Regina Meeks v. Gillman of Fort Bend, Inc. D/B/A Gillman Honda

Opinion issued August 14, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00283-CV
———————————
REGINA MEEKS, Appellant
V.
GILLMAN OF FORT BEND, INC. D/B/A GILLMAN HONDA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 295th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-68814

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Regina Meeks appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of Gillman of Fort Bend, Inc. d/b/a Gillman Honda. Because the

challenged order is not a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for want

of jurisdiction.
Background

While visiting Houston from her home state of Arkansas, Meeks purchased a

car from Gillman. Meeks made a partial down payment and signed a retail

installment sales contract for the remainder of the car’s purchase price. The contract

stated that Ally Bank was the lender. According to Meeks, she contacted Ally Bank

to set up payments, but they were unable to locate her account. When Meeks was

later contacted by a different lender, Mechanics Bank, she discovered that Gillman

had allegedly forged her signature on a different contract.

Meeks sued Gillman for fraud, forgery, negligent hiring, training, and

supervision, gross negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and violations of the

Texas Finance Code. She also pled for a “Declaratory Action”— requesting the trial

court to “declare that the contract is void due to forgery.”

Gillman moved for a no-evidence and traditional summary judgment on

Meeks’s “causes of action for fraud, forgery, negligent hiring, negligent training,

negligent supervision, grossly negligent hiring, grossly negligent training, grossly

negligent supervision, and violations of the Texas Finance Code.” Gillman did not

move for summary judgment on Meeks’s request for declaratory relief.

The trial court granted Gillman’s motion for summary judgment in a written

“Order” which states as follows:

2
ORDER

On this day the court heard the motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Gillman of Fort Bend, Inc. d/b/a Gillman Honda.
The court finds that the motion is meritorious and should be
GRANTED. Accordingly,

It is ORDERED that Defendant Gillman of Fort Bend, Inc. d/b/a
Gillman Honda’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and
that Plaintiff Regina Meeks shall have and recover nothing of or from
Defendant Gillman of Fort Bend, Inc. d/b/a Gillman Honda by way of
this cause of action.

Meeks complains on appeal that the trial court erred in granting Gillman’s

motion for summary judgment. But, first, we must determine whether the trial

court’s order is a final, appealable judgment.1

Jurisdiction

Excluding certain statutory exceptions that do not apply here, this Court’s

appellate jurisdiction is limited to the review of final judgments that dispose of all

parties and claims. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001);

see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (listing appealable interlocutory

orders). When, as here, there has been no trial on the merits, an order or judgment

is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim

1
We must address this at the outset because it affects our jurisdiction—even though
neither party challenges the finality of the trial court’s order. “[W]e are obligated
to review sua sponte issues affecting jurisdiction,” and we may raise jurisdictional
issues for the first time on appeal. M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673
(Tex. 2004); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46
(Tex. 1993).
3
and party or clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and

parties. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205.

Ordinarily, a reviewing court confronting an order that contains a finality

phrase should not look at the record but, rather, should take the order at face value.

In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018). But if an order’s finality is not

“clear and unequivocal”—then the reviewing court must examine the record to

determine whether the trial court intended the order to be final. In re R.R.K., 590

S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2019) (citing In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827).

“[T]he language of an order or judgment can make it final, even though it

should have been interlocutory, if that language expressly disposes of all claims and

all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200. If the intent to finally dispose of the case

is clear, “then the order is final and appealable, even though the record does not

provide an adequate basis for rendition of judgment.” Id. “Granting more relief than

the movant is entitled to makes the order reversible, but not interlocutory.” Id. at

204.

Here, the face of the order is unclear as to whether the trial court intended to

dispose of all of Meeks’s claims against Gillman. The order is entitled only “Order,”

and it does not contain any finality language indicating that it “is final, disposes of

all claims and all parties, and is appealable.” See, e.g., In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d

at 825, 829 (holding that order containing this finality language was clear and

4
unequivocal).2 Instead, the order states that Meeks shall “recover nothing” from

Gillman “by way of this cause of action.” The order’s use of the phrase “cause of

action,” singular, and as opposed to suit or case, “suggests that summary judgment

was not granted on all [of Meeks’s] causes of action, plural.” See Cont’l Airlines,

Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. 1996).3

Because the order’s finality is not “clear and unequivocal,” we must examine

the record to determine whether the trial court intended the order to be final. In re

R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 540. Here, the record shows that Gillman’s motion for

summary judgment only addressed Meeks’s causes of action for fraud, forgery,

negligence, gross negligence, and violations of the Texas Finance Code—for which

it sought recovery of damages. It made no mention of Meeks’s declaratory judgment

action. And Meeks did not reference the pending declaratory action in her summary

judgment response, nor did Gillman in its reply.

Accordingly, in light of the record and the lack of any indication to the

contrary in the language of the order, we conclude that, by granting Gillman’s

2
See also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) (“Language
that the plaintiff take nothing by his claims in the case, or that the case is dismissed,
shows finality if there are no other claims by other parties.” (emphasis added)).
3
Cf. In re Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. Auxiliary, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Because there are no other claims by other
parties, language that Sparks take nothing by her suit against HCHDA and that her
cause of action is dismissed shows finality.” (emphasis added)).
5
motion for summary judgment and stating that Meeks “recover nothing . . . by way

of this cause of action,” the trial court intended to dismiss only those causes of action

on which Meeks sought recovery of damages and which were actually addressed in

Gillman’s summary judgment motion. (Emphasis added); see Boyd v. West, No. 01-

00-00230-CV, 2002 WL 285513, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28,

2002, no pet.) (holding that “order” stating plaintiff’s singular “cause of action”

against defendants was dismissed with prejudice was not final, appealable order

because defendant’s plea to jurisdiction pertained only to plaintiff’s claims under

TTCA, and not to other claims alleged in petition).4

We therefore hold that the trial court’s order granting Gillman’s motion for

summary judgment did not dispose of all of Meeks’s claims and is thus interlocutory.

Because no statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal applies here, we further hold

that our Court has no jurisdiction over Meeks’s appeal.5 See id.

4
Cf. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. 1996) (noting that
order stating that plaintiffs’ “cause of action is dismissed as being preempted”
indicated summary judgment may not have been granted on newly added causes of
action not addressed by motion, but ultimately holding that trial court “intended to
render a final, appealable judgment” because order was entitled “final summary
judgment” and plaintiffs directed trial court to new causes of action in their
summary judgment response and in motion for new trial).
5
On July 29, 2025, the Clerk of the Court notified Meeks that this appeal was subject
to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless she timely responded and showed how
this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Meeks timely filed a response in which
she concedes that the trial court’s order granting Gillman’s motion for summary
judgment was not final and appealable and that “this Court currently lacks
jurisdiction.”
6
Conclusion

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We dismiss any pending

motions as moot.

Terry Adams
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.

7