Carmen Aleman v. Standard Casualty Company

Opinion issued August 26, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00572-CV
———————————
CARMEN ALEMAN, ERIC B. DICK, AND THE DICK LAW FIRM, PLLC,
Appellants
V.
STANDARD CASUALTY COMPANY,
Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1188597

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Carmen Aleman, Eric B. Dick, and the Dick Law Firm, PLLC

(the “Dick Law Firm”) (collectively, “appellants”), challenge the trial court’s

rendition of summary judgment and award of sanctions in favor of appellee,
Standard Casualty Company (“Standard”), in Aleman’s suit against Standard for

breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and

violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DPTA”) and the Texas

Insurance Code. In three issues, appellants contend that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment, sanctioning appellants, and awarding Standard

attorney’s fees.

We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Background

In her first amended petition, Aleman alleged that she owned a residential

property in Katy, Texas (the “property”) that was insured by Standard from

December 12, 2019 to December 12, 2020. According to Aleman, on or about

October 23, 2020, the property was damaged “as a result of a wind and hail storm.”

Aleman submitted a claim to Standard for the damage caused on October 23, 2020,

estimating $67,851.78 as the amount of damage to the property. Aleman alleged

that Standard refused to pay her the “full” amount she was owed under her policy.

Aleman brought claims against Standard for breach of contract, breach of the

duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and violations of the DPTA1 and the Texas

Insurance Code. Aleman sought damages and attorney’s fees.

1
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01–.955.

2
Standard answered, generally denying the allegations in Aleman’s petition

and asserting that Aleman “ha[d] not presented a covered loss for . . . damage that

occurred within the policy period” and Standard had already paid for Aleman’s

“separate claim for wind damage to [the property’s] roof.”

Standard then moved for summary judgment on Aleman’s claims against it.

Standard asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Aleman’s

claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and

violations of the Texas Insurance Code and there was no evidence to show that

Standard breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violated the DTPA, or

committed fraud. In its motion, Standard explained that on February 9, 2021,

Aleman presented “a claim to Standard for a loss occurring on or about October 23,

2020 for damage to the [p]roperty allegedly from hail.” The property was then

inspected on February 11, 2021.

The insurance adjuster who inspected the property “found no evidence of hail

or wind damage to the roof or exterior” of the property. The adjuster also “found no

evidence of wind damage to [Aleman’s] fence or gazebo and no evidence of any

covered loss for the various damages found on the interior of the home.” According

to the adjuster, the property had “rotted decking on the roof’s right slope,” “missing

shingles on the right and left front gable,” “left-rear hip on [the] right slope,” and

“missing shingles on a portion of the ridge showing weathered exposed decking.”

3
The damage was found to be preexisting and “not caused by a named peril” under

Aleman’s policy. The adjuster’s interior inspection found “damage in the game

room right below the damaged ridge on the roof as well as in the hall bathroom

ceiling.” Because such damage had “resulted from a repeated event,” it was not

covered by Aleman’s policy. According to the adjuster, any damage “to the

downspouts and the fence post [was] not caused by hail or any covered event.”

Although there was “hail damage to some window beading, weather reports clearly

demonstrated that no hail [had] occurred on or near the [p]roperty during the [p]olicy

period.” On February 24, 2021, Standard notified Aleman by letter that her claim

related to the purported October 23, 2020 weather event was not covered by her

policy.

In the matter-of-law portion of its summary-judgment motion, Standard

argued that Aleman could not recover on her breach-of-contract claim as a matter of

law because Aleman could not establish that she suffered hail damage to the property

and that “the cost for repairs of the purported hail damage [was] in excess of her

deductible.” Standard also could not breach its insurance policy with Aleman if

Aleman did not have damages to the property that were covered by her policy.

Further, Standard explained that Aleman could not recover for violations of the

Texas Insurance Code under chapters 541 and 542 because if Standard did not breach

the insurance policy, then it could not have violated the “unfair practices” provisions

4
of the Texas Insurance Code. Aleman could also not establish that Standard acted

in bad faith in handling her claim.

As to Aleman’s claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,

Standard argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim

because “[t]he undisputed evidence establishe[d] that Standard acted reasonably in

denying [Aleman’s] hail claim and . . . there was a bona fide dispute as to whether

the [p]roperty suffered hail damage in excess of [Aleman’s] deductible.” An insurer

breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing “by denying or delaying payment of

a claim” when it “knew or should have known it was reasonably clear the claim was

covered,” and, here, Aleman could not establish that Standard had acted in bad faith.

(Internal quotations omitted.)

In the no-evidence portion of its summary-judgment motion, Standard argued

that Aleman could not recover on her claim for breach of the duty of good faith and

fair dealing because Aleman had no evidence that Standard breached its duty. As to

Aleman’s claim for violations of the DTPA, Standard asserted that Aleman had no

evidence that Standard represented that any goods or services had characteristics,

benefits or qualities that they did not have, Standard represented that Aleman’s

policy conferred rights and remedies that it did not, Standard failed to disclose

information concerning Aleman’s policy that was known at the time of purchase and

the failure to disclose was intended to induce Aleman into a transaction which she

5
would not have otherwise entered, Standard engaged in unconscionable conduct, and

that any act by Standard proximately caused Aleman damages. And as to Aleman’s

fraud claim, Standard asserted that Aleman had no evidence that Standard operated

in reckless disregard for Aleman in the course of handling her claim, made false

statements, misrepresented material facts, engaged in fraudulent acts for the purpose

of misleading Aleman as to actual damages resulting from the storm, had knowledge

of any alleged false statements or made any statement recklessly without any

knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and made any misrepresentation

that Aleman acted upon. Standard also asserted that Aleman had no evidence that

she acted in reliance on any alleged misrepresentation or that she suffered any injury

as a result of the alleged fraud.

Standard attached to its summary-judgment motion a copy of Aleman’s policy

for the property, which was effective from December 12, 2019 to December 12,

2020. The policy stated that it “insure[d] against physical loss to the property”

caused by a “[w]indstorm, [h]urricane and [h]ail.”

Standard also attached to its motion the affidavit of Rebecca Renee Johnson,

the assistant claims manager for Standard. In her affidavit, Johnson testified that

Aleman, on February 9, 2021, notified Standard of a claim for hail and wind damage

at the property that occurred on October 23, 2020. The property was inspected on

February 11, 2021 by Christopher Ryan Strohl from Mason Claims Services. On

6
February 24, 2021, Standard notified Aleman that her claim was not covered by her

policy because “none of the claimed damage was caused by a peril insured against

in the [p]olicy.”2 On February 7, 2022, Aleman submitted a claim under her policy

2
A copy of the February 24, 2021 letter from Standard to Aleman was attached to
Johnson’s affidavit. It listed her claim number, the date of loss as October 23, 2020,
and the cause of loss as “[h]ail.” In the letter, Standard stated:
As you are aware, this office received notice on February 9th 2021,
for hail damage to your roofing system on you [sic] home. . . .
Adjuster . . . Strohl’s inspection . . . with you on February 11th 2021,
revealed rotted decking on the roof’s right slope; missing shingles on
the right and left front gable; left-rear hip on [the] right slope; [and]
missing shingles on a portion of the ridge showing weathered exposed
decking. This damage is preexisting and not caused by a named peril
under your policy therefore, not covered.
Additionally, the inspection revealed hail damage to the window
beading. Your . . . policy [was] in effect as of December 12th 2019
through December 12th 2020, which constitutes the time for which
coverage will be afforded. We have received the hail event report
which concludes the hail which damaged your home occurred prior to
your policy inception. Therefore, there is no coverage for the hail
damage prior to your policy incept[ion] date.
The interior inspection revealed damage in the game room right below
the damaged ridge on the roof as well as in the hall bathroom ceiling.
This is a repeated event, therefore not covered under your policy.
During the inspection the adjuster noted damage to the downspouts
and the fence post on the right elevation was leaning and not damaged
due to any named peril under your policy. No coverage applies.
. . . There is no coverage for the damages as reported.
....
. . . [T]he purpose of this letter is to advise you that there is no
coverage for the deteriorated roofing system, interior damage to
ceilings, fencing and hail damage to window beading to your home.

7
for damage arising from a January 10, 2022 windstorm; Standard paid her based on

that claim.3

Additionally, the unsworn declaration of Strohl was attached to Standard’s

summary-judgment motion. In the declaration, Strohl stated that he was employed

by Mason Claim Services and was assigned to inspect the property after Aleman’s

claim “for a loss caused by . . . hail and wind on October 23, 2020.” Strohl inspected

the property on February 11, 2021, and he did not find “any damage caused by hail

or wind to the roof or exterior of the [p]roperty.” Strohl explained that he also “found

no evidence of wind damage to [Aleman’s] fence or gazebo[,] and further found no

evidence of any covered loss for the various damages found on the interior of the

home.” Although his inspection of the property “revealed rotted decking on the

roof’s right slope; missing shingles on the right and left front gable; left-rear hip on

[the] right slope; [and] missing shingles on a portion of the ridge showing weathered

exposed decking,” the damage was “preexisting and not caused by a named peril

under [Aleman’s] policy.” Strohl also stated that his inspection of the interior of the

home showed “damage in the game room right below the damaged ridge on the roof

as well as in the hall bathroom ceiling.” Damage on the property’s downspouts and

the fence post “were not caused by hail or any covered event.” Finally, Strohl noted

3
A copy of a check from Standard to Aleman was attached to Johnson’s affidavit.

8
that although he found “hail damage to some window beading,” a hail report, 4

showed that “no hail occurred on or near the [p]roperty during the [p]olicy period”

from December 12, 2019 to December 12, 2020.

Further, Standard attached to its summary-judgment motion a copy of the

transcript from Aleman’s deposition. In her deposition, Aleman testified that she

owned the property, and she recalled calling Standard to make a claim. Aleman

could not recall the weather event that purportedly occurred on October 23, 2020

that caused her to file her claim with Standard. She also could not recall what

happened in February 2021 that caused her to think she had a claim for damage to

the property. When asked if she remembered a storm happening around October

2020, Aleman responded, “Maybe.”

According to Aleman, at some point, “someone . . . stop[ped] by to look at

[the property] and there was some damage,” but she did not remember who that

“someone” was or what kind of damage he saw. Aleman, herself, had not seen

damage to the property and did not know the cause of any damage.

4
A copy of the hail report was attached to Strohl’s unsworn declaration. The report
showed that no “significant hail event” occurred at the property on October 22, 2020
through October 24, 2020, and “[h]ail greater than 0.75[] [inches] did not occur” at
the property on October 23, 2020. Further, the last time that there was hail
measuring 0.75 inches in diameter was on August 27, 2019, 423 days before the
reported date of loss. The estimated wind speed on those days was thirty-five miles
per hour.

9
She had not hired anyone to do repairs on the property. From the time that

Aleman had lived at the property, she had not had the roof repaired. While looking

at photographs of the property during her deposition, she did not know when the

damage to her roof had occurred. She did not know when shingles had gone missing

from the roof, and she did not remember any water entering the home. She also did

not know that “there were rugs being used to patch [the] roof.” She was not told that

hail or wind had caused the rotting wood outside the game room window of the

home. Aleman did not know what caused any of the damage found by the adjuster

who inspected the property in February 2021. No one had ever told her that the

interior damage to the home was caused by hail or wind.

Aleman also testified that her attorney had hired a company to inspect the

property in August 2021, but she did not recall if anyone from the company told her

what had caused the damage to the property. Between October 2020 and August

2021, Aleman had repaired “some shingles” on the roof, but she did not know where

on the roof the shingles were replaced. This would have happened after she filed

her February 2021 claim with Standard, and she did it because water was coming

into the upstairs of the home.

Finally, Aleman testified that she made a second claim with Standard for a

wind event that occurred on January 10, 2022. She stated that she thought a storm,

or some wind had occurred, but she could not remember exactly what had happened

10
weather wise. She recalled finding shingles on the ground though. Standard sent

her a check in response to her second claim. Aleman could not remember if her

second claim involved damage to the interior of the home as well.

Standard also attached to its summary-judgment motion a copy of the

transcript from Billy Bray’s deposition testimony. In his deposition, Bray testified

that he owned a commercial insurance brokerage, and he had been contacted about

Aleman’s case in January 2023 by her attorney. He had never spoken to Aleman,

and he had not inspected the property. He was not told that he had been designated

as an expert witness by Aleman, and he had not been told whether he was going to

testify in the case. In preparation for his deposition, Bray had reviewed Aleman’s

policy, “the dispute,” and other files sent to him by Aleman’s attorney. He had not

been asked to produce a report by anyone. He was available to answer “coverage

questions” about whether Aleman’s claim was covered by her policy. Bray stated

that he “believe[d] there[] [was] coverage for the claim based on the policy

language.”

Bray further testified that he “believe[d] [Aleman’s] claim was a wind or hail

or maybe [a] wind and hail claim” and “[i]t look[ed] like the damage was caused by

wind, hail or a combination of the two.” Bray did not get on the property’s roof and

observe the damage personally though. He also could not say when the damage to

the property’s roof had occurred, and he was not sure if a weather event had occurred

11
in the timeframe listed in Aleman’s claim or during Aleman’s policy period.

Further, he noted that it was possible that something other than wind or hail had led

to the damage to the interior of the home; he believed the damage to the interior of

the home was caused by water. He did not know when the damage to the interior of

the home had occurred. Bray did not believe that Standard had acted in bad faith,

but he also stated that he was not asked to testify as to bad faith.

A copy of the transcript from the deposition of Richard Gadrow was attached

to Standard’s summary-judgment motion. Gadrow testified that he was contacted

by Aleman’s attorney, but he had not been asked to serve as an expert witness in the

case, and he had never been told that he was designated as one. Gadrow owned

Quantum Claim Consulting Services, and he “d[id] inspections and estimates on

storm damage and insurance claims” for both residential and commercial properties.

Gadrow inspected the property in 2021 and wrote an estimate for the cost of repairs

to the property. He could not remember ever speaking to Aleman.

Gadrow further testified that he had concluded that there was damage to the

property, and he believed the damage to the property was due to “the freeze,” but he

could not recall when “the freeze” had occurred. He also stated that he could not

say “exactly what [had] happened”; it was just his “best guess.” While viewing

photographs that he took during his inspection, Gadrow acknowledged that he could

12
not determine what caused certain damage to the property’s roof or when that

damage had occurred.

He noted that he believed that the water damage to the ceiling and wall inside

the home was caused by ice damming on the roof, which led to water leaking inside.

As to other damage inside the home, Gadrow opined that it “could be a leaking pipe”

or it “could be a leak from the roof dripping off of a rafter,” but there was “a number

of different ways that [the damage] c[ould have] happen[ed].” He did not reach a

conclusion as to what caused the damage inside Aleman’s home. He also did not

know when the damage had occurred. While investigating both the outside and

inside damage to the property, Gadrow did not see any damage that was the result

of hail.

According to Gadrow, he intended to testify at trial that there was $67,851 in

damage to the property because that was what he estimated it would be the cost to

repair the property. A copy of Gadrow’s estimate was attached as an exhibit to his

deposition transcript. The estimate stated that it was “based upon a visual inspection

of the . . . property conducted in August of 2021,” and it would cost $37,124.53 to

repair the roof, $8,304.21 to repair the exterior, $3,370.68 to repair the “[l]oft,”

$1,079.12 to repair the stairway, $3,159.81 to repair the hallway, and $2,156.06 to

repair a bedroom. It also included $12,657.37 for other “[g]eneral” repair costs.

13
Further, Standard attached a copy of the transcript from Matthew Morgan’s

deposition to its summary-judgment motion.5 Morgan testified that he was a

licensed insurance adjuster that had been contacted by Aleman’s attorney. He

reviewed Gadrow’s estimate, and the photographs attached to it, and he concluded

that there was damage to the property because there were missing shingles on the

roof. He believed the damage to the roof was caused by wind. He also used certain

software and found that there were two wind events in September and October

2021.6 Morgan did not look for hail damage to the property when he reviewed

Gadrow’s estimate and photographs.

Morgan had no information to show that Standard was trying to avoid paying

Aleman’s claim, and he did not have any information regarding Standard’s overall

handling of Aleman’s claim. Despite this limited knowledge, he stated that he

believed that Standard had acted in bad faith because Standard did not pay Aleman’s

claim. Morgan noted that he had never been to the property, and he had never spoken

to Aleman.

A copy of the transcript from Shiran Renga Perera’s deposition was attached

to Standard’s summary-judgment motion. Perera testified that he had been contacted

5
A copy of an email sent from Morgan to Standard’s counsel, which was also
attached to the summary-judgment motion, stated that he was an “unretained
expert.”
6
In her petition, Aleman alleged that the property was damaged on October 23, 2020.

14
a few weeks before her deposition by Aleman’s attorney, who told him that he was

designated as an expert witness in the case. Perera was employed as a civil and

structural engineer. Perera intended to testify about the cause of damage to the

property and not about whether the damage was covered by Aleman’s policy. Perera

did not inspect the property, but reviewed Gadrow’s estimate. He had never spoken

to Aleman.

After reviewing Gadrow’s estimate, Perera understood that mainly wind

damage had occurred to the property. The photographs attached to the estimate

showed wind damage but not hail damage. He noted that the photographs were taken

in August 2021, even though the damage to the property reportedly occurred in

October 2020. He could not tell from the photographs when any damage to the

property had occurred, and he noted that he did not see hail damage in the

photographs. At least one of the photographs revealed what he believed to be

damage from a tree rubbing against the roof. He thought some damage he observed

in the photographs could have been caused by wind along with temperature changes,

and some was caused by only wind.

While viewing photographs of the fence on the property, Perera opined that

the damage was caused by wind. As to the interior of the home, Perera stated that

the photographs showed water intrusion from a leak. He did not see any damage to

the attic in the photographs.

15
In her response to the matter-of-law portion of Standard’s summary-judgment

motion, Aleman argued that Standard was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on her breach-of-contract claim because Standard “failed and refused to pay

adequate compensation for [Aleman’s] claim” and there was a fact issue as to

whether the damage to the property was covered by Aleman’s policy. As to her

claims for violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Aleman argued that Standard was

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they remained viable, and

Standard had engaged in bad faith in handling Aleman’s claim. For instance,

according to Aleman, Standard had “failed to perform a reasonable investigation of

[the] property” because Aleman’s investigator’s repair estimate was larger than

Standard’s adjuster’s estimate. Further, Aleman asserted that there was a fact issue

as to whether Standard had engaged in unfair settlement practice because the

evidence showed that Standard did not conduct an accurate evaluation of Aleman’s

damages, did not conduct a reasonable investigation or provide a reasonable

explanation for its failure to pay Aleman under her policy, did not provide a timely

indication of acceptance or rejection, and did not timely compensate Aleman for her

losses. As to her claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Aleman

argued that Standard was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because

Standard “unquestionably owed [Aleman] a duty of good faith and fair dealing.”

16
In her response to the no-evidence portion of Standard’s summary-judgment

motion, Aleman argued that there was “ample evidence” that Standard had violated

the DTPA because the same violations of the Texas Insurance Code constituted

violations of the DTPA. Aleman also asserted that there was a fact issue as to

whether Standard “knowingly made a false, material representation upon which

[Aleman] was intended to rely and [Aleman] actually relied and suffered injury,” so

summary judgment was improper on her fraud claim.

Aleman attached her own affidavit to her response as well as a copy of her

policy with Standard and a copy of Gadrow’s repair estimate along with his business

record affidavit.

In its reply to Aleman’s summary-judgment response, Standard objected to

Aleman’s summary-judgment evidence, and it requested that those documents be

struck. Standard also asserted that Aleman had failed to raise a fact issue as to

whether she suffered a covered loss during her policy period, and without a covered

loss, Aleman could not recover of on her claims for breach of contract, violations of

the Texas Insurance Code, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and bad

faith. Further, Standard asserted that Aleman, in her response, failed to cite any

evidence “to identify a single act or omission that constitute[d] a deceptive act or

that constitute[d] fraud.”

17
The trial court sustained Standard’s objections to Aleman’s

summary-judgment evidence and struck Aleman’s affidavit and Gadrow’s repair

estimate and affidavit from the summary-judgment record. The trial court also

granted Standard’s matter-of-law and no-evidence summary-judgment motion on

Aleman’s claims against it and ordered that she take nothing on her claims against

Standard.

In connection with its summary-judgment motion, Standard also moved to

recover attorney’s fees under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Texas

Insurance Code, the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the DTPA,7

asserting that Aleman had filed a frivolous lawsuit, which was sanctionable conduct.

According to Standard, Aleman’s claims against it were “wholly without basis in

law or fact” at the time she filed her petition. Neither Aleman nor her attorney “had

made [a] reasonable inquiry to determine if the claims [alleged against Standard]

were supported by facts or law,” “had investigated or obtained any analysis

regarding causation of the alleged damages” to the property, or “had retained any

experts to review or analyze the cause of damage to [the] [p]roperty in order to

ascertain if the cause of such damage would fall within the categories of ‘covered

peril’ under [Aleman’s] policy.” (Emphasis omitted.) Further, Aleman testified in

7
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.153; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 10.001; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c).

18
her own deposition that she “had no knowledge of the cause of the damage to [the

property], she had not been told that any damage to [the property] was caused by

wind or a hailstorm,” and she had no knowledge or expertise “to be able to evaluate

the type or cause of damage to [the property].” Standard also asserted that Aleman

had filed a false, groundless, and misleading designation of expert witnesses along

with her petition to “make it appear that [she] had retained multiple experts.” But at

the time the designation was filed “none of the designated experts [had been] told or

[were] aware they had been designated as expert witnesses” and “none of the

designated experts who [were] deposed ha[d] reviewed or approved the

[d]esignation prior to the time [it] was filed.” (Emphasis omitted.) Standard

attached attorney’s fees evidence to its motion.

In response to Standard’s motion for attorney’s fees, Aleman asserted that her

claims against Standard were not frivolous, and she had based her suit on “findings

[from] expert reports,” referring to Gadrow’s repair estimate.

The trial court granted Standard’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas

Insurance Code section 541.153, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001, and Texas Business and Commerce

Code section 17.50(c). Aleman then requested a jury trial on the issue of

reasonableness and necessity of Standard’s attorney’s fees under Texas Insurance

Code section 541.153, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, Texas Civil Practice and

19
Remedies Code section 10.001, and Texas Business and Commerce Code section

17.50(c), which the trial court granted.

Following the admission of evidence at trial, the jury found, as to the amount

of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, that Standard was entitled to recover

$137,000 for representation in the trial court, $16,250 for representation in the court

of appeals, $10,000 for representation at the petition for review stage in the Texas

Supreme Court, $10,000 for representation at the briefing on the merits stage in the

Texas Supreme Court, and $12,000 for representation at the oral argument stage and

through the completion of the proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court.

In its final judgment, the trial court sustained Standard’s objections to

Aleman’s summary-judgment evidence and struck the objected-to evidence attached

to Aleman’s summary-judgment response. The trial court also granted Standard

summary judgment on Aleman’s claims against it and ordered that she take nothing

on her claims against Standard. Further, the trial court granted Standard’s request

for attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas Insurance Code section 541.153, Texas Rule

of Civil Procedure 13, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001, and

Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.50(c). Consistent with the jury’s

verdict, the trial court awarded Standard $137,000 in attorney’s fees as sanctions

against Aleman and her attorney as well as unconditional appellate attorney’s fees.

20
Related to its award of attorney’s fees, the trial court made the following

findings of fact:

1. [Aleman] failed to present any admissible evidence to contradict
[Standard’s] Traditional and No-Evidence Motion[] for
Summary Judgment pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
166a and 166a(i):

a. [Aleman] and her counsel did not present admissible
evidence of coverage under any insurance policy and
failed to identify a loss occurring within the applicable
policy period that was covered under the policy.

b. [Aleman] and her counsel failed to establish with any
admissible evidence that [she] suffered any damages for
which Standard could be held liable.

c. [Aleman] and her counsel did not present admissible
evidence of any act or omission constituting a breach of
any policy contract issued by Standard, including evidence
of a covered peril occurring within the policy period.

d. [Aleman] and her counsel did not present admissible
evidence segregating covered losses from those
specifically excluded by the applicable insurance policy
for any loss suffered.

e. In [her] response to the Motion[] for Summary Judgment,
[Aleman] and her counsel failed to establish that Standard
(1) violated the policy contract or any provision of the
Texas Insurance Code; (2) committed any act or omission
constituting bad faith; (3) failed to act in good faith and
fair dealing; or (4) engaged in fraud or a breach of the
[DTPA].

2. [Aleman’s] Response to Standard’s Motion[] for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Recovery of Attorney’s Fees and Costs
as described above demonstrate[s] that the lawsuit is groundless,
brought in bad faith, and could only have been brought for the
21
purpose of harassment. [Aleman’s] Response demonstrates that
the pleadings filed by [Aleman] lacked any reasonable basis in
law or fact; that the pleadings were signed by counsel without
any inquiry and without knowledge of viable claims; and that
counsel knew or should have known the allegations were
groundless.

3. [Aleman’s] pleadings and responses demonstrate that neither
[Aleman] nor her counsel had any evidence of coverage, acts
violating any provision of the Texas Insurance Code, any act
constituting bad faith or the failure to act in good faith and to deal
fairly with its insured, fraud, or a violation of the [DTPA] when
this lawsuit was filed.

4. Due to [Aleman] and her counsel’s failure to support by any
claim pled in this lawsuit and the failure to identify any effort to
investigate a basis in law or fact to support the[] pleadings, the
[c]ourt finds that there is no evidentiary support for any claim
pled by [Aleman] in this lawsuit and that the lawsuit was brought
for an improper purpose, including to cause unnecessary delay
and the needless increase of the cost of litigation.

5. With regard to the following of [Aleman’s] designated experts,
the [c]ourt further finds that the Expert Designations filed by
[Aleman] and her attorneys, . . . Dick and the Dick Law
Firm, . . . were misleading and contained false information about
designated witnesses. . . . Dick and the Dick Law
Firm . . . obstructed the discovery process by filing designations
that were not reviewed or approved by the named witnesses and
did not accurately represent the views or opinions of the
identified witnesses. [Aleman’s] expert designations stated false
opinions that were not actually held by the identified witnesses:

a. Richard Gadrow:

i. Gadrow was designated as a “General
Contractor/Estimator” to testify “about the nature,
existence of damage, loss cause . . . and value of
[Aleman’s] property and similar property.”

22
ii. [T]he [Expert] Designation further identifies the
following expected opinions for Gadrow:

A. “ . . . [A]n insurance carrier adjusting this
claim reasonably and in good faith either
knew or should have known to identify and
accept coverage for the aforementioned
reasonably clear damages”;

B. “[T]o the extend [sic] [Standard] failed to
acknowledge and accept coverage for the
aforementioned reasonably clear damage,
[Standard] adjusted this claim in bad faith”;

C. “[Standard] did not fully indemnify the
insured for his/her loss and he/she has not
been paid to restore the insured’s property
back to pre-loss condition”; and

D. “[T]he insured was underpaid for this claim
and [Standard] knew or should have known
that its claim decision constituted an unfair
denial because evidence of covered damages
warranting further coverage at all times was
reasonably clear during its claim
investigation[.]”

iii. Gadrow was deposed on January 19, 2023. He
testified that he did not recall being approached by
[Aleman’s] counsel to be an expert and could only
recall inspecting the [p]roperty “sometime in 2021.”
He had not seen the Expert Designation attributable
to him, did not approve of it before it was filed in
this case, was not informed that it was being
submitted on his behalf, or that he was being
designated as an expert. He was first informed that
he was designated an expert a few weeks before his
January 19th deposition.

23
iv. He inspected the [p]roperty and prepared a single
damage estimate using Xactimate, which contained
detailed information regarding the damaged items
and estimated costs of repair but was wholly devoid
of any analysis as to the cause or type of damage
and did not address causation. Rather[,] the
estimate contains a single remark related to
causation which was not a conclusion or opinion of
Gadrow, but merely a statement that he was
contracted to provide a “disinterested third party
estimate for the repairs to the subject property
caused by a covered peril as defined by Others[.]”

v. Gadrow testified that he would not be testifying
whether or not the damage was covered under the
policy, and his sole report (an Xactimate estimate)
contains no analysis of policy coverage.

vi. . . . Gadrow merely inspected the damage and
prepared a repair estimate, but he did not find that
[Aleman’s] roof exhibited damage caused by hail,
rather he found it was caused by “the freeze” and
“ice damming” and also stated that wind was a
possible cause of some of the damage, and that there
was nothing he could rely on to tell the date of
damage.

vii. Gadrow did not calculate any percentage of the roof
damaged by the ice storm versus wind damage, and
did not recall any damage caused by hail, nor
conclude that any damage was caused by hail based
on review of his report photos during his deposition.
He did not state in his report on which elevations he
saw any alleged ice or wind damage. He further
admits he cannot tell when the damage occurred and
stated there is nothing he could rely on that shows
when the damage occurred.

24
b. Billy Bray:

i. [Aleman] designated Bray to opine as to the
following:

A. [T]he insured sustained covered loss during
the effective policy period.

B. The proper scope of repairs to address the
damages is reflected in the estimates or
appraisal awards previously produced or to
be produced.

C. Evidence of covered damage was obvious
and reasonably clear.

D. An insurance carrier adjusting this claim
reasonably and in good faith either knew or
should have known to identify and accept
coverage for the reasonably clear damages.

E. To the extent [Standard] failed to
acknowledge and accept coverage for the
reasonably clear damage, [Standard] adjusted
this claim in bad faith.

F. [Standard] did not fully indemnify the
insured for his/her loss and he/she has not
been paid to restore the insured’s property
back to pre-loss condition.

G. The insured was underpaid for this claim and
[Standard] knew or should have known that
its claim decision constituted an unfair denial
because evidence of covered damages
warranting further coverage at all times was
reasonably clear during its claim
investigation.

25
ii. [Aleman’s] counsel initially agreed to a date for
Bray’s deposition and the deposition was scheduled
for January 17, 2023. [Aleman’s] counsel informed
Standard’s counsel the day before that the
deposition had to be rescheduled. . . . Bray’s
deposition was eventually taken on January 26,
2023.

iii. When deposed, . . . Bray admitted he was first
contacted by [Aleman’s] counsel in January of
2023, and had never spoken with [Aleman].

iv. Bray testified that he would not be testifying as to
bad faith and had no basis to believe bad faith
occurred.

v. Bray did not inspect the [p]roperty, has not been
asked to prepare a report, and he did not review or
approve the [Expert] Designation prior to the date it
was filed.

c. Matt Morgan:

i. [Aleman’s] Expert Designation states that Morgan
is expected to opine to the following opinions:

A. He may be called to testify as an insurance
professional with regard to what a reasonable
and prudent insurance adjuster and/or
insurance company would have done in
processing the insurance claim subject to this
lawsuit.

B. He is expected to testify regarding his
investigation and [Standard’s] handling of
the claim and that [Standard] did not exercise
good faith while adjusting [Aleman’s] claim.

C. He is designated to testify that he would
testify as insurance professional and “legal
26
expert” with regard to what constitutes a
valid defense of fraud. More specifically, he
will testify that the [Standard] would be
incorrect in claiming fraud because there is a
lack of materiality and/or there is no material
evidence showing intent to deceive on behalf
of the insured. . . .

ii. This deposition was unnecessarily difficult to
schedule. [Aleman’s] counsel initially agreed to a
date, and the deposition was scheduled for January
10, 2023. Counsel apparently never informed
Morgan about the deposition and Standard was
forced to serve a Notice of Deposition and a
subpoena to compel Morgan to appear. After
Morgan was served, he contacted Standard’s
counsel, asking to be paid, and stated that
[Aleman’s] counsel had never contacted him.
Indeed, his first knowledge of this case was when
Standard’s counsel contacted him.

iii. Morgan’s deposition was rescheduled twice, first
from January 10, 2023 to February 15, 2023, and
then rescheduled again to February 21, 2023, and
his deposition was ultimately taken on February 21,
2023.

iv. Morgan did not inspect the [p]roperty and had not
spoken to the [Aleman] at the time of the deposition.
He did not contribute at all to the Expert
Designation attributable to him. Despite being
designated to testify to “[Standard’s] handling of
the claim and that [Standard] did not exercise good
faith while adjusting [Aleman’s] claim,” he was not
even given the claim file to review.

v. Contrary to [Aleman’s] claim that her [p]roperty
was damaged by hail, Morgan concluded the
damage was caused primarily by a wind event, and

27
he had no basis to conclude there was any other
cause.

d. Shiran Perera:

i. [Perera] was designated to testify “regarding the
causation, nature, existence of damage at the
insured property” and “an event (ie: hail, wind, fire,
pipe burst, freeze, water loss, etc) occurred at the
insured location during the policy period and said
event caused damaged [sic] to the insured
property.”

ii. Perera was first contacted by [Aleman’s] counsel a
few weeks before his January 11, 2023 [d]eposition.
He did not inspect the [p]roperty, nor speak with
anyone about the [p]roperty and the alleged
damage. Perera testified only to wind damage,
damage from a tree branch, and temperature
changes (freezing and thawing).

iii. He did not see evidence of hail damage to the roof,
including no hail damage to any of the metal vents.
He could only testify from photographs taken in
August 2021, even though the alleged hailstorm was
stated as occurring in October 2020.

iv. He cannot determine when any of the damage he
sees in the photograph occurred, other than to guess
at the “last couple of years,” and some of the
damage was even older.

6. . . . Dick and the Dick Law Firm . . . obstructed the discovery
process by failing to timely tender each designated witness for
deposition, forcing Standard to incur substantial expense in
issuing and serving subpoenas, forcing Standard to incur cost to
issue multiple deposition notices, and in having to depose each
witness to discover the falsity of the designations. In addition to
the findings discussed above in paragraph 5, [Aleman] and her
counsel designated Dexter McIntrye as an “Appraiser,” with a
28
nearly identical designation as Gadrow. There was no appraisal
in this case. [Aleman] never made McIntyre available for
deposition, forcing [Standard] to serve a Notice of Deposition
and subpoena to compel him to appear. McIntyre was served and
scheduled to appear for deposition on January 9, 2023. After
McIntyre was served, he personally contacted Standard’s
counsel, asking to be paid, and stated that [Aleman’s] counsel
had never contacted nor retained him to serve as an expert.
McIntyre’s deposition was then scheduled for March 2, 2023,
however [Aleman’s] counsel cancelled and informed [Standard]
that the deposition again needed to be rescheduled without
providing any reason or explanation. . . . McIntyre was never
presented for deposition.

7. [Aleman] and her counsel . . . Dick and the Dick Law
Firm . . . were provided the opportunity to respond to the Motion
for Recovery Fees and Costs, but failed to do so in any
meaningful or substantive way. In response to the Motion for
Recovery of Attorney’s Fees and Costs, neither [Aleman] nor
counsel responded with affidavit testimony or any evidence
establishing that either had investigated the facts supporting the
lawsuit, nor determined that the lawsuit was supported by any
legal authority. The [c]ourt finds that [Aleman] and her
counsel’s failure to present evidence supporting the claims made
in [Aleman’s] [p]etition and the failure to identify any
investigation or basis for any claim made in this proceeding when
the suit was filed is evidence that the lawsuit, from its inception,
was frivolous, groundless, and made solely for the purpose of
harassment.

8. [Standard] has suffered damages in the amount of $137,00.00 in
attorney’s fees as a result of the groundless and frivolous
pleadings and expert designations filed in this lawsuit
by . . . Aleman and her attorneys, . . . Dick and the Dick Law
Firm . . . .

(Emphasis omitted.)

29
Summary Judgment

In their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting

Standard summary judgment on Aleman’s claims against it because “more than a

scintilla of evidence exist[ed] raising genuine issues of material fact” and the trial

court erred in striking Aleman’s affidavit attached to her summary-judgment

response.

A party seeking summary judgment may combine in a single motion a request

for summary judgment under the no-evidence standard with a request for summary

judgment as a matter of law. Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 650–51 (Tex. 2004).

We review a trial court’s summary-judgment ruling de novo. Valence Operating

Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Provident Life & Accident Ins.

Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). In conducting our review, we take

as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we indulge every reasonable

inference and resolve any doubts in the non-movant’s favor. Valence Operating,

164 S.W.3d at 661; Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215. If a trial court grants summary

judgment without specifying the grounds for granting the motion, we must uphold

the trial court’s judgment if any of the asserted grounds are meritorious. Beverick v.

Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet.

denied).

30
A. Summary-Judgment Evidence

In a portion of appellants’ first issue, they assert that the trial court erred in

striking Aleman’s affidavit attached to her summary-judgment response.

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude summary-judgment

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Starwood Mgmt., LLC v. Swaim, 530 S.W.3d

673, 678 (Tex. 2017); Holland v. Mem’l Hermann Health Sys., 570 S.W.3d 887,

893–94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). A trial court abuses its

discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Carpenter

v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002). We will not

reverse a trial court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused

the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Interstate

Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001).

In the trial court, Aleman attached her affidavit to her response to Standard’s

summary-judgment motion.8 Standard then objected to and moved to strike

Aleman’s affidavit, asserting, among other things, that it contained inadmissible

8
Aleman also attached a copy of her policy with Standard and a copy of Gadrow’s
repair estimate, along with Gadrow’s accompanying affidavit. Standard moved to
strike Gadrow’s repair estimate and accompanying affidavit, which the trial court
granted. Appellants do not appear to challenge that ruling on appeal, but to the
extent that they do, for reasons discussed below, we hold that the complaint is
waived due to inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Trimcos, LLC v.
Compass Bank, 649 S.W.3d 907, 921 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet.
denied).

31
hearsay and inadmissible legal opinions and was nonsensical, confusing, conclusory,

vague, lacked a proper foundation, lacked personal knowledge, and was irrelevant.

The trial court sustained Standard’s objections to Aleman’s affidavit and struck it

from the summary-judgment record.

On appeal, appellants’ briefing contains only conclusory statements that “the

trial court abused its discretion in striking Aleman’s summary[-]judgment

evidence.” There is no substantive analysis or argument to support their assertion

that the trial court erred in sustaining Standard’s objections or in striking Aleman’s

affidavit. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Bolanos v. Purple Goat, LLC, 649

S.W.3d 753, 763 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“It was [appellant’s] burden

to challenge on appeal each basis for the trial court’s exclusion of evidence.”).

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that an appellant’s brief

“contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). A failure to

provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite appropriate authority supporting a

complaint waives the complaint on appeal. Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt,

373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Huey v. Huey, 200

S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex.

Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also In re Estate of Taylor, 305 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex.

32
App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (failure to provide substantive analysis of issue

presented results in waiver of complaint on appeal).

We hold that appellants waived, due to inadequate briefing, their complaint

about the trial court’s striking of Aleman’s affidavit. See, e.g., Shaw v. Trinity

Highway Prods., LLC, 329 S.W.3d 914, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)

(appellant’s failure to adequately brief complaint trial court erred in striking

summary-judgment evidence resulted in waiver of complaint on appeal); Torres v.

GSC Enters., Inc., 242 S.W.3d 553, 559 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)

(appellant waived complaint trial court erred in striking his summary-judgment

evidence where he did not provide argument or authority supporting his

contentions); see also Ramirez v. Gelman, No. 13-10-00618-CV, 2012 WL 987817,

at *4 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 22, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“We will only consider contentions that are supported by clear and concise

arguments . . . .”).

B. No-Evidence Summary Judgment

In a portion of their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in

granting Standard’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment because “more than

a scintilla of evidence supports the challenged elements of Aleman’s various causes

of action.”

33
To prevail on a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, the movant must

establish that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the

non-movant’s claim on which the non-movant would have the burden of proof at

trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148

S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 523–24 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to

present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements

challenged in the motion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.

2006); Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 524. A no-evidence summary-judgment may not be

granted if the non-movant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a

genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements in the motion. See Ford

Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). More than a scintilla of

evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and

fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.

Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). The trial

court must grant a no-evidence summary-judgment motion if the movant asserts that

there is no evidence of one or more specified elements of the non-movant’s claim

on which the non-movant would have the burden of proof at trial and the non-movant

fails to file a timely response or fails to produce summary-judgment evidence raising

a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

34
166a(i); Lockett v. HB Zachry Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

Here, Standard moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on Aleman’s

claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the DTPA,

and fraud, asserting that there was no evidence to support those claims. More

specifically, as to Aleman’s claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair

dealing, Standard asserted that to recover on such a claim, Aleman was required to

show that (1) there was an insurance contract between Aleman and Standard,

(2) Standard breached its duty when it (a) denied or delayed payment when liability

was reasonably clear, or (b) cancelled Aleman’s insurance policy without a

reasonable basis, and (3) Standard’s breach proximately caused Aleman’s damages.

But Aleman had no evidence that Standard had breached its duty by “denying or

delaying payment to [Aleman] when liability was reasonably clear.”

Further, as to Aleman’s claim for violations of the DTPA, Standard asserted

Aleman had no evidence that “Standard represented that any goods or services had

characteristics, benefits, or qualities which they did not have,” “Standard represented

that [Aleman’s] [p]olicy conferred rights and remedies which it did not have,”

“Standard failed to disclose information concerning [Aleman’s] [p]olicy which was

known at the time of purchase and such failure to disclose such information was

intended to induce [Aleman] into a transaction into which [Aleman] would not have

35
entered had the information been disclosed,” “Standard engaged in an

unconscionable course of conduct,” and “any act” allegedly committed by Standard

“proximate[ly] cause[d]” any of Aleman’s damages. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE

ANN. §§ 17.46(b), 17.50(a).

Finally, as to Aleman’s fraud claim, Standard asserted that to recover on her

claim, Aleman needed to establish: (1) that a material representation was made,

(2) the representation was false, (3) when the representation was made, Standard

knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a

positive assertion, (4) Standard made the representation with the intent that Aleman

should act upon it, (5) Aleman acted in reliance on the representation, and

(6) Aleman suffered injury. But Aleman had no evidence that Standard made false

statements, misrepresented material facts, “[]engaged in fraudulent acts for the

purpose of misleading [Aleman] as to the actual damages resulting from the

[purported] storm,” “had knowledge of any alleged false statements or made any

statement recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion,”

“made any misrepresentation with the intent that [Aleman] act upon it,” and

“operated in [a] reckless disregard for [Aleman] in the course of handling [her]

claim.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Additionally, there was no evidence that

Aleman “acted in reliance on any alleged misrepresentation [by] Standard or that she

suffered any injury as a result of any act of alleged fraud.”

36
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is like a pre-trial motion for

directed verdict. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Tex. 2021). In its

motion, the movant must state the elements of a claim as to which it believes there

is no evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Bolanos, 649 S.W.3d at 762; see also Roper

v. CitiMortg., Inc., No. 03-11-00887-CV, 2013 WL 6465637, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Austin Nov. 27, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A movant . . . who seeks a

no-evidence summary judgment against another party’s claim, must allege that there

is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the claim on which the adverse

party would have the burden of proof at trial.”). The burden then shifts “to the

nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting

each element contested in the [no-evidence] motion.” JLB Builders, L.L.C. v.

Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021).

Aleman attached to her response to Standard’s no-evidence

summary-judgment motion, her own affidavit, as well as a copy of Gadrow’s repair

estimate, and Gadrow’s accompanying affidavit. But the trial court struck such

evidence, and we have concluded that Aleman has either not challenged or waived

any error related to the trial court’s striking of her summary-judgment evidence. See,

e.g., McCollum v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 481 S.W.3d 352, 361–62 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). Because the only evidence Aleman produced in

response to Standard’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment was struck by the

37
trial court,9 there was no summary-judgment evidence for the trial court to consider,

and without any responsive evidence to consider, the trial court was required to grant

Standard’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i);

McCollum, 481 S.W.3d at 362 (holding trial court was required to grant no-evidence

motion for summary judgment because non-movant’s evidence was struck);

Blackard v. Fairview Farms Land Co., Ltd., 346 S.W.3d 861, 869 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“Once the trial court struck all of [appellant’s] summary

judgment evidence, she was left with no summary judgment evidence with which to

raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . .”); see also Hamilton v. Wilson, 249

S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (trial court must grant no-evidence summary-judgment

motion unless non-movant produces summary-judgment evidence raising genuine

issue of material fact); Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2006, pet. denied) (filing of no-evidence motion for summary judgment places

burden on non-movant to present summary-judgment evidence raising genuine fact

issue). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Standard’s

9
In reviewing whether summary judgment was properly granted, an appellate court
may not consider struck portions of the record because that evidence is not part of
the summary-judgment record. See McCollum v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co.,
481 S.W.3d 352, 361–62 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).

38
no-evidence motion for summary judgment as to Aleman’s claims for breach of the

duty of good faith and fair dealing,10 violations of the DTPA, and fraud.

We overrule this portion of appellants’ first issue.

C. Matter-of-Law Summary Judgment

In the remaining portion of their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court

erred in granting Standard’s matter-of-law summary-judgment motion because

“Aleman provided the [t]rial [c]ourt with more than a scintilla of evidence to

substantiate her claims that she suffered a loss within her policy period that [was]

covered by [her] policy and ha[d] not been paid.”11

10
We further note that in her summary-judgment response, Aleman did not respond
to Standard’s no-evidence argument related to Aleman’s claim for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and as such, the trial court was obligated to grant
the no-evidence summary-judgment motion as to that claim. See, e.g., Wohlstein v.
Aliezer, 321 S.W.3d 765, 772–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.);
see also Hernandez v. Vazquez, 656 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022,
no pet.) (where appellant did not respond to negligence per se portion of
no-evidence summary-judgment motion, he waived any error in trial court’s
granting of summary judgment on his negligence per se claim).
11
Standard moved for summary judgment as a matter of law on Aleman’s claims for
breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations
of the Texas Insurance Code. We have already held that the trial court did not err
in granting Standard’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion as to Aleman’s
claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, we need not
consider whether the trial court properly granted Standard’s matter-of-law
summary-judgment motion as to that claim on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1;
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). Instead, the
memorandum opinion will focus on the propriety of the trial court’s matter-of-law
summary-judgment ruling on Aleman’s claims for breach of contract and violations
of the Texas Insurance Code.

39
To prevail on a matter-of-law summary-judgment motion, the movant must

establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the trial court should grant

judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900

S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). When a defendant moves for a matter-of-law

summary judgment, it must either: (1) disprove at least one essential element of the

plaintiff’s cause of action, or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential

element of an affirmative defense, thereby defeating the plaintiff’s cause of action.

See Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341; Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197

(Tex. 1995). Once the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant

to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See Siegler,

899 S.W.2d at 197; Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Briggs Equip. Tr., 321 S.W.3d 685, 691

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The evidence raises a genuine

issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded fact finders could differ in their

conclusions in light of all of the summary-judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).

As to Aleman’s breach-of-contract claim, Standard, in its summary-judgment

motion, argued that Aleman could not recover on her claim as a matter of law

because Aleman was unable to show that the property had sustained damages

covered by her policy and, thus, could not establish that Standard had breached the

policy by refusing to pay her the “full” amount she was owed under her policy.

40
To recover on her breach-of-contract claim, Aleman was required to establish

the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid contract between her and

Standard, (2) she performed or tendered performance, (3) Standard breached the

contract, and (4) she was damaged as a result of the breach. Tex. Windstorm Ass’n

v. Dickinson Indep. Sch. Dist., 561 S.W.3d 263, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Moreover, to prevail on a claim for breach of an insurance

policy, Aleman had to establish that her claim was covered by her policy. Seger v.

Yorkshire Ins. Co., 503 S.W.3d 388, 400 (Tex. 2016); see also Powell v. USAA Cas.

Ins. Co., No. 01-19-00308-CV, 2021 WL 1414217, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Apr. 15, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“In the context of an insurance policy,

a plaintiff must prove the existence of a valid insurance policy covering the denied

claim and entitlement to money damages on that claim. The insured bears the initial

burden to establish coverage under the policy.” (internal citations omitted)). To

prove coverage, Aleman had to show that the damage to the property was covered

by the policy and that it was incurred at a time covered by the policy. See Seger,

503 S.W.3d at 400; see also Stagliano v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 633 Fed. Appx. 217,

219 (5th Cir. 2015).

41
Aleman’s policy with Standard for the property was effective from December

12, 2019 to December 12, 2020.12 The policy stated that it “insure[d] against

physical loss to the property” caused by a “[w]indstorm, [h]urricane and [h]ail.” In

her affidavit, Johnson, the assistant claims manager for Standard, testified that

Aleman, on February 9, 2021, notified Standard of a claim for hail and wind damage

which Aleman asserted had occurred on October 23, 2020.13 An inspection of the

property was done on February 11, 2021.

Strohl, in his declaration, explained that he inspected the property after

Aleman made her claim with Standard “for a loss caused by . . . hail and wind on

October 23, 2020.” When Strohl inspected the property on February 11, 2021, he

did not find “any damage caused by hail or wind to the roof or exterior of the

[p]roperty.” He also “found no evidence of wind damage to [Aleman’s] fence or

gazebo[,] and further found no evidence of any covered loss for the various damages

found on the interior of the home.” Although his inspection of the property “revealed

rotted decking on the roof’s right slope; missing shingles on the right and left front

gable; left-rear hip on [the] right slope; [and] missing shingles on a portion of the

ridge showing weathered exposed decking,” Strohl determined that the damage was

12
Aleman’s policy and the additional evidence discussed below were attached to
Standard’s summary-judgment motion.
13
In her petition, Aleman alleged that, on or about October 23, 2020, the property was
damaged “as a result of a wind and hail storm,” and she had submitted a claim to
Standard for the damage caused to the property on October 23, 2020.

42
“preexisting and not caused by a named peril under [Aleman’s] policy.” Further,

damage on the property’s downspouts and the fence post “were not caused by hail

or any covered event,” and Strohl noted that although he found “hail damage to some

window beading,” a hail report showed that “no hail occurred on or near the

[p]roperty during the [p]olicy period” of December 12, 2019 to December 12,

2020.14

Following Strohl’s inspection, Standard notified Aleman that her claim was

not covered by her policy because “none of the claimed damage was caused by a

peril insured against in the [p]olicy.” A letter sent by Standard to Aleman on

February 24, 2021, listed her claim number, the date of loss as October 23, 2020,

and the cause of loss as “[h]ail.” The letter stated:

As you are aware, this office received notice on February 9th 2021, for
hail damage to your roofing system on you [sic] home. . . .

Adjuster . . . Strohl’s inspection . . . with you on February 11th 2021,
revealed rotted decking on the roof’s right slope; missing shingles on
the right and left front gable; left-rear hip on [the] right slope; [and]
missing shingles on a portion of the ridge showing weathered exposed
decking. This damage is preexisting and not caused by a named peril
under your policy therefore, not covered.

14
The hail report showed that no “significant hail event” occurred at the property on
October 22, 2020 through October 24, 2020, and “[h]ail greater than 0.75[] [inches]
did not occur” at the property on October 23, 2020. Further, the last time there was
hail measuring 0.75 inches in diameter was on August 27, 2019, 423 days before
the reported date of loss. The estimated wind speed on those days was thirty-five
miles per hour.

43
Additionally, the inspection revealed hail damage to the window
beading. Your . . . policy [was] in effect as of December 12th 2019
through December 12th 2020, which constitutes the time for which
coverage will be afforded. We have received the hail event report
which concludes the hail which damaged your home occurred prior to
your policy inception. Therefore, there is no coverage for the hail
damage prior to your policy incept[ion] date.

The interior inspection revealed damage in the game room right below
the damaged ridge on the roof as well as in the hall bathroom ceiling.
This is a repeated event, therefore not covered under your policy.

During the inspection the adjuster noted damage to the downspouts and
the fence post on the right elevation was leaning and not damaged due
to any named peril under your policy. No coverage applies.

. . . There is no coverage for the damages as reported.

....

. . . [T]he purpose of this letter is to advise you that there is no coverage
for the deteriorated roofing system, interior damage to ceilings, fencing
and hail damage to window beading to your home.

Aleman testified in her deposition that she could not recall the weather event

that occurred on October 23, 2020 that caused her to file her claim with Standard.

She also could not recall what happened in February 2021—when she filed her

claim—that caused her to think she had a claim for damage to the property. Aleman

could not say whether a storm had occurred at the property around October 2020.

Instead, according to Aleman, at some point, “someone . . . stop[ped] by to

look at [the property] and there was some damage,” but she did not remember who

44
that “someone” was or what kind of damage he saw. She had not seen damage to

the property and did not know the cause of any damage to the property.

Aleman also noted that she had never had her roof repaired, and she did not

know when the damage to her roof had occurred, i.e., whether or not it was during

her policy period. Further, she did not know when shingles had gone missing from

the roof, and she did not remember any water entering the home. She also did not

know that “there were rugs being used to patch [the] roof.” She was not told by

anyone that hail or wind had caused the rotting wood outside the game room window

of the home, and she did not know what had caused any of the damage found by

Strohl when he inspected the property in February 2021. No one had ever told her

that the interior damage to the home was caused by hail or wind.

As to Aleman’s designated expert witnesses, Bray, who stated he was

available to answer “coverage questions,” testified in his deposition that he had

never spoken to Aleman and had not inspected the property. Bray “believe[d]” that

Aleman’s claim “was a wind or hail or maybe [a] wind and hail claim,” but he did

not get on the property’s roof and observe the damage personally. Although he had

viewed photographs of the property, he did not know when the damage to the

property’s roof had occurred, and he did not know if a weather event had occurred

in October 2020, as alleged by Aleman, or during Aleman’s policy period. To the

45
extent that there was damage to the interior of the home, he believed that the damage

was caused by water, but he did not know when that damage occurred.

Similarly, Gadrow, one of Aleman’s designated expert witnesses, testified

that he inspected the property in 2021, but he did not speak to Aleman. Gadrow

believed that the damage to the property had been caused by “the freeze,” but he did

not know when “the freeze” had occurred. He also admitted that he could not say

“exactly what [had] happened”; “the freeze” was just his “best guess.” He could not

determine what had caused certain damage to the property’s roof or when that

damage had occurred.

Gadrow also testified that he thought the damage to the ceiling and the wall

inside Aleman’s home was caused by ice damming on the roof, and other damage

inside the home “could be a leaking pipe” or it “could be a leak from the roof

dripping off of a rafter.” But there were “a number of different ways that [the

damage] c[ould] [have] happen[ed].” Gadrow did not have a conclusion as to what

had caused the damage inside the home, and he did not know when the damage

occurred. While investigating both the outside and inside damage to Aleman’s

home, he did not see any damage that was caused by hail.

Further, Morgan, another one of Aleman’s designated experts, testified at his

deposition that he had never been to the property, and he had never spoken to

Aleman. He reviewed certain photographs of the property from which he concluded

46
that damage to the roof had been caused by wind. But as to the timing of the damage,

he testified that he had only identified wind events that had occurred in September

and October 2021—a timeframe outside of Aleman’s policy coverage and after

October 23, 2020 the date Aleman had alleged that the damage had occurred.

Finally, Perera, a designated expert for Aleman, testified in his deposition that

he did not intend to testify as to whether the damage to the property was covered by

Aleman’s policy. He had not inspected the property, and he had never spoken to

Aleman. Perera viewed photographs of the property and believed that the damage

to the roof was caused by wind, not hail.15 However, the photographs that he viewed

were taken in August 2021, even though the damage to the property purportedly

occurred in October 2020. Perera did not know when the damage in the photographs

had occurred. As to the interior of the home, Perera stated that the photographs

showed water intrusion from a leak.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Standard’s uncontroverted

summary-judgment evidence16 established as a matter of law that Aleman could not

15
He also noted that some damage he saw was caused by a tree rubbing against the
roof, and some could have been caused by wind along with temperature changes.
16
As previously mentioned, the trial court struck the summary-judgment evidence
attached to Aleman’s summary-judgment response, including Aleman’s affidavit
which she relies on in her briefing. We may not consider the struck evidence in
determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to coverage
because that evidence was not part of the summary-judgment record. See McCollum
v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 481 S.W.3d 352, 361–62 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2015, no pet.). We also do not consider any evidence attached to Aleman’s motion
47
show that the damage to the property was covered by her policy or that the damage

was incurred at a time covered by the policy. See Seger, 503 S.W.3d at 400; see also

Stagliano, 633 Fed. Appx. at 219. As such Aleman is unable to maintain a

breach-of-contract claim against Standard, and we hold that the trial court did not

err in granting Standard summary judgment on Aleman’s breach-of-contract claim

against it.

Turning to Aleman’s claim for violations of the Texas Insurance Code, we

note that “[w]hen the issue of coverage [has been] resolved in [an] insurer’s favor,

extra-contractual claims[17] do not survive.” State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d

525, 532 (Tex. 2010). Further, generally, an insured cannot recover policy benefits

as statutory damages caused by an insurer’s statutory violation unless there has been

a finding that the insured had a right to receive those benefits under the insurance

policy. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 489, 494–95, 500

(Tex. 2018); Conlee v. ASI Lloyds, No. 01-23-00159-CV, 2024 WL 3503067, at *4

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because we

for new trial. See Eckhardt v. Nestra, No. 04-16-00394-CV, 2017 WL 1244442, at
*2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not considering
evidence filed with appellant’s new-trial motion in reviewing trial court’s
summary-judgment ruling); Rodriguez v. Spencer, 902 S.W.2d 37, 45 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
17
See Prime Time Fam. Ent. Ctr., Inc. v. AXIS Ins. Co., 630 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.) (noting claims for violations of chapters 541 and 542
of Texas Insurance Code constitute extra-contractual claims).

48
have held that Aleman is unable to show coverage for her claim related to the

property as a matter of law, and thus cannot establish a breach of contract, she is also

unable to maintain her extra-contractual claims for violations of the Texas Insurance

Code.18 See, e.g., Reyes v. S. Vanguard Ins. Co., No. 14-19-00728-CV, 2020 WL

6741942, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.); Prime Time Fam. Ent. Ctr., Inc. v. AXIS Ins. Co., 630 S.W.3d 226, 233 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.). Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court did

not err in granting Standard summary judgment on Aleman’s claim for violations of

the Texas Insurance Code.

We overrule this portion of Aleman’s first issue.

Attorney’s Fees

In their second issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in awarding

Standard attorney’s fees as sanctions because Aleman’s suit was not groundless or

brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment. In their third issue, appellants

argue that the trial court erred in awarding Standard attorney’s fees because the

evidence was insufficient to show that the fees were reasonable and necessary.

18
Aleman does not assert that the independent-injury exception applies to this case.
See State Farm Lloyds v. Fuentes, 597 S.W.3d 925, 938, 940 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

49
A. Sanctions

In its final judgment, the trial court granted Standard’s request for attorney’s

fees pursuant to Texas Insurance Code section 541.153, Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 13, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001, and Texas

Business and Commerce Code section 17.50(c).

A trial court is authorized to impose sanctions, including attorney’s fees,

against a party or the party’s attorney by rule, statute, or inherent authority. Powell

v. Grimes, No. 01-23-00129-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2025 WL 626428, at *10 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 27, 2025, no pet.); Sadeghian v. Webb, No.

2-03-367-CV, 2005 WL 737424, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2005, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (sanctions can include attorney’s fees); see, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P.

13; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 10.001–.006; Brewer v. Lennox Hearth

Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718 (Tex. 2020) (“Courts . . . possess inherent powers

that aid the exercise of their jurisdiction, facilitate the administration of justice, and

preserve the independence and integrity of the judicial system. A court’s inherent

authority includes the ‘power to discipline an attorney’s behavior.’” (internal

footnotes omitted)).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 states that the signature of a party or an

attorney constitutes a certificate that the pleading, motion, or other paper filed, to the

best of her knowledge, “is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and

50
brought for the purpose of harassment.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Under rule 13, a trial

court may impose a sanction when a pleading is filed that is groundless and brought

in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purposes of harassment. See id.;

Sakonchick v. Overlook at Rob Roy Owner, LLC, No. 03-23-00085-CV, 2025 WL

626590, at *16 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 27, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

“Groundless” means there is no basis in law or fact and the pleading is not warranted

by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing laws.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (internal quotations omitted).

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10 provides that the

signature of an attorney or a party on a pleading or motion constitutes a certificate

by her that, to the best of her knowledge, information, and belief formed after a

reasonable inquiry, the instrument is not being presented for an improper purpose,

is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, and there

is evidentiary support for each allegation or contention. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 10.001. Thus, there are two requirements under chapter 10: (1) the

claims made in a pleading must not be frivolous and (2) the pleading may not be

made for an improper purpose. Fontenot v. Little, No. 01-07-00328-CV, 2009 WL

144579, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 22, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).

“A court that determines that a person has signed a pleading or motion in violation

51
of [s]ection 10.001 may impose a sanction on the person, party represented by the

person, or both.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.004(a); see also

Fontenot, 2009 WL 144579, at *2 (trial court’s finding claims made in pleading were

frivolous or pleading made for improper purpose supported imposition of sanctions).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions for an abuse of

discretion. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004); Knoderer v. State

Farm Lloyds, 515 S.W.3d 21, 31 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied). We

will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if it “acted ‘without reference to any guiding

rules and principles,’ such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Am. Flood

Rsch., Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); see also Downer v.

Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985).

Appellants must attack all independent grounds that fully support an adverse

ruling. Fontenot, 2009 WL 144579, at *2; Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 95

S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Sheets v.

Autogrp. Premier, Inc., No. 14-18-00279-CV, 2020 WL 548366, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The rule that an appellant

must attack all independent grounds supporting an order or judgment has been

applied in many contexts, including judgments awarding monetary sanctions.”). If

appellants fail to do so, we must affirm the ruling. Fontenot, 2009 WL 144579, at

*2; Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681.

52
In their briefing, appellants only assert that the trial court erred in awarding

Standard attorney’s fees as sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. Rule

13 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10 are “independent

grounds on which the trial court based its ruling.” Fontenot, 2009 WL 144579, at

*2. Appellants do not raise a challenge under chapter 10 to the trial court’s

attorney’s fees award, which could, if meritorious, independently support the

award.19 Id.; see also In re Hansen, No. 05-06-00585-CV, 2007 WL 824587, at *1

(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 20, 2007, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (overruling

appellant’s assertion trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure 13 and 215.2(b) because appellant did not challenge

sanctions award under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 10).

Because appellants do not challenge all the grounds under which the attorney’s fees

award was imposed, we must uphold the award. Fontenot, 2009 WL 144579, at *2;

see also Sheets, 2020 WL 548366, at *2, *4. Accordingly, we hold that the trial

court did not err in awarding Standard attorney’s fees as sanctions.

We overrule appellants’ second issue.

19
Appellants do not refer to or cite Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter
10 in their briefing. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). They also make no
reference to Texas Insurance Code section 541.153 or Texas Business and
Commerce Code section 17.50(c)—which the trial court, in its final judgment, also
relied on to support its award of attorney’s fees to Standard. See generally id.

53
B. Reasonable and Necessary

In a portion of their third issue, appellants argue that the jury’s award of trial

court attorney’s fees was unreasonable and unnecessary as a matter of law because

Standard “failed to offer any testimony that th[e] [attorney’s fee] rates were

reasonable,” Daena Goldsmith Ramsey—Standard’s attorney—did not testify “that

the $136,941.50 in fees [she] incurred . . . were, in her expert opinion, reasonable or

necessary,” and Standard “failed to present any evidence required by” Arthur

Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).20 (Emphasis

omitted.)

Appellants further argue, as part of their third issue, that the jury’s award of

appellate attorney’s fees was supported by legally insufficient evidence because “[a]

party seeking to recover . . . appellate attorney’s fees must provide expert testimony

about the services [it] reasonably believes will be necessary to defend the appeal and

a reasonable hourly rate for those services.”21 Appellants also argue that the trial

20
A “matter of law point[]” is a legal-sufficiency challenge. See Raw Hide Oil & Gas,
Inc. v. Maxus Expl. Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, writ
denied) (internal quotations omitted). Appellants also assert, in their third issue,
that the jury’s award of trial court attorney’s fees was excessive. A challenge to
attorney’s fees as being excessive is a factual sufficiency challenge to the attorney’s
fees award. Tite Water Energy, LLC v. Wild Willy’s Welding LLC, No.
01-22-00158-CV, 2023 WL 5615816, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug.
31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Due to our disposition below, we need not
address appellants’ factual-sufficiency challenge to the award of trial court
attorney’s fees. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
21
In a single sentence in their opening brief, appellants mention that the “award of
appellate fees” was not supported by “factually sufficient evidence.” To the extent
54
court erred in awarding Standard appellate attorney’s fees because the award was

unconditional.

We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.

See Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 850 (Tex. 2018). We

may review the amount of attorney’s fees awarded for legal sufficiency. See Bocquet

v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998).

When appellants attack the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue

on which they did not have the burden of proof, they must demonstrate on appeal

that no evidence supports the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas

Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). We will sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge

if the record shows: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court

is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence

offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more

than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a

vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018); City of Keller v.

Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). In determining whether there is no

evidence to support a jury’s finding, all the record evidence must be considered in

the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered.

that appellants attempt to challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s award of appellate attorney’s fees, we hold that the issue is
waived due to inadequate briefing. See id. 38.1(i); Trimcos, 649 S.W.3d at 921.

55
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). As the

Texas Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he final test for legal sufficiency must always

be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to

reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. In conducting

our review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that the jurors, as

fact finders, “are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to

give their testimony,” and it is jurors’ role to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.

Id. at 819–20.

1. Trial Court Attorney’s Fees

In Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, the Supreme Court of

Texas clarified Texas law regarding the evidence a party must introduce to make a

legally sufficient showing as to trial court attorney’s fees. 578 S.W.3d 469, 486–

506 (Tex. 2019). In reaching its decision, the supreme court explained that Texas

generally applied what was known as the lodestar method, which incorporated the

well-known Arthur Andersen factors. Id. at 497–501 (explaining lodestar method of

calculating attorney’s fees incorporated into base calculation most considerations

previously set forth in Arthur Andersen and specifying lodestar method of

calculating attorney’s fees should be used whenever fees may be calculated by

multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable rates). Under the lodestar method, a

party seeking attorney’s fees had to first adduce sufficient evidence of the reasonable

56
hours worked by the attorneys and their reasonable hourly rates. Id. at 497–98, 501.

The multiplication of these figures—hours x rates—resulted in a base amount of

attorney’s fees that was presumptively reasonable. Id. at 498–99, 501.

But, according to the court, general, conclusory testimony lacking real

substance could not support a fee award. Id. at 501. So, for example, testimony

estimating the collective number of hours worked by attorneys, attributing these

hours to several general categories of tasks, and swearing these tasks were

reasonable and necessary was insufficient. See id. at 494–95. Likewise, testimony

that did no more than specify the number of hours worked by attorneys and their

respective billing rates accompanied by general representations that their time was

occupied with extensive discovery, several pretrial hearings, multiple

summary-judgment motions, and trial was insufficient. See id. at 495–96. In part,

such generalities were legally insufficient to support an attorney’s fee award because

they effectively amounted to the subjective say-so of attorneys, which could not be

meaningfully evaluated by a fact finder or reviewed by an appellate court. See id. at

496, 498 (characterizing lodestar method as “focused and objective analysis” of

reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees that was “readily administrable,”

limited discretion of trial courts and other fact finders, and allowed real judicial

review).

57
Thus, to be legally sufficient as to trial court attorney’s fees, the supreme court

concluded that testimony about the reasonable hours worked by attorneys and their

reasonable rates must, at a minimum, include evidence of:

(1) the particular services performed;

(2) who performed these services;

(3) approximately when they performed these services;

(4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform these services; and

(5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person who performed them.

Id. at 498, 502. Further, fees resulting from excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unneeded services should not be considered and should be excluded. Id. at 498–99.

Rates needed to reflect the legal market in the community as well as an attorney’s

experience, skill, and reputation. Id. at 499. If such evidence was introduced, then

the resulting lodestar calculation was presumptively the amount of reasonable and

necessary fees. Id.

The supreme court also explained that parties could rebut the presumption of

reasonableness and necessity with additional evidence, effectively adjusting the

lodestar calculation up or down based on relevant considerations. Id. at 500. But

because the lodestar calculation usually already accounted for most of the Arthur

Andersen considerations—including the time and labor necessary, novelty and

difficulty of questions at issue, skill needed to perform the legal services, fee

58
customarily charged for like services in the area, amount at stake, abilities of the

attorneys and their reputations, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, uncertainty of

collection before the work is done, and the results obtained—an enhancement or

reduction of the fee ordinarily could not be premised on such considerations. Id. at

500–01. Instead, an enhancement or reduction in the lodestar amount needed to be

based on specific evidence showing that a higher or lower amount of attorney’s fees

was necessary to effect an award of reasonable and necessary fees. Id. at 501–02.

As a result, an upward or downward adjustment was rarely warranted. See id. at 502

(agreeing presumption lodestar calculation resulted in reasonable and necessary

amount of attorney’s fees could only be overcome in “rare circumstances”).

In clarifying the standard for legal sufficiency as to trial court attorney’s fees,

the supreme court concluded that contemporaneous billing records were not

required. Id. Nonetheless, the court “strongly encouraged” their use as evidence,

reasoning that in all but the simplest cases, an attorney would likely have to refer to

these records or other documentation to provide legally sufficient testimony about

the reasonableness and necessity of her fees. Id. (emphasis omitted). Moreover,

billing records could provide additional information that allowed an attorney to

testify more succinctly. See id. at 502–03, 505 (indicating billing records would

allow opposing counsel to identify areas of dispute and thereby facilitate agreement

as to fees or at least narrow or focus disagreements about fees and observing that

59
attorneys “should not have to take the stand for days and testify to every detail of a

three-year-long case” to justify fees).

In Rohrmoos, the supreme court ultimately concluded the attorney’s

testimony, which was not accompanied by billing records, was too general to serve

as legally sufficient evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of the more than

$800,000 in trial court fees found by the jury and awarded by the trial court. Id. at

486, 505; see also Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 576 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. 2019)

(holding conclusory affidavits reciting only generalities did not satisfy standard

articulated in Rohrmoos and therefore were legally insufficient to support fees

imposed as sanctions); Patriot Contracting, LLC v. Shelter Prods., Inc., 650 S.W.3d

627, 657–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied) (reiterating

legal-sufficiency standard stated in Rohrmoos and restating that generalities as to

tasks performed were not enough and there must be evidence about time spent on

specific tasks).

In this case, as to trial court attorney’s fees, Ramsey testified before the jury

that she began practicing law in 1988 and a large part of her practice involved

representing insurance companies in suits like Aleman’s where claims had been filed

against the insurance companies. She was board certified in civil trial law and had

received the distinction of Super Lawyer. She owned her own law firm and had

handled cases in Harris County, Texas county courts for over thirty years.

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In the instant case, she represented Standard. Most of her cases with Standard

were litigated in Harris County courts. Her normal hourly rate was $450 to $550,

while an associate attorney’s normal hourly rate at her firm was $400 and a

paralegal’s normal hourly rate was $225. She charged Standard a discounted rate of

$300 an hour for attorneys’ work and $175 for paralegals’ work on this case. She

also did not charge Standard for all work performed in the case.

Ramsey stated that her work in the case began with reviewing the petition and

Aleman’s policy with Standard and “figuring out what [Standard was] being sued

for.” Ramsey drafted and filed special exceptions in the case because she “could not

tell from the petition” the reason for Aleman’s suit. Ramsey also filed a

counterclaim on behalf of Standard for attorney’s fees.22 During the course of the

suit, Ramsey had to deal with noncompliant disclosures from Aleman, which

required multiple emails with Aleman’s attorneys and the filing of a motion in the

trial court. Additionally, related to discovery, Aleman was not responsive, which

required Ramsey to spend time contacting Aleman’s attorneys and filing a motion

to compel.23 Ramsey also needed orders from the trial court to get Aleman to answer

Standard’s discovery requests.

22
Ramsey filed two motions requesting attorney’s fees.
23
Ramsey noted that she filed five motions to compel in the trial court.

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Further, because Aleman had designated multiple expert witnesses in her

petition, Ramsey had to take the depositions of six to seven of those designated

expert witnesses. Ramsey had to subpoena the expert witnesses because Aleman

would not produce them for depositions. After the expert witnesses received their

subpoenas, they called Ramsey because they did not know about Aleman’s case and

had never been retained by Aleman—despite Aleman having designated them as her

expert witnesses. According to Ramsey, it cost $400 to subpoena the witnesses and

multiple emails were required to schedule the depositions. Aleman cancelled some

of scheduled depositions at the last minute. It took five or six months to get the

expert witnesses deposed. To prepare for the depositions, attorneys at Ramsey’s law

firm had to review the claim file and determine what needed to be asked of the

witnesses. Ultimately, Ramsey determined that what Aleman had disclosed her

expert witnesses would testify about was false. It cost $7,000 to take the depositions

of Aleman’s purported expert witnesses, which included the cost for paying court

reporters and the cancellation fees.

Ramsey also testified that she filed a motion for summary judgment on

Standard’s behalf in the case, which typically would take her anywhere from three

to 100 hours of work to prepare because of the difficulty involved. She believed that

she spent at least thirty hours working on the summary-judgment motion. A hearing

on the summary-judgment motion was held, which Ramsey attended. After the

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summary-judgment motion was granted, Aleman filed a motion for findings of fact

and conclusions of law, which Ramsey had to respond to. Ramsey also responded

to Aleman’s new-trial motion and attended a hearing on the motion. And Ramsey

responded to a “motion to late file, designate an expert” and attended a hearing on

that matter. Finally, because Aleman requested a jury trial on attorney’s fees,

Ramsey prepared a jury charge on behalf of Standard, filed pretrial motions and

exhibits, and “work[ed] with witnesses.” Cf. Intertek USA, Inc. v. Trical Com. Invs.,

LLC, No. 14-23-00475-CV, 2025 WL 1232342, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Apr. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (lead attorney’s testimony identifying

“several broad categories of work performed—depositions, sorting through

discovery, filing motions, serving subpoenas, preparing for trial—either by him,

someone else at his firm, or by [client’s] prior counsel” was legally insufficient to

support attorney’s fees award); Eason v. Deering Constr., Inc., No.

02-19-00310-CV, 2020 WL 7062687, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2020,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (“While [party’s] counsel testified to the aggregate amount of

fees and the general tasks carried out by himself and his two associates, this sort of

evidence has been held to be insufficient.”).

During her testimony, Ramsey described Aleman’s suit as a difficult case that

required “great skill,” and she noted that it was time consuming. Ramsey declined

work from several other clients because of her work on this case, but also because

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of her work for other clients. According to Ramsey, the total amount of attorney’s

fees that Standard incurred in the case through the trial was $136,941.50.

In addition to Ramsey’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence,

among other things, a copy of its docket sheet, Ramsey’s resume, a summary of

Standard’s attorney’s fees and costs, which stated a total of $129,707.63, invoices

sent to Standard for payment of attorney’s fees and costs, which totaled $131,252.63,

and a summary of Standard’s deposition expenses, which stated a total of $7,134.25.

The invoices provided descriptions of the work completed by Ramsey, a

partner, as well as other attorneys, paralegals, and administrative staff employed by

her law firm. They also included information about hourly rates and when particular

services were performed. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502, 505 (stating legally

sufficient evidence of attorney’s fees includes evidence of particular services

performed, when they were performed, who performed such services, and

reasonable hourly rate for person performing services, along with some details

regarding work performed). Although some associate attorneys are listed by name

in the invoices, certain paralegals are not identified by name, and neither are

administrative staff nor legal assistants whose work on the case was charged to

Standard. Further, based on billing rates, it appears that other partner-level attorneys

may have worked on Aleman’s suit, but that is not entirely clear from the invoices.

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The jury awarded Standard $137,000 in attorney’s fees for “representation in

the trial court.” Although Ramsey testified as to her experience and reputation and

her resume was admitted into evidence, there was no evidence admitted regarding

the skill, experience, or reputation of any other attorney, paralegal, or legal assistant

for whom fees were sought.24 This is necessary to show that the fees sought for these

individuals were reasonable. See Westheimer v. Ziemer, 702 S.W.3d 621, 633–34

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (holding evidence of attorney’s fees

was legally insufficient where there was “no evidence regarding the skill,

experience, or reputation of any attorney for who fees [were] sought other than [the

testifying attorney]” and “no information about the qualifications of the legal

assistants who worked on the case”); Walsh v. Gonzalez, No. 01-21-00729-CV, 2023

WL 4110851, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“[T]o recover paralegal fees, the evidence must show: (1) the paralegal’s

qualifications to perform substantive legal work, (2) that the paralegal performed

substantive legal work under an attorney’s direction and supervision, (3) the nature

of the legal work performed, (4) the paralegal’s hourly rate, and (5) the number of

hours the paralegal expended.”).

The attorney’s fees evidence admitted in this case is similar to evidence in

other cases we have considered in the past. See, e.g., Westheimer, 702 S.W.3d at

24
The invoices admitted into evidence do not supply this information.

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633–34; Calleja-Ahedo v. Compass Bank, No. 01-15-00210-CV, 2020 WL 3820420,

at *3, *6–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). For

example, in Calleja-Ahedo, the appellee, Compass Bank, was awarded attorney’s

fees in the trial court. 2020 WL 3820420, at *5. On appeal, the appellant argued

that the trial court erred in awarding Compass Bank its fees because the evidence

was legally insufficient to prove that the awarded trial court fees were reasonable

and necessary. Id. at *6, *10–13. This Court noted that, in the trial court, one of

Compass Bank’s attorneys submitted affidavit testimony and billing records or

invoices to support Compass Bank’s request for fees. See id. at *10–12. Although

the evidence of attorney’s fees admitted included invoices describing the tasks

performed by members of the law firm, the date the tasks were performed, the

individuals performing the tasks, the number of hours billed for each task, and the

amount billed for each task, we explained that the invoices “reflected that work was

performed, throughout the case, by . . . individuals” other than just the testifying

attorney. Id. at *12. The invoices identified those individuals by names and stated

the amount of hours that they worked as well as their hourly rates, but the record

contained “no evidence . . . concerning the qualifications of th[e] individuals or

whether the legal assistants and paralegals performed substantive legal work under

[the testifying attorney’s] direction.” Id.; cf. State Farm Lloyds v. Hanson, 500

S.W.3d 84, 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (upholding fee

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award and noting evidence included testimony concerning experience and

qualifications not just of lead attorney, but also his two associate attorneys and

additional lawyer who assisted on case); River Oaks L-M, Inc. v. Vinton-Duarte, 469

S.W.3d 213, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding sufficient

evidence supported fee award and noting attorney “expressly described the

qualifications of his legal assistant, that she performed substantive legal work under

his direction and supervision, and the nature of the legal work she performed”). As

such, we concluded that the evidence admitted in the trial court did not establish

“that the amounts charged by th[e] [other] individuals [who worked on the case

were] reasonable and necessary.” Calleja-Ahedo, 2020 WL 3820420, at *12. And

we held that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s

attorney’s fees award in favor of Compass Bank. Id. Accordingly, we reversed the

trial court’s judgment as to trial court attorney’s fees awarded to Compass Bank and

remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on attorney’s fees. Id. at

*13.

We are presented with the same scenario regarding the attorney’s fees

evidence, or lack thereof, as we were in Calleja-Ahedo. Thus, as we did in that case,

we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s award

of trial court attorney’s fees to Standard. See id. at *12; see also Westheimer, 702

S.W.3d at 633–34; Trujillo v. Shafaii Invs., Ltd., No. 01-22-00819-CV, 2024 WL

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2001612, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 7, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“We may not uphold a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees unless the record

contains sufficient evidence to support the award. The party seeking attorney’s fees

bears the burden of proof to support the trial court’s award. If the evidence

supporting the award is insufficient, we must reverse.” (internal quotations and

citations omitted)). We hold that the trial court erred in awarding Standard $137,000

in trial court attorney’s fees.

We sustain this portion of appellants’ third issue.

2. Appellate Attorney’s Fees

As to appellate attorney’s fees, Ramsey testified:

. . . [I]f there’s an appeal, that’s a whole other process. [$]7,000 for an
appeal. That’s the easy part. The rest of the part is getting the record
and filing briefs. Then there’s oral argument. Then there’s the Texas
Supreme Court which is a three-stage process that you may or may not
get to the full court. So we started with a representation to the Court of
Appeals. Because a lot of this has already been briefed, it would be
$25,000. If the Texas Supreme Court accepts what’s called a petition
for review, again, it’s $10,000. If the court at that stage wants some
briefing to see whether it still wants to take the case, that is another
[$]10,000. If the Texas Supreme Court does take the case, I am
anticipating it would be about [$]15,000 to fully brief, make oral
argument at the Texas Supreme Court. I don’t think that will happen,
but these are just anticipating if the appeal is filed, these are the kind of
fees that we would incur.

Following Ramsey’s testimony, the jury awarded Standard $16,250 “[f]or

representation in the court of appeals,” $10,000 “[f]or representation at the petition

for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas,” $10,000 “[f]or representation at

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the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas,” and $12,000 “[f]or

representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the

Supreme Court of Texas.” The trial court, in its final judgment, awarded Standard

appellate attorney’s fees in accordance with the jury’s findings, but did not condition

the award upon Standard’s success on appeal. Appellants first complain about the

trial court’s unconditional appellate attorney’s fees award.25

A trial court may not penalize a party for taking a successful appeal. Hoefker

v. Elgohary, 248 S.W.3d 326, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.);

Sipco Servs. Marine, Inc. v. Wyatt Field Serv., 857 S.W.2d 602, 607–08 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). Thus, an award of appellate attorney’s

fees must be conditioned upon the appellants’ unsuccessful appeal. Sipco Servs.

Marine, 857 S.W.2d at 607–08; Keith v. Keith, 221 S.W.3d 156, 171 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Simply put, an unconditional award of appellate

25
Standard asserts that appellants waived their complaint about the trial court’s failure
to award appellate attorney’s fees conditioned on Standard’s success on appeal, we
disagree. See, e.g., Branfman v. Alkek, No. 13-18-00554-CV, 2020 WL 2776719,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding appellant did not waive his objection to unconditional appellate attorney’s
fees award); see also Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 156 (Tex. 2015) (“An
award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees to a party is essentially an award of
fees that have not yet been incurred and that the party is not entitled to recover unless
and until the appeal is resolved in that party’s favor. [Thus,] . . . because an award
of appellate attorney’s fees depends on the outcome of the appeal, it is not a final
award until the appeal is concluded and the appellate court issues its final
judgment.” (internal quotations omitted)).

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attorney’s fees is improper. Sagredo v. Bell, 689 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi—Edinburg 2024, no pet.); see also Tite Water Energy, LLC v. Wild

Willy’s Welding LLC, No. 01-22-00158-CV, 2023 WL 5615816, at *12 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Trial courts do

not have discretion to award appellate attorney’s fees that are not conditioned on the

[appellant’s] failure to obtain relief [on appeal].” (internal quotations omitted)).

Generally, the proper remedy for an unconditional award of appellate

attorney’s fees is to modify the trial court’s judgment and make the award contingent

upon the receiving party’s success on appeal. Hoefker, 248 S.W.3d at 332–33; Keith,

221 S.W.3d at 171. Here, however, appellants also assert that the evidence was

legally insufficient to support the jury’s award of appellate attorney’s fees. We

agree.

To prove a conditional award of appellate attorney’s fees, a party must make

a request for such fees and it “must also . . . provide[] opinion testimony about the

services [it] reasonably believe[s] will be necessary to defend [an] appeal and a

reasonable hourly rate for those services.” Fiamma Statler, LP v. Challis, No.

02-18-00374-CV, 2020 WL 6334470, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2020,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal quotations omitted); see also Yowell v. Granite

Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. 2020); MRT of Kemp TX-SNF, LLC v.

Lloyd Douglas Enters., LC, 698 S.W.3d 607, 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.)

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(“[A] party seeking to recover conditional appellate fees . . . [must] provide opinion

testimony about the services it reasonably believes will be necessary to defend [an]

appeal and a reasonable hourly rate for those services.”). Ramsey’s testimony

concerning appellate attorney’s fees merely constituted a request for such fees and

did not serve as evidence of their reasonableness and necessity. See Fiamma, 2020

WL 6334470, at *19. Because Ramsey’s testimony did not identify the services that

she reasonably believed would be necessary to defend an appeal and did not identify

a reasonable hourly rate for the performance of any of such services, we conclude

that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s award of appellate

attorney’s fees to Standard. See, e.g., MRT of Kemp, 698 S.W.3d at 620–24. Based

on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in awarding Standard appellate

attorney’s fees.

We sustain this portion of appellants’ third issue.26

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s judgment as to its award of attorney’s fees to

Standard and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial limited to the

determination of reasonable and necessary trial court and conditional appellate

attorney’s fees to be awarded to Standard. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 506

26
Due to our holdings as to appellants’ third issue, we need not address any of
appellants’ remaining arguments related to that issue. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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(reversing award of attorney’s fees because evidence was legally insufficient and

remanding to trial court solely for redetermination of attorney’s fees); Westheimer,

702 S.W.3d at 636; see also City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736–37

(Tex. 2013) (remanding for recalculation of attorney’s fees when evidence of work

performed existed but was insufficient to support the amount awarded in judgment).

We affirm the remaining portions of the trial court’s judgment.

Kristin Guiney
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.

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