Harris County v. Michael J. Hall

Opinion issued January 22, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00399-CV
———————————
HARRIS COUNTY, Appellant
V.
MICHAEL J. HALL, Appellee

On Appeal from the 125th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-58319

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Harris County (the “County”) challenges the trial court’s order

denying its plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment motion in an

employment discrimination suit brought by appellee Michael J. Hall. The County

contends that the trial court erred because Hall failed to produce evidence
generating a fact issue as to whether the County’s governmental immunity to suit

was waived. We reverse and render judgment dismissing Hall’s claims against the

County.

Background

Hall began working for the Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) in

2012 as a detention officer and subsequently as a detention training officer in the

Harris County Jail. The essential duties of a detention officer in the Harris County

jail include the proper care, custody, and control of inmates housed in the County’s

jail facilities.

Beginning in 2020, Hall started missing work, sometimes without letting the

County know of his intended absence. He last reported to work in May 2020. In

August 2020, he was advised that he would soon exhaust his paid leave. In October

2020, Hall requested a six-month leave of absence (“LOA”) due to a diagnosis of

Non-Alcoholic Cirrhosis of the Liver Stage IV and the need for subsequent

surgery, treatment, and recovery. The request was approved. In April 2021, Hall

submitted a second LOA request for six additional months of leave. The request

was approved.

On September 1, 2021, he requested to transfer to a civilian position,

claiming, among other restrictions, that he could not have any contact with

inmates. The request was denied. On September 15, 2021, Hall submitted a third

2
LOA request, stating that he could not work and requesting another six-month

leave. The request was denied. Following the third LOA request, the HCSO

terminated Hall’s employment effective October 6, 2021. The termination letter

cited Hall’s lack of current Commission of Law Enforcement (“TCOLE”) license.

The letter stated that his leave of absence was rescinded due to a poor attendance

record.

Hall filed an EEOC complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission on

Civil Rights alleging discrimination based on disability and retaliation. He then

sued the County alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights

Act (“TCHRA”), specifically that he was discriminated and retaliated against

because of his disability.

The County filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary

judgment asserting its immunity and arguing Hall failed to establish that immunity

had been waived. The County alleged that Hall failed to establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination or retaliation, that Hall had not exhausted his

administrative remedies with regard to his retaliation and aiding and abetting

discrimination claims, and that there was no cause of action for practice and

pattern discrimination for which governmental immunity can be waived. The

County attached as evidence Hall’s attendance record, LOA requests, transfer

requests, emails related to his requests, the Sherriff’s office’s transfer and leave

3
policies, Hall’s deposition, and records of Hall’s long term disability payments.

Hall responded and attached his own declaration and deposition excerpts from

various HCSO employees.

The trial court denied the County’s plea to the jurisdiction and summary

judgment motion. This interlocutory appeal followed.1

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A. Governmental Immunity and Plea to the Jurisdiction

Governmental units are immune from suit unless immunity is clearly and

unambiguously waived by state law. City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d

523, 528 (Tex. 2022); see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“[I]n order to preserve the

legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriates

process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless

the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”). Because

governmental immunity is jurisdictional, it is properly raised through a plea to the

jurisdiction, which we review de novo. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642

(Tex. 2007).

1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (stating that an immediate
appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order granting or denying a plea to the
jurisdiction filed by a governmental unit); PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t, 593
S.W.3d 296, 301 n.1 (Tex. 2019) (noting that an interlocutory appeal may be taken
under § 51.014(a)(8) “from a refusal to dismiss for want of jurisdiction whether
the jurisdictional argument is presented by plea to the jurisdiction or some other
vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment”) (internal citation removed).
4
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that functions generally to defeat

an action without regard to whether the plaintiff’s asserted claims have merit.

Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012).

The plea challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep Sch.

Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether a trial court has subject

matter jurisdiction and “[w]hether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively

demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction” are questions of law that we

review de novo. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex.

2016) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004)).

The plaintiff has the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that

the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852

S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993); see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635. “If the plaintiff

pleaded facts making out a prima facie case and the governmental unit instead

challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider the relevant evidence

submitted.” Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Douglas, 544 S.W.3d 486, 492

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at

635. “The analysis then ‘mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment.’” Tex.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Garcia, 372

S.W.3d at 635).

5
B. Summary Judgment

A movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden to establish that

no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the nonmovant produces more than a

scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on the challenged elements, then summary

judgment is improper. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437

S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014). “More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the

evidence ‘rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to

differ in their conclusions.’” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751

(Tex. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711

(Tex. 1997)). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is “so

weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of a fact. Ford

Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

“We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Scripps

NP Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 790 (Tex. 2019). The evidence is

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts against the motion. Buck v. Palmer,

381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d

417, 424 (Tex. 2009).

6
C. TCHRA

The TCHRA prohibits, among other things, age, disability, and national

origin discrimination and retaliation by employers. See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.051,

21.055, 21.105. The TCHRA waives immunity from suit “for statutory violations,

which means the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute

absent” a “claim for conduct that actually violates the statute.” Alamo Heights

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 763, 770 (Tex. 2018); see TEX. LAB.

CODE § 21.254. If a plaintiff fails to allege a violation of the TCHRA, then the trial

court does not have jurisdiction, and the claim should be dismissed. Garcia, 372

S.W.3d at 637.

“We follow the burden-shifting framework the United States Supreme Court

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, [411 U.S. 792 (1973)].” Tex.

Tech. Univ. Health Sciences Ctr.-El Paso v. Flores 612 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex.

2020); Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782.

Under this framework: (1) the plaintiff must first create a presumption
of illegal discrimination by establishing a prima facie case; (2) the
defendant must then rebut that presumption by producing evidence of
a legitimate-nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action; and
(3) the plaintiff must then overcome the rebuttal evidence by
producing evidence that the defendant’s stated reason is a mere
pretext.

Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 305; Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. If a plaintiff fails to

establish a prima facie case against a governmental unit or overcome the rebuttal

7
evidence, then the trial court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. See

Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26.

Among the express purposes of the TCHRA are to “provide for the

execution of the policies” of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of

the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and their subsequent

amendments. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.001(1), (3). Thus, we look to those analogous

federal statutes and the cases interpreting them in applying the TCHRA. Lara, 625

S.W.3d at 52; see Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 578 n.16 (5th

Cir. 2020).

Analysis

The County asserts that the trial court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the

claims against it because Hall failed to establish a prima facie case against it for

any of his causes of action. We consider each of Hall’s claims in turn.

A. Disability Discrimination Claim

The Labor Code prohibits discrimination that occurs “because of or on the

basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual’s ability

to reasonably perform a job.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.105. To establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination under the TCHRA, Hall has the burden to show

(1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for the job, and (3) he suffered an adverse

employment decision because of his disability. Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 61 (citing

8
Green v. Dallas Cnty. Schs., 537 S.W.3d 501, 503 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam)); see

Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 436 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); see also TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.105

(noting that, for purposes of TCHRA, disability means “a physical or mental

condition that does not impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform a

job.”).

The County argues that Hall cannot establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination because he cannot meet his burden as to the second element: that he

was qualified for the position he held at the time he was fired. The County argues

that Hall was not qualified to work in the Harris County jail because at the time of

his termination, his jailer’s license had expired. We agree.

A plaintiff can show the “qualification” element in one of two ways: (1) by

proving that he can perform all essential job functions with or without

modifications or accommodations; or (2) by showing that some reasonable

accommodation by the employer would enable him to perform the job. Donaldson,

495 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093

(5th Cir. 1996)).

Hall was not qualified to perform the essential functions of a detention

officer in the Harris County jail. The evidence shows that Hall’s TCOLE license

was suspended at the time of his termination, rendering him unqualified to work as

9
a detention officer or detention training officer in the jail. Hall argues that he later

received a waiver from TCOLE for the licensure requirement, but Hall did not seek

that waiver until after his separation notice. To avoid summary judgment, the

plaintiff must show that he was qualified at the time of his termination. Moss v.

Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 851 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2017). The

evidence reflects that at the time of his termination, Hall was not qualified to

perform his job duties because his jailer’s license was not in good standing.

Hall failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination

because he could not establish that at the time of his termination he was qualified

for the job. Absent a viable claim for disability discrimination, the County’s

immunity is not waived, the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over the claim, and the claim must be dismissed. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 637. The

trial court erred by not dismissing Hall’s disability discrimination claim against the

County.

B. Failure to Accommodate Claim

An employer violates the TCHRA if the employer, “fail[s] or refuse[s] to

make a reasonable workplace accommodation to a known physical or mental

limitation of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an

employee.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.128(a); Harris Ctr. for Mental Health & IDD v.

McLeod, No. 01-22-00947-CV, 2024 WL 1383271, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston

10
[1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The elements of a failure to

accommodate claim are: (1) the individual has a disability; (2) the employer had

notice of the disability; (3) with a reasonable accommodation, the individual could

perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) the employer refused to

make the accommodation. Datar v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 518 S.W.3d 467,

474 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

To the extent Hall argues that the County failed to accommodate him in his

jailer position, we have explained supra that at the time of termination, Hall was

not a qualified employee because his TCOLE license had lapsed. See TEX. LAB.

CODE § 21.128(a) (stating employer violates TCHRA if fails to make reasonable

workplace accommodation for “otherwise qualified” employee with disability).

Moreover, Hall submitted a third LOA request after his transfer request which

stated that he was unable to work at all. Therefore, Hall has not produced

controverting evidence indicating that he could in fact work.

Hall also argues that the County failed to accommodate him when it did not

transfer him to a different position. The evidence reflects that Hall failed to request

transfer to a specific and available position. He also did not allege facts to show

that he met the qualifications of that position. See Moss, 851 F.3d at 419 (holding

plaintiff did not meet burden of raising fact issue regarding whether transferring

him to light duty position would be reasonable accommodation because he failed

11
to present evidence that such position was vacant at time of termination or that he

could perform its duties). Hall’s summary judgment evidence includes depositions

from various County employees stating generally that civilian positions are usually

available. Hall failed to present any evidence that a specific civilian duty position,

which is a different job than what he had, was vacant at the time of his termination

or that he could perform the essential functions of a civilian position.

Because Hall failed to provide evidence of a specific civilian position where

he could be accommodated or evidence that he was a qualified employee who

could be accommodated in his jailer position, he cannot establish a prima facie

case of his failure to accommodate claim. Accordingly, the trial court erred in

denying the County’s summary judgment motion on Hall’s failure to accommodate

claim, and the claim must be dismissed.

C. Retaliation Claim

The County argues that the trial court erred in denying its summary

judgment motion on Hall’s retaliation claim because Hall failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, and even assuming he did, Hall did not establish a prima

facie case of retaliation.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the TCHRA, an

employee must demonstrate that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the

TCHRA, (2) he experienced a material adverse employment action, and (3) a

12
causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Alamo

Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782.

“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to

filing a civil action alleging violations of the [T]CHRA.” Bering v. Tex. Dep’t of

Criminal Justice-PFCMOD, No. 02-24-00033-CV, 2024 WL 4455843, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 10, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Hoffmann-LaRoche

Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex. 2004)). As a governmental entity,

Harris County is immune from suit absent a waiver of immunity, and all statutory

prerequisites to suit are jurisdictional. Id. A TCHRA plaintiff’s exhaustion of

administrative remedies “begins by filing [an administrative] complaint.” Waffle

House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 804–05 (Tex. 2010). Filing an

administrative complaint does not give the plaintiff carte blanche to pursue other

TCHRA claims that he might later devise. Bering, 2024 WL 4455843, at *2. The

resulting TCHRA lawsuit is confined to claims specifically identified in the

administrative complaint and to those factually related claims that could

“reasonably be expected to grow out of the agency’s investigation of the claims” in

the administrative complaint. Univ of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Carroll,

No. 01-23-0014-CV, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

July 16, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Cuadra v. Declaration Title Co.,

682 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)). When

13
determining an administrative complaint’s scope, the crucial element of a charge of

discrimination “is the factual statement contained in the administrative complaint.”

Carroll, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see

TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.201(c)(2) (requiring administrative complaint to state “the

facts on which the complaint is based”).

Hall filed a form EEOC complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission.

On the form, he checked boxes indicating he alleged discrimination based on

retaliation and disability. He included a three-typed-page factual statement

outlining his complaint. The factual statement does not mention retaliation or

termination for engaging in a protected activity. On the last page of the charge, he

states that he was “dismissed on inadequate information . . . based on sheer

neglect.” He does not state that he was terminated because he engaged in a

protected activity.

Hall’s petition states that the County “retaliated unlawfully” when it

terminated Hall for engaging in a protected activity “by opposing a discriminatory

practice on 9/20/21 with Paul Mendez HR Analyst.” Later, in his deposition, Hall

stated that he called Mendez, a human resources representative with the County, on

September 20, 2021, and expressed that he believed he was discriminated against

by the County based on his medical condition.

14
We conclude that Hall’s charge does not include an adequate factual basis to

put the County on notice that he was complaining that he was retaliated against

based on his disability. Therefore, Hall did not exhaust his administrative remedies

as to this claim. Since Hall failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the

County’s immunity with regard to Hall’s TCHRA retaliation claim has not been

waived. The trial court erred in denying the County’s summary judgment motion

on this claim.

D. “Practice and Pattern” Discrimination Claim

Hall’s petition alleges that the County has a pattern and practice of

discrimination against minority employees. The County asserts that the TCHRA

does not waive governmental immunity for such a claim and that Hall also failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies.

The TCHRA waives immunity when a plaintiff alleges a violation of the

TCHRA by pleading facts that fall under a cause of action within the statute.

Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770. The TCHRA does not contain a cause of action

for a pattern and practice of discrimination. See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.001–23.003

(employment discrimination). Therefore, the County’s immunity is not waived.

Moreover, Hall’s EEOC charge does not contain factual statements alleging a

pattern and practice claim. Carroll, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7 (stating TCHRA

lawsuit is confined to claims brought in administrative charge). Even if the

15
TCHRA waived immunity for this claim, Hall did not administratively exhaust his

remedies. Id. (stating TCHRA lawsuit is confined to claims brought in

administrative charge).

The trial court erred by denying the County’s summary judgment motion

related to this claim.

E. Aiding and Abetting Discrimination Claim

The County argues that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment

on Hall’s aiding and abetting discrimination claim. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.056

(stating it is a violation “if [a]n employer . . . aids, abets incites, or coerces a person

to engage in a discriminatory practice.”). As explained supra, Hall failed to meet

his burden to show that Harris County engaged in a discriminatory practice. Hall

therefore cannot establish a prima facie case that the County aided or abetted a

person to engage in a discriminatory practice. Moreover, Hall failed to exhaust

administrative remedies because his EEOC charge does not include facts or

statements alleging an aiding and abetting claim. Carroll, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7

(stating TCHRA lawsuit is confined to claims brought in administrative charge).

Hall’s EEOC charge did not include factual statements alleging that the County

enticed any other party to commit discriminatory practices.

16
Because Hall failed to establish a prima facie case of aiding and abetting

discrimination, the County’s immunity from suit is not waived. The trial court

erred by denying the County’s summary judgment motion on this claim.

Conclusion

Having determined that the County’s immunity from suit is not waived for

any of Hall’s claims against it, we reverse and render judgment dismissing Hall’s

claims against the County.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Morgan and Dokupil.

17