so far.1

He asserted that records from the Office of the Attorney General showed he had paid

$44,657.53. Subtracting the latter amount from the former one, Owens stated that

this left $19,042.47, which he says he paid directly to Johnson.

According to Owens, these direct payments were not shown in the Attorney

General’s records. As proof of direct payments, Owens relied on certain (partially

redacted) bank statements, which he introduced into evidence.

Owens insisted he had paid in full and owed no child-support arrearage.

Trial Court’s Order

The trial court signed a final, appealable order in which it reduced Owens’s

monthly child-support payment to $1,046.46. The trial court also confirmed that

Owens has an existing child-support arrearage in the amount of $6,896.31.

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The actual amount owed under this calculation is $63,724.85.

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DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s modification of a child-support obligation for an

abuse of discretion. Banakar v. Krause, 674 S.W.3d 564, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). We review the court’s confirmation of an arrearage amount

for an abuse of discretion as well. Cline v. Cline, 557 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Generally speaking, the trial court abuses its

discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or does so without reference to guiding

rules and principles. Banakar, 674 S.W.3d at 573; Cline, 557 S.W.3d at 813.

In a bench trial, the trial court sits as factfinder. Banakar, 674 S.W.3d at 573.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to its decision and indulge every

legal presumption in its favor. Id. The trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’

credibility and decides what weight to assign their testimony. Id. at 573–74. And the

trial court may choose to believe one witness and not another. Id. at 574.

Applicable Law

The parties do not disagree about the applicable law. In general, the first step

in deciding the amount of a monthly child-support obligation is to calculate, if

feasible, the income of the parent in question. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE

§§ 154.061(a), 154.062. Once this is done, the trial court applies the child support

percentage guidelines to set the amount of child support owed. Banakar, 674 S.W.3d

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at 574; see TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 154.121–154.133. After an order has been signed

awarding monthly child support, the order may be modified if the circumstances of

the child or children at issue or a person affected by the order have since materially

and substantially changed. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.401(a).

An arrearage occurs when a parent who owes child support has not satisfied

his obligation. Ochsner v. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tex. 2016). A trial court

is authorized to confirm the amount of any such arrearage. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 157.263. In doing so, the trial court may take into account direct payments. See

Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d at 722 (“[T]he statute contemplates that the trial court has

discretion to consider direct payments either to the other parent or to a third party in

deciding whether an arrearage exists.”).

I. Owens’s child-support arguments do not support reversal here.

Owens does not raise legal- or factual-sufficiency issues. Instead, Owens

argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) miscalculating his income based on

an online military pay calculator, and (2) not crediting Owens’s own calculation. His

arguments do not support reversal.

A. Online Military Pay Calculator

Owens first argues that the trial court erred in relying on the online military

pay calculator proffered by Johnson to calculate his income. But the record refutes

this argument.

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The trial court excluded the online calculator as hearsay. When a trial court

sitting as factfinder rules that proffered evidence is inadmissible, we presume that,

consistent with its ruling, the trial court disregarded the evidence in making its

decision. See Kenny v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 464 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (appellate court presumes that trial court

disregards improperly admitted evidence when presiding over bench trial).

Nothing in the record defeats this presumption. The trial court’s order, which

sets Owens’s monthly child-support obligation at $1,046.46, does not correspond to

the child-support amount that Johnson calculated based on the online military pay

calculator, which was $1,237.43. Owens’s argument does not account for this

difference between Johnson’s monthly child-support calculation and the lower

amount awarded by the trial court or explain how or why the trial court’s award is

derived from Johnson’s calculation in whole or in part. He therefore has not shown

that the trial court relied on the online military pay calculator and abused its

discretion by doing so.

B. Owens’s Child-Support Calculation

Owens next argues that the trial court should have accepted his calculation of

his income. But the trial court sitting as factfinder was free to disbelieve Owens in

whole or in part. See Banakar, 674 S.W.3d at 573 (trial court sole judge of

credibility).

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The parties disputed whether Owens continued to receive housing and food

allowances, which significantly affected the amount of Owens’s income. We cannot

revisit and displace the trial court’s credibility determinations. See id.

Johnson also called into question the completeness of Owens’s exhibits.

Owens acknowledged that he did not provide evidence of his income through the

Army’s MyPay website. And Owens conceded that the Military Leave and Earnings

Statements he introduced did not reflect the garnishment of his wages, even though

his wages were being garnished. On this record, and given the dispute about

allowances as well, the trial court could have found that the Statements did not offer

a full picture of his actual income.

In sum, because the accuracy and completeness of Owens’s income-related

evidence was disputed and the resolution of this dispute depended on the truthfulness

of Owens’s testimony regarding his pay and benefits, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by not accepting his child-support calculation.

***

Neither of Owens’s arguments shows an abuse of discretion here, as neither

one demonstrates that the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or without

reference to guiding rules or principles. See In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d

118, 136 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (decision on child-support

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amount must stand “unless” appellant “can show a clear abuse of discretion”);

Banakar, 674 S.W.3d at 573 (stating abuse-of-discretion standard).

We overrule Owens’s first appellate issue.

II. Owens’s arrearage assertion also offers no basis to reverse.

Finally, Owens argues the trial court abused its discretion in confirming a

child-support arrearage in the amount of $6,896.31. He reasons that bank statements

he introduced into evidence show he paid this amount already.

But the trial court could have discounted this evidence because the evidentiary

value of the statements depends on Owens’s testimony about them. Owens testified

that the bank statements he introduced showed direct payments he made as

child-support payments that were not reflected in the records of the Office of the

Attorney General. Johnson, on the other hand, insisted the Attorney General records,

which were also admitted into evidence, were complete as to his child support

payments.

An examination of the bank statements, on their own, does not show which

side is correct about Owens’s direct payments. The statements contain the following

notation next to each of the ostensible direct payments: “Transfer to Checking Nicole

L. Johnson.” But the record does not divulge who made these notations—whether

Owens or someone else—and the redacted bank statements do not contain any

additional information showing that the payments were actually transferred into

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Johnson’s checking account. Moreover—and importantly—the record also does not

show, even if these payments were sent to Johnson, that they were made for child

support, rather than something else.2 As the judge of the credibility of the witnesses,

the trial court was free to disbelieve Owens’s testimony about the statements. See

Banakar, 674 S.W.3d at 573.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in resolving a fact dispute based on

its evaluation of the credibility of witness testimony. See McLane v. McLane, 263

S.W.3d 358, 366–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (rejecting

party’s argument “that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to believe

his testimony and evidence regarding his financial status” because “almost all of the

evidence” necessitated an evaluation of credibility; when “trial court’s decision

regarding the appropriate amount of child support is based, in part, on the credibility

of the witnesses, a matter within the trial court’s purview, we will not disturb that

decision on appeal”), overruled in part on other grounds by Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d

74 (Tex. 2011). Owens has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by

declining to accept his representations as to the bank statements and their

2
We note that under the September 18, 2020 Order, Owens was obligated to pay Johnson
$6,000 in attorney’s fees. Assuming Owens made the payments to Johnson reflected in
the bank statements, some portion of these payments could have been for these fees
rather than child support. The statements do not say one way or another, and the record
lacks any evidence as to this.
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significance or, by finding, contrary to Owens’s representations about them, that he

still owed the $6,896.31 arrearage at issue.

We overrule Owens’s second appellate issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order.

Jennifer Caughey
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Caughey.

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