Darryl and Darresha George v. Barbers Hill Independent School District

Opinion issued January 22, 2026.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00789-CV
———————————
DARRYL AND DARRESHA GEORGE, Appellants
V.
BARBERS HILL INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
Chambers County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 23-DCV-0776

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case concerns the interpretation of Section 25.902 of the Texas Education

Code, commonly referred to as the Texas CROWN Act. Section 25.902 prohibits

school districts from adopting dress or grooming policies that “discriminate against
a hair texture or protective hairstyle commonly or historically associated with race.”1

After the Texas CROWN Act went into effect, Appellee Barbers Hill Independent

School District filed a petition against Appellant Darresha George on behalf of her

son, Appellant Darryl George,2 seeking a judicial declaration that its dress and

grooming policy restrictions limiting male student hair length do not violate Section

25.902. Appellants subsequently filed a counterpetition seeking a judicial

declaration that the District’s male-student hair length restrictions violate Section

25.902 and seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the

District from enforcing its dress and grooming policy against Appellant Darryl

George.

Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the

District concluding that Section 25.902 does not render unlawful those portions of

the District’s dress and grooming policy restrictions limiting male student hair

length. This appeal ensued. Appellants request that we reverse the trial court’s final

judgment and render declaratory judgment in favor of Appellants declaring that the

District’s male-student hair-length restrictions violate Section 25.092.

1
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.902(b).
2
Appellant Darryl George was a minor when Appellee filed its declaratory judgment
action.

2
The parties have raised important questions of first impression, and they have

done so with commendable clarity and rigor. Ordinarily, such questions would

warrant a decision on the merits. Yet the judicial role is bounded by constitutional

and prudential limits. Because the case has become moot, those limits prevent us

from answering the important questions before us. We vacate the trial court’s

judgment and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Texas CROWN Act

Section 25.902 of the Texas Education Code, known as the Texas CROWN

Act, went into effect on September 1, 2023. The Act, which “relat[es] to

discrimination on the basis of hair texture or protective hairstyle associated with

race,” added new sections to the Education Code, Labor Code, and Property Code.

See TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 25.902, 51.979; TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.1095; TEX. PROP.

CODE § 301.0045. The only statute at issue in this appeal is Section 25.902 of the

Texas Education Code.

Section 25.902, entitled “Prohibition on Certain Discrimination in Student

Dress or Grooming Policy,” states:

(a) In this section, “protective hairstyle” includes braids, locks,
and twists.

(b) Any student dress or grooming policy adopted by a school
district, including a student dress or grooming policy for any
extracurricular activity, may not discriminate against a hair
texture or protective hairstyle commonly or historically
associated with race.

3
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.902.

Background

In August 2023, Appellant Darryl George (“Darryl”) enrolled in Barbers Hill

Independent School District (“District”) for the 2023-2024 school year and began

attending Barbers Hill High School. The District’s dress and grooming policy then

in effect stated in relevant part:

Male students’ hair will not extend, at any time, below the eyebrows or
below the ear lobes. Male students’ hair must not extend below the top
of a t-shirt collar or be gathered or worn in a style that would allow the
hair to extend below the top of a t-shirt collar, below the eyebrows, or
below the ear lobes when let down.

On September 21, 2023, the District filed a declaratory judgment action in

state district court seeking a judicial declaration that Section 25.902 of the Education

Code did not “render unlawful those portions of [the District’s] dress and grooming

restrictions limiting male student hair length.” The District named Appellant

Darresha George as a defendant on behalf of her son Darryl, who was then seventeen

years old. In its petition, the District alleged that Darryl, a male student who

identified as Black or African American, “wears his hair at a length that extends

below the top of a t-shirt collar, below the eyebrows, and/or below the ear lobes

when let down,” “currently wears his hair gathered in braids or twists,” and “is

currently in violation of the District’s dress and grooming code due to the length of

his hair.” According to the District, Darryl was placed in an in-school suspension

4
classroom and was subject to a “possible placement in the District’s alternative

education center due to [his] continuing noncompliance with the District’s dress and

grooming code based on [his] hair length.”

Appellants filed a general denial, a request for declaratory judgment, a request

for a temporary restraining order, and a request for injunctive relief. They requested

that the court issue declaratory relief declaring unlawful that portion of the District’s

policy applicable to male student hair styles and lengths. They also sought attorneys’

fees and costs.3

Following a bench trial on the merits, the trial court issued a final judgment

in favor of the District declaring that Section 25.902 of the Education Code “does

not render unlawful those portions of [the District’s] dress and grooming restrictions

limiting male student hair length.” The trial court denied all relief not expressly

granted. This appeal followed.

3
Appellants also filed a counterpetition in which they asserted claims against the
District for race discrimination, sex discrimination, violations of Darryl’s rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Appellants removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, but the case was ultimately remanded to state district
court in Chambers County. Appellants later nonsuited their counterclaims for race
and sex discrimination, violations of Darryl’s constitutional rights, breach of
fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, leaving for
consideration only Appellants’ requests for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
attorneys’ fees and costs.

5
Jurisdiction

Appellants filed their notice of appeal in June 2024. Two months later, in

August 2024, Darryl withdrew from the District and enrolled for his senior year in

the Goose Creek Consolidated Independent School District for the 2024-25 school

year. It is undisputed that Darryl graduated from a Goose Creek ISD high school in

May 2025.

In June 2025, the District filed a suggestion of mootness arguing the case is

moot because Darryl “can no longer be enrolled by the Barbers Hill Independent

School District as a student” and thus Darryl no longer has a legally cognizable

interest in the outcome of this case. The District argues that because Darryl has

graduated from high school, he will never again be subject to the District’s dress and

grooming policy and a judicial declaration regarding whether the policy violates

Section 25.902 will have no practical effect on Darryl. The case is thus moot.

Invoking the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine,

Appellants respond that although Darryl has graduated from high school, the case is

not moot because Darryl suffered “prejudicial events, concrete disadvantages, and

disabilities, the effects of which will persist and continue to stigmatize him going

forward.” Appellants argue that the District “confined . . . [Darryl] to in school

suspension and withheld [him] from regular curriculum instruction during his entire

year of junior high school due to his refusal to cut his protective hairstyle commonly

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or historically associated with race” and that Darryl “was forced to transfer out of

the District to avoid being subjected to the same treatment during his senior year.”

They argue that as a result, Darryl “suffered concrete educational disadvantages

and/or disabilities,” including emotional distress and poor academic performance.

Appellants further contend that Darryl’s academic and disciplinary records, which

the District maintains and which Darryl “will likely be required to disclose in the

future,” will “burden him with a concrete disadvantage that will persist going

forward.”

Appellants last argue that the case is not moot because the question of whether

the District’s policy violates Section 25.902 impacts all male students in the District

who wear protective hairstyles, not just Darryl. And even if part of the appeal is

moot, the entire case is not moot because they have live claims for their reasonable

and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs of suit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 37.009 (“In any proceeding [for declaratory judgment] under this chapter, the court

may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and

just.”).

The District responds that the collateral consequences exception is

inapplicable because the disadvantages and disabilities Darryl claims to have

suffered did not result from the trial court’s judgment but rather stem from the

District’s purportedly wrongful conduct. According to the District, “these

7
consequences would exist regardless of whatever action a court could take in this

case.” The District argues that Darryl’s concerns “that his disciplinary record will

follow him and limit his educational, financial, and employment opportunities,” are

speculative and not supported by any evidence. And although a judicial declaration

regarding the lawfulness of the District’s policy could impact other students in the

District, this is not a class action and none of those students are parties to the trial

court case or this appeal.

The District last argues that Appellants’ claims for attorneys’ fees and costs

do not prevent the case from being moot because Appellants are not eligible to

recover attorneys’ fees and cost under Section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code based on their claim for declaratory judgment. The District

argues that Appellants cannot recover fees and costs under Section 37.009 because

they also challenged the legality of the policy in administrative proceedings.4

A. Mootness

Mootness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of

Family & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 866–

67 (Tex. 2025). Therefore, before reaching the merits, we must determine whether

there is a live controversy to be resolved or whether the matter is now moot requiring

4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (“In any proceeding [for declaratory
judgment] under this chapter, the court may award costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”).

8
dismissal. Like the other core justiciability doctrines, mootness “is rooted in the

Texas Constitution” and prohibits courts from rendering advisory opinions. Id. at

873–84; In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021) (“Any ruling on the merits

of a moot issue constitutes an advisory opinion, which we lack jurisdiction to

issue.”). A court’s “lack of jurisdiction over moot cases is a mandate of the

constitution, not a matter of convenience.” Electric Reliability Council of Tex., Inc.

v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex.

2021). If a case is or becomes moot, a court “must vacate any order or judgment

previously issued and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.” Heckman v.

Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012).

A case is moot when “a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the

parties,” the “parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the case’s

outcome,” the “court can no longer grant the requested relief or otherwise affect the

parties’ rights or interests,” or “any decision would constitute an impermissible

advisory opinion.” Panda Power, 619 S.W.3d at 634–35 (Tex. 2021) (citing State

ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018)). In other words, “a case is moot

when the court’s action on the merits cannot affect the parties’ rights or interests.”

Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162.

A case may become moot at any time, including on appeal. See id. at 166.

When assessing mootness, courts must first determine whether “the case is moot on

9
its face—that is, has the live controversy come to an end,” and if so, does any

“exception” to mootness apply. Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 874. Two

recognized “exceptions” to the mootness doctrine are the collateral consequences

exception and the capable-of-repetition exception.5 Id. at 874. Although they are

often described as “exceptions” to mootness, they are not true exceptions because

they “do not allow courts to disregard the boundaries of the judicial power and

adjudicate cases that are actually moot.” Id. at 883 (emphasis in original). Rather,

the exceptions “elucidate when a case that seems moot actually remains live for

reasons that might not be immediately apparent.” Id. (emphasis in original). In other

words,

[T]here are no exceptions to the fundamental constitutional requirement
that courts may reach the merits of only live disputes. Each recognized
mootness “exception” complies with that mandate by identifying
disputes that seem to have ended but in fact remain live and thus are not
truly moot at all in a constitutional sense. Each exception carefully
ensures that the parties retain a genuine stake in the case and that a

5
Appellants do not invoke the capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness
doctrine. In Grassroots Leadership, the Texas Supreme Court held that to invoke
the capable-of-repetition exception, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) the
challenged action was too short in duration to be litigated fully before the action
ceased or expired; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining
party will be subjected to the same action again.” Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 884 (Tex. 2025) (emphasis
in original) (quoting Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001)). “In other
words, the same dispute still divides the same parties despite the seeming
termination of the dispute’s initial cause, thus generating a ‘reasonable expectation’
of that cause’s recurrence.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because Darryl has graduated
from high school, he cannot be subject to the District’s dress and grooming policies
again and thus the capable-of-repetition exception is inapplicable.

10
judgment resolving the dispute would still afford genuine relief. They
are not exceptions to the Constitution’s limitations and, particularly, its
prohibition of advisory opinions.

Id. at 863 (emphasis in original).

The collateral consequences exception, which applies only in “rare

circumstances,” allows courts to decide cases “when vacating the underlying

judgment will not cure the adverse consequences suffered by the party seeking to

appeal that judgment.” Id. at 883–84 (quoting Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of

San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 779 (Tex. 2006)). Collateral consequences exist

“when, as a result of the judgment’s entry, (1) concrete disadvantages or disabilities

have in fact occurred,” and “(2) the concrete disadvantages and disabilities will

persist even after the judgment is vacated.” Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 789. The

collateral consequences exception therefore applies only when adverse

consequences result from the judgment rendered on the claim—not from the

purportedly wrongful conduct underlying the claim—and when vacating the

underlying judgment will not cure the adverse consequences. See id.

Although the collateral consequences exception most often arises in criminal

proceedings, it also has been applied in civil proceedings involving challenges to

“involuntary mental commitments, juvenile adjudications, protective orders, and

contempt orders.” Hatten v. Univ. Interscholastic League, No. 13–06–00313–CV,

2007 WL 2811833, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 27, 2007, pet. denied)

11
(mem. op.) (identifying types of cases to which collateral consequences exception

applies and holding doctrine did not apply to students’ appeal involving challenge

to UIL eligibility determination); see also Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at

883 (stating “[c]riminal cases are frequent examples” of cases involving collateral

consequences exception because “[c]onvicts may be subject to burdens or

obligations that linger even after any sentence has ended, affecting their right to vote,

possess firearms, or enjoy other freedoms generally available to those without a

conviction”).

The Texas Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Grassroots Leadership provides

a comprehensive discussion of the mootness and the recognized “exceptions” to the

doctrine. Discussing the collateral consequences exception, the court explained that

a “dispute remains live under [that] exception only if the otherwise-moot claim itself

is the source of a sufficiently concrete collateral consequence.” Id. (emphasis in

original). “If the consequence would exist regardless, then the case remains moot.”

Id. 6

6
The issue presented in Grassroots Leadership was whether the capable-of-repetition
exception and purported public-interest exception to mootness demonstrated that a
justiciable controversy between the parties remained. The court held the capable-
of-repetition exception was not applicable and further that “there is no ‘public-
interest exception’ that authorizes Texas courts to resolve moot cases.” Id. at 888.
Appellants are not relying on either the capable-of-repetition exception or the
purported public-interest exception.

12
With these principles in mind, we address the parties’ mootness arguments.

B. Collateral Consequences Exception

It is undisputed that Darryl graduated from high school in May 2025 and that

he is no longer eligible to enroll as a student in the District. Darryl, who is no longer

subject to disciplinary action for failing to comply with the policy, thus lacks a

legally cognizable interest in obtaining declaratory relief regarding the legality of

the policy or injunctive relief prohibiting the District from enforcing the policy

against him. See Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 879–80 (holding case moot

when plaintiffs challenging policy applicable to immigration detention centers were

no longer detained in detention center); see also Hatten, 2007 WL 2811833 at *2

(holding students’ appeal of UIL’s determinations of eligibility moot when students’

period of ineligibility had expired and one student had graduated from high school).

Although a judicial declaration regarding whether the District’s policy

violates Section 25.902 could impact the District’s current and future male students

who wear protective hairstyles, this has no bearing on the jurisdictional question

before us. Darryl, who did not assert in the trial court any claims on behalf of a class

of similarly situated persons, appealed from the final judgment on his own behalf

and not as a member of a class. See Panda Power, 619 S.W.3d at 634–35 (requiring

justiciable controversy between parties); see also Grassroots Leadership, 717

13
S.W.3d at 875 (stating mootness requires “judgment to actually affect the plaintiff,

not merely vindicate a favored legal position”).

Appellants argue that the case is not moot based on the collateral

consequences exception to the mootness doctrine. According to Appellants, Darryl

suffered and will continue to suffer concrete educational disadvantages and

disabilities because the District placed him in in-school suspension and alternative

learning centers during the entirety of his junior year for refusing to cut his hair to

comply with the District’s policy and he was forced to transfer to another District

his senior year to avoid the same sanction. Appellants also argue that the District’s

superintendent “publicly maligned” Darryl in a paid advertisement the District

placed in the Houston Chronicle in which the superintendent defended the policy.

Appellants argue that as a result of the District’s actions, Darryl experienced

emotional distress and his grades suffered.

Appellants argue that the “lingering effects on [Darryl] owing to the concrete

educational disadvantages and/or disabilities he has suffered as a result of the

District’s discriminatory conduct will not only persist and continue to stigmatize

him, but cannot be absolved merely by dismissing the Appeal as moot.” They argue

that the “academic and disciplinary records the District maintains for [Darryl], which

he will likely be required to disclose in the future—not to mention the public and

pervasive stigma [Darryl] will have to bear as a result of the District suing him—

14
will burden him with a concrete disadvantage that will persist going forward.”

Appellants also argue that a student’s academic and disciplinary record “often

follows the student into adulthood and surfaces at critical junctures—such as when

applying for college admission, financial aid, public and private grants, employment,

professional licensure, and military enlistment,” and “[]i]nstitutions and agencies

routinely solicit academic transcripts and records, as well as conduct background

checks to assess the character and fitness of applicants.”

In support of their arguments, Appellants rely primarily on an affidavit from

Darryl they submitted in support of their request for an emergency temporary

restraining order in the trial court.7 Darryl stated in his affidavit that he had been

suffering since he was told “there was an issue with [his] hair,” and he felt like he

was “going crazy” and had “had to seek mental health treatment.” Darryl stated he

was “being harassed by school officials and treated like a dog,” and he was “being

subjected to cruel treatment and a lot of unkind words” from school officials. He

stated that he had not received “regular instruction since August 30, 2023,” his

grades were “suffering,” and he was “being completely ostracized.” According to

Darryl, the District’s actions were “affecting [his] education [and] mental state” and

7
See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.220(c) (stating courts have power, “on
affidavit or otherwise,” to “ascertain the matters of fact that are necessary to the
proper exercise of its jurisdiction,” even if evidence establishing those facts is not
in trial court’s record).

15
he asked the trial court to issue a temporary restraining order “to deliver [him] from

the cruelty that [he was] experiencing all because of the issues between the

Legislators, [the District] and the government.”

Darryl’s affidavit testimony, which predates the trial court’s March 2024 final

judgment, speaks to the negative consequences Darryl asserts he was experiencing

in January 2024 because of the District’s conduct, but it does not speak to any

disadvantages or disabilities Darryl contends he is currently experiencing and will

continue to experience because of the trial court’s judgment—which is the relevant

inquiry when invoking the collateral consequence exception to mootness. Appellants

acknowledge that the “requisite collateral consequences exist ‘when, as a result of

the judgment’s entry,” concrete disadvantages or disabilities exist and will persist.

(Emphasis added). But other than stating that “that is what happened to Darryl,”

Appellants do not explain why the entry of the trial court’s judgment—as opposed

to the actions of the District—resulted in collateral consequences. Appellants cite to

the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Marshall v. Housing Authority of the City of

San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006) but that case does not lend support to their

argument. To the contrary, it underscores that the relevant inquiry is whether

collateral consequences stem from the trial court’s judgment.

In Marshall, the Housing Authority evicted Marshall from her apartment and

the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Housing Authority on its forcible

16
detainer action awarding the Housing Authority possession of the apartment. Id. at

784. While Marshall’s appeal remained pending, her apartment lease expired. Id. at

785. The court held that the case had become moot because once Marshall’s lease

expired, there was no longer a live controversy between the parties regarding which

party had a superior right to possession of the apartment. Id. at 787. Relying on the

collateral consequences exception, Marshall argued that the case was not moot

because the trial court’s eviction judgment had caused her to lose her federal rent

subsidy and the “loss of the subsidy might last for up to five years.” Id. at 788. She

argued that the judgment had “adverse practical collateral consequences, including

the possibility that landlords may be dissuaded from renting an apartment to her” in

the future. Id. According to Marshall, “a favorable appellate ruling reversing the trial

court’s judgment would ameliorate collateral consequences to her resulting from the

judgment.” Id.

Rejecting Marshall’s argument, the court explained that the collateral

consequences doctrine applies only in “narrow circumstances” and for it to apply,

Marshall had to establish both “that a concrete disadvantage resulted from the

judgment and that the disadvantage will persist even if the judgment is vacated and

the case dismissed as moot.” Id. at 789 (emphasis added). The court held there was

no evidence that Marshall’s federal rent subsidy would be denied in the future or

that the practical consequence she identified—that future landlords might be

17
dissuaded from renting an apartment to her—would persist even if the trial court’s

judgment of eviction was vacated. Id.

Unlike the appellant in Marshall, Appellants do not argue that Darryl

experienced adverse consequences stemming from the trial court’s judgment.

Although Appellants argue that Darryl experienced adverse consequences resulting

from the District’s actions, as in Marhsall, there is no evidence demonstrating that

Darryl experienced concrete disadvantages and disabilities as a result of the trial

court’s judgment that will persist even if the judgment is vacated and the case

dismissed as moot.

After the court heard oral argument in this appeal, Appellants filed a letter

addressing “the panel’s questions regarding the types of concrete disadvantages and

disabilities that will persist for [Darryl] as part of the collateral consequences he will

likely suffer” and directing the court to two amicus briefs filed in support of

Appellants. Relying largely on academic articles and research, the amicus briefs

state that hair discrimination, including the discriminatory application of school

dress and grooming codes, has “lasting negative effects” on children that can “persist

into adulthood,” including poor mental and physical health, low self-esteem,

depression, and an increased risk of suicide. Although helpful and informative, the

amicus briefs provide no evidence of any concrete disadvantages or disabilities

Darryl is experiencing because of the trial court’s judgment that will persist even if

18
the judgment is vacated. At most, the amicus briefs and sources they cite, like

Darryl’s affidavit, provide evidence of possible ongoing disadvantages and

disabilities that may result from the District’s alleged conduct. See Grassroots

Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 885 (stating “evidence required [to establish applicability

of mootness exception] is essentially the same as what a plaintiff must identify to

rebut a defendant’s establishment of facial mootness: a basis that is not speculative

or hypothetical for why continuing the litigation would tangibly and directly affect

the plaintiffs’ rights”).

We do not dismiss Appellants’ arguments, nor do we discount Darryl’s

testimony. The evidence reflects, however, that the disadvantages and disabilities

Darryl identifies, including emotional distress, poor grades, and stigmatization, are

not the result of the trial court’s judgment declaring that the District’s dress and

grooming policy does not violate Section 25.902. As the District points out, these

purported disadvantages and disabilities “would exist regardless of whatever action

a court could take in this case” and regardless of any action this Court takes on the

merits of the pending appeal.

In their post-oral argument letter brief, Appellants contend that “while the

factual collateral consequences may exist regardless of the trial court’s decision

below, the legal consequences to [Darryl] persist only by virtue of the imposition of

the trial court’s final judgment.” Appellants, however, do not identify any ongoing

19
legal consequences to Darryl caused by the trial court’s judgment nor do they explain

why such consequences will not be negated by vacating the judgment. In that respect,

this case is unlike others where courts have recognized the application of the

collateral consequences exception to mootness based on stigmatization and adverse

legal consequences resulting from the trial court’s judgment. See, e.g., State v.

Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1980) (holding that significant and prejudicial

effects stemming from order of involuntary commitment and confinement in mental-

health hospital continued to stigmatize person subject of order even though

commitment order had expired and thus case was not moot); Carrillo v. State, 480

S.W.2d 612. 617–18 (Tex. 1972) (holding that “deleterious collateral effects and

legal consequences” stemming from juvenile-delinquency adjudication continued to

stigmatize adjudicated person even though person had served his sentence and

reached age of majority and thus appeal was not moot); see also In re Salgado, 53

S.W.3d 752, 757–58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.) (holding that father’s

challenge to expired protective order was not moot because order resulted in

significant collateral legal repercussions involving ongoing child custody

determinations). This case is more akin to Hatten v. University Interscholastic

League, where the court held that two students’ challenge to a UIL’s determination

of ineligibility to play sports in high school had become moot because the period of

ineligibility had expired and one of the two students challenging the determination

20
had graduated from high school. 2007 WL 2811833 at *2. The court held that the

collateral consequences doctrine did not apply because the students had “not shown

that (1) a concrete disadvantage had resulted from the judgment and (2) the

disadvantage [would] persist even if the judgment [was] vacated” and the case

dismissed as moot. Id. at *4 (comparing facts of case to other cases where collateral

consequences doctrine applied involving “stigmatizing consequences inherent in

involuntary mental commitments, juvenile adjudications, protective orders, and

contempt orders”); see also Univ. Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759,

760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding appeal of permanent

injunction allowing high school student to play football was moot because student

had graduated from high school).

Appellants argue that a student’s academic and disciplinary record “often

follows the student into adulthood and surfaces at critical junctures—such as when

applying for college admission, financial aid, public and private grants, employment,

professional licensure, and military enlistment,” and “[]i]nstitutions and agencies

routinely solicit academic transcripts and records, as well as conduct background

checks to assess the character and fitness of applicants.” But Appellants do not tether

these consequences to the trial court’s judgment. And there is also no evidence that

any of these potential scenarios has materialized and thus any concerns about the

possible future impact of Darryl’s academic and disciplinary records are speculative.

21
The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Texas A & M University–Kingsville v.

Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 2011) is instructive on this point. In Yarbrough,

an associate professor who applied for tenure received an allegedly improper

negative performance evaluation that she believed would harm her tenure prospects.

Id. at 289–90. Because the university’s grievance policy prevented her from filing

an official grievance challenging the evaluation, Yarbrough sued the university

requesting a declaration that the university’s action violated a provision in the Texas

Government Code. Id. at 290. The university moved for summary judgment arguing

that Yarbrough’s complaint about her negative evaluation was moot because her

application for tenure had been granted. Id. Yarbrough argued on appeal that

although she had been granted tenure, a justiciable controversy remained because

“the evaluation remain[ed] part of [her] file and may be used against her in future

employment decisions.” Id. at 291. The majority, recognizing that Yarbrough’s

argument appeared to be premised on the collateral consequences exception to

mootness, held that Yarbrough’s claim was moot on its face because although “the

possibility that the ‘taint’ of a negative evaluation could lead to unspecified future

harm it d[id] not present a ‘substantial controversy, between parties having adverse

legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

declaratory judgment.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac.

Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) and citing Governor Wentworth Reg. Sch.

22
Dist. v. Hendrickson, 201 Fed. Appx. 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding case seeking

declaration regarding constitutionality of student suspension was moot after student

graduated and potential effect of suspension on student’s prospective employment

possibilities lacked immediacy and reality required to support declaratory

judgment)).

Here as well we conclude that Appellants’ case is moot and that the collateral

consequences exception to mootness does not apply. Appellants have not established

both “that a concrete disadvantage resulted from the [trial court’s] judgment and that

the disadvantage will persist even if the judgment is vacated and the case dismissed

as moot.” Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 789. Nor have they presented evidence of any

materialized consequences resulting from Darryl’s disciplinary or academic records.

Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 878 (holding that the mootness test “poses a

practical test, not one that turns on speculative, theoretical, contingent, or unlikely

events that might happen”) (emphasis in original).8

8
During oral argument, the District’s counsel stated that Darryl’s school transcript
reflects only the courses taken and the grades earned. According to the District’s
counsel, minor disciplinary consequences that occur in public schools are neither
reflected in the student’s transcript nor “become part of a larger record.” The
District’s counsel stated that the common application used for college admissions
asks whether a student has been expelled from school, not whether the student has
faced disciplinary actions for dress and grooming code violations. Asked how the
District maintains its disciplinary records, the District’s counsel stated that public
school districts are required to report to the Texas Education Agency all disciplinary
consequences imposed by the district and the TEA retains that information, which
is submitted in an anonymous fashion, and information regarding minor

23
This case presents important questions of first impression, thoroughly briefed

and skillfully argued by the parties. We do not minimize the importance of these

issues, nor the care with which they have been presented. But, however compelling

the questions may be and “[h]owever much we may desire to provide answers in

these now-moot . . . proceedings, the constitution prohibits us from doing so, and we

must respect that prohibition.” Panda Power, 619 S.W.3d at 631.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Appellants argue that even if some of the claims in this case are moot, they

have live claims for their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs of suit,

which prevent the case from being moot. See Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at

877 (stating “case ‘is not rendered moot simply because some of the issues become

moot during the appellate process’”) (quoting Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162);

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 790 (stating “in some instances a case is not moot even

though the only issue presented relates to court costs” but holding “the issue of the

Housing Authority’s costs and post-judgment interest on those costs” did not present

“a controversy preventing dismissal of the case for mootness”).

In their first amended countersuit, Appellants pleaded for “costs of suits

herein, including reasonable attorney fees through appeal.” The District argues that

consequences, such as being sent to in-school suspension, are purged at the end of
the year and all school records are purged after seven years.

24
Appellants cannot recover attorneys’ fees and costs based on their declaratory

judgment claim seeking a declaration that the policy violates Section 25.902 because

they challenged or could have challenged the legality of the policy in the grievances

they filed with the District that were subsequently appealed to the Commissioner of

Education. See TEX. EDUC. CODE 7.057 (allowing appeal to commissioner by person

aggrieved by actions or decisions of school district board of trustees); Poole v.

Karnack Indep. Sch. Dist., 344 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.)

(“Because the relief sought in Poole’s declaratory-judgment action is redundant of

the relief available to her in a suit for judicial review under [Section 7.057(d) of the

Education Code], the trial court did not err in dismissing Poole’s declaratory-

judgment action and the accompanying request for attorney’s fees.”).

Even if Appellants were not eligible to recover their attorneys’ fees and costs

based on their declaratory judgment claim, as the District contends, the District also

filed a declaratory judgment action. The trial court thus could have awarded

Appellants their costs and fees based on the District’s claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 37.009 (stating court “may award costs and reasonable and necessary

attorney’s fees as are equitable and just” in any declaratory judgment action);

Feldman v. KPMG LLP, 438 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2014, no pet.) (“Under section 37.009, a trial court may exercise its discretion to

award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, the nonprevailing party, or neither.”).

25
In any event, the trial court did not award attorneys’ fees or costs to either

party—and neither party appealed from the denial of their requests for attorneys’

fees and costs. There is thus no pending or unresolved claim for attorneys’ fees and

costs that can “breathe[] life” into this otherwise moot case. Grassroots Leadership,

717 S.W.3d at 877 (quoting Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 7).9

* * *

Based on the record before us, we hold the case became moot when Darryl

graduated from high school in May 2025 because he is no longer subject to

disciplinary action for failing to comply with the District’s dress and grooming

policy, and thus there is no live controversy between the parties regarding the

legality of the policy. We further hold that the collateral consequences exception to

mootness is inapplicable.

9
In their post-oral argument letter brief, Appellants argue that a finding of mootness
in his case will have the “practical effect” that “only freshman or perhaps sophomore
students who are subjected to the District’s racially-discriminatory conduct will
likely ever be able to obtain relief from Texas courts.” We note that if a live
controversy arises between the District and another student who is adversely
affected by the policy, nothing prevents those parties from seeking an expeditious
resolution of their dispute in a trial court. And in the event either party appeals the
trial court’s judgment, appellate courts, including this court, routinely consider
requests for accelerated consideration of appeals when hearing the appeal in due
course could have the undesirable result of depriving the court of jurisdiction. See
generally ERCOT, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619
S.W.3d 628, 631 (Tex. 2021).

26
Conclusion

We vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162 (stating if case becomes moot,

court “must vacate any order or judgment previously issued and dismiss the case for

want of jurisdiction”).

Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Gunn, and Caughey.

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