In the Matter of L.G. v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued January 22, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
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NO. 01-25-00622-CV
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IN THE MATTER OF L.G.

On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2024-02077J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The juvenile court waived its jurisdiction over L.G., a minor, and transferred

him to the criminal district court to be tried as an adult for capital murder. L.G.

argues that the juvenile court erred in doing so. We affirm.

Background

This case arises from the murder of a homeowner in her backyard. The

decedent was stabbed over 25 times, and her son found her body in a backyard
shed. L.G.’s house was adjacent to the decedent’s home. The decedent’s and

L.G.’s DNA were found on his shoes, gloves, and knife. L.G. was 15 years old at

the time of the murder.

After an investigation, L.G. was arrested and charged with capital murder.

The State moved that the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction and transfer L.G. to

the criminal district court to stand trial as an adult. L.G. was 16 years old at the

time of the transfer hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court received

documentary evidence and heard testimony from a law enforcement officer who

investigated the murder and a psychologist who examined L.G.

A. Law Enforcement Testimony

The law enforcement officer testified that on the day of the murder,

authorities responded to a 911 call from a neighbor. The neighbor reported finding

a bloody knife and gloves in his backyard. Shortly after he got off the phone with

911 but before officers had responded, the neighbor witnessed L.G. running across

his lawn. The neighbor went upstairs for a better view, and he saw L.G. run back

into his own yard. When the neighbor went back outside, the knife and gloves were

gone. The neighbor told law enforcement what had happened when they arrived

about an hour later.

The law enforcement officer went to L.G.’s residence to speak with L.G.

L.G. told the officer that he had been outside doing chores, flipping a knife, and the

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knife fell over into the neighbor’s yard. He said that he jumped the fence to

retrieve it. Law enforcement collected the knife as well as L.G.’s sandals, clothing,

gloves, and cell phone. DNA analysis revealed that the items had both L.G.’s and

the decedent’s DNA on them.

L.G. was arrested and later confessed to the murder. L.G. told law

enforcement that he was in his backyard cutting weeds when he looked over the

fence line and saw the decedent in her hot tub with her back facing outwards. He

said she looked vulnerable and helpless. He jumped a fence, ran across another

neighbor’s yard, exited a side gate, and entered the decedent’s backyard through a

side gate. He took off his shoes to avoid getting blood on them. He ran up to the

decedent and began to stab her. At some point in the altercation, she got out of the

hot tub. L.G. told investigators he continued to stab her about six or seven times in

the chest. She tried to run away, and he pursued her around the patio and into her

house. He was able to pull her back out of her house onto the patio.

When she succumbed to her injuries, L.G. attempted to conceal her body. He

dragged her off the patio, through the grass, and into a shed. He removed rocks

keeping the shed doors closed, opened the shed, and pulled her inside. He then

closed the shed and replaced the rocks where he had found them. He covered blood

in the house with rugs and attempted to prevent the decedent’s cell phone from

working by covering it in tinfoil. L.G. tried to remove blood from the knife by

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stabbing it into the ground several times. He then threw away the gloves he was

wearing in his trash can. Law enforcement recovered them when speaking to L.G.

The law enforcement officer also testified that he had spoken with the

decedent’s son at the request of the prosecutor. The son relayed that in a prior

hearing, when L.G. was allowed to hug his mother, he did so while looking

directly at the decedent’s son and smirking. The law enforcement officer testified

that the decedent’s son said that it really upset him because the probable cause

statement, describing what had happened to his mother, had just been read in court.

B. Psychiatric Evaluation

A psychologist from the Harris Center for Mental Health and the Harris

County Juvenile Forensic Unit testified regarding her evaluation of L.G. She

testified that she supervised the evaluation which was conducted by a doctoral

intern. Throughout the evaluation, L.G. showed the ability to concentrate and focus

and his thought process was logical and coherent. She testified that on the advice

of his counsel, L.G. did not answer questions related to homicidal thoughts or

ideations, which are used to assess risk of dangerousness or the presence of mental

health disorders, but he had given indications to detectives that he had experienced

homicidal thoughts for months prior to the murder. He also stated that when he was

about 10, he was obsessed with burning paper.

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Prior to the incident, L.G. reported having a small group of friends. He was

in the gifted and talented program at his high school. He had no history of physical

or mental health issues. He had no previous encounters with the juvenile justice

system. The psychologist described L.G.’s behavior since entering the juvenile

detention center. He had received various minor infractions, such as horseplaying,

not following staff instructions, and possessing a contraband pen in his room.

The psychologist conducted an IQ test. L.G. scored 117, which falls in the

high-average range. His “personality assessment inventory” indicated that he had

low interest in treatment and low motivation. As far as his results of “Risk-

Sophistication-Treatment Inventory,” when including the murder, he scored in the

middle offender range for risk of dangerousness. He was in the high range for

sophistication and maturity. He knew the difference between right and wrong and

had a basic understanding of the law. The psychologist opined that L.G. had

difficulty understanding how his actions affected others.

The psychologist testified that normally as time goes on, a youth

acknowledges the impact of his choices more and shows more empathy toward the

victim. The psychologist questioned L.G.’s level of empathy, as evidenced by the

fact that after the murder he went home and resumed his normal routine, attending

a family party that night. She said empathy is crucial for avoiding repeated harmful

behavior because it helps youth understand the impact of their actions. She testified

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that normally she would expect more empathy or acknowledgement of impact than

the levels L.G. displayed. The psychologist testified that L.G.’s ability to mask

how he was feeling and keep his anger concealed gave her concern for risk of

future dangerousness.

The court entered an order finding that the seriousness of the alleged crime

and L.G.’s conduct during it and L.G.’s background required that he be transferred

to the criminal district court for prosecution as an adult. L.G. appeals the juvenile

court’s order waiving its jurisdiction and transferring him. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 56.01.

Juvenile Court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction

L.G. contends that the juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction and

transfer him to the criminal district court to be tried as an adult must be reversed

because the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s stated

findings supporting its order to transfer him to the criminal district court.

A. Criteria for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction

Children ordinarily are not subject to criminal proceedings like adults.

Instead, juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving

what otherwise would be criminal conduct by children 10 years of age or older and

under 17 years of age. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 51.02(2)(a), 51.03(a)(1), 51.04(a). If a

juvenile court determines that certain conditions are met after an evidentiary

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hearing, it may waive its jurisdiction and transfer a child to the district court for

criminal proceedings. Id. § 54.02(a), (c). The State initiates this process by

requesting a hearing and providing notice.

To transfer a child who is alleged to have committed a felony of the first

degree, like capital murder, to the criminal district court, a juvenile court must find

that (1) the child was 14 or older at the time of the alleged offense; (2) there is

probable cause to believe the child committed the offense; and (3) the seriousness

of the alleged offense or the background of the child requires criminal rather than

juvenile proceedings. Id. § 54.02(a).

The State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance

of the evidence that the welfare of the community requires transfer of jurisdiction

for criminal proceedings, either because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or

the background of the child or both. Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 886 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] pet. ref’d). In deciding whether the preponderance of

the evidence satisfies this last requirement, the juvenile court must consider four

non-exclusive factors:

(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property,
with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against
the person;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

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(4) the prospect of adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
juvenile court.

Id. § 54.02(f).

All four of the 54.02(f) criteria need not weigh in favor of transfer for a

juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction. In re S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Any combination of these criteria may

suffice. Id. Not every factor need weigh in favor of transfer to the criminal district

court. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886. If it decides to waive its jurisdiction based on its

consideration of these factors, the juvenile court must enter a written order in

which it states specifically its reasons for waiver and its findings. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 54.02(h).

B. Standard of Review

We review a juvenile court decision to waive its exclusive original

jurisdiction and transfer a case to the criminal district court using two steps. First,

we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence relating to the juvenile

court’s specific findings of fact regarding the four factors stated in section 54.02(f).

S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 239. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence,

we credit the proof favorable to the findings and disregard contrary proof unless a

reasonable factfinder could not reject it. Id. If there is more than a scintilla of

evidence supporting a finding, then the proof is legally sufficient. Id. When

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reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the proof

presented to determine if the juvenile court’s findings are so against the great

weight and preponderance of the proof as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. Our

review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting waiver is limited to the facts

the juvenile court expressly relied on in its transfer order. Id.

If the findings of the juvenile court are supported by legally and factually

sufficient proof, then we review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse of

discretion standard. S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 239. As with any decision that lies

within the discretion of the trial court, the salient question is not whether we might

have decided the issue differently. Id. Instead, we consider in light of our review of

the sufficiency of the evidence whether the juvenile court’s decision represents a

principled application of the section 54.02(f) factors or was arbitrary or made

without reference to the statutory criteria for waiver. Id. So long as the juvenile

court correctly applies these criteria and complies with the requirement to

specifically state its supporting findings, its waiver decision will pass muster under

our standard of review. Id.

C. Analysis

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by waiving its jurisdiction.

L.G. stipulated to his date of birth and confessed to his participation in the

murder. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a)(1)–(2). He was fifteen years old at the time.

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Thus, the dispositive issue before the juvenile court was whether the seriousness of

the offense or L.G.’s background required criminal proceedings instead of juvenile

proceedings. See id. § 54.02(a)(3). L.G. does not contest that the evidence was

legally sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings. He argues instead that the

evidence was factually insufficient to find that the section 54.02(f) factors weighed

in favor of transfer.

The juvenile court’s order states that the court based its findings on its

“observations at the hearing, the clerk’s record, the diagnostic studies, the social

evaluations, the circumstances of the child and the offense, and all the evidence

presented at the hearing.” After noting that it had considered the section 54.02(f)

factors, the court found there was probable cause to believe that L.G. committed

capital murder. The court further found that the welfare of the community requires

criminal proceedings due to “the seriousness of the alleged” capital murder and

“this juvenile respondent’s conduct during it.” Finally, the court noted “the

background of the juvenile respondent necessitates transfer to criminal district

court for the welfare of the community.”

The juvenile court found that, as an offense against the person, capital

murder favored waiver of its jurisdiction, and L.G. does not contest this finding.

See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(f)(1). He instead argues that waiver is not appropriate

merely because the offense was a serious one committed against a person, and that

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the trial court did not properly consider that L.G. had no prior history of violence

or substance abuse disorders.

It is not “merely the category of crime” or its consequence that are serious;

the circumstances of the crime are significant as well. See In re. J.B., No. 01-24-

00644-CV, 2025 WL 409407, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 6, 2025,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding capital murder involving pistol whipped victim who

was shot in the back while he lay prone and helpless was gratuitous crime

exhibiting malice and callous disregard for human life); S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 243

(indicating that when the crime is sufficiently brutal and malevolent, nature of the

crime alone may support waiver of juvenile jurisdiction).

At the hearing, the law enforcement officer described a gruesome murder

scene. See In re Z.M., No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (nature and seriousness of

alleged offense, alone, may justify juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction

“notwithstanding other section 54.02(f) factors, so long as the offense: (1) is

substantiated by evidence at the transfer hearing, and (2) is of sufficiently

egregious character”). He testified that the decedent suffered 7 or 8 stab wounds to

her chest and was stabbed by L.G. at least 25 times. He found blood around the hot

tub, on the patio, and inside the house. The decedent had defensive wounds to her

hands indicating a struggle. L.G. told the officer that he saw the decedent in her hot

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tub, and she looked “vulnerable” and “helpless.” L.G. jumped the fence,

approached her from behind, and began to stab her. L.G. told law enforcement that

the decedent fought back and went into her house, but he followed her and was

able to bring her back on the patio. The law enforcement officer testified that L.G.

told him that once the decedent died, he dragged her to the shed.

As to L.G.’s sophistication and maturity, the psychiatric evaluation, admitted

into evidence at the transfer hearing, and testimony from the psychiatrist indicated

that L.G. demonstrated understanding of the court proceedings and had a high

average range IQ. L.G. had been enrolled in his high school’s gifted and talented

program before the incident. The record reflects that L.G. understood the legal

process. See In re K.J., 493 S.W.3d 140, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2016, no pet.) (stating whether juvenile can assist attorney in his defense is a

relevant consideration when assessing juvenile’s maturity and sophistication).

Moreover, L.G.’s efforts to conceal the crime showed his sophistication and

maturity. See In re K.M., No. 01-20-00121-CV, 2020 WL 4210493, at *11 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence that

juvenile attempted to conceal participation in crime was fact supporting

sophistication and maturity). L.G. removed his shoes before the attack so they

would not get blood on them. He moved the rocks keeping the shed door closed,

dragged the decedent’s body inside, closed the shed, and replaced the rocks. He

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covered the blood inside the residence, and he stabbed the knife used in the murder

into the ground several times to try to conceal the blood. He also wore gloves

during the commission of the crime and attempted to prevent the decedent’s phone

from working properly by covering it in tinfoil. L.G. returned home after the

murder and attended a family party that evening.

As to the third factor, it is undisputed that L.G. has not been involved in the

juvenile justice system and had only minor infractions while detained, but that does

not prevent the juvenile court from deciding that the evidence still weighs in favor

of transfer. The juvenile court is “free to decide to transfer [a] case due to the

seriousness of the crime, even if the background of the child suggests the

opposite.” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting C.M. v. State, 884 S.W.2d 562, 564

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.)).

As to prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of

rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the psychologist testified that L.G. had little

appreciation of the impact of the crime on others. She testified that she had

concerns for L.G.’s future dangerousness, given his lack of empathy and ability to

mask his feelings. She pointed to the fact that he committed the murder and then

returned to his family home to attend a party that evening and the fact that as time

passed, she would have expected him to have more understanding of the impact of

his actions and to develop more empathy. While L.G. argues that the juvenile court

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should have given greater weight to the programs for rehabilitation that exist in the

juvenile justice system, the court could have reasonably concluded that L.G.’s

attitude about crime made him a less likely candidate for rehabilitation.

We hold that the juvenile court’s findings are supported by factually

sufficient evidence. The juvenile court’s findings are not so contrary to the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.

Because the court’s ultimate waiver decision was made with reference to guiding

rules and principles, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion

when it waived its jurisdiction and transferred L.G.’s case to the criminal district

court.

We overrule L.G.’s issue on appeal.

Conclusion

We affirm the juvenile court’s transfer order.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.

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