Keith Blum v. Kevin Sommer

Opinion issued August 21, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00868-CV
———————————
KEITH BLUM, Appellant
V.
KEVIN SOMMER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 269th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-83850

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Keith Blum, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the

trial court’s October 22, 2024 order granting the motion for summary judgment of

appellee, Kevin Sommer.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
This Court generally has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments

and specific interlocutory orders that the Texas Legislature has designated as

appealable. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see

also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014. The trial court’s October 22,

2024 order granting summary judgment expressly states that it is a “partial summary

judgment dispos[ing] of all pending motions,” but that it “is interlocutory and not

appealable.” Further, in his notice of appeal, appellant noted that the order appealed

is a “partial judgment.”

An interlocutory order granting a motion for summary judgment of some, but

not all, claims and parties in a lawsuit has not been specifically designated as an

appealable interlocutory order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014;

see also Gaitan v. Ventura, No. 01-22-00598-CV, 2022 WL 16556820, at *1–2 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal of

partial-summary-judgment order where “order [did] not claim to be anything other

than a partial-summary-judgment order resolving only” some claims against some

parties). Accordingly, we can exercise jurisdiction only if the trial court’s October

22, 2025 order constitutes a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39

S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it

either (1) actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless

of its language, or (2) states with “unmistakable clarity” that it is intended as a final

2
judgment as to all claims and all parties. See Farm Bureau Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015).

On April 1, 2025, the Court notified appellant that that we may lack

jurisdiction over the appeal and told appellant that, unless a response was provided,

in writing, demonstrating that this Court had jurisdiction over the appeal, the Court

would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a),

43.2(f). Appellant has not responded to the Court’s April 1, 2025 order or

established our jurisdiction over the appeal. Where, as here, the trial court has

expressly stated in its order that the order is “interlocutory and not appealable,” we

conclude that the trial court’s October 22, 2024 order is not “final” for the purposes

of appeal.

Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). All pending

motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.

1
“[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” Heckman
v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (jurisdiction fundamental in nature and
cannot be ignored). If this case is an appeal over which we have no jurisdiction, the
appeal must be dismissed. See V.I.P. Royal Palace, LLC v. Hobby Event Ctr. LLC,
No. 01-18-00621-CV, 2020 WL 3579563, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d at 763.

3